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A Critical Systems Explanation for the Racial Effect of US and UK Counter-terror 
Stop, Search and Surveillance Powers  
 
Introduction 
 
0.1 Research Background 
 
Counter-terrorism police powers are a widely utilised means of using criminal law to 
respond to the threat and commission of terrorist attacks.  However, there remains a 
considerable on-going debate regarding the form that these powers should take and, in 
particular, the balance that should be struck within these powers between safeguarding the 
population from terrorist attack and maintaining individual rights and freedoms.
1
  It is the 
way that this balance has been struck in US and UK counter-terrorism police powers, 
used since the terrorist attacks on the US on the 11 September 2001 (‘9/11’), that is the 
focus of this thesis.  More specifically, this thesis explores the negative impact that 
facially neutral national security measures have had on the individual right to equal 
treatment irrespective of race or ethnic background, without them representing an 
effective means of safeguarding either country against terrorist attack.   
 
0.2 Aims and Objectives 
 
There are two foundational premises on which this thesis is based.  The first is the racial 
effect of the suspicion-less counter-terrorism stop, search and surveillance powers used in 
the US and UK in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.   There is widespread 
empirical evidence demonstrating the racially uneven impact of these policing powers, 
alongside a trend of increasing condemnation of their ineffective and counter-productive 
nature, starting almost as soon as the powers were enacted or used.
2
  Whilst such claims 
regarding police stop, search and surveillance powers are not unopposed,
3
 this thesis uses 
the available data as a factual background from which to consider the factors behind the 
                                               
1
 See, e.g., United Nations, Handbook on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism (Criminal Justice 
Handbook Series, 2006); J. Strawson, Law after Ground Zero (Glasshouse, 2002); C. Walker, ‘Terrorism 
and Criminal Justice’ [2004] CLR 311; and ‘Keeping Control of Terrorists without losing control of 
constitutionalism’ (2007) 59 Stanford Law Review 1395. 
2 B. Bowling and C. Phillip, ‘Disproportionate and Discriminatory: Reviewing the Evidence on Police Stop 
and Search’ (2007) 70(6) MLR 936. 
3 See, e.g., P.A.J. Waddington, K. Stenson, D. Don, ‘In Proportion: Race and Police Stop and Search’ (2004) 
44 British Journal of Criminology 889. 
  
8 
deleterious impact of the counter-terrorism powers.  The main sources of data include 
statistics recording the use of the powers across different ethnic groups gathered by 
governmental and non-governmental organisation, individual reports of racially-biased 
police deployment of the counter-terrorism powers, and the findings of independent 
reviews of the use and impact of the powers.  A second starting point for this thesis is the 
persistence of the threat of terrorist attack faced by both the US and UK.  Whilst it is 
recognised that the exact level and imminence of the threat of terrorist attack may at times 
have been exaggerated,
4
 this thesis asserts that both countries have faced a real prospect 
of attack over the period of time with which this thesis is concerned, namely from 1999 
when the UK’s s.44 powers were debated in Parliament to the present, not least 
demonstrated by the commission of the 9/11 attacks in the US and the attacks in London 
on 7
th
 July 2005 (‘7/7’), as well as the attempted attacks on the city on the 21st July in the 
same year.
5
   
 
Intelligence regarding terrorist activity in both the US and UK undoubtedly gives 
credence to the seriousness of the national security threat arising from international 
terrorism and, in particular, Islamic terrorists.
6
  Muslims within both the US and UK are 
disproportionately individuals of Asian or Arabic origins.
7
  These characteristics, relating 
to the level and origins of the terrorist threat, suggest that it is prima facie common sense 
for police counter-terrorism efforts to focus disproportionately on individuals from 
particular minority ethnic and racial backgrounds.
8
  This thesis questions whether, instead 
of constituting an appropriate and effective means of countering the threat to the national 
security posed by terrorists, targeting of specific groups with counter-terrorism measures 
effectively provided a popular ‘permission to hate’ individuals connected with these 
                                               
4  F.P. Harvey, The Homeland Security Dilemma: Fear, Failure and the Future of American Security 
(Routledge, 2002); and R.A. Posner, Countering Terrorism: Blurred Focus, Halting Steps (Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2007). 
5 See Intelligence and Security Committee, Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, Cm 
6785 (HMSO, May 2006); and National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 
Commission Report (Government Printing Office, 2004). 
6
 G. Mythen, S. Walklate and F. Khan, ‘’I’m a Muslim, but I’m not a terrorist’: Victimisation, risky identities 
and the performance of safety’ (2009) British Journal of Criminology 736. 
7  T. Smith, ‘The Polls – Review: The Muslim Population of the United States: The Methodology of 
Estimates’ (2002) 66 Public Opinion Quarterly 404. 
8  Home Affairs Committee, Terrorism and Community Relations, HC165-II, Written Evidence, 
Memorandum submitted by the Police Federation of England and Wales, Ev.85, para 3.2; and Home Affairs 
Committee, Terrorism and Community Relations, HC165-III, Written and Oral Evidence (6 April 2005), 
Oral Evidence taken before the Home Affairs Committee (1 March 2005), Hazel Blears, Ev.97. 
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groups,
9
 so that the mode of counter-terrorism policing appeared to be reasonable and 
effective despite the small proportions involved when viewed in the context of national 
Muslims populations in both the US and UK.
10
  In this way, the counter-terrorism powers 
not only appear to have been an ineffective weapon against terrorism but may have also 
helped to increase levels of minority community distrust in the police as well as cutting 
off potentially valuable sources of community information.
11
    
 
This thesis looks at the often-subtle process by which apparently race neutral legislative 
provisions are created, used and renewed in a way, which means that through both 
omissions and commissions, they have a demonstrable racial effect.
12
  The overt nature of 
consciously prejudicial behaviours makes them more readily identifiable than 
unconsciously biased behaviour, and consequently more able to be separated from 
mainstream operations of the legal system, which purport to deploy provisions in a 
racially neutral manner.
13
  Rather than seeing racism as a consequence of isolated 
individual prejudice, therefore, this thesis treats discrimination as an endemic 
phenomenon, arising from, and expressed through, institutional discourses and 
practices.
14
  In particular, this thesis explores the way in which law, and the institutions 
responsible for enacting, implementing and reviewing it, can respond to and engage with 
its environment while maintaining its separateness and governing all of its operations 
according to self-referential rules and communications.  This characteristic, and its impact 
upon the interplay between the legal machinery of the state and social and political 
                                               
9 S. Poynting and V. Mason, ‘Tolerance, Freedom, Justice and Peace?  Britain, Australia and Anti-Muslims 
Racism since 11 September 2001’ (2006) 27 Journal of Intercultural Studies 365, 367. 
10 In the UK the Muslim population is approximately 2.5 million and in the US the Muslim population is 
around 6.5 million.  See, T. Choudhury and H. Fenwick, The Impact of Counter-terrorism Measures on 
Muslim Communities (EHRC Research Report, No. 72, 2011) 9.  The figures relating to the US have, 
however, been subject to particular criticism and labelled as little more than guesses, see T.W. Smith, 
‘Estimating the Muslim Population in the United States’, http://www.ajc.org/site/apps/nl/content3.asp?c=ij 
ITI2PHKoG&b=843 637&ct=1044159, accessed 03.07.2012. 
11 House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, Terrorism and Community Relations, HC165-II, Written 
Evidence (The Stationery Office, London, 2003), Memorandum submitted by the Association of Chief 
Police Officers, Ev.1, para 1.2; and ibid, Memorandum submitted by the Independent Police Complaints 
Commission, Ev.50. 
12
 See, e.g., N. Gotanda, ‘A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color Blind”’ (Nov 1991) 41(1) Stanford Law 
Review 1; D.A. Bell, ‘Racial Realism’ (1992) 24(2) Connecticut Law Review; C.I. Harris, ‘Whiteness and 
Property’ (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 1707; L.S. Greene, ‘Race in the Twenty-First Century: Equality 
through Law?’ (1990) 64 Tul L. Rev 1515; and G. Peller, ‘Race-Consciousness’ (1990) Duke L. J. 758.  
13 C.R. Lawrence III, ‘The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism’ (1987) 
39(2) Stanford Law Rev 317. 
14 E. Said, Orientalism (Penguin, 1985); and M. Mirza, ‘Being Muslim is not a Barrier to being British’ The 
Guardian (7 February 2007). 
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discourses,
15
 will be linked to the creation and sustenance of a ‘suspect community’,16 
through the application of social systems theory.  This jurisprudential framework is 
applied to explain how the system-specific programmes of behaviour by which the law-
making, policing and judicial sub-systems responded to the threat of terrorist attack 
helped to facilitate the existence of an unconscious racial effect arising out of the US and 
UK counter-terrorism powers.
17
   
 
0.3 Structure of Thesis
18
 
 
Over nine chapters, this thesis analyses the systems-based origins of the racial effect of 
the counter-terrorism stop, search and surveillance powers.  Chapter one sets out the 
jurisprudential framework on which the substantive claims, pertaining to the systems-
based origins of the racial effect of the powers, are centred.  Chapter two describes the 
particular statutory provisions which are used as a case study for the racial effect of 
counter-terrorism powers, namely section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (the ‘Terrorism 
Act’) in the UK and sections 214 and 215 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 
(the ‘Patriot Act’), in the US. 19   These powers have been chosen because of their 
particular suitability for analysis through the social systems framework, which forms the 
analytical core of this thesis.  Chapter two also provides an overview of some of the key 
empirical evidence demonstrating that these and analogous counter-terrorism powers have 
had a racial effect when deployed by each country’s law enforcement organisations, and 
the critical race theory informed approach adopted herein, which sees racial inequality as 
a permanent feature of US and UK societies.   
 
Having set out the background for this thesis, in terms of its legal, factual and 
jurisprudential frameworks, chapters three to eight concentrate on the operation of three 
social subsystems - the law-making, policing and judicial subsystems and their operation 
                                               
15 C. Pantazis and S. Pemberton, ‘Restating the case for the ‘suspect community’: a reply to Greer’ (2011) 
British Journal of Criminology 1054, 1056. 
16 P. Hillyard, Suspect Community: Peoples’ Experiences of the Prevention of Terrorist Acts (Pluto Press, 
1993) which coined this phrase in relation to the counter-terror legislation enacted to tackle Irish terrorism. 
17 See N. Luhmann, Law as a Social System (OUP, 2004); and G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System 
(Blackwell, 1993). 
18 See fig. one. 
19 Terrorism Act 2000 (c.11), s.44; and Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, ss.214-215. 
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in enacting, using and reviewing the counter-terrorism powers.  Using the stop, search and 
surveillance powers as a case study, this thesis argues that, as a result of subsystem 
behaviours and communications, what were intended as racially neutral, security 
enhancing law enforcement tools were ineffective and racially uneven in deployment.  
Whilst this thesis focuses on the law-making, policing and judicial subsystems it is not 
claimed that these represent the entirety of influences leading to the racial effect of the 
powers.  The media, for example, has been cited as an important factor in shaping the law 
enforcement and law-making subsystems’ response to the threat of terrorism, by directing 
public perception of the need for particular forms of legislative and police behaviour, 
which the police and legislatures then responded to.
20
   Nevertheless, the law-making, 
policing and judicial subsystems are the analytical focus for this thesis because they each 
play a vital role in the operation of the legal system and are the key subsystems involved 
in the creation, use and review of counter-terrorism law enforcement powers.   
 
Through the operation of these three subsystems legislative proposals become codified in 
statute, are used to direct the behaviour of the police and comprise the adjudicatory 
workload of the judiciary.  This is important because it enables an analysis of the powers 
from conception to condemnation and indicates that there is not a single cause or source 
of their racially uneven and negative impact.  Instead, it arose as a result of the 
cumulative effect of various responses to a set of circumstances.  In addition, whilst the 
case study explored in this thesis is linked to a set of specific contextual circumstances it 
suggests a more broadly-applicable conclusion regarding the difficulties, even 
impossibility, of achieving the successful interaction between different societal 
institutions responsible for shaping and using legal powers to ensure the smooth-running 
of society.   
 
This thesis focuses on the three subsystems in turn, with each forming the analytical focus 
of two successive chapters.  Chapter three considers the operational qualities attributed to 
the law-making subsystem by which it maintains its functional legitimacy in enacting 
                                               
20  See, e.g., M. Slone, ‘Responses to Media Coverage of Terrorism’ (2000) 44(4) Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 508; B.L. Nacos, ‘Terrorism and Media in the Age of Global Communications’ in D.S. Hamilton 
(ed.), Terrorism and International Relations (Washington Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2006) 81-102; 
A. Saeed et al, ‘Media, Racism and Islamophobia: The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Media’ 
(2007) 1 Sociology Compass 443, 451; R. van Swaaringen, ‘Public Safety and the Management of Fear’ 
(2005) 9 Theoretical Criminology 289, 293; and B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 
2006).    
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legislation.  This analysis focuses on how the US and UK subsystems seek to balance 
majoritarian responsiveness and minority protection.  Chapter three also shows that the 
US and UK law-making subsystems recognised the potentially deleterious impact on the 
quality of the statutory provisions enacted where this balance is not achieved.  Despite 
this awareness, Chapter three ends by arguing that both the US and UK law-making 
subsystems departed from its normative considerations in enacting the s.44 and ss.214-
215 powers.  Chapter four uncovers the subsystem behaviours behind the apparent 
inability of either country’s law-making subsystem to stop repeating the negative modes 
of behaviour that gave rise to the enactment and use of the suspicionless police powers.  
Despite the different circumstances in which s.44 and ss.214-215 were enacted this 
chapter will focus on three trends in both country’s law-making subsystem behaviour.  
Chapter four suggests that each subsystem demonstrates a tendency to emphasise the 
exceptionalism of the legislative context.  This exceptionalism helped to curtail subsystem 
debate and with it the mechanism upon which the subsystems rely to balance majority 
interests with majority protection.  Finally, chapter four considers the types of imagery 
used within each country’s subsystem and suggests that these presupposed a particular 
race-based bias in police use of the powers that echoed popular and media stereotypes of 
the threat, rather than an intelligence-led assessment. 
 
Chapters five and six repeat the approach of chapters three and four, but in relation to the 
policing subsystem.   Chapter five firstly explores the normative legislative safeguards 
intended to protect individuals against police misuse of their powers, namely reasonable 
suspicion and probable cause, chapter five goes on to demonstrate that the risk, in terms 
of its impact on police behaviour, of removing these safeguards was recognised within 
both the US and UK.  Chapter five ends by considering the extent to which the police 
reverted to deploying s.44 and ss.214-215 in previously criticised patterns of use, 
influenced by racial profiling and institutionally racist behaviour.  Chapter six looks 
behind the statistics pertaining to the racial effect of the powers at the subsystem 
communications relating to their use.  This analysis suggests that the police understood 
the actions of the law-making subsystem in enacting the suspicion-less powers differently 
from how the law-making subsystem understood its own actions.  These different 
subsystem understandings meant that what the law-making subsystem intended to be 
flexible powers deployed on the basis of police professional judgement were used as 
discretionary powers with not minimum standard for use.  A further gap in inter-
  
13 
subsystem understanding explored in chapter six is that while the law-making subsystem 
expected use of the powers only in response to the most exceptional threat, the police 
interpreted the law-making subsystem’s exceptionalism as necessitating high levels of use 
of the powers more widely.  Coupled with different subsystem understandings of when 
the powers should be used, Chapter six also argues that the law-making and police 
approaches to intelligence differed and accommodated police use of s.44 and ss.214-215 
on broad brush race-based profiles which gave these powers an operationally unjustifiable 
racial effect. 
 
Chapters seven and eight turn to the judicial subsystem, looking at its role as defender of 
minority interests together with the expectations of both the law-making and policing 
subsystems that it would act to counteract any deficiencies, in terms of infringing 
minority right, in their own operations.  Chapter seven ends by analysing judicial 
behaviour in a selection of cases relating to police counter-terrorism powers and argues 
that the reality of the court’s rights-protecting role did not match the expectations 
expressed by the other subsystems.  Chapter eight considers the obstacles faced by the 
judicial subsystem in meeting expectations for the level of minority protection it was able 
to provide.  Firstly, chapter eight evaluates the structural obstacles to the right-
safeguarding role of the courts resulting from the structure of the statutory protection.  
Secondly, chapter eight analyses each judiciary’s own interpretation of its rights-
protecting function and the extent to which this differs from the expectations expressed by 
the law-making and policing subsystems.  Finally, chapter eight analyses the apparent 
susceptibility of the judiciary to political irritants, contrary to expectations of its 
independence from such influences. 
 
Chapter nine draws together the findings, within chapters three to eight, relating to the 
causes and consequences of each subsystems operational programme and offers 
recommendations for ‘strategies of translation’ by which each of the subsystems in both 
the US and UK may be able to safeguard against the recurrence of such deleterious law-
making, policing and judicial adjudication in the face of each new threat to national 
security.
21
    
 
                                               
21
 J. Black, ‘Proceduralizing Regulation’ (2001) 21(1) OJLS 33. 
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At the start of each of the key analytical chapters within this thesis there is a diagram 
which maps out the arguments relating to that subsystem and how its operations 
contributed to the racial effect of the stop, search and surveillance powers.  The numbers 
stated in the diagrams relate to the relevant section of this thesis where that argument is 
primarily explored.  Because of the way subsystem operations are affected by other 
systems, and external factors, some of the sections referred to are contained within 
different chapters. 
 
0.4  Broader Relevance of this Thesis 
 
Alongside the context-specific findings, this thesis potentially has broader applicability.  
The analysis of the origins of the racial effect of the counter-terrorism powers centres on 
the relations of relative power between the constitutionally-ordained institutions 
responsible for making, implementing and reviewing statutory provisions.
22
  In analysing 
these relations this thesis looks for evidence of, and explanations for, how and why law 
finds it difficult to take cognisance of other social systems, of other systems, or other 
parts of the legal system.  The case study, therefore, offers an example of how society 
brings to the legal system, and to the subsystems that comprise the legal system, disputes 
to resolve and policies to legitimise.  At the same time it brings with it the possibility of 
unexpected or undesired effects of the legal system addressing these on the basis of its 
own, self-deployed internal norms and operational rules.   
 
The impact of the broader applicability of this thesis is especially relevant to the 
recommendations for reform, proposed in chapter nine, and their possible implementation 
independent from the particular counter-terrorism stop, search and surveillance powers 
that provide the case study herein.  This broader relevance means that the value of the 
analysis undertaken within this thesis, and the recommendations for reform offered, are 
not diminished by the fact that the UK stop and search powers have already been repealed 
and replaced,
23
 and the US surveillance and records search powers are set to expire under 
a statutory sunset clause, in June 2015.
24
  The analysis in this thesis is focused on the 
matrix of communications, and barriers to effective inter-subsystem understanding which 
                                               
22 Justice, The Future of the Rule of Law (October 2007) 7. 
23 Protection of Freedom Act 2012 (c.9) ss.59-63. 
24 PATRIOT Sunset Extension Act of 2011, s.1 extending the previous renewal within the USA PATRIOT 
Improvement and Reauthorisation Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-177; 50 USC 1805), s.102(b)(1). 
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occurred in the enactment, use and review of the stop, search and surveillance powers.  
These exemplify barriers which exist recurrently within different parts of the legal system, 
and explored throughout social systems scholarship,
25
 and contribute to the distinction 
between the ideal operation of the rule of law and the reality of its experience, in both the 
US and UK.  Analysing subsystem communications in a systematic and concrete way 
may help to shed light on the gap between what subsystems think they are doing and what 
they think other subsystems are doing; and what those other subsystems themselves 
understand the first subsystem to be doing and its understanding of that subsystems 
expectations regarding how it should respond to its behaviour.  This gap between one 
subsystem’s expectations of the behaviour of another and the behaviour of that subsystem 
responding in expectation of those expectations, is part of a wide matrix of inter-system 
expectations and responses throughout the social system. It is in the gaps in understanding 
arising from these operations that some unexpected effects of legal measures, such as 
racially uneven counter-terrorism police powers, may have their genesis, as is argued in 
this thesis. 
                                               
25
 See chapter one of this thesis. 
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Fig. one: Structure of Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions/ Recommendation 
for reform (ch. 9). 
 
 
Racial effect of suspicion-less counter-terrorism 
stop, search and surveillance powers (ch. 2). 
Social Systems Framework (ch. 1): 
Social Systems theory suggests a mechanism by which the behaviours observed by CRT arise, without relying 
on explanations based on conscious discrimination or individual prejudice. Subsystems# cognitive openness but 
operational closure leading to obstruction to communications between subsystems. 
Counter-terror Operational Closure: 
- Case law demonstrated a high level of judicial deference towards the 
need for, and utility of, the powers. 
- Structural obstacles to rights-protecting arising from legal framework of 
the protections. 
- Judicial subsystem operations and decision-making affected by political 
irritants before and after adjudication. 
 
Counter-terror Operational Closure: 
- Exceptionalism as to the scale and imminence of likely terrorist attacks. 
- Elimination of debate either by demanding unanimity or by executive 
fiat in insisting its statutory proposals are enacted. 
- Racially loaded imagery regarding the origins and nature of terrorist 
threat. 
 
 Counter-terror Operational Closure: 
- Interpreted the flexibility of the statutory powers as affording unfettered 
police discretion in their deployment. 
- Law-making subsystem exceptionalism regarding the threat understood 
as requiring equivalently high level of use. 
- Intelligence, upon which use of the powers, was based on law-making 
subsystem claims of the threat, as opposed to police expertise, which was 
what the law-making subsystem expected. 
Normal Operational Closure: 
- Recognition and condemnation of 
the risk of institutional racism. 
- Risk of lapsing into unthinking 
modes of behaviour, which give rise 
to unlawful and discriminatory 
profiling. 
 
Normal Operational Closure: 
- Subsystem balances majoritarian 
responsiveness with minority 
protection. 
- Debate acts as the means by which 
the subsystem maintains its 
operational balance. 
Normal Operational Closure: 
- Judiciary as overseeing and 
safeguarding power against unlawful 
statutory powers or their effect. 
- Protection of minority interests 
through the application of article 14 
ECHR or 14th amendment EPC 
protections. 
Empirical evidence and minority 
perceptions of the racial effect of 
the policing powers (ch. 2). 
 
 
 
Law-making Subsystem (chs. 3-4). 
Judicial Subsystem (chs. 7-8). 
Policing Subsystem (chs. 5-6). 
Cases relating to racially uneven deployment of powers are discouraged 
from being launched and existing case law showed signs of the judicial 
tendency towards deference in national security matters. 
Deployment of powers relying on broadly-drafted, predictive race-based 
profiles of suspected terrorists.  Expected judicial condemnation if use 
unlawful. 
Enactment of powers which depart from normal suspicion-based 
operation and are subject to minimal safeguards and oversight, in the 
expectation of police expertise and professionalism as a control on their 
use. 
Racial effect of suspicion-less counter-terrorism stop, search and 
surveillance powers (ch. 2). 
Critical race theory: racism as normal, dominant group construction of subordinate 
minority group facilitated by law as politics; uncheck executive discretion and 
judicial deference (ch.2). 
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Chapter One: Theoretical Framework for Thesis Claims 
 
This thesis explores the racial effect of the counter-terrorism stop, search and surveillance 
powers within s.44 of the TA and ss.214-215 of the PA through the jurisprudential 
framework of social systems theory.   Social systems theory, or ‘systems’, is an empirical 
theory of society that was co-opted as a sociological theory from its biological origins,
26
 
before being developed through the work of Niklas Luhmann
27
 and Gunther Teubner.
28
  In 
methodological terms systems offers a ‘thick description of society’29 in which the ‘social 
system’, and its constituent subsystems, replace ‘society’.30  In asserting this mode of 
civilisational functioning Luhmann’s version of systems theory makes only two 
fundamental assumptions: that reality exists and that systems exist.
 31
  However, the 
nature of reality, systems, and indeed understanding systems theory itself, are contingent 
upon their system-derived representation.
32
 Systems theory is not used to assess law, or 
any social system to which it may be applied, against any benchmark of expected 
behaviour.  Instead, the theory offers a primarily mechanistic explanation for the way in 
which law, and other social systems, operate.
33
   
 
For Luhmann and his theoretical adherents the existence and operation of the social 
system is a condition of modernity.
34
  Modern society is functionally differentiated.
35
  
This is in contrast to earlier, archaic and pre-modern societies in which the central societal 
                                               
26 Amongst the first proponents of the use of systems within sociology was Talcott Parsons. See, T. Parsons, 
The Structure of Social Action (McCraw-Hill, 1937); T. Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory (Free Press, 
1954) and T. Parsons, Sociological Theory and Modern Society (Free Press, 1967).    
27 Luhmann in fact worked with Parsons for a year in 1960 at Harvard and became an enthusiastic advocate 
of Parson’s theoretical basis of structural functionalism.  See, N. Luhmann, ‘Talcott Parsons: The Future of 
a Theory’ in N. Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society.  See N. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law 
(Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1985); Law as a Social System; Social Systems (trans S. Holes and C. 
Larmore) Differentiation of Society (Columbia University Press, 1982).  See also D. Michailakis, ‘Law as 
an Autopoietic System’ (1995) Acta Sociologica 323.    
28 See G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (1993); G. Teubner (ed), Autopoietic Law a New Approach 
to Law and Society (Walter de Gruyter, 1998); and Juridification of Social Spheres A Comparative Analysis 
in the Areas of Labor, Corporate Antitrust and Social Welfare Law (Walter de Gruyer, 1987). 
29 Luhmann’s descriptions are considered to be ‘thick’ because they use the theory to account for, both 
situationally and conceptually, every societal occurrence.  See K.A. Ziegert, ‘The Thick Description of Law: 
An Introduction to Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Operatively Closed Systems’ in R. Banaker and Travers, 
An Introduction to Law and Society: 55-75; and C. Geertz, ‘Thick Description: Towards and Interpretive 
Theory in Culture’ in C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture (Basic Books, 1973) 3-30. 
30 G. Teubner, Global Law without a State (Aldershot, 1997). 
31 N. Luhmann (trans J. Bednarz with D. Baecker), Social Systems (Stanford University Press, 1995) 12. 
32 J. Black, ‘Proceduralizing Regulation: Part II’ (2001) 21(1) OJLS 34. 
33 N. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law (Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1985) 10-11. 
34 N. Luhmann, Social Systems 423-26. 
35
 N. Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society xii. 
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units were based around kinship groups, families or tribes, and which were organised 
primarily on the basis of segmentation which operated according to a clear hierarchical 
structure.
36
  The feudal system provides an example of a segmented society: a vertically 
constituted order with the king at the top, subject only to divine authority, followed by the 
nobility, knights and stretching downwards to peasant classes, with landless labourers at 
the bottom.
37
  The evolution of segmentary society into functionally differentiated social 
systems occurred through the gradual concentration of loose associations into tight 
functional groups.
38
  These functional ties then came to define the social groups, as 
opposed to the common values and blood ties which previously served this organisational 
role.
39
  This process is a basic feature of social development,
40
 and reflective of the 
increasing complexity of societal organisation.
41
  In contrast to pre-modern societies, the 
functional alignment of modern society means that individuals are not contained within 
any single subsystem, but can operate within different subsystems depending on the role 
that they are performing.
42
  Systems theory therefore argues against positivist claims of a 
single hierarchical chain of ‘command and rule’, which focuses on individual agents 
operating at different segmentary levels within society.
 43
  Instead, systems theory is 
concerned with the operation of separate, heterachically related subsystems, together 
making-up the social system.
44
  
                                               
36 N. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law 114-47. 
37 For a basic description of feudal society see C. Stephenson, Mediaval Feudalism (Detzer Press, 2007). 
38  The gradual reconstruction of society from one of segmental to functional differentiation builds on 
Durkheim’s description in which segmental society was subdivided into similar units of minimal 
complexity; whereas functionally organised society was stratified by division of labour into different types 
of part system performing different functions which both reflected and promoted the increased complexity 
of society.  See. E. Durkheim (trans. L.A. Coser), The Division of Labour in Society (The Free Press, 1997); 
and T. Parsons, ‘Durkheim’s Contribution to the Theory of Integration of Social Systems’ in K.H. Wolff 
(ed.), Emile Durkheim , 1858-1970.  A Collection of Essays with Translation (The Ohio State University 
Press, 1960) 118-53. 
39 J. Priban and D. Nellsen, Laws New Boundaries.  The Consequences of Legal Autopoiesis (Ashgate 
Publishing, 2001) 2. 
40 See, e.g., N.J. Smelser, Social Change in the Industrial Revolution.  An Application of Theory to the 
Lancashire Cotton Industry, 1770-1840 (London, 1959) and T. Parsons, ‘Some Considerations on the 
Theory of Social Change’ (1961) 26 Rural Sociology 219-39. 
41 N. Luhmann, A Sociology of Law: 167-73; D. Michailakis, ‘Law as an Autopoietic System’ (1995) 38 
Acta Sociologica 323, 325-27; and J. Priban and C. Nelken (eds.), Law’s New Boundaries The 
Consequences of Legal Autopoiesis. 
42
 Luhmann suggests that the only single system within which an individual can be considered to be wholly 
contained is that of the insane asylum! See, S. Holmes and C. Larmore, ‘Introduction’ quoting N. Luhmann, 
Politische Planung: Aufsatze zur Soziologie von Politik under Verwaltung, in N. Luhmann, The 
Differentiation of Society, 37. 
43 See J. Austin (auth) and W.E. Rumble (ed.), The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (first pub 1832, 
Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
44 Despite this shift, systems theory acknowledges that hierarchical differentiation continues to exist within 
functionally aligned societies.  N. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law 109. 
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As already stated, the emergence of social systems is an effect of increasing social 
complexity. Systems manage this complexity by developing programmes of operation, 
which also promote the subsystem’s specialised function.  Complexity has both an 
outward and an inward-looking effect on subsystem behaviour.  Firstly, looking outward, 
the distinction between the system and its environment is created by the system 
selectively interpreting its environment in order to reduce internal subsystem 
complexity.
45
  Conversely, whilst systems reduce the complexity of their environment to 
aid their operation this simplification also enables the system to increase its inward-
looking, or internal complexity, and thereby increase system functional specificity.  
Through this process society is transformed from one of unorganised complexity into one 
of organised complexity.
46
  The ‘complexity differential’ between systems and their 
environment enables the system to perform tasks, make decisions and consequently to 
fulfil its function within society.
47
   To the extent that complexity enforces selectivity, it 
also brings with it the corresponding risk posed to the system as a result of an incorrect 
choice.  This risk arises from the possibility that in making any individual choice a system 
may make a wrong one, and in so doing jeopardise its own operational success.  
Therefore, an understanding of organised complexity also requires an awareness of its 
improbability, even precariousness.  Luhmann’s ‘methodological recipe’ consequently 
results in a theory which ‘can succeed in explaining the normal as improbable’.48  The 
risk of a wrong decision is avoided by the subsystem developing internal safeguards, to 
protect against their functional failure.
49
  These ‘stabilisation mechanisms’50 account for 
the autopoietic nature of social systems, as will now be explored below. 
 
1.1 Social Systems as Autopoietic Systems  
 
The central theoretical tenet of social systems theory is that systems are self-referential 
                                               
45 Luhmann defines complexity as represented in the difference between two types of systems: those in 
which each element can be related to every other and those in which this is no longer the case.  It is out of 
this latter form of complexity that social systems develop.  See, N. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law 
24-31. 
46 This ‘order from noise’ principle is found throughout systems theory.  See, e.g., H. von Foerster, ‘On Self-
Organizing Systems and their Environment’, in M.C. Rovik and S. Cameron (eds.), Self-Organizing Systems 
(London, 1960) 31-50. 
47 N. Luhmann, Social Systems 190-94. 
48 ibid, 114 and N. Luhmann, Essays on Self-reference (Columbia University Press, 1990) 87. 
49 N. Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society 138-65. 
50
 G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System 59. 
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and self-creating and that, like biological systems, the initial characteristics of one 
generation are controlled by properties of preceding generations.
51
  Therefore, what 
distinguishes autopoietic systems from the ordinary linear operation of closed systems is 
that in autopoietic systems ‘everything that is used as a unit by the system is produced as 
a unit by the system itself’.52  According to Humburto Maturana, writing in relation to 
biological systems, autopoietic systems constitute ‘networks of production of components 
that recursively, through their interactions, generate and realize the network that produces 
them and constitute, in the space in which they exist, the boundaries of the network as 
components that participate in the realization of the network’.53  Maturana labelled these 
systems ‘autopoietic’ to refer to the ‘self-(re)productive operations of organisms that use 
their own output as input’.54  Luhmann proposed autopoiesis as a means of accounting for 
the absence of a unifying set of principles to integrate law, politics, economics and other 
foundational aspects of society.
55
  In applying autopoietic systems theory to society 
Luhmann suggested that a number of different subsystems exist within the social system, 
including law,
56
 the economy and politics.
57
   
 
Within an autopoietic framework a system’s function represents its relationship with other 
systems; whilst the self-reflexive nature of the system is illustrative of its relationship 
with its self.
58
  In this way the functional separateness of each system from the 
environmental noise surrounding it
59
 is confirmed by the internal self-reflection inherent 
in system operation, which proceeds along the lines of system-specific rules and terms of 
operation.
60
  This aspect of systems behaviour is described as showing that autopoietic 
systems are ‘operationally closed’. 61    Consequently, the conventional explanation of 
                                               
51 M.D.A. Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (7th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2001) 700. 
52 N. Luhmann, ‘The Autopoiesis of Social Systems’, in N. Luhmann, Essays on Self-Reference 3. 
53 H.R. Maturana, ‘Autopoiesis’ in M. Zeleny (ed.), Autopoiesis: A Theory of Living Organization (New 
York, 1981). 
54ibid; and H.R. Marturana and F.J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition (Reidel, 1980). 
55 N. Luhmann, A Sociology of Law 282-83. See also N. Luhmann, ‘The Autopoiesis of Social Systems’ in 
N. Luhmann, Essays on Self-Reference (New York, 1990) and G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System. 
56 N. Luhmann, ‘Unity of the Legal System’ in G. Teubner, Autopoietic Law 19.See also A. Podgorecki, C.J. 
Whelan and D. Kosha (eds.), Legal Systems and Social Systems (Croom Heln, 1985). 
57  N. Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society 138-65 (political subsystem); and 190-335 (economic 
subsystem). 
58 G. Teubner, ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law’ (1983) 17 Law and Society Review 239, 
272. 
59 The precise definition systems theorists apply to operational closure is, however, somewhat elusive, A. 
Beck, ‘Is Law an Autopoietic System?’ (1994) 14 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 401, 405.  
60 See J. Priban and D. Nelken, Law’s New Boundaries. The Consequence of Legal Autopoiesis (Ashgate, 
2001). 
61
 See G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System 32-34 and H.R. Maturana and F. Varela, Autopoiesis and 
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input-output based systems is replaced by a version of systems in which their output 
comes from the system itself.
62
  As well as the self-producing nature of autopoietic 
systems they must also be self-maintaining, so that self-produced behaviour feeds back 
into the system, guaranteeing the conditions of its on-going production.  This process is 
referred to as ‘hyper cycle’.63  Systems theory does not assert that social systems are 
wholly impervious to environmental influences.  Instead, systems align their operational 
behaviour with these irritants in accordance with their own self-created modes of 
operation.  This is described by systems theorists as demonstrating that social systems are 
‘cognitively open’. 64   Autopoiesis, therefore, proposes a multi-dimensional model of 
societal organisation incorporating interaction between the system and its environment, as 
formed by other systems and also within the system itself.  The fundamental building 
block of these system behaviours is communications. 
 
1.2 A Theory of Communication 
 
The basic element of social systems, as distinct from living systems, is communications:
65
 
social systems only exist, and are only able to function and interact with their 
environment, through communications.
66
  Consequently, instead of defining systems in 
terms of human agency the social system emerges from the communication within and 
between systems.
67
  Communication is accordingly not a separately functioning 
subsystem, acting upon individuals, but a vital constituent part of all systems.
68
  Similarly, 
whilst language is not a separate subsystem it is an important medium through which 
                                                                                                                                            
Cognition: The Realization of the Living (D. Reidel Publishing, 1980) 127. 
62 Luhmann, Social Systems 9. See also, J. Paterson and G. Teubner, ‘Changing Maps: Empirical Legal 
Autopoiesis’ (1998) Social and Legal Studies 457. 
63 G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System 23. 
64 See G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System 32-34 and H.R. Maturana and F. Varela, Autopoiesis and 
Cognition: The Realization of the Living (D. Reidel Publishing, 1980) 127. 
65 The focus on communications represents a distinction between the theories of Habermas, Parsons and 
Luhmann:  Habermas and Parsons both focus on action as the primary constituent of systems; while 
Luhmann and subsequent systems theorists focus on communication. See J. Habermas, Between Facts and 
Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (MIT Press, 1999); and T. Pasons, The 
Structure of Social Action (The Free Press, 1937). 
65
 N. Luhmann, ‘Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation of the Legal System’ 
(1991-92) 13 Cardozo Law Review 1419 and G. Teubner, ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern 
Law’ (1983) 17 Law and Society Review 239.  
66 N. Luhmann (trans. K.A. Ziegert), Law as a Social System (OUP, 2004) 80-86.  
67 This emphasis on communications to the neglect of the role of agency has, however, resulted in criticisms 
of systems theory, see A.J. Jacobson, ‘Autopoietic Law: The New Science of Niklas Luhmann’ (1989) 87 
Michigan L. Rev 1647-84. 
68
 M. Luhmann, Social Systems 137-75. 
  
22 
communication may occur.
69
    
 
Luhmann defined communication as a synthesis of three selections: information, which 
comprises of a selection from a repertoire of referential possibilities; utterance, which 
comprises of a selection from a repertoire of intentional acts; and understanding, which 
comprises of the subsystem observation of the distinction between utterance and 
information.
70
  In accordance with systems theory an utterance leads to understanding 
through the system’s selection from a ‘repertoire of possibilities’ or varieties.71  Systems, 
therefore, do not respond to all facets of their environment, but only to those with 
relevance to system function, as determined by established patterns of system behaviour, 
so-called ‘communicative redundancies’.72  Communicative redundancies are the way in 
which each subsystem seeks to fulfil its particular function through the development of 
shortcuts.  These shortcuts dictate how subsystems understand, and respond to, 
environmental irritants.  This ‘coordinated selectivity’ 73  determines what becomes a 
communication, and how that communication is interpreted, as well as what remains 
environmental noise undetected by the system.
74
  Communicative redundancies, therefore, 
enable systems to deal with complex environmental irritants and fulfil the subsystem 
function.  The development of communicative redundancies reinforces system specificity 
of function and system-specific interpretation of irritants.  As well as being the foundation 
of the efficiency of subsystem operations, therefore, communicative redundancies are also 
at the foundation of subsystem communication constraint. 
 
The role of communicative redundancies in entrenching the autopoietic nature of 
subsystem behaviour does not, however, mean that a subsystem response to a particular 
irritant can be predicted with absolute certainty.  Systems theorists use the notion of 
                                               
69 J. Black, ‘Proceduralizing Regulation: Part II’ (2001) 21(1) OJLS 39. 
70 N. Luhmann, Social Systems 140-45. 
71 ibid, 140. 
72 G. Teubner, Law and an Autopoietic System 136. 
73 N. Luhmann, Social Systems 154. 
74 To give an example, if an individual goes into a café for lunch they will notice the cakes and sandwiches 
on the counter, but many other aspects of the café interior remain unnoticed.  This is not because these 
additional details do not exist in a material sense but, because they are not relevant to the individual’s 
objective of getting lunch.  If the individual represents the social system the system function would be to get 
lunch and its operational programme would involve taking the requisite steps to achieve this.  In such a 
situation the food on offer would form the environmental irritants, whilst other contextual details would 
remain as unobserved environmental noise as they are irrelevant to the system programme.   See also R. 
Nobles and D. Schiff, ‘Why Do Judges Talk they Way they Do?’ (2009) 5 International Journal of Law in 
Context 25, 27-30. 
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variety to account for this indeterminacy.  Whilst redundancies are established modes of 
responding to externally and internally-generated communications variety refers to the 
range of options available which provide for flexibility in the nature of the response.
75
  In 
other words, there may be a variety of possible redundancies from which the system can 
choose,
76
 based on its reapplication of existing subsystem rules.
77
  This process of 
attaching a value-judgement to a subsystem redundancy is referred to as ‘coding’.  
System-based coding is applied, and gives value, to the system programme and 
determines what is and is not of relevance to the system.
78
   
 
A further aspect of inter-subsystem communications observed by system theory is that of 
‘structural couplings’. 79   Structural couplings occur where the external environment 
irritates the system triggering its self-regulatory mechanisms.  The detecting subsystem 
interprets the irritant and aligns its own development to its expectations of the operation 
of the originating subsystem.  This process is a means by which one subsystem can 
intervene strategically in the operation of another, resulting in the formation of a stable 
pattern of interaction between the systems.
80
    Couplings, therefore, taking effect against 
‘a continuous influx of disorder’, are the means by which the system maintains or 
changes its operational programme.
81
  Luhmann distinguished operative couplings from 
structural couplings, suggesting that structural couplings require that a system 
presupposes certain features of its environment on an on-going basis and relies on them 
structurally.
82
  The interaction between separate systems, the ‘structural couplings’, 
comprise of irritation and a self-referential response.  In this way, structural couplings 
constitute a parasitic relationship between subsystems enabling inter-subsystem 
cooperation, and account for the way in which autopoietic systems respond to bigger 
societal developments notwithstanding their operationally closed nature.  As well as 
                                               
75 G. Teubner, Law and an Autopoietic System 144. 
76 To continue the previous example (fn 74 above), if the individual getting their lunch was a vegetarian 
redundancies would be analogous to their pre-determined and, therefore, automatic rejection of a meat 
option.  By contrast, variety would describe the choice available between several meat-free options – all of 
which would form communicative redundancies in accordance with the system’s programme.   
77 To finish the lunch analogy (fn. 74 and 76 above) the autopoietic response to variety would be determined 
by the individual choosing between the several vegetarian options on the basis of which is their favourite 
choice.   
78 N. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law 173-210.  
79 N. Luhmann, Law as a Social System 381-422; and N. Luhmann, ‘Operational Closure and Structural 
Coupling: The Differentiation of the Legal System’ (1992) 13 Cardozo Law Rev 1419, 1432-3. 
80 N. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law 381-422. 
81 G. Teubner, ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law’ (1983) 17 Law and Society Review 239.  
82
 N. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law 382. 
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normative closure, therefore, systems possess cognitive openness, so that: ‘[t]he norm 
quality serves the autopoiesis of the system, its self-continuation in deference to the 
environment.  The cognitive quality serves the coordination of this process with the 
system’s environment’. 83   Cognitive openness means that systems are capable of 
responding to their environment.  The cognitive nature derives from the necessity that 
such responses are an inevitable simplification of the real world, and operate as a form of 
cognition; whilst also learning from the interaction by making communications that alter 
the possibilities of what will, in future, constitute an intra-system communication.
84
   
 
Whilst systems theory maintains the separateness of different subsystems Anglo-
American approaches to law have typically emphasised a greater degree of continuum 
between law, politics, economic and other social functions.  Systems theory has 
consequently attracted criticism for overemphasising subsystem closure, despite the fact 
that systems can respond to external pressures and influences.
85
  In apparent support of 
such arguments the legal system has obliged with occasional radical changes in rules in 
response to social and political pressures.
86
  Systems theory resists the claim that such 
behaviours diminish the extent to which different systems can be seen as separate and 
self-determining by maintaining that the decision to change subsystem rules is 
fundamentally determined by the subsystem itself, on the basis of its pre-existing 
communicative redundancies.
87
  To this extent even radical departures from previous 
modes of behaviour support the hypothesis of system cognitive openness and normative 
closure, because it is only when the system itself detects environmental irritants, and they 
are interpreted through the systems’ own modes of understanding, that they affect the 
subsystem’s programme of operation.  According to systems’ claims, therefore, 
operational closure does not prevent the legal system, or any other social system, from 
incorporating other influences into its operation.
88
  This claim is, however, caveated by 
                                               
83 N. Luhmann, ‘Unity of the Legal System’ 20. 
84 N. Luhmann, Social Systems 321-25. 
85 E.g. Sharon Herzberger poses the question of whether social science research should not have, and does 
not have, a relevant role within the judicial function of the courts, S. Herzberger, ‘Social science 
contributions to the law: Understanding and predicting behaviour’ (1993) 25 Connecticut Law Review 1067.  
See also A.L. James, ‘An Open or Shut Case? Law as an Autopoietic System’ (1992) 19 Journal of Law and 
Society 271, and systems theorist reply, M. King, ‘The Truth about Autopoiesis’ (1993) 20 Journal of Law 
and Society 218. 
86 Plessy v Fergusson 163 US 537 (1896) and Brown v Board of Education 347 US 483 (1954); Roe v Wade 
410 US 113 (1973). 
87 See R. Dworkin, ‘The Interpretive Attitude’ in Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press, 1986). 
88
 G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System 13. 
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the need for this incorporation to be determined by the system, and checked by the usual 
references to subsystem rules.
89
    
 
Communicative redundancies and the establishment of structural couplings, therefore, 
provide a means by which the receiving system turns what is, to it, meaningless 
environmental noise into a meaningful communication, coded in accordance with its own 
rules.
90
  However, because the system from which the communication originates has 
modelled the communication on its own system-specific interpretation of its observations 
relating to the receiving system; while the receiving subsystem interprets the 
communication through its own understanding and expectations of the originating 
subsystem, different system-specific understandings of the communication arise.
91
  On 
forming the structural coupling, therefore, the values attached to the system’s own 
behaviour are entirely internal to the system itself.  This behaviour is referred to as ‘self-
steering’ and represents the system’s attempt to minimize differences between the 
situation faced and the desired one, which is one incorporating the external 
communication.
92
  Systems, therefore, exist and create their own boundaries in relation to 
their environment (autopoiesis); systems organise, reproduce, maintain possibilities, and 
conditions for other possibilities, through their operation; and the possibilities that are 
provided by systems operations are determined by their function.
93
   However, the 
system-specific nature of system behaviour and its interpretation of communications 
mean that no single system can declare its view as representing a fundamental truth and as 
binding on all other systems.
94
  This ‘essential circularity’95 of systems means that they 
face significant difficulties in successfully engaging in inter-system communication, and 
difficult to account for radical change. 
                                               
89 See N. Luhmann, ‘Operational Closure and Structural Coupling’.  See also, N. MacCormack, ‘Why Cases 
Have Ratios and what these Are’, in L. Goldstein (ed), Precedent in Law (Clarendon Press, 1987) 166-82. 
90 Luhmann offers the example of walking: ‘Walking presupposes the gravitational forces of the earth 
within very narrow limits, but gravity does not contribute any steps to the movement of bodies.  
Communication presupposes awareness of states of conscious systems, but conscious states become social 
and do not enter the sequence of communicative operations as part of them; they remain environmental 
states for the social system’, N. Luhmann, ‘Operational Closure and Structural Coupling’ 1426. 
91 G. Teubner, ‘Autopoiesis in Law and Society: A Rejoinder to Blankenburg’ (1984) 18 Law and Society 
Review 291, 299; and N. Luhmann, ‘The Self-Reproduction of Law and its Limits’ in G. Teubner, Dilemmas 
of Law and the Welfare State (Walter de Gruyter, 1986)113. 
92 N. Luhmann, ‘Limits of Steering’ (1997) 14(1) Theory, Culture and Society 41-57. 
93  K.A. Ziegert, ‘The Thick Description of Law: An Introduction to Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of 
Operatively Closed Systems’ in Banaker and Travers, An Introduction to Law and Society 58. 
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1.3 Obstacles to Inter-System Communication and the Regulatory Trilemma 
 
The lack of a common understanding of communications between systems can lead to the 
development of ‘double contingency’. 96  Double contingency is a consequence of the 
confrontation of at least two autonomous systems that make their own selections in 
relation to one another, but that, because of the complexity of subsystems, are unable to 
fully and reciprocally understand each other.
97
  Consequently, systems ‘concentrate on 
what they can observe as input and output in the other … They can try to influence what 
they observe by their own action and can learn further from the feedback’. 98    The 
development of a theory of inter-system communication represents a key formative period 
within autopoietic legal theory, marked particularly by the Habermas-Luhmann dialogue 
of the early 1970s.  By way of a jointly published work the two theorists criticised each 
other’s approach as an inadequate response to the complexity of highly functionally 
differentiated post-industrial societies.
99
  For Luhmann, the extent of the functional 
differentiation meant that effective communication between different systems was 
impossible.
100
  By contrast, for Habermas it remained possible, contingent upon the 
removal of certain pre-existing barriers to inter-subsystem operations.
101
  For Luhmann 
and other social systems theorists the obstacles to inter-system communications are 
inherent within the nature of the systems themselves, and there is no ‘ideal speech 
pattern’, as proposed by Habermas, which enables effective communication.102   
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Luhmann saw the solution to system-based contingency as the development of a pattern 
of behaviour so that future indeterminacy would be responded to within a framework of 
pre-determined rules.
 103
  Such a framework would enable each system to hold a firm 
expectation of the nature of another system’s behaviour.  This expectation involves 
presenting to that system a pattern which provides them with a similar firmness of 
expectation.
104
  In other words it is the successful expectation of expectations by one 
system in relation to another that enables stable systems of operation.
105
  Luhmann offers 
the regular pattern of irritation between the political system and the mass media system as 
an example of such subsystem behaviour. Luhmann suggests that political actors attempt 
to be mentioned in the media, while what is constructed by the media as politicians often 
respond to political news.
106
 In modern, functionally differentiated societies, however, 
there is too great a degree of system complexity for such assurance.
107
  The esoteric 
nature of communications consequently means that both in-coming and out-going 
communications face apparently unassailable obstacles in terms of effective, trans-system 
understanding.
108
   
 
A key consequence of the obstacles to successful inter-system communication, observed 
by systems’ theorists, is the ‘regulatory trilemma’.109   The regulatory trilemma describes 
the over-extension of structural couplings between autonomous social systems, and is 
specifically used to account for the failure of regulation to act as a successful means of 
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coordinating cross-system understanding.
110
  Development of the regulatory trilemma can 
have three outcomes, in terms of the fate of the obstructed communication or regulation.  
The communication may ‘disintegrate’, in the sense that it is ignored by the intended 
receiving subsystem.  Alternatively, the regulation could damage the ability of the 
targeted subsystem to reproduce itself, and therefore its ability to function.  Finally, the 
intervention might damage the originating subsystem and result in a crisis of legitimacy 
for that subsystem.
111
  For Teubner there is no solution to the regulatory trilemma,
112
 but 
only the hope for more flexible self-regulation of reflexive subsystems.
113
  Teubner 
specifically applied his hypothesis to the legal system and proposed the adoption of a new 
model of law.  This model adjusts itself in the hope of inducing adjustment in other 
systems and by working with the dynamics of other subsystems as opposed to 
prescriptively imposing its rules and goals on other system, reinstates legitimacy in the 
legal system.
114
  Teubner’s proposal represents a development of systems theory and 
inhabits something of a midway between the approaches adopted by Habermas and 
Luhmann, in that it recognises that deliberation may be a mediating strategy to facilitate 
effective communications between different social systems.
115
   
 
Teubner explains the regulatory trilemma in the context of competition law.
116
  In the 
context of law enforcement one example is provided by police disciplinary processes and 
the interaction between these processes and the inaccessibility of the police to 
underrepresented groups.
117
   Here, the Law is trying to micromanage human resources 
within the police.  However, the fact that antidiscrimination law creates an environment in 
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which minorities and women can bring a cause of action against the police if their 
discipline issues are mishandled risks creating an unintended incentive for the police to 
shunt all minorities and women into the formal system straight away, whilst they deal 
with white men through traditional informal means.  This is an example of the regulatory 
trilemma, because the regulated system does not receive communication, only irritation, 
from the law, it does not seek to give effect to what the law is trying to do, it either 
ignores the law, is destroyed by the law, or destroys the law.  In this case the police 
discipline system is being corrupted by a law that sends unintended messages, because of 
the ways in which the two subsystems do not match up, but this is in part because the 
intent, and often even the true substance of the law, is being ignored by the police 
disciplinary system. 
 
Teubner’s emphasis on the regulatory role of law, arising from the ‘juridification’ of 
society,
118
 has been further explored by academics including Julia Black and Nicola 
Lacey.
119
  Black and Lacey use the obstacles to inter-systems communications as an 
explanation for the failure of regulatory legislation to achieve parliamentary goals, when 
laws are implemented within specialist subsystems.   The application of autopoiesis to 
regulatory law illustrates how each system shifts its behaviour in order to render what is 
happening within one system meaningful to another. The legal system has a mediating 
role in facilitating these regulatory communications,
120
 although Black suggests that 
deliberations themselves may require mediation.
121
  This conclusion thus reasserts the 
long-standing theoretical concern with issues of difference in cognition and perception 
between social subsystems.
122
  Regulatory scholarship does not conceptualise society as a 
top down social order but instead adopts a ‘heterarchical conception of control’, citing a 
diverse range of influences on regulation caused by the nature of system behaviour.
123
   
For example, the limited data-gathering capabilities of courts mean that they frequently 
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defer on such matters to other branches of government.
124
  In addition, sometimes courts 
will decline to hear a particular claim, or its judgment may fail to address an issue within 
a claim, thereby influencing the shape and contents of judicial precedents.
125
   
 
This latest stage in the development of social systems theory also advocates the 
application of the theoretical tenets to non-standard subsystems.  Luhmann himself 
applied the theory to a range of subsystems including science, religion, art and even 
love.
126
  What is central for each of these subsystems, and at the root of their autopoietic 
nature, is their self-referentiality, which means that where externally and internally 
generated communications are responded to, it is in a system-specific way.  The 
description of a system as ‘autopoietic’ can, therefore, be applied to any system which is 
able to respond to and engage with its environment, but which remains distinct from it, so 
that a definitional line can be drawn between the system and its context.  Within their 
analysis of regulatory law Black, Lacey and others apply the systems theory ideas, which 
were discussed by Luhmann and Teubner at a very general, macro level, to individual 
industries and areas of legal regulation.
127
  In the scheme of systems and subsystems 
while law is a second order autopoietic system, within society as the first order 
autopoietic system,
128
 such subsystems would be considered as third and fourth order 
subsystems.   
 
1.4 Social Systems Theory within the Law Subsystem  
 
Although Luhmann’s claims about autopoiesis in the social system apply to all 
subsystems, his work, along with that of many social systems theorists, focuses upon the 
legal subsystem.  Law, especially the common law, offers a particularly clear example of 
the workings of communicative redundancies, self-referential rule-making and 
operational closure/ cognitive openness, as compared to other social systems because the 
subsystem operates through the activities of lawyers and courts in discussing matters of 
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definition and precedent.
 129
  These represent the formalised mechanics of self-referential 
rule-making, built on useful, but constraining communicative redundancies.   
 
An example of a communicative redundancy found within the Law subsystem is its 
understanding of the distinction between questions of law and questions of fact.  This is a 
hugely influential distinction within the Law subsystem.  However, outside the Law the 
distinction is either not recognised or means something completely different.  A ‘non-law’ 
observer of a criminal trial will see the question of whether someone is guilty or not 
guilty as a factual question, yet for lawyers it is a purely legal question determined by the 
fact-based answers to several purely legal questions, articulated in jury instructions.
 130
   
For Nobles and Schiff, this latent difference in the functioning of the legal subsystems 
compared with other subsystems, such as the media, can generate hostile views of the 
legal system, based on the legal system’s inability to reproduce the media’s understanding 
of convictions based on a factual finding of guilt.
131
  From the perspective of the media, 
appeals which succeed on procedural grounds are ‘technical acquittals’ after which, in the 
media’s eyes, the defendant remains guilty; while appeals which fail in the face of 
widespread media reporting of the defendant’s innocence represent miscarriages of justice.  
Both outcomes can result in a reduction in public confidence in the criminal justice 
system, linked to the media’s understanding and report of the case.  For the Law 
subsystem, which centres its operation on criminal justice and procedure, the media’s 
irritations can jeopardise the routine operations of the system and consequently its ability 
to perform its subsystem function, whilst retaining popular legitimacy.
132
  So for lawyers 
‘law’ and ‘fact’ incorporate a complex and established set of understandings about the 
different facets of legal decision-making; in that sense they are useful redundancies that 
do a completely different job within law than they do in other subsystems.   
Communicative redundancies are also constraining in that they result in communication 
with the environment, but this communication does not incorporate all the nuanced 
understandings associated with the terms when the communication was formed, within 
the Law subsystem.   
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Rules of evidence are a further communicative redundancy upon which the Law 
subsystem bases its behaviour, but which give rise to communicative barriers between the 
Law subsystem and other parts of the social system.  One recurrent issue within criminal 
law, and also in terrorism law, is the fact that people who are known to be criminals 
cannot be charged and convicted. From a non Law perspective this is a failure of the legal 
system: if it is a known and demonstrable fact that an individual is guilty of criminal 
conduct then, by definition, subsystems such as the media would expect that the 
individual is charged with an offence and convicted.  However, within the legal system a 
charge and conviction are contingent upon satisfying rules of evidence and the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Internal rules within the Law subsystem 
built on communicative redundancies about what counts as evidence and presumptions of 
innocence, such as the need to protect sources in vulnerable positions; the inability to 
introduce evidence procured by certain suspect means; the fact that the prosecution can 
have enough information that would persuade a reasonable person that the individual in 
question is guilty of the criminal conduct but not have enough to persuade a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt, shape the legal subsystem’s operations.  However, these mean nothing 
outside the legal subsystem, which only observes that the individual engaged in legally 
prohibited conduct.    
 
Just as Law subsystem communications are not understood in the same way when they 
are received outside the subsystem as they are understood when formed within the 
subsystem, when the Law subsystem is required to interpret situations in the real world 
which do not easily fit into the legal subsystem’s own distinctions, the Law subsystem’s 
communicative redundancies operate as a constraint on its response.   Decisions made, for 
example, by employment tribunals about whether a dismissal was ‘reasonable’ defy 
categorisation as either fact or law.   When faced with such situations, therefore, the legal 
system incrementally redefines its operational terms or builds new factors into the 
existing analysis, but does so in a way consistent with or analogous to some earlier 
decision on another issue.  The Law subsystem may, for example, resort to arguments 
over definitions, or to developing hybrid concepts like the notion of ‘mixed questions of 
law and fact’.  In this way the law openly builds on its own redundancies, is constrained 
by the need to fit within existing understandings or build modifications based on 
previously accepted logic, and ends up describing the world in a way that would not be 
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understood outside the legal system.
133
 
 
Another example, of a disjunct between the legal subsystem’s own workings and how 
they are understood by other subsystems, as well as the influence of this on subsystem 
autopoietic behaviours, is the law/equity distinction.   The Law subsystem maintains a 
self-created distinction between courts acting in equity and in law. To non-law observers 
this is unsatisfactory: they want the Law to tell them the rules within which they must act.  
For such, ‘non-law’ observers, equity rulings serve that function and are made by courts.  
Consequently, they are understood by other subsystems as constituting “Law”.  However, 
the legal system itself maintains that they are merely equitable decisions.  A situation may 
arise, for example, when another subsystem, such as business of economy, wants to know 
whether someone has a legal right to some money.  In the case of a trust the law 
subsystem will determine that the trustee a legal interest in the money, but the beneficiary 
has an equitable interest in the money. This distinction is unhelpful for the non-legal 
subsystem, which understands only that the beneficiary is legally entitled to the money.   
 
The theoretical background of social systems theory will be used to analyse the operations 
and communications of the law-making, policing and judicial subsystems in the US and 
UK in an effort to understand the racial effect of the counter-terrorism stop, search and 
surveillance powers in both countries.  This analysis will compare the self-determined 
patterns of subsystem behaviour upon which each subsystem founded its operational 
legitimacy with the actual behaviour in response to the environmental irritants and 
communications arising from the threat of terrorist attack.  Before embarking on this 
analysis, the next chapter sets out the legal powers and empirical evidence which provide 
the case study for the social systems-based analysis. 
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Chapter Two: Legal Powers and Racial Effect 
 
Having set out the theoretical framework for this thesis this chapter sets out the legal and 
empirical context for this analysis.  This chapter, therefore, provides a detailed description 
of the legal powers that are used as the case study for the claim of the unintended racial 
effect of the counter-terrorism powers, before setting out some key pieces of evidence 
upon which these claims are premised. 
 
2.1 Legal Powers 
 
This analysis uses the stop and search powers within s.44 of the Terrorism Act and the 
surveillance and records search provisions in ss.214-15 of the Patriot Act as case studies 
through which to suggest a systems-based explanation for one form of undesired outcome 
of the operations of subsystems which feed into the legal system.  These powers have 
been chosen because, despite the fact that the powers differ, the use of both powers has 
given rise to claims of racially uneven policing.
134
   The use of different powers helps to 
separate the claims regarding the origins of the racial effect of counter-terrorism policing, 
from a specific type of police behaviour.  Instead, it suggests that there are particular 
factors and circumstances which cause some statutory provisions, to have a 
discriminatory effect.  This thesis considers the implementation and operation of the two 
police powers in a parallel analysis of the two powers as a means of uncovering what 
these additional factors are, how they arise, and, therefore, how this effect may be avoided 
in future.     
 
2.1.1 UK Power: Stop and Search 
 
The stop and search powers within s.44 of the Terrorism Act replaced the latest of what 
had been a succession of temporary powers.
135
  Following their enactment the powers 
were extended to the British Transport Police (‘BTP’), the Civil Nuclear Constabulary 
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and the Ministry of Defence Police.
136
   Following the ECtHR decision in the case of 
Gillan and Quinton v The United Kingdom,
137
 the UK Government announced the 
suspension of s.44.
138
   The powers have subsequently been repealed and replaced,
139
 
providing a natural chronological end point with the case study of s.44 offered herein.  
Despite the repeal of the s.44 power the use of this statutory provision as a case study for 
the racial effect of counter-terrorism police powers remains relevant because of what it 
reveals about the understanding of each subsystem with regard to its own behaviour and 
its effect, as compared to the understanding of this from the perspective of other 
subsystems.  The permanent enactment of the power followed a review of counter-terror 
legislation conducted by Lord Lloyd of Berwick.
140
 Whilst recommending the passage of 
permanent powers Lord Lloyd acknowledged that such powers should not be given 
lightly or used freely.
141
  Section 44, like its predecessor powers, enabled police officers 
to stop and search individuals without individualised suspicion of wrong-doing, as a 
means of countering the threat of terrorist attack within the country.
142
   
 
Section 44 provided that, subject to obtaining a relevant authorisation, a police constable 
in uniform could stop and search any vehicle, its driver, passenger(s) and anything in or 
on the vehicle or carried by the driver or passenger within the area or place specified in 
the authorisation.
143
  Authorisations under s.44 also permitted any constable in uniform to 
stop and search a pedestrian, and anything carried by the pedestrian, in an area or at a 
place specified in the authorisation.
144
  The s.44 powers could be utilised irrespective of 
any suspicion on the part of the officer that the individual subject to the search was in any 
way involved in terrorist activities.  Indeed, in the event of such officer suspicion the s.44 
power was usurped by the suspicion-based stop and search powers in s.43 of the 
Terrorism Act, which provide for the stopping and searching of an individual whom a 
constable reasonably suspects of being a terrorist.
145
  The whole purpose of s.44, therefore, 
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was to enable officers to stop and search an individual in the absence of any objectively 
determined grounds for doing so.  The policing freedom arising from the suspicion-less 
nature of s.44 was counter-balanced by the limited scope of the search that could be 
conducted.  These limitations included the fact that when exercising the power an officer 
could not require a person to remove any clothing in public, except for headgear, footwear, 
an outer coat, a jacket or gloves.
146
  Stops and searches carried out under s.44 were also 
restricted to searching for articles of a kind which could be used in connection with 
terrorism,
147
 although its suspicion-less nature meant that there was no requirement that 
the searching officer had any grounds for suspecting that articles of this kind were 
present.
148
  The officer conducting the search was authorised to seize and retain any 
article discovered during the search which he reasonably suspected was intended to be 
used in connection with terrorism.
149
   Following a stop and/ or search the individual 
targeted was provided with a written statement as evidence of the stop and search that had 
been carried out.
150
 
 
The written authorisation necessary for use of the suspicion-less stop and search power 
had to be sanctioned by a police officer of at least the rank of chief constable, or 
equivalent, in the area that the authorisation related to.
151
  The authorisation could be 
given orally, provided that it was confirmed in writing as soon as reasonably 
practicable.
152
  Aside from the seniority requirement the only other pre-condition for the 
grant of an authorisation was that the individual granting the authorisation considered it to 
be expedient for the prevention of acts of terrorism.
153
  Once granted authorisations had to 
be confirmed by the Secretary of State within 48 hours,
154
 and the authorising officer was 
required to inform the Secretary of State of the grant of the authorisation as soon as it was 
reasonably practicable to do so.
155
  If the authorisation was not confirmed within 48 hours 
it ceased to have effect, although the lawfulness of any actions carried out whilst it was 
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active were unaffected.
156
  Authorisations could be granted for a maximum period of 28 
days,
157
 although the authorisation could be cancelled by the Secretary of State at any 
time during this period.
158
  Despite the maximum duration, the authorisation could also be 
renewed an unlimited number of times, so that it could take effect as an indefinite, rolling 
authorisation.   
 
Under the Terrorism Act it was an offence for an individual to fail to submit to a stop or 
search when required to do so by an officer exercising the s.44 power, or to wilfully 
obstruct an officer in the exercise of that power.
159
  The penalty for committing such an 
offence was imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months; a fine or both.
160
  However, 
the mere act of an individual refusing to be subject to an s.44 stop and search could 
provide the officer with reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop and search under an 
alternative provision, such as s.43, or even to arrest the individual on suspicion of being a 
terrorist.
161
   Once targeted for an s.44 stop and search, therefore, there was no means by 
which an individual could guarantee avoiding police attention. 
 
The requirement that s.44 had to be used in connection with counter-terrorism policing, 
made the definition of ‘terrorism’ important in determining when and how the powers 
could be utilised.  The Terrorism Act 2000 defined ‘terrorism’ as the use or threat of 
action which involves: (a) serious violence against a person; (b) damage to property; (c) 
endangers a person’s life, except that of the individual committing the action; (d) creates a 
serious risk to health or safety of the public or a section of the public or (e) is designed 
seriously to interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic system,
162
 if the use or threat 
is designed to influence the government and is made to advance a political, religious or 
ideological cause.
163
  For the purposes of s.44, the definition included any person who had 
committed an offence under the Act,
164
 or was, or had been, concerned in the commission, 
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preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.
165
  This definition afforded the meaning of 
‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’ a very wide scope, not simply referring to specifically pre-
ordained offences, but also including the ‘catch-all’ provision relating to any form of 
involvement in ‘acts of terrorism’.166   Parliamentary focus on the definition of ‘terrorism’ 
during the debates concerning the draft Terrorism Act
167
 reflects something of its 
politically charged nature.
168
  This is further indicated by the difficulty experienced in 
achieving a consensus regarding what was the appropriate definition, a difficulty also 
reflected within international law.
169
  The legislature’s debate about the definition voiced 
a concern that it should not be drawn too broadly
170
 or in a way that would cast ‘long and 
dark shadows over the nature of democratic society and open government’. 171   In 
responding to concerns over the breadth of the definition the Government sought to ‘make 
it clear that the new definition will not catch the vast majority of so-called domestic 
activist groups’.172  This assurance acknowledged that wholly domestic activities would 
be differentiated from international activities, and subject to the catch all ‘domestic 
extremism’ label.   
 
2.1.2 US Power: Surveillance and Records Searches 
 
The US powers within ss.214-15 of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 enable electronic 
surveillance and records searches to be conducted by federal law enforcement officers, 
without the need for individualised suspicion, provided that the operations may be 
relevant to a foreign intelligence investigation.
173
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Section 214 amended pre-existing FBI surveillance powers, within the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,
174
 by expanding the range of information which 
could be captured through the use pen registers
175
 and trap and trace devices,
176
 as well as 
by extending the powers to apply to electronic communications, including the Internet 
and email.
177
  Section 214 prohibits the capture of the contents of the communication, but 
does enable the surveillance of unique data that provides detailed information regarding 
the use of these forms of communication, such as URLs generated while using the 
Internet.
178
  Under s.214 pen registers and trap and trace devices may be authorised for 
any investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information to protect against international 
terrorism.
179
   The power applies to both US citizens and non-citizens, although activities 
of US citizens which are protected by the First Amendment are excluded from the remit 
of the authorisation.
180
  Prior to the enactment of the Patriot Act the use of pen registers 
and trap and trace devices could only be used against non-citizens.
181
  The Patriot Act also 
removed previously existing geographical limitations to the judicial authorisations, and in 
so doing made it easier for the FBI to undertake surveillance and monitor an individual, 
without any suspicion of their involvement in terrorist activities.    
 
As well as broadening the potential use of pen registers and trap and trace devices the 
Patriot Act also removed the warrant requirement that had previously existed.  Instead of 
a warrant being required for the implementation of a pen register or trap and trace device 
applications only need to include a certification by the applicant that the information 
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likely to be obtained is foreign intelligence information not concerning a US citizen, or is 
relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities.
182
  The power, therefore, may be used on the basis of 
the low standard of ‘relevance’, as opposed to the more generally applicable 
constitutional standards of either reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
183
  In addition, 
the ‘relevance’ does not need to relate to a particular national security-related 
investigation or crime.  Instead, it is sufficient that the information is likely to be relevant 
to the general threat from terrorism.  Consequently, s.214 combines expanded 
surveillance methods with a lower threshold requirement for their use.  Finally, the 
‘relevance’ of the information that may be obtained is assessed by the federal officer 
seeking the authorisation.  Therefore, not only is the standard low, but it is applied on the 
basis of the subjective assessment of the police applicant, without any objectively applied 
test or oversight.  The suspicion-less use of the surveillance powers is a departure from 
the normal statutory and common law standards for police surveillance, and has led to the 
power being described as probably the most significant change to police powers 
occasioned by the Patriot Act.
184
 
 
Section 215 of the Patriot Act amended Title V of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act by replacing ss.501-03 to permit the US Government to access private personal 
records of citizens and non-citizens, which are held by third parties.
185
  The statutory 
revision means that, upon obtaining a court order, the Government may search and seize 
‘any tangible things for an investigation to protect against international terrorism’,186 
including records held by bookshops and libraries.
187
  Businesses and organisations from 
which the records are obtained are prevented from notifying the individual to whom the 
records relate meaning that such searches can be conducted without any knowledge of 
their occurrence.
188
  External information concerning the use of the power is limited to a 
semi-annual report by the Attorney General to the Committee on Intelligence of the 
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House of Representative and the Senate detailing the number of requests made under the 
provision.   
 
Section 215 is subject to a sunset clause that is currently due to expire on 31 December 
2015.  Its temporary nature was retained when many other surveillance powers under the 
Patriot Act were made permanent under the Patriot Act Improvement and Reauthorisation 
Act of 2005.
189
  This may be attributable to the controversy surrounding the very low 
threshold test for use of s.215.
190
  If an application for use of s.215 demonstrates, through 
a statement of facts, that the ‘tangible things’ to be searched are relevant to an authorised 
investigation this threshold is surpassed.  Further, the requirement is automatically 
satisfied if the records pertain to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; the 
activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power; or an individual who is in contact with, 
or known to, a suspected agent.
191
   Because there is no need to show probable cause, that 
the records are related to terrorist activities, the FBI does not need to believe that the 
individual targeted is actually involved in terrorism, either directly or indirectly.
192
  In 
addition use of the s.215 power can be based partially on the First Amendment activities 
of a US citizen or permanent resident, or solely on such activities of non-citizens.
193
    
 
As in the UK the scope of the Patriot Act’s surveillance and records search powers are 
affected by the definition of ‘terrorism’, adopted.  Within the statute “terrorism” is 
defined as any act that ‘appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, [or] affect 
the conduct of a government’. 194  The definition of “terrorism” includes a new crime of 
‘domestic terrorism’, which is defined as activities that: (A) involve acts dangerous to 
human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (B) 
appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the 
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a 
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government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
 195
  The breadth of the definition 
necessarily increases the level of discretion involved in determining whether the powers 
are applied, especially because, due to resource considerations, officers must make 
operational decisions as to where to target the powers. 
 
Congressional debate concerning the definition of terrorism is revealing in what it shows 
about the relative governmental priorities in tackling terrorism.
196
  The key US reference 
to the definition of terrorism used within the Patriot Act was during the meeting of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary.  During the discourse congressman Robert Scott noted 
that the definition of domestic terrorism was too broad and unclear, and would include 
activities that ‘few of us would define as domestic terrorism’.197  To emphasise his point 
Scott stated that it was essential to ‘make certain that only those individuals who had the 
traditional means to do a terrorist act are investigated and prosecuted as terrorists, not the 
protestor at an abortion, nor the student protestor who is sitting out in the dean’s 
office’. 198   In response to these concerns James Sensenbrenner, acting as Chairman, 
merely replied that ‘terrorism is terrorism’.199  Conversely, in the UK supporters of the 
definition of terrorism sought to assure its critics that there was no intention to use the 
powers against individuals who could, but would not previously have, come within the 
definition.
200
  This distinction indicates that while from the outset the UK law-making 
subsystem was crafting ‘terrorism’ with a particular type of activity in mind, no such 
limitation was accepted in the US.  These types of subsystem assumption suggest that 
dominant group assumptions were already shaping the operations of the law-making 
subsystem and the way in which the statutory powers were shaped and expected to be 
used.  This thesis argues that one effect of these assumptions was the racial effect of the 
powers.  Chapters three to eight explore the systems behaviours which contributed to this 
effect, but the next section sets out some of the evidence of the occurrence of this effect. 
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2.2 Evidence of Racial Effect 
 
The broad drafting of the s.44 and ss.214-215 powers and the low evidential standard for 
their use were described as being nothing more than pragmatic, necessary legislative 
choices.
201
  However, this thesis asserts that each of the powers have been 
disproportionately utilised against individuals on the basis of their religion and/or their 
ethnic or racial origin.
202
  Against this disproportionality, claims pertaining to the 
neutrality of the powers can only be sustained by those who maintain that racial equality 
is achieved through identical treatment and, therefore, that racially-silent legislation is 
racially equal legislation.
203
  ‘Racial’ here is used to denote a visible, though possibly 
heterogeneous, minority community, as opposed to a group whose members belong to a 
single race or share a common ethnic background.  It is acknowledged that the terrorist 
threat against which s.44 of the Terrorism Act and ss.214-215 of the Patriot Act were 
predominantly used may be characterised as existing along religious lines.  However, the 
nexus between religion and the implementation of the stop, search and surveillance 
powers is imprecise, because of the limited ability to determine a person’s religion by 
their physical appearance, with race consequently acting as a proxy for religion.
204
  It was 
‘Muslim-looking’ minorities who bore the brunt of the powers, meaning that the disparate 
impact can be described as operating along ‘racial lines’ and giving the powers a racial 
effect.  The powers, therefore, contributed to a ‘religioning [of] race’.205     
 
The different nature of the counter-terrorism powers in each country necessities that 
evidence of their racial effect is established differently.  In particular, the US powers lend 
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themselves to covert use, meaning that, unlike UK stop and search data, published 
statistics concerning the nature of the implementation of the powers are very limited. It is 
therefore necessary to build up a picture from other available evidence to explore whether 
the powers have a racial effect, as is considered in the following sections. 
 
2.2.1 Racial Effect of UK Stop and Search 
 
A number of tests have been widely used to show the racial effect of UK counter-
terrorism stop and search powers.  One such test is the disproportionality ratio, which 
indicates how much more likely racial minority individuals are stopped and searched than 
white individuals.  Disproportionality is assessed by comparing the proportion of 
individuals subject to stops and searches from each ethnic and racial group, compared to 
their proportion of the local resident population, as established by returns from the 
national census.  A second test is the number of excess searches, which reveals how many 
more stops and searches are conducted against racial minorities than would be the case if 
they were targeted at the same rate as white individuals.
206
  The disproportionate and excessive 
use of stop and search powers against a particular ‘suspect community’207 has been a consistent, 
statistically established characteristic of this form of policing, albeit that the identity of 
the community has changed in line with contemporary political and policing priorities.
208
  
Indeed, Paddy Hillyard and Janie Percy-Smith predicted that the recommended extension 
of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Protections) Act 1989, to include international 
terrorism as well as domestic terrorism,
209
 would mean that racial minorities would 
receive disproportionate police attention in a comparable way to that experienced by the 
Irish.
210
  The crudeness of the created ‘suspect community’ is suggested by the targeting 
of Sikh individuals, mistakenly associated with the threat from international terrorism 
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because of their turbans, after 9/11.
211
    
 
Statistics collected and published by the Home Office
212
 indicate that since its 
implementation s.44 was consistently deployed disproportionately and excessively against 
individuals belonging to ethnic minority groups, as compared to white individuals.
213
  
Between 2001 and 2003 the proportion of white individuals subject to suspicion-less 
stopping and searching fell from 72 per cent to 63 per cent.
214
  Figures published in 2004 
showed that Asian and black people were four and five times more likely, respectively, to 
be stopped and searched than white people.
215
  The disproportionate targeting of Asian 
people increased further following 7/7, demonstrating the ease with which the pre-
existing statutory provisions enabled the targeting of minorities.
216
  More recently, the 
disproportionate use of the powers continued, so that in the data year covering 2008/9, of 
185,086 individuals stopped and searched by the MPS under s.44, 58 per cent were self-
described as white; around 16 per cent as Asian and around 11 per cent black.
217
  In 2010, 
a report by human rights group Liberty concluded that black and Asian individuals were 
between five and seven times more likely to be stopped under s.44 than their white 
counterparts.
218
  That this increase was at least partially attributable to broad-brush, race-
based profiling was apparently accepted by a member of the Metropolitan Police who 
stated that ‘intelligence cannot lead to a 1,100% increase; this is just random stop and 
search’.219  When the ‘random’ searches are consistently focused on Asian and Arabic 
individuals in circumstances where such bias is known it must be questioned how truly 
random this result is or whether it is a manifestation of racially biased policing.   
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In the event that police use of s.44 had resulted in the discovery of significant numbers of 
terrorists or the uncovering of planned terrorist attacks then there may be grounds for 
arguing that, despite their racially uneven use the powers were a justifiable response to 
the need to safeguard public security.
220
  However this argument is negated by the 
particularly low ‘hit rate’221 arising from use of the powers222 as compared to the ordinary 
hit rate arising from police stops and searches.
223
  The persistently low arrest and 
conviction rates arising from use of s.44 are exemplified by the fact that in the year 
2004/5, with only five individuals, all of whom were white, were arrested, a hit rate of 1.2 
per cent.
224
  Further, out of over 100,000 s.44 stops and searches conducted in 2008/9 
there were no terrorism-related convictions.
225
  Indeed, in the period between April 2007 
and April 2009 there were no successful prosecutions for terrorism-related offences 
arising from the use of s.44, despite almost 450,000 such stops and searches having been 
carried out.
226
  As well as failing to secure arrests or convictions the Independent 
Reviewer of counter-terrorism powers, in 2010 Lord Carlile, expressed his doubts that 
anything more than ‘morsels of intelligence’, at best, had been obtained from use of the 
suspicion-less powers.
227
  These are arguments against the efficacy of the powers 
themselves but also serve to counter any possible suggestion that racial disproportionality 
in the deployment of the powers could be justified by their use in safeguarding national 
security. 
 
Faced with growing evidence of the racial effect of s.44 the Government specifically 
sought to separate statistical disproportionality from consciously or unconsciously 
discriminatory police behaviour.
228
  On top of the purely statistical evidence of the racial 
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effect of the powers, however, these claims are also made out through evidence from a 
number of different sources, including: governmental comments;
229
 individual 
testimonies;
230
 official reviews;
231
 rights groups’ surveys; 232  police reports; 233  and 
anecdotal evidence.
234
  The empirical basis for the perception of disproportionality is also 
supported by the findings of a House of Commons Home Affairs Committee.
235
 Police 
sources themselves also increasingly voiced concerns regarding the disproportionate use 
of s.44.
236
  A report by the MPA, for example, acknowledged that such uneven 
deployment of the powers could ‘only be fully understood as perhaps the most recent 
manifestation of this long legacy and historical relationship between the police and Black 
people’, and described it as a concerning reflection of police culture and practice. 237  
Further, in 2006, the Deputy Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Peter 
Clarke, was quoted as saying that the s.44 powers must be ‘much more tightly focused’ to 
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Committee Stage Briefing on the Crime and Security Bill in the House of Commons Stop and Search 
Amendments (January 2010) 11-12; and Justice, Home Office Review of Counter-terrorism and Security 
Powers, Written Submission of Justice (August 2010) 16. 
233 See, e.g., MPS, Scrutiny on MPS Stop and Search Practice (May, 2004), para 143 which concluded that 
the use of stop and search in London had a disproportionate impact on Black and minority ethnic people. 
234 See MPA, Counter-terrorism: The London Debate (February 2007) 47; Lord Carlile, Report on the 
Operation in 2008 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 (June, 2009) para 140; 
and BBC News, ‘Terror Watchdog in Search Warning’ (17 June 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8105093.stm, accessed 06.05.2011. 
235 House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, Terrorism and Community Relations, at 153. 
236 See MPA, ‘Stop and Search’, www.mpa.gov.uk/scrutinies/stop-search/, accessed 25.08.2010 and MPA, 
Counter-terrorism: The London Debate (2007). See also Home Office, Stop and Search Interim Guidance 
(Home Office, 2005) which states that ‘ministers believe that disproportionality is too high’, para 1.2 and 
Lord Carlile, Report on the Operation in 2009 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part 1of the Terrorism Act 
2006 (July 2010) para 177. 
237
 MPA, Report of the MPA Scrutiny on MPS Stop and Search Practice (2004) 8-9. 
  
48 
remove their discriminatory and alienating effect.
238
  It is on the basis of a range of 
statistical and other evidence that this thesis contends that s.44 was used in a racially 
uneven and discriminatory manner.    
 
2.2.2 Racial Effect of the US Records Searches and Surveillance 
 
The covert nature of the surveillance powers within ss.214-15 of the Patriot Act means 
that direct statistical information about their use is not readily available.
239
  In addition, 
the US Government has been guarded in releasing any such information,
240
 claiming that 
doing so would compromise national security,
241
 although such claims have been 
criticised.
242
  The information that has been released is limited and even directly 
contradictory.
243
  The limited statistical evidence regarding use of ss.214-15 does not, 
however, mean that the powers are any less rights-infringing than overtly deployed 
powers, such as s.44.  In fact, covert methods have long been recognised as being more 
likely to intrude on political and religious activities, than powers used in full view of the 
                                               
238 Quoted in A. Travis, ‘Use of ‘Stop and Search’ Terror Law ‘Alienating Muslims’, Warns Yard’ The 
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Power to Check Library Records’ NY Times (19 September 2003) at A16 which stated that the power had 
not been used.  However, conflicting evidence demonstrates that the power had been used prior to this 
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cent one year later.  See Library Research Center, University of Illinois at Urbara, Public Libraries 
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public.
244
  However, the inherent difficulty in employing statistical measures to establish 
the racial effect is that the powers are covertly deployed and published information 
regarding the extent and nature of their use remains limited.  Individual case studies and 
testimonies offer an insight into specific instances where the powers have been apparently 
deployed based on nothing more than an individual’s ethnic or religious affiliation.  This 
has included reports concerning the surveillance of Muslim communities, organisations 
and charities.
245
      
 
The use of electronic surveillance to monitor Muslims, particularly those from minority 
racial groups, has included checking telephone calls, emails and internet use, credit card 
charges and travel routes.
246
  Such investigations have extended to places of work, homes 
and universities as well as friends and family of the targeted individual.
247
   This 
discriminatory focus is apparently sanctioned by FBI guidelines which, despite 
undergoing a number of revisions in the post-9/11 period, have consistently allowed 
federal agents to use an individual’s race and religion as relevant considerations when 
deciding where to commence surveillance.
248
  The Patriot Act provides unequal de facto 
protection against the misuse of powers that exist under the Act, particularly in relation to 
the enhanced surveillance clauses.
249
  Although it is clear that police counter-terror racial 
profiling extends beyond the powers in ss.214-15 of the Patriot Act,
250
 evidence of the 
disproportionate impact of these powers on people of Asian, Arabic and Muslim origins 
provide a case study through which to analyse the racial effect of the powers. 
 
Academic comment in the US has vociferously condemned a range of counter-terror 
surveillance powers for their race-targeting nature.
251
   The Lawyers Commission for 
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Human Rights, for example, has claimed that through use of the powers ‘the US has lost 
something essential and defining: some of the most cherished principles on which the 
country is founded have been eroded or disregarded’.252  Other human rights groups, such 
as ACLU, Arab American Anti-Discrimination Committee, and the Council on Islamic 
Relations, have campaigned specifically against the discriminatory nature of ss.214-15.
253
  
The potential for the misuse of policing powers to exacerbate, as opposed to lessen, the 
threat from terrorism has also been recognised.  The FBI, for example, has noted, with 
concern, that ‘distorted and inflammatory linkages between Islam and terrorism can 
convince Muslims that the West is their enemy’.254   Such official acknowledgement of 
the detrimental effect of the surveillance and records search powers echoes a more 
widespread public sentiment condemning the racial effect of the powers.
255
   A further 
suggestion of the Patriot Act’s racially uneven and ineffective nature is that a number of 
states, cities and communities have adopted ordinances and resolutions expressing their 
opposition to the Act and its rights-infringing surveillance powers.
256
 Even some 
individuals responsible for implementing the powers have subsequently criticised their 
ineffective and racially targeted nature.
257
   
 
The racial effect of the Patriot Act’s vague and broadly-drafted counter-terrorism power is 
also evident in the enforcement of counter-terrorism laws against American Muslim 
charities.  These powers are, of course, different in their nature and effect to the 
surveillance and records searches powers, but their racial effect demonstrates the 
implications of comparably broadly defined powers to those granted in ss.214-215.
258
  A 
report by the ACLU quotes a Department of Treasury official suggesting that an 
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unquestioned, commonsense link could be drawn between race and terrorism, saying that: 
‘We are not going into Irish bars looking for people who support the IRA…There is a 
greater proportion of Muslims engaged in ethnic terror than other groups.  Everybody 
knows [targeting Muslim charities is] not baseless’.259   Individual case studies also offer 
specific instances of where counter-terrorism powers appear to have been deployed on 
nothing more than an individual’s ethnic or religious affiliation.260   Some such examples 
are set out in a 2003 report by the Office of the Inspector General which stated that out of 
762 cases reviewed many of the tips and leads on which the police acted were based on 
ethnic profiling, by both the police and the public. In all of the 762 cases reviewed the 
individuals came from countries in the Middle East or Pakistan, and none were ever 
charged with participating in, or lending support to, terrorist activities.   The report found 
that individuals were on occasion arrested merely on the basis of their presence in a 
particular vicinity, coupled with their own ethnic background.
261
  Further case studies 
showing evidence of racially uneven policing have been collected and published by the 
American-Arab Antidiscrimination Committee, Amnesty International and the American 
Civil Liberties Union.
262
    
 
One example of police use of ethnicity-based profiling is the treatment of Tariq Ramadan.  
Ramadan, a Swiss native and Muslim scholar, had his US visa revoked in August 2004 on 
the basis that the Department of Homeland Security was permitted to do so, wherever the 
Government believes an individual to ‘endorse or espouse terrorist activity’. 263   The 
Government had no grounds for believing Ramadan had either espoused or endorsed 
terrorist activity, except that he was a Muslim of Egyptian descent.  A further case study is 
that of Sami Al-Hussayen, a Saudi Arabian born student who had been studying in the US 
since 1994.  Al-Hussayen was charged with running a website which supported 
terrorism.
264
  Again the government had no grounds for targeting Al-Hussayen – except 
his racial and religious background, although he was later deported by immigration 
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authorities on grounds that he had breached the terms of his student visa by working. 
Whilst there is no suggestion that the publicised case studies are entirely representative of 
the way that the powers have been used neither are they unique, and as such do suggest 
that the counter-terrorism powers have been deployed on the basis of racial profiles.  
Alongside anecdotal evidence
265
 and further individual case studies
266
 the media’s support 
of profiling
267
 also gives a strong indication of popular support for racially deployed 
counter-terrorism surveillance powers.
268
  Although the covert nature of the surveillance 
and record search powers make it difficult to establish the full extent of their use or race-
based targeting, therefore, a range of evidence suggests that such targeting was a part of 
their deployment by the police in the US. 
 
2.2.3 Criticisms of the Empirical Evidence of Racial Effect 
 
Having set out the evidence pertaining to the racial effect of counter-terrorism stop, 
search and surveillance, it is necessary to address the critics of such claims.   
 
In the UK the statistical evidence of the racial effect of stop and search is disputed on the 
basis of how disproportionality is assessed and the limitations of compiling evidence of 
racial effect from police data.
269
  In particular, studies of stop and search powers, not 
specific to s.44, have criticised the assessment of disproportionality by comparing 
numbers of stops and searches with the ethnic make-up of the resident population, based 
on the most recent census returns.
270
  This measure has been described as ‘profoundly 
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misleading’ as it is not adjusted to take into account the growing ethnic population 
structures.
271
  In addition, attempts to assess the ethnic make-up of the people actually 
‘available’ to stop and search, have found that this can differ significantly from that of the 
resident population, against which disproportionality is assessed.
272
 In particular, because 
s.44 was predominantly used within London, critics of the disproportionality thesis, such 
as Sveinsson, have argued that it should be judged by comparing the racial breakdown of 
individuals stopped and searched with the specific ethnic composition of the capital city.  
Sveinsson’s revised figures do result in a reduction of the disproportionality, but across all 
stop and search powers Asians remain 1.3 times more likely than white individuals to be 
stopped and searched (from five and a half time more likely under the national census 
figures).
273
  Aside from the specific criticisms, the data relating to stop and search has 
been described as ‘simplistic’ and as unable to give any useful indication of whether or 
not use of the powers was discriminatory.
274
 
 
Claims of disproportionality have also been opposed based on suggestions that police 
officers are more likely to record a minority individual’s ethnic origin than the ethnic 
origin of a white individual,
275
 as a result of police sensitivity to issues surrounding 
disproportionality.
276
  Conversely, the police have been accused of stopping white 
individuals as a means of balancing statistical racial disproportionality,
277
 a practice that 
was confirmed by a member of the BTP, in 2010.
278
  Therefore, while comparisons 
between the number of recorded stops and searches and the numbers in the resident 
population remain important in describing the different experiences of stop and searches 
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for different ethnic communities, they may provide a poor overall indication of the 
existence of any police bias in the deployment of the powers.
279
  By contrast, despite the 
limitations of the statistical evidence, other studies have maintained that the pattern of use 
of stop and search, and in particular suspicion-less stop and search, bears out its racial 
effect.
280
  
 
In the US the lack of published data regarding use of the surveillance powers has led to 
criticism of arguments regarding their racial effect.
281
  Further, what published figures 
there are suggest that their deployment is so numerically insignificant that any effect, 
even if present, is minimal.
282
  This in turn has led to claims that any such effects are 
justifiable in light of the severity of the terrorist threat.
283
  In addition, some sources 
concede that the powers have been deployed in a racially uneven manner, but support use 
of profiling as the best means of countering the terrorist threat.
284
   
 
The data in both the US and UK are inevitably imperfect,
285
 and in themselves reveal 
little of either the depth of feeling around the stop, search and surveillance powers,
286
 or 
‘the significant and multi-layered emotional, psychological and other impacts on those 
stopped and searched’. 287   However, they remain an important indication of racially 
uneven policing.  For example, arguments which cite the ethnic composition of the on-
street population as removing any apparent disproportionality ignore the recurrent trend 
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by which these are the very areas in which stop and search use is concentrated, without 
this necessarily corresponding with local crime rates or a geographically specific high 
threat of terrorist attack.
288
  Once such a factor is accepted, even if police officers acted 
entirely neutrally with regard to race their actions would still have a disproportionate 
racial effect,
289
 arising from the operational decisions which led to the use of stop and 
search in a particular location.
290
  Decisions which involve focusing police resources in 
public spaces as opposed to less visible offending, which is predominantly committed by 
more affluent groups, have also been linked to a particular, politically informed focus on 
reducing crime in a way which weighs most heavily on racial minority groups.
291
  
 
Instead of disproving the disproportionality thesis, therefore, arguments against the 
racially uneven use of police counter-terrorism powers may simply indicate that the 
origins of the racial effect of policing are elsewhere than simply residing in conscious 
officer behaviour.
292
  A further factor of the stop and search statistics which casts doubt on 
the validity of the ‘available population’ thesis is that there is less marked 
disproportionality in stop and account figures based on reasonable suspicion of criminal 
behaviour, as compared to suspicion-less stop and search.
293
  This discrepancy supports 
the idea that disproportionality is not simply about who is available but also reliant upon 
operational decisions as to how to deploy stop and search powers.  Some critiques of 
statistical arguments of racial disproportionality offer some relevant points, regarding 
their limitations.  However, this thesis maintains that the more persuasive argument is that 
when government actions and statutory powers adhere to endemic discriminatory 
assumptions, which are difficult to explain on race-neutral grounds,
294
 racialized 
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reasons/motives must be afforded serious consideration as a plausible explanation behind 
their use.
295
  
 
Irrespective of whether or not one accepts the evidence of a statistically quantifiable racial 
effect, however, the powers nevertheless have had a detrimental effect on minority 
communities.
296
  This is because their use created, or at least exacerbated, a clear 
perception amongst minorities of a racial effect.
297
  In the US, for example, in a poll 
recorded that after 9/11, 71.7 per cent of respondents believed that the US Government 
was monitoring the activities of Muslims in the United States, as compared to only 4.2 per 
cent who believed that such monitoring was not taking place.
298
  Further research 
indicated that a majority of US Muslims believe counter-terrorism policies to single-out 
Muslims, a sentiment that was shared, albeit to a lesser extent, by a large minority of the 
general population.
299
 This perception, whether or not it is accompanied by actual 
disproportionality, has had the effect of ostracising and alienating certain minority 
communities from majority society in general and law enforcement powers in 
particular.
300
  The practical effects of the real or perceived racially discriminatory use of 
stop, search and surveillance has affected how Muslims and racial minorities have 
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behaved in their daily lives – from their attendance at mosque; willingness to take flights; 
and their use of communications media.
301
  These detrimental effects include untold 
damage to community confidence in the police and law enforcement effectiveness in 
countering terrorism.
302
   
 
2.3 A Critical Race Theory approach to the Racial Effect 
 
This thesis does not argue that the racial effect of the counter-terrorism powers was the 
result of conscious prejudice on the part of the police, or any individual officer.  Instead, 
this thesis approach the statistical evidence of racial disproportionality from the 
perspective advanced within Critical Race Theory (“CRT”).   
 
The CRT movement encompasses a broad range of doctrinal and jurisprudential views 
regarding racial inequality.
303
  Fundamental amongst the various permutations of CRT is 
the principle that race is a social construct.
304
  This claim has effectively become ‘a 
mantra of Critical Race Theory’.305  Although the CRT movement has yet to have a 
significant impact in the UK
306
 the race-crit claim that race is socially constructed is a 
strong theme in both US and UK academic discourse, especially in the field of 
sociology.
307
  These sociological and critical race arguments correspond with Du Bois’ 
focus on the importance of race as a socio-historical concept.
308
  CRT claims that the 
construction of race and race-based hierarchies incorporate socially and historically 
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contingent ideas of racial dominance and subordination,
309
 so that while ‘race is only skin 
deep…white supremacy runs to the bone’ and pervades societal organisation.310  Race-
based social hierarchies conceal the privileges enjoyed by majority groups within policies 
and laws,
311
 through claims of objectivity, neutrality and merit.
312
  Pursuant to this, CRT 
maintains that the strength of social construction is in the treatment of ‘the external world 
as if it determines our ideas, ascribing false concreteness to the categories we have in fact 
identified.
313
   Consequently, for race-crits, racism is ‘not aberrant but rather the natural 
order’ of life.314   
 
CRT is a compelling jurisprudential theory because of the persistence of racial inequality 
in both the US and UK which remain despite efforts to achieve equality within each 
country’s legal system and society.   Racial minority groups in both countries continue to 
have average earnings that are far below that of the white majority groups.
315
  Educational 
and occupational achievements are also highly stratified along racial lines.
316
  Inequality 
appears to pervade society whilst purportedly having been eliminated within the law.   
Some race-crits argue that even advances in rights equality, by which minority groups 
have secured legally-mandated concessions to the racially biased social status quo, are 
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frequently illusory or primarily serve to further the interests of the dominant group.
317
  In 
such examples of ‘Interest Convergence’, 318  white elites tolerate or encourage racial 
advances for minority groups, because doing so promotes the majority’s own self-
interest.
319
  The effect of dominant group interests in constructing and dismantling racial 
hierarchies also determines the fluid construction of the socially subordinate groups, 
which race-crits identify. 
 
The shifting and constructed nature of group identity also means that groups with 
‘honorary majority status’ have been vulnerable to having their superior standing 
withdrawn by the dominant group.
320
  Perhaps the most extreme example of the 
revocation of honorary dominant group standing came in the rounding up and internment 
of 126,000 Japanese, including 70,000 American-born individuals of Japanese descent, 
following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1942.
321
  These race-based 
measures were judicially sanctioned in 1944 through the test case of Koremastu v US,
322
 
even though the executive order out of which the action arose made no mention of race.
323
  
This reclassification of Japanese Americans as an ‘enemy within’ is labelled by race-crits 
as one of the most blatant examples of ‘crisis racism’, and how actions sanctioned by the 
dominant group can change the status of a minority group.
324
  The treatment of Japanese 
Americans during the Second World War has subsequently been widely condemned;
325
 
the Korematsu judgment has been overturned, 
326
 and compensation has been paid to 
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affected individuals.
327
  However, condemnation has not ensured the subsequent 
avoidance of similar patterns of treatment,
328
 whereby non-white groups are classified as 
‘foreign, disloyal, and imminently threatening’ when the social context is seen by the 
dominant group to require it.
329
  For race-crits, therefore, the subordination of different 
racial groups is part of a constructed, flexible and shifting hierarchy which consistently 
works against people of colour.    
 
Illustrating the control that dominant groups have over constructions of racial hierarchies, 
in the post-9/11 context critical race theorists have argued that Asians and Arabic groups 
have been constructed as ‘black’ both by law and their popular treatment.330  Race-crits 
also assert that Asian and Arabic individuals have faced a particular difficulty in resisting 
laws that subject them to detrimental treatment because they do not constitute protected 
minorities during ‘normal’ times, meaning that they fall outside the black/white paradigm 
within which racial inequality is usually characterised.
331
  In fact, in the US the apparent 
acceptability of the prejudice towards this group has been directly attributed to it not 
inflaming old wounds of black/ white ethnic division.
332
  The ‘othering’ of Arabs and 
Asians illustrates how notions of race and religion are increasingly intertwined and 
because these racial minority groups are those most closely associated with the Islamic 
faith they are perceived as a legitimate focus for suspicion.
333
  For race-crits, therefore, 
the aftermath of 9/11 provides a further example in a long-standing history of systemic 
racial inequality.     
 
The broad scope of CRT means that adherents to the movement cite a range of causes of 
societal discrimination.  The most instrumental causes in any given circumstances depend 
on the form of discrimination under consideration, including whether it is conscious or 
unconscious.  The causes of discrimination cited by race-crits also depend on whether a 
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more or less radical form of the theory is being advanced.  Given the multifaceted causes 
of unequal treatment proposed by CRT this thesis focuses on three race-crit claims.  These 
claims link discrimination against minority groups to: the role of politics in formulating 
legal provisions; the provision of unfettered executive discretion in applying and using 
legal powers; and the judiciary’s tendency to defer to legislative and executive decisions 
to the detriment of minority protection.
 334
    
 
2.3.1 Law is Politics 
 
Through their engagement with ‘the politics of difference’ 335 race-crits argue that the 
issues of paramount importance for law-makers reflect political priorities.
336
  
Consequently legal doctrine is a form of political power and a means of furthering that 
power.
337
  The connection between politics and law is primarily manifested through the 
law-making process and means that the popular accountability of political representatives 
is a primary driving force behind the legislative agenda.  Political accountability to public 
opinion means that politicians need to be seen to react to legislation-triggering situations 
in a popularly supported way.  For race-crits, therefore, ostentatious political 
overreactions to popular crises results in racialised law.  This may include over-reacting to 
events, to avoid popular censure from under-reacting, and not making controversial 
statements and policy decisions which can later be turned into political fuel by opposition 
parties.  The political character of law-making means that institutional inattention to the 
impact of politics on law-making behaviour risks perpetuating racist segregation and 
subordination.
338
  The ‘law is politics’ sentiment leads to a tendency that in times of crisis 
political parties unite and avoid divisive debate, whether relating to law-making, its 
implementation or its review.  For race-crits the politicised nature of the law-making 
process affects the way that laws are debated and enacted and the provisions that they 
contain, and makes the purported political neutrality and objectivism of Western liberal 
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rule of law a key target for CRT criticism.
339
   
 
Race-crit arguments as to the discriminatory nature of law, as opposed to simply its 
discriminatory effect, go further than most civil liberties campaigners who continue to 
label the laws neutral, but with racially discriminatory effects or results.  Instead, for race-
crits, racial silence stops being racial neutrality when its uneven effects are known, and 
accepted as inevitable, by those enacting, implementing, using and reviewing the laws.   
An example frequently cited by race-crits in the US is the operation of apparently neutral 
behaviour in jury selection.
340
  Whilst juror selection is ostensibly race-blind the 
underrepresentation of minority groups hints at the existence of structural and institutional 
bias, whereby ‘race-neutral’ selection criteria produce a racially uneven effect.  Factors 
contributing to this effect include the use of voter registration rolls as the source for juror 
selection, so that low registration amongst minority groups disproportionately excludes 
them from service; and the increasing use of ‘blue-ribbon’ juries, in which jurists are 
required to have specialist qualifications and skills, and which therefore 
disproportionately exclude relatively less-educated minority groups.
341
  Historically, a 
comparable effect arose in the US from the use of ‘grandfather clauses’ and literacy 
requirements for voter registration.
342
  Even the use of majority decisions and small-size 
juries in criminal trials have the propensity to weaken the minority voice within the 
criminal justice system, contributing to the continuing criticism of its racially biased 
structure and operation.
343
  According to race-crits even the doctrine of equal protection, 
interpreted as necessitating identical treatment, is a tool by which existing patterns of 
racial hierarchy have been entrenched and reified.
344
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2.3.2 Executive discretion and racial effect 
 
Race-crits also argue that the greater the degree of executive discretion that is 
incorporated into legal provisions the higher the risk that they will be used in a way which 
disadvantages minorities, especially racial and other visible minorities.
345
   For CRT, the 
connection between executive discretion and discriminatory behaviour is exemplified by 
police operations, because although social and legal racism is typically unconscious and 
hidden it can achieve a concrete form through law enforcement behaviour.
346
  This causal 
link is strengthened where executive discretion is accompanied by heightened executive 
powers.  Race-crits suggest that an important reason that this discretion turns from benign 
flexibility to a pernicious power has been particularly attributed to the application of the 
powers on the basis of crude, over-generalised and inaccurate stereotypical views of ‘the 
usual suspects’.347  CRT asserts that conscious prejudice and individual discriminatory 
behaviour have a role in constructing and perpetuating racial inequality.
348
  Most 
adherents to CRT, however, also maintain that discrimination and racial injustice is 
caused by more than consciously discriminatory behaviour: not just about ‘individual 
“bad apple” police officers, but the criminal justice system; not bigoted school-board 
members, but the structures of segregation and wealth transmission’.349  The positioning 
of racism as endemic within society builds upon theories of institutional racism, by which 
discriminatory treatment can occur without the existence of conscious prejudice, and may 
be concealed either intentionally or innocently.
350
  Race-crits consider unconscious 
behaviour, including the unquestioning acceptance of the discriminatory status-quo, to be 
an equally, possibly even more, potent force in the societal subordination of ethnic 
minority groups, than conscious bias.
351
  Such forms of inequality are seen by race-crits 
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as culturally transmitted and a seemingly endemic part of society.
352
 
 
2.3.2 Judicial deference and racial effect 
 
Finally, race-crits cite judicial deference as a key factor contributing to racial bias within 
the law.
353
  Judicial overview of the implementation and use of legislative powers is 
intended to provide a means of checking and balancing in order to prevent any one 
government branch from assuming too much power.  CRT claims, however, that the 
judiciary is self-conditioned to defer to the authority of the legislature and/ or executive 
particularly where minority interests are contrary to those of the majority group and the 
issue is one of high public importance, such as in matters relating to national security.
354
  
Such deference has the effect of unbalancing the checks and balances of the separate 
branches of the legal system, and giving a disproportionate amount of power to the 
executive, especially when judicial deference is coupled with the legislature affording the 
executive a high level of unfettered operational discretion.
355
     
 
One example of the type of judicial deference and its impact in the racial effect of the law 
cited by race-crits is the case of McCleskey v Kemp.
356
   In his dissenting opinion, Justice 
Blackmun opined that while judicial constitutional intervention should be ‘sparingly 
employed’ it was nevertheless ‘the particular role of the courts to hear these [minority] 
voices, for the Constitution declares that the majoritarian chorus may not alone dictate the 
conditions of social life’.357  The gulf between this and the majority decision that it was 
institutionally incompetent to adjudicate the equal protection arguments, illustrates the 
judiciary’s preoccupation with its own limitations in reviewing rights-related issues.  
Even where it is established that race is a significant factor in determining an officer’s 
suspicion the courts have demonstrated a tendency to defer to the law enforcement 
subsystem regarding the efficacy and legitimacy of such race-based generalisations.  In 
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the case of United States v Weaver, for example, the appeal court upheld the use of race 
because ‘facts are not to be ignored simply because they may be unpleasant – and the 
unpleasant fact in this case is that Hicks [the police agent accused of engaging in the 
racially discriminatory behaviour] had knowledge, based on his own experience and upon 
the intelligence reports he had received from the Los Angeles authorities, that young male 
members of black Los Angeles gangs were flooding the Kansas City area with 
cocaine’.358  A comparable deference to law enforcement claims of operational necessity 
and validity was demonstrated in the case of United States v Marquez where the 
suspicion-less, random stops and searches were assumed, without further evidence or 
argument, to have a deterrent factor.
359
 
 
Judicial deference enables the courts to exercise a discretionary level of analysis in its 
adjudication.  Deference is at the heart of the doctrine of the separation of powers in that 
it requires that where a particular issue falls outside the competence of the courts, and 
within that of a different governmental branch, the court should show a level of deference 
to that expertise.
360
  Judicial deference is frequently endorsed on grounds of constitutional 
legitimacy
361
 and/or institutional competency.
362
  The judicial approach to assessing the 
proportionality of a measure in the UK and the varying levels of judicial scrutiny in the 
US are closely related to deference, as the manner in which a court applies these tests 
affects the level of deference it shows to decisions by other subsystems.
363
  Deference can 
also affect judicial decision-making outside considerations of proportionality, including 
through fact deference, whereby the judiciary scrutinizes governmental behaviour, but 
                                               
358 United States v Weaver 636 F.Supp.2d 769 (C.D. Ill., 2009) at para 396. 
359 United States v Marquez, 410 F.3d 612 (9th Cir., 2005).  See also United States v Green, 293 F.3d 855 (5th 
Cir, 2000). 
360 S. Sayeed, ‘Beyond the Language of “Deference”’ [2005] 10 Judicial Review 111, 111. 
361 For a selection of the views concerning this subject see, e.g., F. Klug, ‘Judicial Deference under the 
Human Rights Act’ (2003) 2 EHRLR 125; T. Hickman, ‘Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories 
and the Human Rights Act 1998’ [2005] Public Law 306; T.R.S Allan, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Review: 
A Critique of “Due Deference”’ (2006) 65(3) CLJ 670; A. Tomkins, ‘In Defence of the Political 
Constitution’ (2002) 22(1) OJLS 157; Lord Steyn, ‘Deference:  Tangled Story’ [2005] Public Law 346; R. 
Edwards, ‘Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act’ (2002) 65 MLR 859; P. Craig, ‘The Courts, the 
Human Rights Act and Judicial Review’ (2001) 117 LQR 589; I. Leigh, ‘The Standard of Judicial Review 
after the Human Rights Act’ in H. Fenwick, G. Phillipson and R. Masterman, Judicial Reasoning under the 
UK Human Rights Act (CUP, 2007) 174-205; and D. Pannick, ‘Principles of Interpretation of Convention 
Rights under the Human Rights Act and the Discretionary Area of Judgment’ (1998) Public Law 545. 
362 See, e.g., M. Hunt, and M. Dennetriou, ‘Is there a Role for the “Margin of Appreciation” in National 
Law after the Human Rights Act?’ [1999] EHRLR 15, 22; and R.A. MacDonald, ‘Postscript and Prelude – 
the Jurisprudence of the Charter: Eighth Thesis’ (1982) 4 Sup. Ct. L. Rev 321, 337. 
363 D. Dyzenhaus, ‘The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy’ in M. Taggart (ed.) The 
Province of Administrative Law (Hart Publishing, 1997). 
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does so only on the basis of the facts presented to it without inquiring into their nature or 
origins.
 364
  Deference, therefore, has a multi-faceted influence on the court’s adjudicatory 
function and, with it, the ability of the courts to uphold individual rights in the face 
alleged infringement.
365
 
 
Having set out the legal and factual context of the claims herein, the rest of this thesis 
explores how the operation of three subsystems which feed into the legal subsystem – the 
law-making subsystem, the policing subsystem and the judicial subsystem, contributed to 
the racial effect of these provisions, championed as a necessary policing response to 
terrorism.    
                                               
364  See M. Hunt, ‘Sovereignty’s Blight: Why Contemporary Public Law Needs the Concept of ‘Due 
Deference’’ in N. Bamforth and P. Leyland (eds.), Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Hart 
Publishing, 2003). By contrast Lord Lester, Lord  Pannick and J. Herberg reject this characterisation, see 
Human Rights Law and Practice, (3rd ed., Butterworths, 2009) para 3.18. 
365 See, e.g., Secretary of State for Home Department v International Transport Roth [2002] EWCA Civ 158, 
[2003] QB 728 at 69-71 (Laws LJ Dissenting); R (on the application of Limbuela) v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [2004] EWCA CIV 540 [2004] QB 1440 at 66-77 (Laws LJ dissenting). 
 Chapter Three: The Legislative Standards for Sub-system Behaviour: Normative 
versus Empirical 
 
Fig two: Law-making subsystem – enactment of legislation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The role of the law-making subsystem in enacting primary legislation, is a hallmark of the 
liberal democratic credentials of both the US and UK.
 1
  Although there is a high level of 
consensus as to the utility of parliamentary and congressional law-making,
2
 this chapter 
explores whether there is an inherent pre-disposition within each country’s law-making 
subsystem to shape operationally closed law-making standards in response to certain 
types of external irritants, in a way which produces legislation with characteristics that 
accommodate or even give rise to detrimental effects, such as racial inequality.
3
  This 
                                               
1  R. Warner, ‘Adjudication and Legal Reasoning’, in M.P. Golding and W.A. Edmundson (eds.), The 
Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Blackwell Publishers 2004), accessed 
12.11.12. 
2 This is not, of course, to suggest that the legislative process is without its critics and there have been 
significant calls for reform.  See, e.g., House of Lords, Select Committee on the Constitution, fourteenth 
report of session 2003-4, Parliament and the Legislative Process vol I, Report (2004) for an example of 
such proposals for reform.  See also Parliament First, Parliament’s Last Chance (London, 2003) which 
declared in its first sentence that ‘Parliament isn’t working’ 5. 
3
 N. Gotanda, ‘A Critique of “Our Constitution is Colorblind” (November 1991) 41(1) Stanford Law Review 
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contradiction between intention and effect suggest that the internal rules adopted by the 
law-making subsystem are not what the subsystem itself claims they are; nor are they 
what other subsystems expect them to be.
4
 
 
In order to understand how law-making sub-system behaviour contributed to the racially 
uneven effect of the counter-terrorism powers this chapter first considers the basis on 
which the UK and US legislative branches command their pre-eminent position within the 
law-making process.
 5
   In particular this analysis focuses on the self-created attributes of 
the sub-system that are recognised as being fundamental to the maintenance of even-
handed and neutral legislation, synonymous with the rule of law.  Operation along the 
lines of this programme ensures the subsystem’s operational legitimacy from the 
perceptive of other subsystems. This chapter then shows that the potentially detrimental 
impact of the cognitive openness of the subsystem, in its maintenance of expected law-
making standards and, therefore, on legislative output, was recognised within both 
countries.  Despite such awareness, this chapter finally considers how the system-specific 
approach to law-making adopted in each country, in relation to the counter-terrorism stop, 
search and surveillance powers, meant that the potential deleterious outcome in terms of 
legislative powers was realised, through the operation of the subsystem on the basis of an 
overwhelming prioritisation of popular accountability in counter-terrorism law-making.  
This section, therefore, suggests that the law-making process within the Terrorism Act and 
the Patriot Act resulted in the creation of police powers that, whilst utilising ‘facially 
innocent criteria’,6 contained the potential for a racially uneven deployment.7   
 
3.1 Why the Legislative Process Inhabits its Pre-eminent Law-Making Position 
 
US and UK law-making institutions reflect the sharply different constitutional set-ups of 
the two countries, with the legislative existing as institutionally separate from the 
                                                                                                                                            
1, making this argument generally. 
4 N. Luhmann, Social Systems 10. 
5
 In this chapter ‘legislative process’ refers to ‘the complex series of event by which the legal implications 
of a policy or objective are identified, changes to legal rules are drafted in a form intended to be understood 
by both lawyers, officials and (perhaps) ordinary people, and both the policy and the proposed new legal 
norms are subjected to parliamentary scrutiny and amendment before being accepted or rejected’, D. 
Feldman, ‘The Impact of Human Rights on the UK Legislative process’ (2004) Statute Law Review 91, 92. 
6 M.J. Whidden, ‘Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and United States Antiterrorism Legislation’ (2000-1) 
69 Fordham L. Rev. 2825, 2838. 
7
 See fig. 2. 
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executive, and often politically opposed to it, in the US; but partially fused with it in the 
UK, and almost invariably controlled by the same political party.  Within these two set-
ups each country enacts legislation through distinct processes, whilst also instilling in its 
legislation different qualities.
 8
   UK legislation, for example, reflects the so-called 
‘Westminster model’ of parliamentary supremacy;9 whilst the US law-making subsystem 
adheres to an approach of ‘constrained parliamentarianism’,10 through which the separate, 
but equal powers of each branch of government, are constrained by a written constitution.
 
11
  These distinct law-making processes have been described as defining ‘the gulf that 
separates our respective approaches to constitutionalism’. 12   These country-specific 
subsystem peculiarities determine the constitutional context, and therefore the subsystem 
programme, through which each law-making subsystem codes communications and forms 
the communicative redundancies which constitute the subsystem-specific programme of 
operation. 
 
The UK constitutional framework asserts that Parliament is the country’s supreme law-
making authority.  Parliament cannot be bound by any other domestic institution, and 
freely acts to alter any law.
13
  Consequently, while the courts and the executive implement 
and review the powers set out in, or provided for by, statute it is the legislature which is 
functionally charged with determining what the law actually is.
14
  Parliamentary 
supremacy has, of course, been eroded from its first articulated parameters,
15
 so that the 
Diceyan principle of the absolute sovereignty of Parliament is increasingly being 
qualified.
16
  One important external influence affecting Parliamentary sovereignty is the 
UK’s membership of the European Union, which acts as an environmental irritant to UK 
                                               
8 See generally W. McKay and C.W. Johnson, Parliament and Congress: Representation and Scrutiny in the 
Twenty-First Century (OUP, 2010). 
9 J. Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (CUP, 2010). 
10 B. Ackerman, ‘The New Separation of Powers’ (2000) 113 Harvard Law Review 633, 664-87. 
11  M. Tushnet, ‘New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights and Democracy-Based 
Worries’ [2003] 38 Wake Forest Law Review 813. 
12  Lord Irvine of Laing, ‘Sovereignty in Comparative Perspective: Constitutionalism in Britain and 
America’ in N. Dorsen (ed), The Unpredictable Constitution (New York University Press, 2002) 324. 
13 As outlined by A.V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed, Macmillan 
1996) 92.  For a more modern interpretation see T.H. Bingham (Lord), The Rule of Law (Allen Lane, 2010). 
14 See Edinburgh and Dalkeith Railway Co. v Wauchope (1942) 8 CL & F 710 and Pickin v British Railways 
Board [1974] AC 765.  See also Lord Bingham in A and others v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2004] UKHL 56, para 36. 
15 W. McKay and C.W. Johnson, Parliament and Congress 24. 
16 See, e .g., D. Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty.  Contemporary Debates (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010) 57-78 which questions the extent to which the idealised Diceyan model of parliamentary 
sovereignty holds true. 
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law-making and Parliamentary functions.
17
  Judicial concern to determine the will of 
Parliament, through interpretation of legislative debate,
18
 demonstrates that the judiciary 
recursively looks to Parliament’s functional programme so that the judicial subsystem 
may interpret laws according to Parliament’s intention, rather than developing its own 
judicial understanding of the principles and provisions of any given statute.   Despite the 
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy within the UK government there is no absolute 
separation of powers,
19
 meaning that the executive is represented in, and depends for its 
continued existence on, the legislature.
20
  The UK’s approach to the separation of powers 
is, therefore, marked by relatively fluid boundaries between executive, judicial and 
legislative functions.
21
 
 
The US Constitutional framework provides for the separate and equal authority of the 
executive, the legislative, and the judiciary.
 22
 The constitutional importance of the 
separation of powers has been asserted as a means of avoiding a ‘popular tyranny’ holding 
sway through the legislature.
23
  Accordingly, the separation of powers is upheld as one of 
the deepest political principles of the Constitution.
24
  The separation between the 
executive and legislature within US law-making is also maintained because although the 
President may propose laws these are experienced by the law-making subsystem as 
environmental irritants that are responded to by Congress, through it drafting and passing 
legislation, which is then enacted by way of Presidential signature.
25
  In addition, while 
                                               
17 European law does not recognise the principle of UK parliamentary supremacy.  See R v Secretary of 
State for Transport ex parte Factortame (Case C-213/89) and M. Elliott, ‘United Kingdom: Parliamentary 
Sovereignty under Pressure’ (2004) 2(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 545.   In addition, it is 
arguable that legislation devolving powers away from Westminster, such as the Scotland Act 1998, the Irish 
Free State (Constitution) Act 1922 and the United Nations Act 1946 are binding on future parliaments and 
therefore irreversible. These arguments are, however, outside the scope of this chapter.  Therefore for 
further discussion see A.L. Young, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act (Hart Publishing, 
2008). 
18 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1992] UKHL 3, although this decision has been criticised.  See, e.g., 
A. Kavanagh, ‘Pepper v Hart and Matters of Constitutional Principle’ (2005) 121 (1) LQR 243. 
19 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p. Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513, 567, per 
Lord Mustill. 
20 W. McKay and C.W. Johnson, Parliament and Congress 4. 
21 R. Masterman, The Separation of Powers in the Contemporary Constitution: Judicial Competence and 
Independence in the UK (CUP, 2011) 17 and generally. 
22
 US Constitution Articles I-III.  See also Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v Sawyer 343 US 579, 635 (1952) 
in which Justice Jackson describes the three branches as separate, but interdependent; autonomous but 
conditioned by reciprocity, under the Constitution.  
23 James Madison, ‘The Same Subject Continued: The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic 
Faction and Insurrection’, Federalist No. 10 (22 November 1787). 
24 See J.K.  Lieberman, A Practical Companion to the Constitution (University of California Press, 1999) 
457. 
25
 Even without Presidential signature, however, a law can become active, and upon gaining two thirds 
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Congress has the sole functional power of enacting legislation, it is subject to judicial 
review as part of the constitutional checks and balances between the three branches of 
federal government.
26
  Congress can negate the effect of judicial decisions, by way of 
subsequent statute,
27
 but doing so necessitates the inherently controversial task of 
enacting a constitutional amendment, which itself may be subject to further judicial 
review.
28
   Consequently, no single branch of US Government has the power to 
definitively overcome either of the others and, whilst the relative power of each has 
shifted at certain times,
29
 constitutionally-prescribed and self-referentially applied 
safeguards seek to achieve a model of shared governance.   
 
Whilst the different constitutional backgrounds to each country’s law-making subsystem 
make the institutional contexts of US and UK law-making distinct, both law-making 
process centre on oral debates within a bicameral legislative,
30
 and committee-based 
structure which scrutinise draft legislation and policy.
31
  In particular, the law-making 
authority of each similarly assumes – or flows from – each institution’s ability to enact 
fair and effective legislation.  In order that the principles giving rise to fair and effective 
legislation are observed in the legislative output of each country’s law-making subsystem 
draft statutes are enacted through specific, self-evolved institutional procedures.
32
  
                                                                                                                                            
support of both Houses a bill may become law having previously been returned to Congress by the 
President for reconsideration, See Federalist No. 69 (A. Hamilton), ‘The Real Character of the Executive’ 
New York Packet (14 March 1788). 
26 Marbury v Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) at 177.   
27 As stated in Clark v Martinez 543 US 371 (2005) at 402. 
28
 See, e.g., Dickerson v United States, 538 US 428 (2000) in which the Court ruled that Congress was not 
competent to overrule the court’s judgment in Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, stating that ‘Miranda, being 
a constitutional decision of the court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress … This Court 
has supervisory authority over the federal courts to prescribe binding rules of evidence and procedure.  
While Congress has ultimate authority to modify or set aside any such rules that are not constitutionally 
required, it may not supersede that Court’s decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution’, per 
Rehnquist CJ 
29 In particular the executive has frequently gained a degree of ascendance during times of economic or 
military pressure, such as during the Great Depression, the Second World War and the Cold War.  See, e.g., 
J. Yoo, Crisis and Command.  A History of Executive Power from George Washington to George W. Bush 
(Kaplan, 2010) and K.R. Mayer, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power 
(Princeton University Press, 2002). 
30 Consisting of: the House of Lords and House of Commons, which comprise of the UK Parliament; and 
the House of Representatives and the Senate, which make-up US Congress.  
31
 W.J. Keefe and M.S. Ogul, The American Legislative Process.  Congress and the States (9
th
 ed, Prentice 
Hall Inc., 1997) 169-202. 
32 The current legislative process in the UK derived predominantly from the reforms instigated by William 
Gladstone, in 1882, although they had previously been proposed by Sir Thomas Erskine May.  There are, 
however, a number of governmental powers which do not need to go through the parliamentary process to 
become law.  These include, where ministers act under royal prerogative, foreign policy matters, economic 
policy, defence and in relation to broad policy decisions. See P. Seaward and P. Silk, ‘The House of 
Commons’ in V. Bogdanor, The British Constitution in the Twentieth Century (OUP, 2003) 139-89.  In the 
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Although these requirements are essentially procedural they are designed to ensure that 
the final statutory provisions have been widely scrutinised and analysed, and that they 
demonstrate the fundamental qualities established as necessary for effective legislation.
33
  
In this way each system’s autopoietic behaviour provides legitimacy to its functional 
operation.  The result of procedural checks, in their ideal manifestation, is that Congress 
and Parliament are responsive to majoritarian considerations,
34
 whilst also being 
protective of minority interests and that these requirements are applied consistently 
throughout the law-making process, as will now be considered.
35
    
 
3.1.1 Majoritarian Responsiveness 
The majoritarian responsiveness of Congress and Parliament helps to secure the 
democratic credentials of the law-making subsystem because each body is elected by a 
popular vote.
36
  This characteristic means that both law-making institutions are 
representative of, and responsive to, the views and opinions of the electorate, whilst being 
charged with constraining and legitimising the actions of government.
37
   
 
Within the UK law-making subsystem the House of Commons seen as deriving its 
legitimacy directly from its representation of the population.  Popular accountability 
relating to what takes place on the floor of the legislative chamber,
38
 via the ballot-box in 
                                                                                                                                            
US legislative law originates as a bill or resolution introduced either independently, jointly, or concurrently 
in the House of Representatives and/or the Senate.  After introduction, the bill is sent to the appropriate 
committee(s) for study.  The committee(s) may choose to let the bill "die" by taking no action, or it may 
report its findings to the full chamber for further action.  Any number of bills on the same topic may be 
introduced into each chamber with different text and each chamber may alter each text of a bill originally 
introduced for consideration and it may even include the text from several bills, amendments, and/or 
riders.  A bill passed in the House may differ from the version passed in the Senate.  When differences arise, 
they are resolved through the negotiations of a joint committee.  Both chambers must agree on an identical 
form of the bill before it can go to the President for further action.  See R. Luce, Legislative Principles.  The 
History and Theory of Law-making by Representative Government (The Lawbook Exchange Limited, 2006). 
33 S.A. Walkland, The Legislative Process in Great Britain (George Allen and Unwin, 1969) 12-16. 
34 R. Dworkin, Freedom’s Law. The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise (OUP, 1996). 
35  R. Blackburn and A. Kennon (eds.), Griffiths and Ryle on Parliament: Functions, Practice and 
Procedures (Sweet and Maxwell, 2003) para 6-002. 
36 See J. Griffiths, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 MLR 1, 16 and R. Blackburn and A. Kennon (eds.), 
Griffiths and Ryle on Parliament: Functions, Practice and Procedures (Sweet and Maxwell, 2003) para 1-
002. 
37 H. Barnett, Constitutional and Administrative Law (5th ed., Cavendish, 2004) 379; and J. Waldron, The 
Dignity of Legislation (CUP, 1999). 
38 J.A.G. Griffith and M. Ryle, Parliament: Functions, Practice and Procedures (Sweet and Maxwell, 1989), 
e.g., write that ‘It is on the floor of the House that the great events take place, where Ministers should 
ultimately be brought to account where their political lives may be threatened, where they will be supported 
or abandoned by their colleagues and held to blame, fairly or unfairly’ 518. 
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general elections held at intervals of not more than five years,
39
 encourages legislators to 
act in accordance with the environmental irritants arising from popular opinion.
40
  The 
need for the law-making subsystem to respond to irritants arising from popular opinion 
has caused the House of Commons to be portrayed as the sounding board of the nation.
41
   
By contrast the House of Lords’ operational legitimacy arises primarily from its 
traditional institutional authority and the expertise of its members.
42
  The link between 
popular elections and the make-up of the House of Commons leads to the likely executive 
dominance of at least one house of the legislature.
43
 
 
In the US, both the Senate and the House of Representatives derive their law-making 
legitimacy from their directly elected nature.  Under the Constitution, therefore, the 
electorate provides the ultimate check against arbitrary and non-democratic exercises of 
governmental power.
44
  This strengthens the importance of the nexus between the 
subsystem’s functional programme and popular opinion.45  There are two basic types of 
elections in the US: primary and general.  Primary elections are held prior to a general 
election to determine party candidates for the general election.
46
  In addition to federal, 
state and local elections held in even-numbered years, many states and local jurisdictions 
also hold ‘off-year’ elections in odd numbered years.47  Members of both House and 
Senate seek re-election by way of two electoral cycles, so that in any two-year period a 
                                               
39 Electoral accountability means that decisions ‘must be made by persons whom the people have elected 
and whom they can remove’ if their consequences will be accepted, C. Gearty, ‘11 September 2001.  
Counter-terrorism and the Human Rights Act’ (2005) 32(1) Journal of Law and Society 18, 30. 
40 The link between public opinion and political action has been widely recognised amongst social scientists, 
including, e.g., J.H. Aldrich, Why Parties?  The Origin and Transformation of political Parties in America 
(Chicago University Press, 1995); R.D. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (Yale University Press, 1989); and 
J.A. Stimson, M.B. MacKuen and R.S. Erikson, ‘Dynamic Representation’ (1995) 89 American Political 
Science Review 543-65. 
41 J.S. Mill, ‘Considerations on Representative Government’ (1861) in J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and 
Representative Government (Wildside Press, 2007) 256. 
42  E.g. the Governmental White Paper ‘Rights Brought Home’ attributed the democratic mandate of 
Members of Parliament to the fact that they are elected, accountable and representative, see ‘Rights Brought 
Home: The Human Rights Bill’ (Cm 3782, October 1997), para 2.13.  See also D. Feldman, ‘Human Rights 
Terrorism and Risk: the Roles of Politicians and Judges’ [2006] Public Law 364, 374.   
43 Justice, The Future of the Rule of Law (October 2007) 1. 
44 M. McClintoch, A Year of Loss.  Re-examining Civil Liberties since September 11 (Lawyers Committee 
for Human Rights, 2002) 1. 
45  Chief Justice John Marshall in Gibbons v Ogden expressed this relationship as meaning that ‘[t]he 
wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their 
constituents possess at elections … are the restraints on which the people must often rely, solely in all 
representative governments’, 22 US 1 (1824) at 197. 
46 Although in a few states, party candidates are chosen in state or local nominating conventions, rather than 
primaries, either by tradition or at the option of the political parties. 
47
 U.S. Department of State, USA Elections in Brief (Bureau of International Information Programs, 2012) 
  
74 
proportion of congressional seats are subject to re-election.
48
  Senators are elected to 
represent an entire State, irrespective of the size or population of that State, while 
Representatives are responsible for a smaller geographical locality which may be revised 
at ten year intervals to account for changes to State population as indicated by the national 
census.  Senators are elected for six year terms, whilst all Representative face re-election 
every two years.  The different lengths of office for the two congressional bodies tend to 
reflect the expectation that Representatives are more closely answerable to public opinion 
than Senators.
49
  Consequently, particularly in the House of Representatives, 
 50  
the 
pressure to secure re-election is a task that begins almost immediately upon taking 
office.
51
 In crafting legislation Congress is expected to use its broad range of flexible 
legislative tools to ‘balance local and national interests in the most responsive and careful 
manner’.52  In fact, it was not until 1913 that Senators were appointed by way of direct 
election.  
  
Another important aspect of the US law-making process is the committee stage, where 
almost all effective scrutiny of draft statutory powers takes place.  Committees are made 
up of members of Congress chosen by the parties according to seniority and a kind of 
patronage, with the chair always being a member of the majority party.  Consequently, 
legislators in Congress and within congressional committees are, as a precept of 
democratic theory and subsystem behaviour, expected to continually respond to irritants 
from the electorate, aligning the subsystem’s programme of operation with these, in order 
that enacted legislation provides an appropriate structural coupling between the 
subsystem and its environment.
53
   
 
A crucial structural difference between the US and UK law-making subsystems is that 
whilst in the UK the Prime Minister has a role within both the legislature and the 
executive in the US the office of President is separate from the law-making subsystem.
54
  
                                               
48 At the biannual congressional elections one third of Senate seats are up for re-election and all seats in the 
House of Representatives, US Department of State, How the United States is Governed (October 2005) 27-
28. 
49 S.S. Smith, J.M. Roberts and R.J. Vander Wielan, The American Congress (6th ed., CUP, 2005) 53-86. 
50 US Constitution, Amendment XVII (1913). 
51 W. McKay and C.W. Johnson, Parliament and Congress 548. 
52 Kimel v Florida Board of Regents 528 US 62 (2000) at 94-95. 
53 W.J. Keefe and M.S. Ogul, The American Legislative Process.  Congress and the States (9th ed., Prentice 
Hall Inc., 1997) 67. 
54
 US Department of State, How the United States is Governed 13. 
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The separation between the law-making system and the role of President means that the 
President is elected separately from other members of Congress.  Presidential elections 
take place on the Tuesday after the first Monday of November, following primary 
elections or caucuses, which are used to choose delegates to the national nominating 
conventions where the part nominees are selected.  The Electoral College method of 
choosing presidents operates with votes being cast for a group of ‘electors’ who are 
pledged to one or another presidential candidate.  The number of electors corresponds to 
the number in a state’s electoral delegation.  Election to the presidency requires an 
absolute majority of the 538 electoral votes, thus helping to reinforce the two party 
system.  Whilst it is an established communicative redundancy that Congress will enact 
presidentially proposed laws they nevertheless retain their separate subsystem origins.  By 
contrast the Prime Minister is part of the UK law-making subsystem and, as such has a 
role in the parliamentary debate and passage of legislation.  The Prime Minister is 
appointed by the monarch, but by convention is the leader of the majority party within the 
House of Commons after a general election.  The roles of the Prime Minister and 
President provide an example of the differing delineation of subsystem boundaries, which 
affect functioning of the law-making subsystem in each country. 
 
Despite the country-specific electoral cycles and the distinct roles of the President and 
Prime Minister, popular elections mean that US and UK law-making subsystem 
operations both tend to prioritise short-term goals that will promote re-election.  This 
prioritisation encourages the law-making subsystems to focus on policies with diffuse 
benefits, as opposed to matters with narrow ones, such as minority group issues.
55
  Whilst 
the strength of the nexus between the actions of elected representatives and opinions of 
the electorate is a matter of debate
56
 there is no doubt that the more homogenous and 
vociferous public opinion the less scope there is for the law-making subsystem to ignore 
this irritant, thus demonstrating the subsystem’s cognitively open nature can result in its 
susceptibility to particular environmental irritants.
57
  Consequently, in the shadow of a 
                                               
55 K. Nash, ‘Between Citizenship and Human Rights’ (2009) 43 Sociology 1067 and R. Delgado, ‘Law 
Enforcement in Subordinated Communities: Innovation and Response’ (2007-08) 106 Michigan Law Rev. 
1193, 1212. 
56 See A.D. Monroe, ‘Consistency between Public Preferences and National Policy Decisions’ (1979) 7 
American Politics Quarterly 3-19 and ‘Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-1993’ (1993) 62(1) Public 
Opinion Quarterly 6-28. 
57
 M. Gildens, ‘Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness’ (2005) 69(5) Public Opinion Quarterly 778-96 
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perceived public emergency legislators act to appease public fears and anxiety,
58
 and 
shape the subsystem’s functional programme in response to these irritants.  The emphasis 
placed on majoritarian responsiveness within the subsystem programme, therefore, often 
shifts in inverse proportion to the second characteristic of the law-making subsystem’s 
self-determined and self-referential behaviour: that of the protection of minority interests.   
Whilst it is not automatic that concerns surrounding minority interests are diametrically 
opposed to the issues of interest to the majority of the electorate, they are by definition 
less likely to represent key, vote-winning concerns as compared to other issues, such as 
economy, health care or national security.  Despite this tendency, the ability of the 
legislative process to enact fair and even-handed laws is secondarily premised on the 
requirement that the law-making process considers and protects minority interests and 
rights, as will now be considered.
59
   
 
3.1.2 Minority Protection 
 
The law-making process institutionalises minority protection in legislation, through 
congressional and parliamentary debate and legislative scrutiny by reference to statutory 
rights protections, within the law-making chambers and in the legislative committees 
which make up the subsystem. 
  
In the UK, parliamentary scrutiny of proposed legislative provisions is a fundamental 
characteristic of the law-making subsystem’s operational programme.  In shaping the 
debate different elements of the subsystem, most notably the Government and Parliament, 
inhabit subtly different roles.  The Government is charged by the electorate with 
developing policy and implementing new legislation; whilst Parliament is expected to 
examine legislative proposals through parliamentary debates, and redefine their contents 
and scope.
60
  Parliament acts as a check on the law-making aspirations of the Government.  
This is particularly the case with the House of Lords, where the Government frequently 
                                               
58  David Bonner observes this pattern of legislative behaviour in relation to both the Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, see D. Bonner, 
‘Responding to Crisis: Legislating against Terrorism’ (2002) LQR 602. 
59 C.A. Gearty and J.A. Kimbell, Terrorism and the Rule of Law.  A Report in the Law Relating to Political 
Violence in Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Civil Liberties Research Unit, 1995) 14-16; and T. 
Jefferson, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice for the Use of the Senate of the United States (1801), section 
1, http://www.constitution.org/tj/tj-mpp.htm, accessed 30.03.2012. 
60 House of Lords, Select Committee on the Constitution, 6th Report of Session 2004-5, Parliament and the 
Legislative Process: The Government’s Response (April 2005) 4, para 3. 
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needs the support of opposition and independent members to pass legislation.  It is rare 
for this to be the case in the House of Commons, in which governments normally have 
large majorities, as a result of the first past the post electoral systems, and thus do not 
need to seek cross-party consensus in law-making.
61
   
 
Parliamentary debate, in both the pre-legislative and post-legislative stages, promotes a 
structured and transparent communicative process.
62
  This public discourse allows 
oppositional voices to comment on government bills, often with the objective of enabling 
the enacted legislation to represent the interests of a wider range of individuals than are 
reflected in the original proposals.
63
  In discussing and publically airing a range of 
minority interests the subsystem programme of operation chooses between a variety of 
redundancies to select those which best reconcile its own programme with environmental 
irritants it detects. The adversarial nature of Parliamentary discourse is, therefore, 
fundamental to law-making subsystem operations.
64
  Indeed, debate itself has long been 
considered ‘the main task of Parliament’ and the means by which it ‘secure[s] full 
discussion and ventilation of all matters’.65  The role of parliamentary debate in protecting 
minority interests is frequently cited as one of the key values of the UK system of 
Parliamentary law-making: ‘fundamental to the work of Parliament’,66 and leading to the 
enactment of better legislation.
67
  Persistent critiques are made regarding the effectiveness 
of minority protection within parliamentary law-making given the nature of the electoral 
system, which frequently returns large majorities, thus reducing opposition ability to 
challenge Government proposals.
68
   Despite this system behaviour, requirements such as 
the statement of compatibility between the legislation and individual rights protected by 
                                               
61   R. Blackburn and A. Kennon (eds.), Griffiths and Ryle on Parliament: Functions, Practice and 
Procedures, (Sweet and Maxwell, 2003) paras 6-131-39. 
62 See Hansard Society Briefing Paper, Issues in Lawmaking: Pre-legislative Scrutiny (The Hansard Society, 
2005) 5. 
63 H. Fenwick, Civil Rights, New Labour, Freedom and the Human Rights Act (Pearson Education Limited, 
2000) 420. 
64 S.A. Walkland, ‘Committees in the House of Commons’ in J.D. Lees and M. Shaw (eds.), Committees in 
Legislatures: A Comparative Analysis (Martin Robertson, 1979) 242-87, 254.  See also S.A. Walkland, The 
Legislative Process in Great Britain (George Allan and Unwin Ltd, 1968). 
65 L.S. Amery, Thoughts on the Constitution (OUP, 1953) 12. 
66 House of Lords, Select Committee on the Constitution, 14th Report of Session 2003-4, ‘Parliament and 
the Legislative Process’, vol. I (2004) 8, para 1. 
67 House of Lords, Select Committee on the Constitution, 6th Report of Session 2004-5, ‘Parliament and the 
Legislative Process: The Government’s Response’ (April 2005) 4, para 2. 
68 House of Lords, Select Committee on the Constitution, 14th Report of Session 2003-4, ‘Parliament and 
the Legislative Process’, vol. I (2004) 10, para 11. 
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the ECHR,
69
have also helped to internalise within government proposals and 
parliamentary debate the assessment of the human rights implications of legislative 
initiatives.
70
  Parliamentary means of securing minority protection, therefore, constitute 
an engrained system-specific rule conditioning its law-making programme, imposed by 
the irritants arising from democratic society.   
 
The UK’s law-making subsystem operations are also affected by the role of the House of 
Lords in the law-making process.  One perceived benefit of this second legislative 
chamber is that it is able to examine the effectiveness of the executive through questions 
and committees and to provide a forum for debate, as well as being able to be 
representative of different views and interests from the House of Commons.
71
  Following 
government reforms in 1999 the House of Lords removed the majority of hereditary peers 
in favour of government-appointed members.
72
   
 
The US law-making subsystem is part of a complex federal system of government where 
the national government is central but state and local governments exercise authority over 
matters that are not reserved for federal government.  Federal law-making in the US has a 
number of characteristics that are distinct from the equivalent process in the UK.  One 
key difference is that debate of the legislative proposals within the two congressional 
chambers primarily comprises of pre-written speeches, without spontaneity or 
intervention, and often without eliciting any direct response.
73
  These deliveries may be 
subject to subsequent amendment, before being placed on the permanent Congressional 
Record.  The impact of such amendments can significantly change the contents of the 
statement that cross references, which can further discourage the congressional debates 
from having a dialogic character.
74
   Committee-based, pre-legislative scrutiny is also an 
                                               
69 Human Rights Act 1998, s.19. 
70 C. Gearty, ‘11 September 2001.  Counter-terrorism and the Human Rights Act’ (2005) 32(1) JLS 18, 22.  
See also J. Wadham, H. Mountfield and A. Edmundson, Blackstone’s Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998 
(3rd ed., 2003) 10. 
71
 HM Government, The House of Lords: Reform Cm 7027(The Stationery Office, February 2007) 22. 
72 The House of Lords Act 1999. Of the 92 hereditary peers that remained, 75 were elected by and from 
amongst the existing party groups in the Lords in proportions which matched the total sitting membership 
of hereditary peers and 15 were elected from across the House, with the remaining two positions were 
hereditary office holders.   
73 W. McKay and C.W. Johnson, Parliament and Congress 163-65. 
74 See H. Mantel, ‘Congressional Record Fact or Fiction of the Legislative Process’ (1959) 12(4) The 
Western Political Quarterly 983. 
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important means of establishing and responding to subsystem priorities
75
  and provides 
the opportunity to ensure that legislation upholds constitutional and popular interests, 
whilst also representing a balanced response to a subject, as judged against the repertoire 
of possibilities which constitute the normative subsystem rules of behaviour.
76
   
 
Despite the institutional differences in how minority interests are reflected in and shape 
US and UK law-making subsystem behaviour minority protection is nevertheless a central 
part of each subsystem’s programme of operation.  In the US the key protectors of 
minority interests, in terms of shaping the substance of congressional and committee-
based scrutiny, are the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, application of which are 
designed to afford minorities ‘extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process’. 77   In order to protect minority interests subsystem behaviour balances the 
communicative redundancies forged through majoritarian responsiveness with those 
relating to minority protection, through the structural coupling of the Constitution.  In the 
US, consideration of the impact of draft statutory provisions on minority groups is mainly 
undertaken through legislative committees, as opposed to within the legislative chambers.  
These arguably represent a more effective means of assimilating conflicting redundancies 
within subsystem behaviour than is frequently encountered in the executive-dominated 
chambers.
78
  This process seeks to assure minority groups of their right to be heard, and to 
have their interests represented in legislation, sometimes to the significant consternation 
of the majoritarian preferences of Congress.
79
 
 
In the UK protection of minority interests in parliamentary law-making is based on the 
structural coupling between minority rights and law-making, currently focused on the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA’).80  Although the HRA had not yet commenced when the 
Terrorism Act 2000 was being debated, the compatibility between the counter-terrorism 
legislation and the human rights statute was nevertheless a theme within parliamentary 
discourse.  The human rights-related scrutiny has affected the way in which government 
                                               
75 In particular this importance is increased by the technical and complicated nature of most legislation 
which necessarily demands a level of expertise for effective scrutiny, see W.J. Keefe and M.S. Ogul, The 
American Legislative Process: Congress and the States (10th ed., Prentice Hall, 2000) 170-72. 
76 J.V. Sullivan, How our Laws are Made, House of Representatives, 110th Congress, Doc. 110-49 (revd ed. 
July 2007)18-19. 
77 San Antonio School District v Rodriguez 411 US 1 (1973) at 28. 
78 W.J. Keefe and M.S. Ogul, The American Legislative Process 170. 
79 ibid 448. 
80
 Human Rights Act 1998, s.3. 
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department and parliamentary bodies take account of the ECHR in carrying out their 
work.
81
  The direct enactment of the ECHR provisions, through the HRA, sought to 
strengthen the law-making subsystems’ majoritarian responsiveness, alongside its 
protection of minority interests.
82
     
 
The HRA came into force in October 2000 and gave ‘further effect’ to the substantive 
rights,
 83
 within the ECHR by allowing domestic courts to employ the principles within 
the ECHR, and relevant ECtHR case law, when determining disputes raising individual 
Convention rights.  In so doing the government sought to reduce recourse to Strasbourg 
through the increased domestic resolution of right-based cases.
84
  Under the HRA, 
therefore, UK domestic courts are required to review allegations of rights infringements 
and afford aggrieved individuals an effective domestic remedy.
85
   The HRA has three key 
effects on the role of the UK courts in safeguarding individual rights.  Firstly, it enables 
the domestic courts to officially take account of the ECHR in their judgments.  Secondly, 
the HRA gives UK courts additional powers of interpretation to ensure that, to the fullest 
extent possible, legislation is compatible with the Convention protections.  Section 3 of 
the HRA states that: “so far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate 
legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the 
Convention rights.
86
  This means that the Act ‘may require a court to depart from the 
unambiguous meaning that legislation would otherwise bear’, 87 providing the judicial 
subsystem with ‘generous and purposive’ interpretation techniques.88  Thirdly, the HRA 
enables domestic courts to declare legislation incompatible with the Convention if it is 
“satisfied that the provision is incompatible with a Convention rights”.   Lord Steyn has 
described this power as a “measure of law resort”.   This aspect of the Act has been 
                                               
81 R. Blackburn, ‘A Human Rights Committee for UK Parliament: The Options’ (1998) European Human 
Rights Law Rev 534-55 and I. Brynoe and S. Spencer, Mainstreaming Human Rights in Whitehall and 
Westminster (Institute for Public Policy Research, 1995). 
82 However, even where this is the case it is seen as an obstacle to parliamentary work.  See, e.g., Gerald 
Howarth who said that ‘The Human Rights Act must not be allowed to stand in the way of the human rights 
of the great majority of people in this country who support the Government in their determination to 
eradicate this particularly pernicious form of international terrorism from our midst’, HC Debs (2001-02) 
372, c.722. 
83
 The HRA came into force on 2 October 2000, see The Human Rights Act 1998 (Commencement No. 2) 
Order 2000, no.1851 (c.47).    
84 Home Office, Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill (1997) Cm 3782, para 2.13. 
85 ECHR, art.13. 
86 HRA, s.3. 
87 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, per Lord Nicholls.    
88 See R v DPP, ex p. Kebeline [1999] UKHL 43, per Lord Hope; and Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681 at para 
703, per Lord Bingham. 
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criticised for its uneasy,
89
 if not antagonistic, relationship with parliamentary 
sovereignty.
90
  The HRA purports to balance its ‘further effect’ with the maintenance of 
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty by stopping short of its entrenchment and 
denying the courts the power to overturn legislation.
 91
  It therefore remains Parliament’s 
decision whether to revise the provision or not.
92
  Indeed, following a declaration of 
incompatibility Parliament is under no compulsion to review the relevant issue or 
legislative provision.
93
  Ian Leigh and Roger Masterman have referred to this as the 
‘escape-hatch’ that the HRA has left for parliamentary sovereignty.94 
 
Both US and UK legislatures shape their operational programme and law-making 
legitimacy by balancing majority interests with minority protection.  The bicameral nature 
of each law-making subsystem and the quality and focus of the debates within each have 
evolved to ensure that this balance is instilled in the statutory provision passed through 
the processes and the US and UK law-making systems are committed to limiting 
instances where legal provisions weigh more heavily on minority individuals than the 
majority of the population to a closely scrutinised and justifiable minimum.  The 
importance of maintaining these patterns of behaviour not only in protecting minority 
interests but also in preserving the legitimacy of the subsystem is shown in the next 
section, which demonstrates that commentators and legislators understood the risk of 
departing from normal subsystem patterns of behaviour in terms of its impact on the 
nature of the legislation enacted. 
 
 
 
                                               
89 M.J. Beloff, ‘The Concept of Deference in Public Law’ (2006) 11 Judicial Review 213, 213. 
90  See Lord Hope of Craighead, ‘The Judge’s Dilemma’ (2009) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 753, 755.  See also F. Klug, ‘The Human Rights Act – A Third Way or a “Third Wave” Bill of 
Rights’ [2001] EHRLR 361, 370; and K. Ewing, ‘The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy’ 
(1999) 62 MLR 79. 
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Human Rights Act 1998 and Constitutional Principles’ (1999) 19 Legal Studies 165; W. Wade (Lord), ‘The 
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ch.2 and 4 and T.R. Hickman, ‘Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories and the Human Rights Act’ 
[2005] Public Law 306. 
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3.2 Appreciation of the Risks Inherent in Legislating for Counter-terrorism 
Powers 
 
Recognition of the inherent difficulty of crafting legislation which acts as an effective 
structural coupling between law-making and policing subsystems, particularly in the 
context of a specific threat or terrorist attack,
95
 is apparent in both the US and UK law-
making subsystems.
96
  This awareness demonstrates that the subsystem behaviour which 
contributed to the enactment of powers with a potential racial effect was not simply an 
unforeseen consequence of unique laws passed in exigent circumstances.
97
  Instead, each 
law-making subsystem recognised that exactly when legislative protections against the 
misuse of statutory powers are most essential, such as amidst threats to national security, 
are the sorts of circumstances in which the autopoietic behaviours giving-rise to ‘good’ 
law-making are lost or unbalanced.
98
  The implications of this departure are not simply 
experienced in terms of the mechanism by which statutes are enacted, but can also have 
an effect on the contents of the legislation enacted, such that the normal subsystem 
programmes of operation are overextended, to the detriment of the legitimacy of the 
powers and the originating and receiving subsystems.    
 
Whilst both the US and the UK legislatures clearly understood the potential implications 
of departing from normal law-making principles each subsystem perceived the problems 
as originating from different changes in behaviour.  This affected the way each subsystem 
sought to regulate subsystem law-making.  The UK law-making subsystem focused on the 
procedural shortcuts that had previously been experienced including the reduced 
parliamentary debates afforded to national security law-making.  The US law-making 
subsystem affirmed the imperative that the substance of the legislative scrutiny continued 
to adhere to the standard subsystem programme, irrespective of the nature of the 
environmental irritants to which it was responding. This difference may be attributed to 
                                               
95 O. Gross, ‘Chaos and Rules: Should Response to Violent Crisis always be Constitutional’ (2002-03) 112 
Yale L. Journal 1011, 1019. 
96 This pattern of subsystem behaviour had also previously been recognised, e.g., by L. Lustgarten and I. 
Leigh, In from the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy (Clarendon Press, 1994); C. 
Gearty and J.A. Kimbell, Terrorism and the Rule of Law (Civil Liberties Research Unit, 1994); International 
Commission of Jurists, States of Emergency: Their Impact on Human Rights (1993); and H.P. Lee, 
Emergency Powers (Law Book Company, 1984); and K. Ewing and C. Gearty, Freedom under Thatcher: 
Civil Liberties in Modern Britain (Clarendon Press, 1990) ch. 7. 
97 Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism (1996) Cm 3420 at 7. 
98 P.A. Thomas, ‘Emergency and Anti-Terrorism Powers 9/11: USA and UK’ (2002-03) 26 Fordham Int. L.J. 
1193, 1196 and 1199-203. 
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the existence of country-specific constitutional backgrounds and their impact on the 
nature of the operational closure and cognitive openness of each subsystem.  Therefore, 
whilst both countries recognised the difficulty of effectively addressing such exceptional 
context the manner in which each sought to avoid such damaging subsystem behaviour 
differed, as is considered in the following paragraphs.  
 
3.2.1 The UK’s Criticism of Procedural Shortcuts 
 
Appreciation of the inherent risk that counter-terrorism powers can be used in ways which 
infringe civil liberties is evident throughout the debate concerning the Terrorism Act 
2000.
99
  Criticism was directed at the statutory approaches previously adopted in 
countering terrorism,
100
 and in particular the powers instituted by the Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974.
101
  These powers were condemned as 
‘fundamentally wrong’ 102  and as having a ‘sinister role’ arising from their rights-
infringing effect.
103
  Such problems were described as giving rise to a long history of ‘ill-
considered’ emergency legislation.104  A key explanation offered for problems within the 
1974 statute was the atmosphere of panic, fear and intimidation in which it was 
enacted.
105
   In 1974 legislators had opined that it would ‘be sad… if we were to worry 
now too much about the curtailment of liberties and later to have upon our consciences 
the deaths of our fellow citizens’.106  Further, MPs had previously agreed that there would 
                                               
99 See, e.g., HC Debs (1999-00) 341 Kevin McNamara, cc.173-75, Simon Hughes, c.183, Jeremy Corbyn, 
cc.192-94.  See also Lembit Opik who emphasised the need to ensure ‘that the legislation is not introduced 
on a wave of hysteria, following widespread revulsion aroused by a particular atrocity.  We need to be sober 
when such serious legislation is introduced, and not act in impulse’, HC Debs (1998-99) 327, c.1011.  See 
also Standing Committee, Ken Maginnis, 18 January 2000 who warns that ‘a Government with a huge 
majority can create anomalies that will result in much of our legislation and many of the procedures and 
protocols within the House being substantially undermined’. 
100 For an overview of the past legal response to terrorism see B. Brandon, ‘Terrorism, Human Rights and 
the Rule of Law: 120 Years of the UK’s legal response to terrorism’ (2004) Criminal Law Review 981. 
101 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Measures) Act 1974. 
102 Simon Hughes, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, c.185. 
103 Jeremy Corbyn, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, c.190.   
104 See P. Hillyard, ‘The “War on Terror”: Lessons from Ireland’ (2005) 2-3; M. O’Rawe, ‘Ethnic Profiling, 
Police and Suspect Communities: Lessons from Northern Ireland’ in Open Society Justice Initiative, Ethnic 
Profiling in Europe (2005) 88-99; B. Simpson, In the Highest Degree Odious.  Detention without Trial in 
Wartime Britain (OUP, 1994); and B. Simpson, ‘The Devlin Commission (1959): Colonialism, Emergencies 
and the Rule of Law’ (2002) 22 OJLS 17, 37. 
105 Kevin McNamara, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, c.174. 
106 Kevin McNamara, HC Debs, 28 November 1974, c.700 and quoted by Jack Straw, HC Debs (1999-00) 
341, c.156.  Kevin McNamara, however, later recanted his words and stated that ‘[h]ad I known then what I 
know now, I would not have voted for that Bill, given its effects on our legal system and the injustices that 
it has brought’, HC Debs (1995-96) 275, c.189.  This may at least in part explain McNamara’s voicing of 
the problems created, as opposed to solved, by the 1974 Act, during the debate over the Terrorism Act 2000. 
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be a ‘greater danger of justifiable criticism if we do too little than too much’.107  The 
manner of parliamentary reaction to the environmental irritants in enacting the earlier 
counter-terrorism legislation, therefore, resulted in the rapid and extensive 
implementation of sweeping powers that were later criticised as ineffective and even 
counter-productive.
108
   The legislative impact of not adhering to normal law-making 
processes in 1974, and on other occasions,
109
 was the passage of counter-terrorism powers 
used to target and ‘alienate a whole community’,  110 without the powers constituting an 
effective or appropriate means of fighting terrorism.
111
  This resulted in the enactment of 
powers ‘used to harry and hinder law-abiding people’ instead of securing terrorist 
convictions and preventing terrorist attacks.
112
  Such insight suggests a subsystem 
understanding of the importance of maintaining normative subsystem behaviour despite 
the extraordinary context within which the process may be operating.
113
    
 
Amidst condemnation of both the process by which the 1974 Act was enacted and the 
impact this had on its provisions, in debating the 2000 Act MPs maintained the imperative 
of avoiding such modes of behaviour.
114
  The Government also maintained the importance 
of upholding established law-making principles in formulating and enacting the new 
                                               
107 National Archive Catalogue, CAS/129/180/13, para 8: 3. 
108 E.g., the PTA 1974 completed most of its passage through Parliament in one day, see HC Debs 28 
November 1974 cc.634-943; HL Debs, 20 November 1974, cc.1500-70; and HL Debs 29 November 1974, 
cc.1573-74, and the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998 was enacted over two days 
following the Omagh bombing in 1998, see HC Debs (1997-98) 317, cc.12-932 and 3 September 1998, 
cc.3-156. In addition, the parliamentary process surrounding the 1974 Act was also criticised for the sheer 
breadth of ineffective measures that it incorporated into the legislation suggesting that the subsystem was 
unable to appropriately select from amongst the variety of possible communicative redundancies in 
response to environmental irritants, see, e.g., Alan Beith, HC Debs (1998-99) 333, c.1393. 
109 Popular accountability was also a factor in prompting a legislating fervour in 1939, see O.G Lomas, ‘The 
Executive and the Anti-Terrorist Legislation of 1939’ [1980] Public Law 16, 21-32, and in 1914, see J. 
Eaves Jr., Emergency Powers and the Parliamentary Watchdog: Parliament and the Executive in Great 
Britain: 1939-1951 (1957) 8-9.  
110 Kevin McNamara, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, c.175.    
111 E.g., one of the driving factors in creating and implementing the PTA 1974 was to assuage public 
opinion in order to prevent any violent backlash against the Irish community following the Birmingham 
bombings.  See D. Bonner, ‘Responding to Crisis: Legislating against Terrorism’ (2002) LQR 602, 629; and 
S. Bailey, D. Harris and D. Ormerod, Civil Liberties, Cases and Materials (5th ed., 2001) 574. 
112 Kevin McNamara, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, c.174.   See also ibid cc.175-7.   
113 E.g. the Bill which became the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 was taken 
through all of its Committee Stages in an 18 hour session spanning 28 to 29 November 1974, followed by 
an early sitting of the House of Lords which took the Bill almost automatically.  It was therefore introduced 
only 180 hours after the proposal was first put forward. See C. Scorer, The Prevention of Terrorism Acts 
1974 and 1976: A Report on the Operation of the Law (1976) 1. 
114 E.g., in the House of Lords debate concerning the 2000 Act Lord Jenkins quoted with disappointment the 
difference between his own statement in 1974, that ‘I do not think anyone would wish these exceptional 
powers to remain in force a moment longer than is necessary’ (HC Debs 25 November 1974, c.642) and the 
subsequent successive renewals of the legislation so that it effectively had a permanent status, HL Debs 
(1999-00) 611, c.1428. 
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counter-terror legislation,
115
 and in his review of counter-terrorism legislation Lord Lloyd 
emphasised the importance of adhering to these principles.
116
  The risks inherent in 
enacting counter-terror legislation both in terms of subsystem legitimacy and minority 
protection were, therefore, a noted consideration in formulating the new Act.
117
  Having 
recognised this past system failing, Lord McNally noted that ‘for the first time we 
[Parliament] shall be able to examine anti-terrorism legislation with a cool ear to see what 
is needed’, as opposed to legislating as a knee-jerk reaction to a catastrophic event.118    
 
3.2.2 US Awareness of the Importance of Substantive Rights Protections 
 
Congressional awareness of the risks inherent in legislating in response to an acute threat 
to national security is apparent throughout consideration of the Bills which were later 
enacted as the Patriot Act.
119
  Concern for upholding normative subsystem behaviour is 
particularly evident in the congressional focus on the need to uphold constitutionally 
protected rights in the statutory provisions enacted.
120
  The law-making subsystem’s 
response to these needs was evident on two levels: one which recognised the general need 
to balance security interests with rights in enacting the legislation; and another which 
focused on the particular risk posed to the interests of minority racial groups in 
circumstances of acute national security pressure.  Therefore, whilst Parliament focused 
on achieving a paced and considered process by which the anti-terrorism legislation was 
enacted, the US legislature showed a greater level of concern for the qualitative substance 
of the provisions within the proposed legislation. 
 
The subsystem’s operational emphasis on the need to weigh up the competing interests of 
                                               
115 Jack Straw, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, c.152.   
116 Namely: (i) the legislative response from Parliament must approximate as closely as possible ordinary 
criminal law and procedure; (ii) additional statutory offences and powers may be justified, but only if they 
are necessary to meet the anticipated threat and strike an appropriate balance between security and rights; 
(iii) the need for additional safeguards should be considered alongside any additional powers; and (iv) the 
law should comply with the UK’s obligations in international law, Inquiry into Legislation against 
Terrorism, Cm 4178, (1998), para 3.1. 
117 Jack Straw, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, c.153. 
118
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Livingstone, Civil Liberties Law: The Human Rights Era (Butterworths, LexisNexis, 2003). 
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120
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protecting security and constitutional rights was demonstrated by successive members of 
Congress, who cautioned against allowing 9/11 to act as the catalyst for any invasion of 
individual liberties.
121
  This echoes pre-existing recognition of the propensity within the 
system’s self-referential behaviour of sacrificing minority rights in favour of appeasing 
majority concerns.
122
  Reconciling the twin aspirations of protecting rights and 
safeguarding national security was a prominent and recurrent theme throughout the debate 
concerning the legislative response to 9/11.  Representative Tom Udall stated that ‘[a]s we 
continue to take further actions and investigate those that have taken place we must be 
vigilant in defence of both our safety and our freedom’. 123   The repetition of the 
importance of adhering to pre-established norms of subsystem behaviour suggests that 
Congress sought to maintain its self-reflexive nature and balance minority protection with 
majoritarian responsiveness.   
 
Assurances were sought from the executive that no comparable use would be made of the 
post 9/11 threat to national security to facilitate such ‘unsavoury activities by the 
government’, 124  or cause any repeat ‘nation’s unfortunate experience with domestic 
surveillance abuses’. 125   Representative John Conyers, for example, noted, during a 
meeting of the House Committee on the Judiciary, that ‘[p]rotecting civil liberties and 
fighting terrorism in the wake of a national tragedy is not an easy thing to do’.126  Even 
more explicitly, reference was made to the past misuse of intelligence powers, such as its 
use to gather ‘embarrassing information’ about Martin Luther King.127  In relation to the 
general need to balance interests Barney Frank stated that ‘much of this bill is going to be 
an effort to give authority and then have safeguards to prevent abuses’.128 
 
In addition to the importance of balancing protection with freedom the heightened risk 
particularly posed to the rights of racial minority groups by national security legislation 
was also acknowledged.  The consequences of failing to protect minorities were 
illustrated by reference to the US’ treatment of Japanese Americans during the Second 
                                               
121 See, e.g., HR Congressional Record, 12 October 2001, comments by Jerrold Nadler, H6774; Butch  Otter, 
H6762; Bob Barr, H6766; and Carolyn Kilpatrick, H6771. 
122 Note, ‘Blown Away?  The Bill of Rights after Oklahoma City’ (1996) 109 Harv L. Rev 274, 2091. 
123 HRCR, article 5 of 7, 25 September 2001, E1735. 
124 Patrick Leahy, SCR 11 October 2001, S10556. 
125 See Patrick Leahy, SCR 25 October 2001, S10992 . 
126 John Conyers, House Committee on the Judiciary, Business Meeting (3 October 2001) 99. 
127 Barney Frank, ibid, 106.    
128
 ibid. 
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World War,
129
 whereby ‘thousands of loyal Americans were imprisoned…simply because 
they had Japanese parents.’130   This departure from the constitutional requirement of 
equal treatment, through measures targeted at a group on the basis of their ethnic 
background, and which included US citizens, was uniformly condemned and provoked a 
strong consensus within the subsystem that such behaviour must not be repeated.
131
   
 
Acknowledgment of the problems arising from departing from normative law-making 
standards sent a clear message about the sub-system’s intentions to adhere to a balanced 
programme of self-referential behaviour in responding to the threat to national security.  
The citation of previous problems in maintaining balanced and non-discriminatory law-
making also demonstrates subsystem awareness of the deleterious impact of any over-
responsiveness of subsystems to environmental irritants, to the extent that they then 
depart from self-defined subsystem behaviour.  Despite such awareness, in both the US 
and UK law-making subsystems each subsystem embarked on a form of self-referential 
behaviour that produced potentially rights-infringing legislation.  These departures are 
particularly evident in the unbalancing of minority protection and popular accountability 
so that majority expectations were prioritised and each legislature enacted powers infused 
with the potential to have a deleterious effect on minority groups.  
 
3.3 Prioritisation of Popular Accountability 
 
Whilst popular accountability has been championed as a positive redundancy for both the 
US and UK law-making systems, emergency situations have frequently been described as 
turning its beneficial characteristics into problematic ones, by generating a ‘something 
must be done’ mentality.  This relationship was explicitly acknowledged by Roy Jenkins 
who said that ‘[a]t a time of threat, to be seen to be doing something, rather than nothing 
is a natural human – and perhaps particularly ministerial – reaction’,132 and has been 
                                               
129 See previous discussion of this case in chapter 2 of this thesis. 
130 Bob Barr, HRCR, 24 September 2001, cited in D. Goldberg, V. Goldberg and R. Greenwald (eds.), It’s a 
Free Country Personal Freedom in America after September 11 (RDV Books, 2002).  See also section 2.1.2 
of this thesis. 
131 Hon. Joseph R. Pitts, HR Additional Remarks Congressional Record, article 1 of 4, 14 September 2001, 
E1655-56. 
132 HL Debs (2001-02) 629, c.200.  See also Adam Ingram who said, in relation to the Government’s 
response to the Omagh bombing in August 1998, ‘[i]f the Government had done nothing, we would have 
been accused – rightly – of standing back and watching that group’s development taking off apace without 
any attempt to provide the police with additional powers to bring those responsible to justice.  That was the 
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linked to pressure on the law-making subsystem to create new offences and grant more 
powers to law enforcement in response to terrorist threats.
133
  Despite the law-making 
subsystems’ operationally closed programme of balancing majoritarian responsiveness 
with minority protection, in enacting the counter-terror stop, search and surveillance 
powers, the environmental irritant of popular accountability morphed into the necessity to 
be seen to be advocating an instantaneous and extreme legislative response to the terrorist 
threat.
134
  This effect is a testament to the role of context in shaping parliamentary and 
congressional law-making.
135
   
 
In the aftermath of 9/11 as shown in chapter one, political, media and popular 
communication placed a disproportionate emphasis on individuals from Asian and Arabic 
backgrounds, perpetuating a popular association between these groups and national 
security threats.
136
  This focus reinforced popular and media stereotypes of these minority 
groups as suspect, as demonstrated by their separation from mainstream culture and 
values.
137
  This link contributed to the unbalancing of majoritarian responsiveness and 
                                                                                                                                            
motivation for the decision to recall Parliament’, Standing Committee (3 February 2000).  In the US a 
comparable form of action is evident in the passage of draconian immigration laws in response to the 
Oklahoma bombing, see N. Strossen, ‘The Current Assault on Constitutional Rights and Civil Liberties: 
Origin And Approaches’ (1997) 99 W. Va. L. Rev 769, 771; and K.R. Johnson, ‘The Anti-Terrorism Act, the 
Immigration Reform Act and Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for 
Citizens and Non-Citizens’ (1997) 28 St. Mary’s L.J. 833, 839. 
133 D. Feldman, ‘Human Rights, Terrorism and Risk: the Roles of Politicians and Judges’ [2006] Public Law 
364, 382-83. 
134 B. Ganor, The Counterterrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers (Transaction Publishers, New 
Brunswick, 2005) 297. 
135
 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Report of Session 2003-4, ‘Parliament and the 
Legislative Process’, vol. I. Report (2004) 53, para 5. 
136 This association is hinted at by the sharp increase in hate attacks against individuals from these ethnic 
and racial groups following 9/11 which meant that between 9/11 and 28 November 2001 the American-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Committee investigated over 450 hate crimes, Cong.Rec. E2150 Daily Ed., 28 
November 2001.  Further between 9/11 and 8 February 2002 over 1,700 anti-Muslim incidents were 
reported to the Council on American Islamic Relations, The Council of American Islamic Relations, Anti-
Muslim Incidents.  See also M. Welch, Scapegoats of September 11th: Hate Crimes and State Crimes in the 
War on Terror (Rutgers University Press, 2006); Human Rights Watch, ‘We are Not the Enemy’ Hate Crimes 
against Arabs, Muslims and those Perceived to be Arabs or Muslims after September 11 (November 2002) 
15; B.O. Hing, ‘Vigilante Racism: The De-Americanization and Subordination of Immigrant America’ 
(2002) 7 Mich. J. Race and Law 441. 
137 See, e.g., J. Shaheen, Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People (Interlink Publishing Group, 
2004); J. Shaheen, ‘Media Coverage of the Middle East: Perception and Foreign Policy’ (1985) 482 Annals 
of American Academic Policy and Social Science 160; N. Saito, ‘Symbolism under Siege.  Japanese 
American Redress and the “Racing” of Arab-Americans as “Terrorists”’ (2001) 8 Asian Law Journal 1, 12; 
E.W. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine how we see the Rest of the World 
(2nd rev.ed., Vintage, 1997); E.W. Said, Orientalism (Vintage,1978) 28; A. Lankford, ‘Re-examining the 
‘War of Ideas’ and ‘Us-Them’ Differentiation: Implications for Counter-terrorism’ (2009) 3 Homeland 
Security Review 1; R. Jackson, ‘Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic 
Discourse (2007) 42(3) Government and Opposition 394; R. Delgado and J. Stefancic, ‘Images of the 
Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systematic Social Ills’ (1992) 72 
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minority protection,
138
 and indicates the extent to which fundamental civil liberties are not 
presumptively safe in democratic institutions,
139
 but instead represent one approach the 
law-making subsystem can take to its achieving its functional programme. 
 
Following 9/11, the UK Parliament responded to its assessment of popular expectations of 
its behaviour by advocating the uncompromising deployment of the pre-existing powers 
within the Terrorism Act, thus repeating established subsystem behaviour of using 
legislative powers to respond to public sentiment, as opposed to effectively addressing the 
problem at its source.
140
  In other words, the strength of the irritant of popular opinion 
shifted subsystem operational behaviour away from the normal programme in favour of 
the political tendency to ‘rally round the flag’ in accordance with public fears.141   The use 
of counter-terrorism powers as a symbol of security through which to appease public 
anxiety was confirmed by Lord Jenkins who conceded that whilst these powers ‘helped to 
steady a febrile state of opinion at the time and to provide some limited protection … I 
doubt it frustrated any determined terrorist’. 142   Repeating this mode of subsystem 
operation in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks popular accountability encouraged the 
‘unreserved condemnation of the atrocities carried out in the US’,143 together with an 
unbridled demand for an immediate reaction.
144
  Although the s.44 powers were passed in 
advance of 9/11, and apparently with a measured consideration and debate,
145
 the ways in 
which they departed from standard statutory safeguards, such as the requirement for 
reasonable suspicion and oversight, meant that the context in which the powers came to 
be used shaped called for widespread, racially uneven of the powers. 
 
The new subsystem programme is evident in the reaction of MPs to 9/11 which reveals a 
                                                                                                                                            
Cornell L. Rev. 1258, 1259; E. Poole and J. Richardson, Muslims and the New Media (Tauris, 2006); K. 
Hafez (ed.), Islam and the West in the Mass Media: Fragmented Images in a Globalizing World (Hampton 
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Newspapers (John Benjamin, 2004). 
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364, 379. 
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140
 P.A. Thomas, ‘Emergency and Anti-terrorism Powers 9/11: USA and UK’ (2002-03) 26 Fordham 
International L.J. 1193, 1196.    
141 A. Vermuele, ‘Emergency Lawmaking after 9/11 and 7/7’ (2008) 75 U. Ch. L.R. 1155. 
142 Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, HL Debs (2001-02) 629, c.1999. 
143 Khalid Mahmood, HC Debs (2001-02) 372, c.612. 
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perceived need not simply to show their understanding of public demands for action,
146
 
but to stand at the forefront of condemnation of the attacks.
147
  MPs used the strong 
emotions that the attacks elicited to show an acute personal empathy with those directly 
affected by the events.
148
  Illustrative of this response are the successive personal 
vignettes, relayed with an almost story-telling like quality,
149
 by which individuals sought 
to closely associate themselves with the attacks,
150
 and with the US.
151
  Even where the 
personal connections were relatively remote they were used to demonstrate politicians’ 
credentials to represent the public in commenting on, and condemning, the attacks.
152
  
When such connections were unavailable a strong emotional connection was created by 
MPs recounting stories from the attacks,
153
 including near-misses
154
 and examples of 
                                               
146 See, e.g., John Wilkinson who expresses his pleasure that ‘I do not believe that my constituents will feel 
in any sense let down by our proceedings’, ibid, c.644. 
147  See e.g. HC Debs (2001-02) 372, John Hume (cc.613-14), Iain Duncan Smith (cc.607-8), Charles 
Kennedy (cc.609-10), and David Trimble (cc.611-12). 
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Justice Debate’ (2000)  86 Va. L. Rev. 1095, 1109-16 discussing the role of activist media and legislative 
rhetoric in transforming juvenile justice debate into a campaign for gun control. 
150 E.g., Julian Lewis detailed the presumed final moments and biographical details of two cousins of his 
constituency chairman who were presumed to have died in the Twin Towers, HC Debs (2001-02) 372, c.637 
and John Battle expresses his fear for his daughter who ‘was travelling in America and was due to visit New 
York’, ibid c.642.  In addition, David Heath, Michael Connarty, Patsy Calton and a number of other 
Members of Parliament mention their presence in Washington during the attack on the Pentagon, ibid, 
cc.649, 654,739.  A further example is that of Sarah Tether who demonstrates a connection with one of the 
victims of the 7/7 attacks from her constituency by describing her as being of around the same age, (2005-
06) 436, c.1268. 
151 E.g., Charles Kennedy recounted a story about his own student experiences of America, HC Debs (2001-
02) 372, c. 609, and Bernard Jenkin described himself as a tourist in New York ‘marvelling’ at the twin 
towards of the World Trade Center, ibid, c.662. 
152 E.g., George Osborne quoted an email from a friend in New York whose husband worked for the firm 
Morgan Stanley who were, at this stage, believed to have lost around 500 employees, ibid, c.652.  
153
 E.g. a number of different MPs return to the image of the four year old child who was on one of the 
flights hijacked by the terrorists.  Particular emphasis is put on the detail that it was the child’s first time in 
an aeroplane.  See ibid, Ian Paisley (c.631), David Heath (c.650), Stuart Bell (c.658), Menzies Campbell 
(cc.703-04) and Tony Lloyd (c.727).  Another example is an emergency services chaplain who was killed 
whilst administering the last rites to one of the victims; see Ernie Ross, ibid, c.682. 
154 E.g. Gordon Marsden described how a college friend from the time he studied in America saw the impact 
of the first aeroplane and then ‘dragged her daughter away’ from her school just by the World Trade Center, 
see HC Debs (2001-02) 372, c.660. 
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individual heroism.
155
  The highly emotive discourse exacerbated the sense of tragedy and 
the human cost of 9/11,
156
 and subsequently 7/7.
157
  These subsystem communications 
demonstrate openness to its environmental irritants, which shaped the subsystem’s 
understanding of the need for uncompromising support for police use of their counter-
terror powers.
158
   
 
Against the backdrop of the horrific images relating to 9/11, and the need to demonstrate 
to the public that the most severe response possible would be directed at terrorist 
suspects,
159
 no attempts were made to secure a reaction that was not strongly driven by 
emotions.  By contrast the pre-legislative scrutiny of the Terrorism Act occurred in 
advance of 9/11 and, therefore, without its imagery in the debate.  In this context an 
emotionally neutral approach to legislative powers was agreed as being essential to 
maintaining the legitimacy of subsystem operation, even if this was not wholly achieved 
in reality.
160
  Following 9/11, politicians specifically demanded that the images and reality 
of the attacks be kept at the forefront of police considerations, instead of separating use of 
the counter-terrorism powers from emotion-led responses.
161
  Despite knowing, and 
acknowledging, the negative implications of succumbing to emotion-led responses to 
shocking events the importance of being seen to be acting in response to popular opinion 
                                               
155 Iain Duncan Smith, ibid, c.607. 
156  On successive occasions MPs emphasised that the events were a human tragedy by portraying the 
victims as ‘ordinary people going about their ordinary daily lives’.  This is perhaps best illustrated by David 
Heath who stated that ‘We watched television and read the newspapers … and looked at the long list of 
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c.650. 
157 See Charles Kennedy, HC Debs (2005-06) 436, c.571, in response to which Tony Blair promises action, 
ibid, c.565. 
158 A similar trend in legislative rhetoric is observed by Daniel Filler in relation to the debate over public 
lists of individuals with child sex attack convictions and by David Hyman concerning the role of 
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important’, Tony Lloyd, HC Debs (2001-02) 372, c.726.  See also A.J. McClurg, ‘The Rhetoric of Gun 
Control’ 42 American University Law Review 53 (1992-93). 
160 A comment by Bruce George suggests almost a desire to be caught up in the emotion surrounding the 
events by describing how ‘[w]e are all willing voyeurs of a catastrophe, rushing to our television sets and 
pinning our eyes on something quite surreal’, HC Debs (2001-02) 372, c.635. 
161 E.g., Tony Blair reiterates the importance of this three times in quick succession stating that ‘it is 
necessary now to use the outrage to devise the right agenda to tackle terrorism’, as well as that ‘[i]t is most 
important not to forget the sheer horror of the events.  Let it inspire use to take the action that is now 
necessary’, and finally ‘we must not let the passage of time dull our determination, in any shape or form, to 
carry out the agenda that we have set out today’, ibid, cc.609-10 and 613.  Jack Straw similarly refers to the 
need to ‘channel the rage and revulsion that we feel today’, ibid, c.620. 
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usurped such considerations, and resulted in calls for an ‘instinctive and robust’ 
parliamentary response.
162
    
 
Following 9/11 US politicians were also keen to ensure that their actions were reflective 
of the environmental irritants arising from popular opinion.
163
   Congressional accounts, 
for example, dwelt on instances of individual heroism arising out of the attacks,
164
 
including that of the rescue services who responded to the events.
165
  The range of talents 
and positive personal characteristics of the victims,
166
  were used in stark juxtaposition 
with the imagery surrounding their deaths.
167
  These condensed biographies demonstrate 
how the law-making subsystem was aligning its own behaviour with the environmental 
irritants leading to the rapid legislative response to 9/11.
168
  Whether they had suffered 
personal losses themselves, therefore, members of Congress were clear that ‘[n]ow more 
than ever, many people are searching for strength and solace’, and that this was expected 
to come from their political representatives.
169
   
 
One example demonstrating the importance of popular accountability as an irritant in the 
subsystem’s operation is Arlen Specter’s concern that ‘some further act of terrorism may 
occur which could be attributed to our failure to act promptly’.170  This fear was turned 
                                               
162 Brian Mawhinney, ibid, c.613. 
163 See R. Jackson, ‘Wartime Security and Liberty under Law’ (1951) 1 Buffalo Law Review 107 in which 
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Rush Holt, HRCR 21 September 2001, E1702. 
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colleague who had been a fire-fighter responding to the World Trade Center attacks, E1649. 
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Rocky Point High School, and describes the hobbies and talents that each had while at school, HRCR 5 
October 2001, E1824. 
167 James P. McGovern cites two particularly emotive examples of the human loss caused by the 9/11 
attacks: Linda M. George who he describes as ‘planning to get married on October 20’ and Christopher 
Zarba, for whom ‘Saturday would have been his 48th birthday’, HRCR 14th September 2001, E1662. 
168
 In order to emphasise the human loss and the importance of not losing sight of this amid the sheer 
numerical scale of deaths caused by the attacks Shelia Jackson-Lee urges that ‘we should not consider that 
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Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001.  Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, House 
of Representatives (107th Congress, 1st Session, 24 September 2001) 62. 
169 Corrine Brown, HRCR 16 October 2001, H6790. 
170 Arlen Specter, HRCR 11 October 2001, S10568.  Specter also states that he sent two letters to Leahy 
repeating this concern, and urging that the ‘Judiciary Committee proceed promptly with the Attorney 
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into a threat, directed at the law-making subsystem, by the Attorney General John 
Ashcroft who suggested that delays in passing the statute risked national security,
171
 and 
would render representatives culpable for any subsequent attacks.
 172
  These sentiments 
were strengthened by the idea, expressed by Orin Hatch, that if the powers under 
consideration had already been in place the attacks could have been prevented.
173
  Specter 
further demonstrated his responsiveness to popular accountability by criticising the bill’s 
opponents ‘for putting on record a disregard for constitutionality and elevating procedure 
over substance’,174 implying that anyone speaking against the bill would be liable to face 
electoral reproach.  The link between public opinion and congressional behaviour is also 
suggested by the desire for individuals who had missed congressional votes relating to the 
statutory powers to put on record their reason for not attending, whilst affirming their 
uncaveated support for the proposed anti-terrorism legislation.
175
   
 
Alongside the feelings of ‘shock’, anger and ‘outrage’ felt at the commission of the 
attacks,
176
 the overwhelming public support for President Bush immediately following 
9/11 was also cited within Congress to garner political support for the Executive’s 
legislative proposals.
177
 Several members of Congress cited examples of public support 
both for the President and for legislative action,
178
 particularly from children,
179
 and, less 
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171 R. Dworkin, ‘The Threat to Patriotism’ New York Review of Books (25 February 2002). 
172 D. Weisburd and A.A. Braga, ‘Introduction: Understanding Police Innovation’ in D. Weisburd and A.A. 
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174
 Arlen Specter, SCR 11 October 2001, S10579. 
175  See, e.g., HRCR 13 September 2001, Norman Dicks, E1644, Solomon Ortiz, E1647, and Carolyn 
Kilpatrick, E1638 who all gave their utmost apologies for missing the congressional vote condemning the 
terrorist attacks (vote no.338). 
176 Steve Chabot, Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001.  Hearing before the Committee on the 
Judiciary, House of Representatives (107th Congress, 1st Session, 24 September 2001), p.52.    
177 Joe Pitts states that ‘right now this country is united like never before.  The President has 90 per cent 
approval rating.  His handling of the war has a 94 per cent approval rating.  Bipartisanship is the rule of the 
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NY Times (3 January 2002). 
178 E.g. Randy Forbes read out a statement by Rabbi Israel Zoberman who described the aftermath of the 
attacks as having a ‘Holocaust resonance to it’, HRCR 3 October 2001, E1785; and Michale Biliraki reads a 
poem by a friend of his entitled ‘Lady Liberty Still Stands Tall’, HRCR 24 September 2001, E1705. 
179 E.g., Jim DeMint read out a poem by a 16 year old girl describing the horrors of the attacks and the need 
to take action against the perpetrators, HRCR 16 October 2001, E1909; and Timothy Johnson reads out a 
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Congressmen, now more than ever before, need our full confidence and support’, HRCR 14 September 
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prosaically, some of the practical reasons for demanding immediate action.
180
 Members of 
the executive and Congress, therefore, demanded complete responsiveness to the 
expectations of their electors whilst rejecting the importance of balancing these with other 
considerations.
181
  The American people were described as deserving ‘fast work and final 
action’ in the enactment of additional police powers,182 despite the known trend for the 
American public to support the President in times of tension, even where the 
administration commits gross violations of civil liberties.
183
  A further subsystem 
behaviour that was used to quieten critics of counter-terror legislation
184
 was repetition of 
media descriptions of the attacks.
185
  These also helped to strengthened the popular 
‘availability heuristic’ so that the statistical likelihood of a repeat event did not determine 
popular or subsystem reaction to it.
186
  Instead it was portrayed as a single example of a 
broader, endemic phenomenon.
187
  At the same time that the threat of terrorism was 
transformed from abstract notions to a real occurrence with a tangible impact,
188
 therefore, 
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185 Various members of Parliament refer to the news coverage of the events and how this heightened the 
sense of tragedy.  See, e.g., HC Debs (2001-02) 372Michael Ancram (c.621) who referred to ‘a terrible and 
almost unbelievable series of images and pictures’ and Tony Blair referred to ‘the memory of it is fresh in 
our minds and its consequences are seen daily in our newspapers and on our television screens’, c.13.  In 
addition, in the House of Lords Lord Dubs stated that ‘[w]e are more affected [by the terrorist attacks] 
because of television.  We have seen the events in our living rooms.  We saw the horror of what happened as 
it took place’, HL Debs (2001-02) 627, c.30.  For discussion of this effect see R.E Kasperson et al, ‘The 
Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework’ in P. Slovic (ed.), The Perception of Risk 
(Earthscan Publications Ltd, 2000) 232-45 and N. Pigeon, R.E. Kasperson and P. Slovic, The Social 
Amplification of Risk (CUP, 2003). 
186
 A. Treversky and D. Kahneman, ‘Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability’ (1973) 
Journal of Cognitive Psychology 207.  See also, C. Sunstein, ‘Terrorism and Probability Neglect’ (2003) 
The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 121. 
187  See J. Best, Random Violence: How We Talk about New Crimes and New Victims, (University of 
California Press, 1999) 28-9.  See also F. Furedi, Invitation to Terror.  The Expanding Empire of the 
Unknown (Continuum, 2007) which considers the way modern society has styled itself as vulnerable, 
powerless and at risk from, as opposed to being in control of, external events, 66. 
188
 Note, ‘Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment and War’ (2002) 115 Harvard L. Rev 1217, 1230. 
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law-making subsystem debate focused on the worst possible outcome of such events and 
the need to avoid this at all costs.
189
    
 
Whilst popular accountability is a key strength of the US and UK law-making sub-
systems its known weakness in emergency situations, arising from popular ‘probability 
neglect’,190 and the legislators need to be seen to be doing something rather than nothing, 
affected the subsystem’s debate surrounding the counter-terrorism powers. 191   Some 
commentators have described the effect of these pressures as resulting in ‘governance 
through fear’. 192   The environmental irritants produced by the images of 9/11 
overwhelmed subsystem operational closure and was highly influential in directing the 
legislative programme implemented.
193
  This contributed to subsystem behaviour which 
departed from the normal programme of effective and impartial law-making in favour of 
unilateral legislating which led to the enactment and use of statutory provisions without 
the necessary safeguards against misuse.
194
  The outcome arose despite subsystem 
recognition of the detrimental impact that emergency situations can have on legislating 
and the importance of avoiding such effects.
195
   
 
In a comparable trend in both countries, therefore, debate focused on individual stories of 
tragedy and heroism arising from the attacks, incorporating particularly emotive details 
                                               
189 C.R. Sunstein, ‘Probability Neglect: Emotion, Worst Cases, and Law’ (2002) 112 Yale LJ 61, 66.    
190
 See C.R. Sunstein, ‘Terrorism and Probability Neglect’ (2003) 26(2) The Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty 121-36 who suggests that the probability of an event happening is neglected when individual’s 
emotions are activated, and that this response is especially prevalent in situations of terrorist attack. 
191 Editorial, The Independent (10 August 2005), 26 described this sentiment as leading to government by 
press release and ‘post it’ note and accused it of lacking coherence. 
192 See, e.g., R. Ericson and A. Doyle, ‘Catastrophic Risk, Insurance and Terrorism’ (2004) 33 Econ. And 
Society 135; J. Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an Anxious Age (Random 
House, 2004); and S. Ahmed, ‘The Politics of Fear in the Making of Worlds’ (2003) 16 Qualitative Studies 
in Education 377. 
193 N.F. Pigeon, R.E. Kasperson and P. Slovic, The Social Amplification of Risk (CUP, 2003); and R.E. 
Kasperson et al, ‘The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework’ in P. Slovic (ed.), The 
Perception of Risk (Earthscan, 2000) 232-45. 
194 Compare this with the argument in E. Posner and A. Vermule, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty 
and the Courts (OUP, 2007), which argues that emergency delegation of power to the executive is not 
obviously broader than would have been enacted by a strictly rational legislation, updating its assessment of 
the terrorist threat: 4-5.  However, this overlooks the fact that even this ‘rational legislature’ is responding to 
expectations of popular accountability, and its behaviour in substance and process reflects this. 
195  Jack Straw, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, c.155. In addition, whilst the damage caused by 9/11 was 
unquestionably horrific, and the potential for attacks using biological weapons was new, seen through 
another lens of understanding these threats repeat the terrorist predisposition to utilise the most 
technologically advanced weapons available at the time, M.O. Chibundu, ‘For God, For Country, For 
Universalism: Sovereignty as Solidarity in our Age of Terror’ (2004) 56 Fla. L. Rev 883,911. 
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about the victims.
196
  The need to respond to public expectations of law-making 
subsystem actions became the preeminent driving force behind subsystem operations 
aimed at countering the threat from international terrorism, both before and after 9/11.  
This shifted the subsystems’ behavioural programme from balancing majoritarian 
responsiveness and minority protection, which in turn affected the legislation produced.  
Although the rhetoric of balance was retained this essentially referred to balance between 
minority rights and majority security as opposed to normal operational balance.  Indeed, 
as Gavin Phillipson has noted, this is a recurrent trend in counter-terror law-making, 
because of the lack of any significant electoral penalty for invasions of civil liberties.  
Instead, even where liberties do have an impact on law-making subsystem behaviour it 
tends to be against parties seen as being pro-civil liberties at the expense of fighting 
terrorism or crime.
197
  The loss, or at least relegation, of minority interests within the 
subsystem programme, meant that subsystem function was predominantly responsive to 
majoritarian concerns relating to national security.  Given the role of the media and 
politicians seeking to win elections and retain political support, perhaps, to expect the 
legislature to behave otherwise perhaps ‘smacks of extreme naivety’.198   
 
3.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has demonstrated how the parliamentary and congressional enactment of the 
suspicion-less stop, search and surveillance powers took place through a law-making 
process with an acknowledged pre-disposition to depart from the self-referential 
behaviours essential to creating even and effective legislation. Such behaviour supports 
the systems theory claim, as well as more general critiques, that law does one things 
whilst maintaining that it is doing another, by way of the hidden assumptions and values 
shaping the law and legal discourse.
199
   The manifestation of such deviations in the law-
making process were differently recognised in the US and UK as either the outcome of a 
                                               
196 See, e.g., Howard Coble, who speaks of the death of Sandy Bradshaw, who was just 38 years old … [and] 
leaves behind her husband Phil and her daughter, Alexandria, 2, and her son, Shenan, not yet one’.  Howard 
Coble describes Ms Bradshaw as ‘friendly, outgoing, bubbly and devoted to her family’, HRCR 11 
September 2001, E1635. 
197 G. Phillipson, ‘Deference, Discretion and Democracy in the Human Rights Act Era’ (2004) Current 
Legal Problems 40-75, 45. 
198 A. Ashworth, ‘What have Human Rights Done for Criminal Justice in the UK?’ (2004) 23 U. Tai L. Rev 
151, 157. 
199 See D. Kennedy, ‘The Political Significance of the Structure of the Law School Curriculum’ (1983) 15 
Seton Hall Law Review and also G. Minda, ‘The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s’ (1989) 50 Ohio St. 
L.J. 599, 622. 
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compromise in procedural standards in the enactment of laws; or the failure to incorporate 
a balanced consideration of the substantive qualities expected to be found in enacted 
legislation.   Despite this difference the outcome of both forms of non-normative 
legislative behaviour was the implementation of legislation which lacked sufficient 
consideration of, or safeguards against, the misuse of the powers contained within it, such 
that it was deployed in a racially uneven manner.
200
   
 
Both the congressional, parliamentary and committee-based debates acknowledged the 
risk of enacting permanent counter-terror powers without safeguards.
201
  An almost self-
congratulatory tone was therefore adopted during the debates for having identified past 
legislative behavioural deficiencies and being committed to remedying them in the new 
statute.
202
  However, despite the explicit acknowledgement of the need for legislative 
safeguards, and a number of signs of human rights thinking within the Act,
203
 the US and 
UK law-making subsystems determinedly refused to demand the incorporation of 
protections against the unrestricted use of the stop, search and surveillance powers into 
the legislation.
204
  The warnings relating to the possible negative impact of enacting 
powers wholly-responsive to popular panic, therefore, did not translate into the inclusion 
of effective protections in the legislation, thus laying the foundations for the possibility of 
the racially disproportionate implementations of the powers once activated against a 
racially-characterised threat.
205
  Despite the apparent desire to break away from cycles of 
ineffective and detrimental emergency law-making, either the process or the contents of 
                                               
200
 In this context ‘misuse’ is used to mean the use of s.44 stop and search in a way that disproportionately 
focuses on racial and religious minority individuals, without this being an effective or justifiable means of 
policing the threat of terrorist attacks, as explored in chapter one of this thesis. 
201 See, e.g., Alan Simpson, HC Debs (1999-00) 346, c.358.   
202 See, e.g., Jack Straw who states unequivocally that ‘[w]e are determined to strike the right balance 
between giving the police and other agencies the powers that they need to fight terrorism and guarding the 
civil liberties of people affected by the exercise of those powers’, HC Debs (1998-99) 327, c.1004.  See also 
Simon Hughes who states that ‘I am conscious of the fact that the provisions are partly a continuation of 
Prevention of Terrorism legislation, which has been tested from time to time.  However, we need to link it 
with the proper level of authorisation’, Standing Committee, 1 February 2000. 
203 C. Gearty, ’11 September and the Human Rights Act’ (2005) 32(1) JLS 18, 21-22. 
204 See, e.g., Ken Maginnis, who states that ‘[i]t is important that the Bill, as it evolves through its various 
stages over the forthcoming months, is flexible enough to adapt to the changing nature of terrorism’, HC 
Debs (1999-00) 341, c.199.  See also Charles Clarke, Standing Committee (1 February 2000) who stated 
that ‘[a]n important and well-established principle of our policing system is that chief officers of the police 
have operational independence.  They are best placed to make operational policing decisions 
which…include deciding whether making a stop-and-search authorisation is expedient in preventing acts of 
terrorism’. 
205 Such characterisation is clear from media reporting of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequent focus on 
Islamic terrorism and terrorism groups, whilst effectively distancing these incidents from terrorist attacks 
outside this narrow construction of the threat.  See H. Vu, ‘Note. Us against Them: The Path to National 
Security is Paved with Racism’ (2002) 50 Drake L. Rev. 661, 663. 
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the legislative debate did not achieve this.  The alternative form of behaviour evident in 
the counter-terrorism law-making failed to incorporate the necessary safeguards and 
considerations to maintain subsystem effectiveness and legitimacy.
206
   
 
This chapter has shown that there is a version of the law-making subsystem’s operational 
programme that makes its communications ‘legitimate’, but that this version is not the 
actual programme on the basis of which it operates.  In times of crisis and the threat of 
violence it becomes clear that the actual programme on the basis of which the system 
operates places very little weight on minority protection and almost all of its weight on 
pleasing the electorate.  Although this raises serious questions about the legitimacy of the 
subsystem’s communications, for the purpose of this thesis the key relevance is that racial 
effect, if present, might flow necessarily and predictably from this ‘real’ programme, and 
that, indeed the existence of a veneer of minority protection, itself generated to feed 
appearance-driven electoral accountability, helps to obscure the real operational 
programme, and create an impression of legitimacy, while in fact the law-making system 
simply pursues the interests of the ruling group.  Having set out the expected 
characteristics of fair and effective law-making, together with the legislature’s 
understanding of the problems encountered if these are departed from and their impact on 
the statutory provisions, chapter four shows how subsystem behaviour brought about 
these deficiencies and, therefore, played its role in the eventual racial effect of the 
legislative provisions. 
                                               
206 E.g., Steve McCabe tabled an amendment to the Standing Committee that the stop and search powers 
should be subject to police codes of practice.  However, this amendment was withdrawn following Mr. 
Ingram’s response that the police should be free to institute more onerous codes of practice in relation to 
these powers if they wish.  The effect of it, however, was to include no safeguards concerning standards of 
police use of the powers into the statute, Standing Committee (3 February 2000). 
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Chapter three set out the law-making subsystem’s programme of operation for enacting 
legislation, together with evidence that the subsystem appreciated the negative impact on 
its legislating when it failed to adhere to this subsystem programme, and its apparent 
repetition of these criticised modes of operation in response to the terrorist threat.  In 
order to explain this mode of subsystem behaviour this chapter uncovers the real 
operational programme through which the law-making subsystems created its impression 
of legitimacy while responding to the interests of the ruling group in the context of the 
threat of terrorist attack in the US and UK.
1
   This argument follows that of race-crits who 
perceive law-making as a highly politicised activity, dominated by majority social groups 
and their needs.
2
  One impact of this is that potential effects of statutory provisions which 
would bear most heavily on minorities are subordinated or even entirely absent from law-
making discourse.
3
  In particular, the desire to reflect and respond to popular 
accountability, above all other considerations, had a strong politicising influence on the 
subsystem function and output and indicates that what is promoted as the subsystem 
programme of operation in terms of balancing minority and majority interests is little 
more than a specific manifestation of the legislature responding to the majority 
expectations and which is readily dispensed with when majority priorities change.   
 
For the purposes of this analysis the behaviour of the UK legislature is considered across 
several different periods, encompassing the enactment and extension of the suspicion-less 
stop and search powers in 1994 and 1996,
4
 their re-enactment through the Terrorism Act 
2000,
5
 and their use following 9/11.
6
   Scrutiny of the Terrorism Bill, undertaken by the 
Parliamentary Standing Committee, will also be used as evidence of the subsystem 
                                               
1 See figs. three and four.  See also R. Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism. Language, Politics and 
Counter-terrorism (Manchester University Press, 2005) 23; I. Parker, Discourse Dynamics: Critical for 
Social and Individual Psychology (New Left Books, 1992) 5. 
2 D. Kairys (ed.), The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique(rev’d ed., 1990). 
3 R.T. Ford, ‘The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis’ 81 Harvard Law Review 1841. 
4 The specific powers that s.44 replaced were contained within the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 
1994 and the Prevention of Terrorism (Additional Powers) Act 1996, which inserted ss.13A and 13B into 
the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989. 
5 Jack Straw, HC Debs (2000-01) 363, c.238W, confirming commencement of the 2000 Act and that it 
would replace the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 and the Northern Ireland 
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1996.  The main focus of this analysis, however, concerns the period prior to 
the Bill gaining Royal Assent, see HC Debs (1999-00) 354, c.608. 
6 Although s.44 had been in force since February 2001 it was little used before 9/11, see Human Rights 
Watch, Without Suspicion.  Stop and Search under the Terrorism Act 2000 (2010) 11, HC Debs (2001-02) 
372, c.604ff; and HL Debs (2001-02) 627, c.1ff. 
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programme which gave rise to the statute.
7
  The behaviour of the US law-making 
subsystem is analysed through congressional debate and committee-based comments 
during the period between the 9/11 attacks
8
 and the passage of the USA Patriot Act of 
2001.
9
  Although congressional behaviour clearly shifted to incorporate popular 
expectations of the subsystem, this chapter considers how, despite the new reality of the 
security threat, constitutional protections continued to influence the subsystem 
programme in delineating the legislative powers.
10
   This chapter suggests that the US and 
UK law-making subsystem debates reveal a subsystem amnesia as regards the aspirations 
for effective and proportionate counter-terrorism measures expressed within the 
subsystem.  Instead, the debates indicate an all-consuming concern amongst the 
politicians to be seen to be safeguarding the population and freeing the police from any 
constraints, which could curb their use of their law enforcement powers.  This is present 
in relation to the TA debates, despite MPs explicitly commending themselves for acting 
outside a context of immediately national security threat, and with the PA debates 
occurring in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.  This indicates that the law-making 
subsystem departure from normal operational behaviour was not contingent upon the 
specific events of 9/11, but reflects a more general trend in how subsystem 
communications are affected by subsystem operational closure and cognitive openness. 
 
The first section in this chapters looks at how exceptionalism became the dominant theme 
in subsystem communications.  The next section suggests that the subsystem response to 
the exceptional context was to seek to eliminate or circumvent the normal operational 
behaviour of statutory debate.  By repeating the previously criticised patterns of 
autopoietic behaviour subsystem agents contributed to the implementation of statutory 
powers which operated on the basis of unchecked subjectivity, particularly owing to their 
suspicion-less nature.  This meant that the powers had the potential to be used in a way 
that targeted individuals on the basis of their membership of a minority racial group, a 
potential that was realised in the febrile atmosphere in which the powers were used, 
                                               
7 This comprised of nine sittings between 18 January 2000 and 8 February 2000.  Minutes of the sittings are 
available at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmstand/d/cmter.htm, accessed 26.11.2010. 
8 See HRCR (11 September 2001) H5503-91ff and SCR (12 September 2001) S9284-88, 9289-333ff.  See 
www.thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query, accessed 04.01.2011 
9 See HRCR (25 October 2001) S10969-70; and SCR (25 October 2001) S10990-11060.   See also Minutes 
of House Judiciary Committee (24 September 2001) and (3 October 2001). 
10 See, e.g., Adam B. Schiff, who stated: ‘We will not relinquish our freedoms of speech, assembly and 
religion, nor sacrifice our precious right of privacy or way of life.  The price of freedom is high, and 
Americans have always paid it’, HRCR Additional Comments (article 4 of 4), E1647. 
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following 9/11.  The final section analyses the communications arising from within the 
law-making subsystem pertaining to the race and religious-based nature of the threat. 
 
4.1 The Appeal to Exceptionalism   
 
Both US and UK law-making subsystems described the legislative context giving rise to 
the counter-terrorism stop, search and surveillance powers in highly exceptional terms, 
repeating a subsystem tendency to portray all national security threats as uniquely 
severe.
11
  Of course, this is unsurprising given the scale and severity of the 9/11 attacks.
12
 
However, the UK Terrorism Act was enacted before this date, with the powers on which 
s.44 was based having existed even before this.  Nevertheless, on each occasion the 
context was portrayed as so exceptional that only the most elevated powers could match 
the threat.
13
  Terrorism became the ‘trump card’ to support government action, 
irrespective of its potential impact on civil liberties.
14
  Within this context moderating 
legal powers to protect individual rights was readily portrayed as a ‘gamble with people’s 
safety’.15  Whilst the scale of the 9/11 attacks was undoubtedly shocking, descriptions of 
them in terms of absolute exceptionalism was contrary to the recognised need to engage 
in measured and calm law-making, in accordance with the subsystem’s self-developed 
functional programme.
16
  Both US and UK law-making subsystem behaviour suggest that 
the special counter-terrorism measures arose from a pattern of operations driven by the 
desire to be seen to take decisive and uncompromising action, as opposed to its task of 
                                               
11  As previously considered in Chapter 3 of this thesis (section 3.2). B. Vaughan and S. Kilcommins, 
Terrorism, Rights and the Rule of Law.  Negotiating Justice in Ireland (Willan Publishing, 2008) 4. 
12  J. Huysmans, ‘Minding the Exceptions: Politics of Insecurity and Liberal Democracy’ (2004) 3 
Contemporary Political Theory 321; House of Commons Defense Select Committee, The Threat from 
Terrorism HC 348 (Session 2001-2002); Home Office, Counter-terrorism Powers: Reconciling Security and 
Liberty in an Open Society.  A Discussion Paper (2004) Cm 6147 at 5 and 7.  This is not, however, a wholly 
post 9/11 phenomenon, see B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (1998); W. Laquer, The New Terrorism: 
Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (1999); X. Raufer, ‘New World Disorder, New Terrorism, 
New Threats for Europe and the Western World’ (1999) 121 Terrorism and Political Violence 30; and C. 
Schmitt (auth.), E. Kennedy (trans.), Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (MIT Press, 1985).    
13 Criticising this see: M. Ignatiev, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Edinburgh, 2005); 
and I. Leigh and R. Masterman, Making Rights Real 296. 
14 A.C. Coveny, ‘When the Immovable Object Meets the Unstoppable Force: Search and Seizure in the Age 
of Terrorism’ (2007-08) 31 Am. J. Trial Advoc 329, 367.  See also M.D. Evans, ‘International Law and 
Human Rights in a Pre-emptive Era’ who describes how ‘Such is the totemic power of the all-pervasive and 
yet unseen threat that it is difficult to gauge the point at which general tolerance of such [civil rights] 
erosions might lie’, in M. Buckely and R. Singh, The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism.  Global 
Responses, Global Consequences (Routledge, 2006) 193. 
15 I. Loader, ‘The Cultural Lives of Security and Rights’ in Goold and Lazarus, Security and Human Rights 
(Hart Publishing, 2007) 39. 
16
 H. Kennedy, Just Law.  The Changing Face of Justice – and Why it Matters to Us All (Vintage, 2005) 198. 
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enacting effective and balanced statutory provisions.
17
    
 
Despite recognising the benefit of enacting security related measures, through its ‘normal’ 
subsystem programme, the UK law-making subsystem interpreted and responded to 
environmental irritants as necessitating legislation that was anything but normal.
18
  One 
example of the impact of the exceptional circumstances on subsystem operations and 
resulting statutory provisions was that the subsystem changed its normal aversion to pre-
emptive police stop and search and enacted permanent police powers as an anticipatory 
step against the significant and serious contemporary terrorist threat.
19
  The original 
suspicion-less stop and search powers were introduced through amendments to the 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 which afforded the police the 
power to stop vehicles, and later pedestrians, where doing so was expedient for the 
purposes of protecting against terrorism, and search for articles which could be used in 
the commission of acts of terrorism.
20
  The Government called for unilateral 
parliamentary support for the proposed powers which were accepted as being 
operationally essential,
21
 on the basis of police expertise and support for the powers.
 22
   
The Government used the urgency of the police calls for such powers to explain its 
introduction of the statutory provisions regarding pedestrian stops and searches by way of 
a timetable motion, and with only 24 hours’ notice,23 despite the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 having been renewed less than three weeks 
previously.
24
   
 
The debates concerning the Terrorism Act sustained the sense of exceptionalism, with the 
‘crisis’25 occasioned by the risk of terrorist attack described as being greater than anything 
                                               
17 For criticism of such narratives see: R. Jackson, ‘Playing the Politics of Fear: Writing the Terrorist Threat 
in the War on Terrorism’ in G. Kassimeris (ed.), Playing Politics with Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 
2007); and J. Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security 
Threats and Why We Believe Them (Free Press, 2006). 
18 See, e.g., Alan Simpson, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, c.203. 
19 Clive Walker has noted the growing emphasis on the anticipatory risk in counter-terrorism legislating.  
See C. Walker, ‘Keeping Control of Terrorists, without Losing Control of Constitutionalism’ (2007) 59 
Stanford L. Rev 1395.    
20
 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, ss.13A and 13B.  Suspicion-less powers were 
also later enacted through s.60 of the CJPOA 1994. 
21 Michael Howard, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, c.198. 
22 Ivan Lawrence, HC Debs (1995-96) 275, c.238. 
23 Michael Howard, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, cc.35, 37. 
24 For criticisms of this see ibid, David Wilshire, c.173, Max Madden, c.175. 
25 For consideration of the difficulty encountered in defining ‘crisis’, ‘emergency’ and the ready tendency to 
resort to emergency-based rhetoric in instances of legislative pressure see K.E Whittington, ‘Yet another 
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previously seen.
26
  The level of the threat was apparently confirmed by reference to the 
ability of terrorists to attack using chemical and biological weapons.
27
  In using such 
references Parliament focused on the most destructive forms of possible attack without 
offering any evidence or basis on which to suggest that the use of such weapons was a 
real probability.
28
  Nevertheless, the prevailing discourse portrayed the threat as one of 
‘common sense’. 29   Exceptionalism, therefore, operated as a ‘universal legislator’, 30 
encouraging the implementation of heightened, continuous and UK-wide counter-
terrorism powers.
31
    
 
After 9/11 the claims of exceptionalism were again escalated.  David Blunkett, for 
example, emphasised the unprecedented nature of the level of threat, which was greater 
than previously envisaged.
32
  One illustration of parliamentary exceptionalism after 9/11 
is shown in the way in which several MPs distinguished the contemporary terrorist threat 
from that of Irish terrorism.  Irish terrorists were described as having been ‘most obliging’; 
such that once caught ‘they went to the courts, lined up like turkeys volunteering for 
Christmas’.33  By contrast the contemporary threat represented ‘everything that would 
                                                                                                                                            
Constitutional Crisis?’ (2002) 43 William and Mary L. Rev 2093, 2096-98 and O. Gross, ‘Once More into 
the Breach: The Systemic Failure of Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched 
Emergencies’ (1998) 23 Yale Journal of International Law  437, 438-9. 
26 See, e.g., David Liddington, HC Debs (1999-00) 346, c.359. 
27 E.g., Tom King states that in contrast to the previous threat ‘[t]errorism is now a global activity which 
poses many fresh and serious challenges, citing the example of the sarin attack on the Tokyo underground 
system in which 13 people dies and around 50 were injured, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, cc.177-78.  This 
example is also used to justify the powers by Jack Straw, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, c.159.  The threat of 
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons was also raised in Lord Lloyd of Berwick’s Inquiry into 
Legislation against Terrorism, (1996) para 5.13. 
28 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, Terrorism and Community Relations, HC165-II, Written 
Evidence (The Stationery Office, London, 2005), memorandum submitted by International Centre for 
Security Analysis, Ev.53. 
29 D. Garland, The Culture of Control.  Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Clarendon Press, 
2001) 135. 
30 This idea originates from Plato who wrote that ‘no man ever legislates at all.  Accidents and calamities 
occur in a thousand different ways, and it is they that are the universal legislators of the world’, Plato (tr. T.J. 
Saunders), The Laws (Penguin Books, 2005) 119. 
31 Government Consultation Paper, Legislation against Terrorism Cm 4178 (December 1998).  See also 
Jack Straw’s statement that the powers were necessary for ‘simply protecting democracy’, The Guardian 
(14 November 1999).  
32 HC Debs (2001-02) 372, c.923 and also Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean who stated that ‘few of us 
can recall a time when reality was so much more terrible than the worst we could imagine’, HL Debs (2001-
02) 627, c.10. 
33  Ken Maginnis, HC Debs (2001-02) 372, c.195 and generally cc.195-62.  This is, however, is stark 
contrast to the portrayal of the context in which the 1974 legislation was passed which, it was argued, 
justified the sweeping powers enacted.  See National Archives Catalogue ref CAB/128/55/24: 2-3.  See also 
David Feldman, ‘Human Rights, Terrorism and Risk: the Roles of Politicians and Judges’ Public Law 
(Summer 2006) 374, who states, in relation to the legislative process surrounding the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005, that ‘[t]he Prime Minister clearly has a rather cosy picture of villains in the 1960s as 
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substitute anarchy for democracy’34 and as ‘likely to continue to exist for the foreseeable 
future’.35  The nature of the possible attacks and attackers was also contrasted from past 
terrorist activities,
36
 particularly distinguishing the threat of suicide bombings perpetrated 
by terrorists who ‘do not care about the consequences of their actions and do devastating 
things such as blowing up themselves as well as others’ from Irish terrorists.37  These 
descriptions imbued the parliamentary debate with a fear of the apparently exceptional 
threat faced, evoking the very kind of emergency response that was believed to be being 
avoided by having enacted the counter-terrorism powers ‘in advance of events’.38      
 
Debate, that so-cherished a feature of subsystem behaviour, designed to protect against 
ill-advised and minority-targeting law-making, was therefore marginalised in the name of 
public security in both pre- and post-legislative consideration of the counter-terrorism 
police powers.
39
  Post-9/11 insistence on cross-parliamentary cooperation
40
 was sustained 
after the 7/7 attacks, which gave rise to uncaveated assurances that the Government 
would receive ‘unqualified’ 41  and ‘wholehearted support’ for its policies from other 
political parties.
42
  The appeal to unity was portrayed as the only possible response to the 
‘massive tragedy … of huge and almost unparalleled historical significance’ and 
transcended all considerations of maintaining the normal subsystem programme, 
including parliamentary scrutiny of governmental proposals, through debate.
43
    
 
                                                                                                                                            
people who were not too violent or clever, easily caught, and then immediately said, ‘It’s a fair cop gov, 
you’ve got me bang to rights’’, 367.   
34 Ken Maginnis, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, c.195. 
35 Jack Straw, HC Debs (1998-99) 327, c.999. 
36  David Feldman, however, considers that in practice the qualitative difference between Al Qaeda’s 
terrorism and that of the IRA is limited, D. Feldman, ‘Human Rights, Terrorism and Risk: the Roles of 
Politicians and Judges’ (Summer 2006) Public Law 364, 369. 
37  Fiona McTaggard, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, c.182.  Despite such descriptions the appeal to 
exceptionalism to justify extending existing powers was also evident following the Birmingham bombings 
in 1974, which were described by Roy Jenkins as ‘a different order of casualties from anything we had 
previously known’, R. Jenkins, A Life at the Centre (Politicos Publishing Limited, 1991) 393 and generally 
392-97. 
38 Richard Shepherd, HC Debs (1999-00) 346, c.343. 
39  This trend has become a normal response to security threats to avoid accusations of being soft on 
terrorism, see N. Whitty, T. Murphy and S. Livingstone, Civil Liberties Law: the Human Rights Era 
(Butterworths Lexis Nexis, 2003) 151. 
40 Iain Duncan Smith assured Tony Blair that ‘the Opposition will co-operate with the Government in any 
way possible’, HC Debs (2001-02) 372, c.677. 
41 Menzies Campbell (then Leader of the liberal Democrat Party) and Elfyn Lloyd, HC Debs (2005-06) 436, 
cc.467 and 469. 
42  David Davis, HC Debates (2005-06) 436, c.466.  See also Iain Duncan Smith (then Leader of the 
Conservative Party), ibid, cc.574-75. 
43
 Jack Straw, HC Debs (2001-02) 372, c.618. 
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Whilst the UK law-making subsystem’s cognitive openness caused it to respond to a non-
particularised terrorist threat, the US legislative subsystem was responding directly and 
specifically to the attacks of 9/11.
44
  The bombings were described as the first attack 
within United States borders by an outside power,
45
 since the war of 1812.
46
   Against the 
background of the attacks and declaration of emergency,
47
 exhortations of the need for 
legislative innovation cut across debate in both congressional chambers and committees 
on the judiciary.
48
  9/11 was labelled ‘a day our very way of life was attacked’49, ‘a date 
which will live in infamy’ 50  and ‘the day the landscape of America was changed 
forever’.51  Through 9/11 the US was described as having entered into a new era in world 
history’. 52   Operating within such a context, congressional debate was replete with 
superlatives revealing the law-making context as being one of ‘utter shock, horror, sorrow, 
[and] dismay’.53  The strength of this sentiment is shown in the description of the attacks 
as a ‘clarion call to arms in a new war against terrorism’.54     This atmosphere affected 
how Congress conceptualised the terrorist threat and the way that members drew on 
notions of risk, fear, catastrophe and precaution to support the proposed statutory 
powers.
55
   
 
                                               
44 See the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 9/11 Congressional Report (22 
July 2004). 
45 Although the US did face over 3,000 domestic terrorist incidents between 1954 and 2000, none were 
anywhere near the scale or destructiveness of 9/11.  See C. Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America: 
From the Klan to al Qaeda (Routledge, 2003) 14, 16.  
46 Orrin Hatch, SCR 25 October 2001, S11059.    
47 Pursuant to the National Emergency Act (50 USC 1621), s.201.  Declaration of National Emergency by 
Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks and Ordering Ready of Armed Forces to Active Duty, Message from the 
President of the United States, H.Doc. No. 107-118, (14 September 2001). 
48 The exceptional nature of 9/11 is however questioned by David Bonner examines knee jerk legislative 
responses to atrocities and suggests that the ‘rules of the game’ had not changed as a result of 9/11, as much 
as it being a case of ‘old wine new bottles’, D. Bonner, Executive Measures, Terrorism and National 
Security.  Have the Rules of the Game Changed? (Ashgate Publishing, 2007) 40. 
49 James Sensenbrenner, Jr., HRCR (11 September 2001) E1628. 
50 Cliff Stearns, ibid, E1627. 
51 Todd Tiahrt, ibid.  See also James Sensenbrenner stating that ‘On September 11th. Not only our Nation but 
our entire way of life was attacked’, House Committee on the Judiciary (3 October 2001).  Such comments 
have also been reflected in academic debate which has considered the extent to which 9/11 fundamentally 
changed the world, see J. Strawson (ed.), The Law after Ground Zero (Glasshouse Press, 2002); M. Cox, 
‘American Power Before and After September 11: dizzy with success?’ (2002) 78(2) International Relations 
261; M. Cox, ‘The imperial republic revisited: the United States in the era of Bush’, in A. Colas and R. 
Saull (eds) The War on Terrorism and the American 'empire' after the Cold War (Routledge, 2006) 114-30; 
and J. Stromseth, P. Allott, and D. Scheffer, ‘International Law after September 11’ (2002) American Society 
of International Law Proceedings 410. 
52 Pete Sessions HRCR (14 September 2001) E1650 
53 Christopher Smith, HRCR (13 September 2001) E1643. 
54 Bob Goodlatte, HRCR (12 October 2001) H6761. 
55  A. Goldsmith, ‘The Logic of Terror: Precautionary Logic and Counterterrorism Law Reform after 
September 11’ (2008) 30(2) Law and Policy 141. 
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Descriptions of the terrorists as not simply having attacked the US but also democratic 
values, civilised and free society and the whole of humanity turned 9/11 into a powerful 
semiotic: a symbol of anarchy and the dying of democracy against which only the most 
uncompromising counter-terrorism powers would suffice.
56
 The impact of these 
exceptional circumstances was confirmed by the need to ‘go to any length to bring these 
criminals, and those who aid and abet them, to justice’.57  A further characteristic of the 
US legislature’s use of exceptionalism was that whilst the context was described as ‘a 
dark time for America, which has generated grave memories that will last forever’,58 it 
was also used as a base line, from which Congress suggested even more horrific attacks 
which could be perpetrated.  This even greater threat was then used as a rallying point for 
equally exceptional demonstrations of American unity, including support for heightened 
police powers, to enable the FBI and other security services to take a wide range of 
actions to safeguard against the terrorist threat.  Tom Udall, for example, declared that 
‘[n]ever before in our history have Americans borne witness to such an egregious, savage, 
violent and cowardly attack on American soil.  The situation defies belief and embodies 
much of what had once been our greatest fear’.59 The exceptional nature of the threat 
meant that what were deemed to be appropriately serious powers were proposed and 
enacted in response.
60
  Despite an acknowledgement that in the process of enacting the 
Patriot Act ‘[t]here was some unfortunate rhetoric along the way’, 61  subsystem 
communications reflected popular exceptionalism, thus helping to legitimise the public 
fear, whilst at the same time placating it through the strength of the legislative powers 
enacted.
62
   
 
Both US and UK law-making subsystems were highly responsive to the irritants of 
popular opinion that arose in relation to the terrorist threat, leading to a self-perpetuating 
and self-legitimising sense of exceptionalism behind its legislating.  Descriptions of the 
                                               
56 See Dennis Moore, HRCH (13 September), E1641; and Shelia Jackson-Lee, ibid, E1663.  I. Ward, Law, 
Text, Terror (CUP, 2009) 6.   
57 William Jenkins, HRCR (13 September 2001) E1645.  See also Olympia Snowe who insists that ‘We 
must move heaven and earth to remove impediments that keep us from maximising our defense against 
terrorism’, SCR (11 October 2001) S10596. 
58
 Robert Cramer, Jr., HRCR (14 September 2001) E1659. 
59 HRCR (24 September 2001) E1735. 
60 Tony Hall, HRCR (14 September 2001) E1655.  George Bush, Message from the President, Report on 
Recovery and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, (20 September 2001) 
S9554. 
61 Patrick Leahy, SCR (25 October 2001) S11014. 
62 R. Whitaker, ‘After 9/11: A Surveillance State?’ in C. Brown (ed.), Lost Liberties.  Ashcroft and the 
Assault on Personal Freedom (The New Press, 2003) 52, 53. 
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context as one of abject exceptionalism contributed to a state of ‘ontological hysteria’ 
amongst representatives who were left waiting for the next, seemingly inevitable and 
devastating attack.
63
  Such ‘discourses of insecurity’64 did not depend on the occurrence 
of a specific terrorist attack because, both before 9/11 and in its aftermath, 
communications describing the threat faced were escalated to an ever greater level of 
acuteness.  Consequently, it is inappropriate to view nature of the counter terrorism 
powers as wholly attributable to the exceptional exigencies of the situation immediately 
following 9/11.  Instead, its genesis may be found in the desire of the law-making 
subsystem to respond to external irritants, such that through the enactment of stop, search 
and surveillance powers the subsystem sought to ‘feign control over the uncontrollable’.65    
The subsystem’s descriptions of the threat from terrorism in terms of its exceptional 
nature, and the subsystem’s aim of satisfying majoritarian considerations, had a resultant 
impact on the subsystem modes of operation, such that it led to the curtailing of the 
parameters of the legislative debate, as is shown in the following section. 
 
4.2 The Scope of Legislative Debate 
 
A further effect of the irritants arising from the exceptional terrorist threat was that 
legislative debate concerning these issues was at best limited, at worse, effectively 
impossible.  Both US and UK legislatures engaged in limited subsystem debate over the 
stop, search and surveillance provisions, and in so doing particularly marginalised 
concerns relating to minority protection within subsystem communications and 
operational considerations.  This section considers the extent to which the subsystem’s 
reliance on a particular type of discourse which marginalised debate facilitated dominance 
of that discourse by majority expectations of total safety, irrespective of considerations of 
minority protection.
66
    
                                               
63 J. Zulaika and W. Douglas, Terror and Taboo: The Follies, Fables and Faces of Terrorism (Routledge, 
1996).  See also H. Hilary and N. Kubaek who argue that the American public and legislators, were blinded 
by the fear of more attacks and were therefore unable to see the consequences of the Patriot Act’s excesses, 
‘The Remaining Perils of the Patriot Act: A Primer’ (2007) 8 Journal of Law and Society 1, 73. 
64
 See T. Abbas, Muslim Britain: Communities under Pressure (Zed, 2005); E. Poole, Reporting Islam: 
Media Representations of British Muslims (IB Tauris, 2002); and E. Poole, ‘The Effect of September 11 and 
the War in Iraq on British Newspaper Coverage’ in E. Poole and J. Richardson (eds.), Muslims and the 
News Media (IB Tauris, 2006). 
65 U. Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited’ (2002) 19 Theory, Culture and Society 39, 
41. 
66 See J. Black, ‘Proceduralizing Regulation’ (2001) 20(1) OJLS 33, 45.  See also M. Foucault, ‘Politics and 
the Study of Discourse’ in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
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One change in subsystem operational programme that arose from its interpretation of the 
exceptional level of the threat was the demand for cross-parliamentary support for 
legislative proposals.  This helped to frustrate one of the key autopoietic characteristics 
relied upon to ensure effective and appropriate legislating, that of confrontational debate 
and partisan scrutiny of draft statutory provisions.
67
  In the UK, the subsystem’s cognitive 
openness to what it understood as the exceptional threat from terrorism, therefore, meant 
that opposition politicians readily acceded that ‘there should be a united front across all 
parties in the House in the fight against terrorism’. 68   Without such cross-party 
cooperation there was a sense that ‘we [the Members of Parliament] would be betraying 
our duty to the people who elected all of us’.69  In fact, enactment of the Terrorism Act 
was used as an opportunity to directly criticise the lack of support given to the previous 
Conservative Government by Labour when it had been seeking the renewal of counter-
terror powers.
70
   Labour’s opposition was condemned as ‘a shoddy and shameful 
action … [and] not a pattern that the present Opposition intend ever to follow’.71  This 
commitment to cooperation between Government and Opposition meant that the 
Government’s willingness to accept suggestions for improvements to the Bill 72  was 
expressed to a largely unchallenging audience.
73
  In relation to s.44, for example, the only 
change to the drafting of the provision was the insertion of the words ‘or on’ in the scope 
of the authorisation for use of the power, so that it permitted search of ‘anything in, or on, 
                                                                                                                                            
Governmentality (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). 
67 The meetings of the Standing Committee demonstrate contradictory views on the role of partisan debate 
concerning the legislation.  E.g., Charles Clarke sought ‘to emphasise the importance of parliamentary 
debate on the issues’, 3 February 200 and David Lidington refer to the Act as ‘a subject that is so important 
that it merits a measure of bipartisanship’ (8 February 2000).  However, John Taylor, stated with apparent 
relief that ‘[t]his Committee has been mercifully free from partisanship’ and David Lidington also 
commends that counter-terrorism measures ‘be put on a permanent basis with cross-party support’, 8 
February 2000.  These apparent contradictions suggest that the importance of debate was recognised but 
that in reality dissenting voices were few and minimised. 
68 Anne Widdicombe, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, c.166. 
69 Charles Clarke, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, c.223.    
70 The Government sought to explain, and thereby excuse, their opposition of the renewal of the counter-
terrorism powers between 1983 and 1995, which was raised by James Gray, by stating that it related to 
proportionality in the use of the powers, as opposed to the need for the powers themselves, Jack Straw, HC 
Debs (1998-99) 327, cc.1002-03.   
71 Anne Widdicombe, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, c.167.   See also David Lidington, John Taylor and Charles 
Clarke, Standing Committee, (8 February 2000). 
72 Jack Straw, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, c.161. 
73 In fact Opposition support in general for the implementation of a comprehensive prevention of terrorism 
act already appeared to be likely, see Anne Widdicombe, who questioned the reason for the Government’s 
unwillingness to support such an Act, HC Debs (1998-99) 333, c.1173. 
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the vehicle or carried by the driver or a passenger’ in the final Act.74   
 
Amidst the consensus-dominated approach to parliamentary debate reservations 
pertaining to the strength of the powers were denigrated as pursuing ‘a tedious path’75 and 
displaying an ‘almost wilful misunderstanding of the Bill’. 76  Further, any attempt to 
moderate the exceptionalism of the subsystem codings, by citing the potentially 
detrimental impact of the measures, was met with derision.   Fiona Mactaggart, for 
example, cautioned against forgetting ‘that the use of such [counter-terrorism] powers is 
itself terrorising in a sense’, but was only met by the retort of ‘Nonsense!’ after which the 
debate resumed the succession of more supportive comments.
77
  Similarly, Jeremy 
Corbyn’s effort to temper the appeal to exceptionalism by stating that we are not ‘in crisis 
at the moment, so surely it is time to do something far more rational and sane than what is 
proposed this evening’78 was responded to by the evasive comment of Ken Maginnis that 
the measures themselves should not be seen as extraordinary, so much as the situation 
faced.
79
   Further efforts by George Galloway
80
  and Alex Salmond
81
 to debate the 
implications of the powers were dismissed as seeking to justify the attacks.
 82
  Instead of 
examining why the pre-existing powers granted to government and executive agencies 
were either inappropriate or insufficient to meet the new threat, therefore, passage of the 
new legislation was promoted as the only responsible course of subsystem action.
83
  
Accordingly, the exceptional threat was seen as necessitating equally exceptional powers 
to enable the police to deal effectively with it.
84
  The cumulative result of these influences 
is that the brevity of the legislative debate and shallowness of the scrutiny can be directly 
                                               
74 Terrorism Act 2000, s.44(1)(d). Compared to s.42(1)(d) Terrorism Bill, as presented to the House of 
Commons on 2 December 1999, c.443. 
75  Ken Maginnis, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, c.174, referring to the reservations expressed by Kevin 
McNamara, ibid, cc.173-4 and 196. 
76 Jack Straw, ibid, c.156. 
77 ibid, c.182. 
78 Jeremy Corbyn, ibid, c.194. See also the concerns of Steve McCabe who stated that ‘we may be tilting 
the balance too far and creating circumstances in which authorities are tempted to be lazy in their 
investigations or in the construction of their evidence, or overzealous in identifying suspects so that they 
identify suspects without proper cause’, Standing Committee (1 February 2000). 
79
 Ken Maginnis, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, c.195. 
80 George Galloway, HC Debs (2001-02) 372, c.640.    
81 Alex Salmond, ibid, c.614. 
82 D. Nicol, ‘The Human Rights Act and the Politician’ (2004) 24 Legal Studies 451. 
83 Oren Gross described the portrayal of the determinacy of legislative responses as a recurrent trend in 
emergency legislating, see O. Gross, ‘Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be 
Constitutional’ (2002-3) 112 Yale Law Journal 1011, 1032. 
84
 David Lidington, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, c.222. 
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contrasted with the extent of the powers the statute set out.
85
    
    
Although the need to balance civil liberties with national security was mentioned within 
the debates
86
 the examples offered ignored the specific burden that the measures could 
place on the interests of minority individuals.
87
  Instead ‘balance’ was accepted as a 
necessary compromise when minority rights were being balanced with majority 
freedoms;
88
 but as inappropriate where the powers could have any significant effect 
amongst majority, white individuals.
89
  Where concern was expressed about the minority 
targeting effect of the flexible statutory powers
90
 attempts to challenge this approach were 
dismissed as ‘invent[ed] hypothetical circumstances’.91  At the time of their enactment, 
however, whilst parliamentarians were willing to concede that minority communities 
needed to be protected from the actions of other individuals,
92
 they were unwilling to 
acknowledge that minorities may have needed protection from the counter-terrorism 
powers themselves.
93
  A consequence of this was that new laws to prevent race and 
religion-based violence and harassment were proposed and supported,
94
 but that there was 
                                               
85 P.A Thomas, ‘Emergency and Anti-terrorism Power: 9/11: US and UK’ (2003) 26 Fordham International 
Law Journal 1203, 1216. 
86 See, e.g., David Blunkett, HC Debs (2001-02) 375, c.31 and Hazel Blears, HC Debs (2005-06) 438, c.411. 
87 H. Kennedy, Just Law.  The Changing Face of Justice – and Why it Matters to Us All (Vintage, 2005) 50.  
However, the nature of the balancing exercise being undertaken is largely overlooked by Richard Posner 
and Adrian Vermeule, see R.A. Posner and A. Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Security Liberty and the 
Courts (OUP, 2007). 
88 However, even the need to protect civil liberties in general did not go wholly unopposed.  See, e.g., Kevin 
Hughes who referred to ‘the yogurt and muesli-eating, Guardian fraternity [who] are only too happy to 
protect the human rights of people engaged in terrorist acts, but never once talk about the human rights of 
those who are affected by them’, HC Debs (2001-02) 372, c.30.  Further, Bridget Prentice urged that the 
demands of the ‘civil liberties lobby’ should be strongly resisted, HC Debs (2001-02) 372, c.933. 
89 JCHR, ‘Review of Counter-terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Prosecution and Pre-Charge Detention’ 
Twenty-fourth Report of Session 2005-6, (HL Paper 240/HC 1576), para 158.  See also T. Bingham, 
‘Personal Freedom and the Dilemma of Democracies’ (2003) 52 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 841. 
90 See Lord Goodhart, HL Debs (1999-00) 611, c.1082 and Simon Hughes in the Standing Committee on 20 
and 27 January 2000 who both voiced concern about the level of discretion afforded to the Executive in 
exercising the counter-terrorism powers. See also HC Debs (1999-00) 341, Steve McCabe, c.207.Kevin 
MacNamara, cc.173-76; and Fiona Mactaggart, c.182 whose comments were criticised by Simon Hughes, 
c.183. 
91 Jack Straw, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, c.163.  See also Anne Widdicombe who criticised the Bill for failing 
to incorporate a mechanism by which Parliament could submit the powers to on-going scrutiny, ibid, c.171. 
92  E.g., Khalid Mahmood describes people ‘ringing up mosques and other institutions leaving abusive 
messages and putting excrement through doors’ as well as the abuse suffered by Sikhs who had been 
mistaken as being Muslims, HC Debs (2001-02) 372, c.649.    See N.S Gohill and D.S Sidhu, ‘The Sikh 
Turban: Post 9/11 Challenges to this Article of Faith’ (2007-8) 9 Rutgers Journal of Law and Religion 1. 
93 See, e.g., HC Debs (2001-02) 372 Tony Blair (c.671) who condemns racist attacks including an attack on 
an Edinburgh Mosque, Iain Duncan Smith (c.675), HL Debs (2001-02) 627, Baroness Uddin (c.205) and 
Baroness Walmsley (c.225). 
94 Ultimately, however, proposals for such a law were dropped from new counter-terror legislation after 
opposition from the House of Lords which voted 204 against 141 to remove the relevant clause (see HL 
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no consideration of the racial effect of the counter-terrorism legislation itself.
95
  The 
imperative of reassuring the general population of their safety against terrorism 
dominated the parliamentary programme and resulted in its departure from the ordinary 
check and balances which safeguard against the passage of ill-conceived and 
discriminatory statutory powers.
96
  In the face of such overwhelming public sentiment 
minority-protection remained largely unobserved in the counter-terror law-making 
programme, even though the risk that the powers could be deployed in a discriminatory 
manner was recognised outside the subsystem.
97
   
 
Following 9/11 the parliamentary subsystem rendered any debate concerning the statutory 
powers, including their appropriateness to address the current threat, impossible.  Instead, 
the two main political parties cultivated an environment in which cross-party consensus 
was the obligatory subsystem sentiment.  This atmosphere left any concerns about the 
weakness of the purported safeguards to be voiced by lone independents,
98
 or party rebels 
at the risk of losing the party whip.
99
  The only consideration given to the powers was that 
they might be insufficient and, therefore, need to be enhanced, in order to ease popular 
anxiety and assure security.
100
  Consequently, the parliamentary behaviour in enacting the 
Terrorism Act and post-9/11 demonstrate the subsystem’s ability to repeat history whilst 
not recognising that it was so doing.  This cycle reveals the extent to which Parliament 
responded to irritants both in a self-referential way, but also in a way that failed to avoid 
repeating the mistakes observed as occurring on previous occasions.
101
    
                                                                                                                                            
Debs (2001-02) 629, cc.348-59).  They were instead included in the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 
(c.1) which came into force on 1 October 2007. 
95 See, e.g., Mike O’Brien who ‘strongly welcome[s] the announcement of new laws against religious 
violence and harassment’, HC Debs (2001-02) 372, c.716.  Support for the proposed bill was also shown, 
see Diane Abbott (c. 932), Kenneth Clarke (c.931), Edward Garnier (c.932) and Paul Marsden (c.935).    
96 Making a comparable point in relation to laws concerning paedophiles, see D. Filler, ‘Silence and the 
Racial Dimension of Megan’s Law’ (2003-4) 89 Iowa L. Rev 1535, 1569-72. 
97  See Amnesty International, UK: Briefing on the Terrorism Bill (April 2000); and later Amnesty 
International, United Kingdom: Human Rights a Broken Promise (February 2008); Amnesty International, 
United Kingdom: Submission for the Review of Counter-terror and Security Powers (2010) 11. 
98 See, e.g. George Galloway, HC Debs (2005-06) 436, cc.639-42. 
99 See, e.g., Jeremy Corbyn, HC Debs (1999-00) 341, cc.191-94; HC Debs (2001-02) 375, c.25; and HC 
Debs (2001-02) 372, cc.734-39. 
100
 Bruce Ackerman identifies a ‘pathological political cycle’ by which successive waves of ever-
increasingly repressive laws follow threats to national security to ease anxiety regarding security, whilst not 
actually provide the purported protection.  See B. Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil 
Liberties in an Age of Terrorism (Yale University Press, 2006) 1-3.  See also K.D Ewing, ‘The Futility of 
the Human Rights Act’ [2004] PL 829. 
101 See G. Teubner, ‘Law as an Autopoietic System’ and G. Teubner, ‘Autopoiesis and Steering: How Politics 
Profits from the Normative Surplus of Capital’ in R. Veld et al, Autopoiesis and Configuration Theory: New 
Approaches to Social Steering (Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1991). 
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In the US, the margin by which the Patriot Act was passed in both congressional houses 
suggests almost unanimous congressional support for the legislation.
102
  However, 
subsystem opinion concerning the draft bills, and even the final Act, was more polarised 
than the vote suggests.  The breadth of views ranged from those who considered the Act 
to afford the executive too strong powers, which compromised individual rights and 
freedoms too far,
 103
 to those who felt that the powers did not go far enough to protect 
national security.
104
  The operational utility of the powers was also questioned.  For 
example, congressmen Bob Barr noted that it was important to ‘remember that electronic 
surveillance can actually make intelligence and law enforcement agencies less 
effective’,105 and Ron Paul felt that ‘[t]he utility of these [surveillance] items in catching 
terrorists is questionable to say the least’.106  Whilst ultimately, and despite continuing 
reservations,
107
 the severity of the threat faced meant that an overwhelming proportion of 
Representatives and an even higher proportion of Senators supported the Act,
108
 
opposition opinions encouraged the exploration of the rights-related issues surrounding 
the powers prior to their enactment.    
 
Despite the more noticeably partisan scrutiny of the draft counter-terrorism legislation in 
the US than in the UK there remained a persistent demand for unified support of the 
proposals.  Senators and Representatives both called for ‘a united Congress’,109 undivided 
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 The Senate passed the bill by 98 votes to 1, Senator Feingold opposing the bill, SCR 11 October 2001, 
S11059. The House of Representatives passed the bill the following day by 337 votes to 79, with one 
Representative answering ‘present’, HRCR 12 October 2001, H6775.   
103 See, e.g., the many concerns over compatibility of the surveillance powers with the Fourth Constitutional 
Amendment reflected the partisanship in the debate, which include Maxine Waters (Democrat) and Bob 
Barr (Republican).  
104 The polarised nature of opinion concerning the Act is well illustrated by the exchange between Senators 
Feingold and Hatch.  In this exchange Feingold’s concern for the potential loss of commitment in the 
Congress and country to traditional civil liberties, exemplified by the powers of the Act, is countered by the 
assertion that ‘these terrorists still have a gun pointed at the heads of all the American people’ and that the 
current legal provisions treated ‘terrorism with kid gloves’ SCR S11019-23. 
105 HRCR (24 September 2001). 
106 HRCR (12 October 2001) H6769. 
107 E.g. Martin Meehan noted in the additional congressional remarks that ‘The short-circuiting of the 
regular order clouds what should have been a day of unanimity.   Nonetheless, I rise in support of the 
antiterrorism legislation’, HR Additional Remarks CR (16 October 2001) E1893.  In addition Jerrold Nalder 
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properly vetted’, HRCR (12 October 2001) H6774. 
108 Recalling the level of support for the Act Congresswomen Maxine Waters stated that ‘I did not vote for it 
[the proposed Act], but some who were not happy with it did, knowing that our country was desperate for 
some efforts at reducing terrorism’, HRCR (10 April 2002). 
109
 William Jenkins, HRCR (13 September 2001) E1645. 
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support for President Bush,
110
 and for all members to be ‘pulling together in support of 
our nation’, 111  as a means of harnessing the popular and political anger aroused by 
9/11.
112
  The non-partisan approach to law-making was most clearly expressed by 
Representative Dennis Moore who said that ‘[t]oday there are no Republicans, no 
Democrats.  Today we are all Americans’.113  As the legislation progressed through its 
various stages of enactment calls of unanimity were bolstered by praise for the consensus 
of support shown across the political spectrum, and the beneficial effect that this was 
having on the law-making process.
114
  Despite the calls for unity, however, in the US this 
was achieved through ‘the essence of compromise’, which characterised the debates as 
opposed to a one-sided acceptance of government proposals.
115
  The role of compromise 
was acknowledged by a series of Representatives and Senators, who praised the 
considered and careful nature in which politically opposed individuals sought to develop 
a mutually satisfactory legislative solution.
116
  A further demonstration of the consensual 
approach to the debate was that a number of proposed amendments were raised simply to 
indicate an area of concern, before being withdrawn as a result of support for, or at least 
acceptance of, the original proposals.
117
    Congress, therefore, continued to be vociferous 
in its criticism of the Executive’s draft legislation,118 the law-making process,119 and the 
                                               
110 Henry Bonilla, HRCR (11 September 2001) E1627.  See also James Sensenbrenner whose immediate 
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111 Dan Burton, HRCR (13 September 2001) E1642.   
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 Dennis Moore, HRCR (11 September 2001) E1641. 
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115 James Sensenbrenner, House Committee on the Judiciary, 3 October 2001.  See also John Conyers who 
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get all this together and move forward’, Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary House of 
Representatives, (24 September 2001), Barney Scott, who expressed his ‘frustration about the time 
limitations’ imposed on the passage of the bill, 22. 
116 See, e.g., HRCR (12 October 2001), Bob Goodlatte, who commended the Committee on the Judiciary 
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needs to fight a war on terrorism while still protecting the civil liberties of Americans’, H6760; and Edward 
Bryant who complemented the bill as ‘a balanced approach to our fight against terrorism.  I believe it is an 
appropriate response to a very real problem’, H6762. 
117  See, e.g., Bill Delahunt, who cited concerns over the adoption of the ‘significant’, as opposed to 
‘primary purpose’ requirement for the grant of search orders under FISA, only to state at the outset that he 
should not press the matter beyond raising it, House Committee on the Judiciary (3 October 2001) 109. 
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HR3108’, HRCR (12 October 2001) H6769.  See also comments of Barney Frank in ‘The USA Patriot Act 
and the American Response to Terror: Can we Protect Civil Liberties after September 11?  A panel 
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impact of the proposed statutory provisions on constitutional values.
120
   
 
Although different opinions were raised both for and against the provisions of the Patriot 
Act the detail in which these could be debated was limited by the lack of time for scrutiny 
of the bill.
121
  The priority afforded to getting the legislation enacted
122
 was indicated by 
Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, who said that although ‘all hundred of us could go 
through this Bill with a fine-tooth comb, the clock is ticking and the work needs to get 
done’.123  While normative subsystem behaviours of debate and negotiation continued, 
therefore, environmental irritants in the shape of the on-going threat and the need for 
rapid law-making,
124
 meant that executive proposals were predominantly ascendant in the 
enacted legislation. 
125
   More prominent than the recursive behaviour of Congress, 
therefore, was its submission to the intervention of the Executive in directing the 
                                                                                                                                            
Discussion, 6 March 2002’ (2002) 39 Am. Crim L. Rev. 150, 1505-06. 
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through all the way to the end instead of being hijacked’, H6772-3 and Bennie Thompson who clarifies his 
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Era (Simon & Schuster, 2003). 
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months’, HRCR (11 September 2001) E1635. 
123 Tom Daschle, SCR (12 October 2001). 
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operation of the law-making subsystem.
126
  As a result the Senate passed a version of the 
Patriot Act which closely resembled that requested by the Attorney General and the Bill 
carefully constructed and debated within the House of Representatives was thrown out 
and replaced with legislation which mirrored the Senate’s version.127 In the end, therefore, 
Congress ‘tossed away the bipartisan compromise painstakingly passed unanimously by 
the House Judiciary Committee’.128  Instead, the final Act was drafted in secret over a 
weekend by representatives of the Department of Justice and the House Leadership,
129
 the 
contents of which were little known by Members other than those directly involved in 
drafting it.
130
    Attorney General, John Ashcroft, faced particular criticism for having 
exerted pressure on Congress to enact the Administration’s proposals.131  Consequently, 
whilst the US congressional record demonstrates a continuation of the partisan character 
of the US law-making subsystem this had a limited impact on the final version of the 
legislation enacted.
132
   
 
The Executive’s dominance of the law-making process evoked congressional criticism, 
and was described as the ‘first partisan shot since September 11’.133  The Executive’s 
behaviour meant that instead of the legislation progressing through the ordinary law-
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A27. 
131
 D. Cole and J.X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution.  Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of 
National Security (The New Press, 2002) 150-52. 
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making processes, in accordance with which differences between the Senate and House 
bills would have been debated and reconciled in a conference committee, the Attorney 
General introduced an alternative version of the Bill under amended rules of process.
134
  
Such manoeuvring demonstrates the strength of the influence of the political subsystem 
on the US law-making subsystem, and its ability to shape the subsystem programme of 
operation.
135
   
 
Whilst Executive control over the law-making process was strong it was not, however, the 
singularly powerful one.  Instead, members of Congress were confident that the Act 
finally brought into force was all the better for the changes they made to the executive’s 
original bill,
136
 and the limited period of debate that Congress had been able to engage 
in.
137
 In particular, congressional negotiations secured two specific safeguards to protect 
against the misuse of the surveillance provisions within the Patriot Act.
138
  These were the 
application of a sunset clause to many of the surveillance powers, and penalties for 
misuse of the powers.
139
  Both of these safeguards came out of the work of the House 
Judiciary Committee, albeit that the sunset clauses, as originally proposed, set a two-year 
expiration period.
140
  Eventually, in order to ‘calm fears of permanent authorisation’,141 a 
four-year period, expiring on 31 December 2005, was incorporated into the Act.
142
  Aside 
from these specific concessions the legislature mainly yielded to the Executive’s 
proposals for the statutory provisions,
143
 and ordinary legislative processes were not 
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allowed to frustrate the need for protective legislation.
144
    
 
Where the Congressional debate considered minority protection from any misuse of the 
counter-terrorism powers it was predominantly in terms of the need to protect racial 
minorities from hate attacks,
145
 with such behaviour being condemned as ‘characteristics 
of terrorists, not individuals who treasure freedom’.146  Despite the limited consideration 
of the need to protect minorities from misuse of the counter-terrorism powers it was, 
however, not entirely absent from subsystem considerations.  The single Senator to vote 
against the final bill, Russ Feingold, for example, voiced his concern that the new 
surveillance, and other, powers ‘may fall most heavily on a minority of our population 
who already feel particularly acutely the pain of this disaster’.147  Feingold suggested that 
this impact may not be discernible by the majority population because ‘[w]e who do not 
have Arabic names or do not wear turbans or headscarves may not feel the weight of these 
times as much as Americans from the Middle East and South Asia do’.148  Such concerns 
were, however, a very marginal consideration within the congressional debate.
149
  In fact, 
Senator Feingold’s suggestion that there only ‘may’ be an impact on minority groups 
resulted was immediately diminished as a purely theoretical concern, unable to withstand 
scrutiny when compared with the ‘concrete loss of liberty of almost 6,000 people because 
of the terrorist acts on September 11’.150    
 
In enacting legislative powers to counter terrorism, the US law-making subsystem 
departed from standard programmes of self-referential behaviour, with both legislatures 
being strongly influenced by executive communications and operations.
151
  Consequently, 
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the US enacted executive-dominated statutes, providing the law enforcement subsystems 
with high levels of subjectivity and individual discretion deploying the powers.
152
  This 
discretion came to be exercised in a racially uneven manner.  The next section shows how 
the atypical nature of subsystem operations not only contributed to the passage of 
sweeping and highly discretionary police powers, but also included communicative 
redundancies, which helped to legitimise the use of police discretion to target a created 
and racially-defined, ‘suspect community’.153 
 
4.3 Imagery Used to Create a Suspect Community 
 
Whilst the law-making subsystem imagery used following the 9/11 attacks did not 
directly influence the statutory parameters of the counter-terrorism powers it reveals the 
strength of the lexical connection made within that subsystem between the terrorist 
attackers and the Muslim community, which contributed to a process of net-widening and 
thereby treating the whole [minority] population as a risk’.154 This imagery formed an 
environmental irritant to the policing subsystem, perhaps contributing to the apparent 
legitimacy of the racially uneven use of the stop, search and surveillance powers,
155
 which 
in turn encouraged the police’s targeting of those ‘beyond the reach of empathy’,156 in 
particular suspect racial minority groups.   
 
It should be noted that nothing in parliamentary or congressional discussions after 9/11 
supported the idea that all Muslims were held responsible for the attacks.  Indeed, 
successive declarations were made to counter any such conclusion,
157
 including citing 
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some examples of positive social contributions made by Muslims.
158
  The terrorists were 
dismissed as a ‘small number of totally unrepresentative groups and individuals’159 and as 
not exemplifying ‘those who truly follow Islam’.160  Nevertheless, having made such 
affirmations both US and UK politicians frequently reasserted damaging rhetorical 
connections between the terrorists, their religion and particular ethnic communities.
161
  
Descriptions rendered the ‘stranger’ and ‘foreigner’ objects of heightened suspicion162 – 
making minorities tantamount to an ‘enemy within’.163  Culpability for terrorism was 
portrayed as existing generally within Muslim communities.
164
   Consequently, the 
language and imagery used in legislative discussions had the effect of fusing Muslims 
with fears of ‘neighbour terrorism’165 emanating from minority communities.166  In the 
UK this image was reinforced and given apparent legitimacy by the fact that the 
individuals involved in the 7/7 attacks were second-generation British citizens with one 
long-term British resident.
167
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In the UK, one example of the ‘suspectification’ of ethnic minority communities 168 is 
Peter Mandelson’s statement that ‘[t]o fight the menace of fundamental Islamic terrorism 
recruitment has to be directed at Muslim and Arab-speaking communities’ because these 
are where the terrorist organisations draw their own membership.
169
   Although 
Mandelson is referring to the recruitment of individuals to protect against the terrorist 
threat, his comments made a link between mainstream Muslim communities and 
extremist terrorists, thus entrenching a perception that minority-identity constituted an 
appropriate operational rationale for deployment of the counter-terrorism powers.
170
  The 
sense of widespread complicity in the terrorist attacks is also demonstrated by the idea 
that British Muslim communities were operating as a safe haven for terrorists.
171
  The first 
mention of this was during the debate concerning the Terrorism Act,
 172
 but various MPs 
and peers unquestioningly adopted the idea, following 9/11.
173
  The collusion between 
Muslims and terrorists that was implied within the debates is exactly the type of heuristic 
shortcut against which MP Khalid Mahmood sought assurance when he stated that ‘it 
would be quite wrong for British Muslims to be tarred with the same brush [as Islamic 
terrorists] following that dreadful act of terrorism’.174  Despite receiving the necessary 
platitudes,
175
 imagery within the debates continued to conflate ‘Muslim’ firstly with 
specific racial minority groups, and ultimately with ‘terrorist’.176 
 
The ‘intensive othering’177 of Asian and Arabic Muslims was initially achieved by the 
portrayal of the terrorists as ‘foreign’,178 and was made more explicit by emphasising the 
‘foreignness’ of Muslims, for example by suggesting that Muslims considered events 
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‘differently’ from the rest of the population.179  In addition, through linguistic laxness 
terrorist characterisations were applied generally to Muslims and individuals within racial 
minority communities.
180
  This trend, which had the effect of increasing the circle of 
suspicion as to those implicated in the attacks, is exemplified by Baroness Cox who, 
having described a film portrayal of a terrorist training camp near Slough, cited five 
examples linking internationally committed terrorist attacks with Britain through a range 
of racial minority and refugee groups, living in the UK.
181
  A further theme in the debate 
was the distinction between the terrorists and ‘Britishness’ which helped to reaffirm the 
national/ non-national distinction between the law-abiding population and terrorist 
suspects.
182
    
 
Whilst ordinary Muslims were repeatedly distanced from the ‘very small number of 
extremists’183 by discussing terrorists alongside Muslims and particular racial minorities 
Parliamentary discourse encouraged the popular conflation of these groups which was 
reflected in police actions and media portrayals of the terrorist threat.
184
  Consequently, 
the predominantly minority characteristic of an institution or group became sufficient to 
place it under suspicion.
185
   Separating ‘them’ from ‘us’186 provided a functional basis for 
the departure from standard communicative redundancies maintaining human rights 
expectations or any concessions to the pursuit of security beneath concerns regarding 
national security.
187
  Such a division also provides an implicit confirmation that whilst the 
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180
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benefits of the counter-terrorism laws extend to everyone, their costs – defined as the 
groups the powers target – would only be experienced by ‘them’. 188   Parliamentary 
communications, therefore, constituted a strong environmental irritant, which, appeared to 
endorse the racially disproportionate implementation of stop and search, and other 
counter-terrorism policing tactics.
189
   
 
After 9/11 parliamentary interconnection of ‘Muslim’ with ‘terrorist’ resulted in calls for 
Muslims to speak out against terrorism in a way not required of the population in general.  
Before 9/11, for example, former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher stated that she ‘had 
not heard enough condemnation from Muslim priests’, when commenting on concerns of 
growing Muslim extremism within the country and the threat of attack from international 
terrorist organisations.
190
  Whilst Thatcher’s comment was described as being 
inappropriate, and potentially damaging to cohesion between Muslims and non-
Muslims,
191
 some MPs had already expressed the same idea.
192
  Support of such calls 
increased over the course of the ensuing debate, eventually justifying the expectation that 
Muslims should explicitly ‘say that suicide bombing is a perversion of the Koran and that 
there is no way in which those who use themselves to destroy the lives of innocent people 
can hope to obtain an accelerated passage to paradise’.193  Following 7/7 the need for 
Muslim religious and community leaders to take the initiative in distancing themselves 
from the attacks was strongly linked to preventing any popular backlash against them.
194
  
The onus was thus placed on the Muslim communities to demonstrate that they were not 
part of the terrorist threat, despite there being no general criminal law requirement for 
such action.  The implication was that if national loyalty was not evident, disloyalty was a 
natural presumption.
195
  Even where they were not being constructed as suspect, therefore, 
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Muslim communities were subject to dualistic treatment as compared to the majority 
population.
196
 
 
As in the UK, an important characteristic of the US congressional debate was the use of 
particular language and imagery to create a separate target community for the counter-
terrorism powers. Expressions of solidarity with Muslim Americans,
 197
 were superseded 
firstly by a general statement linking the attackers and their religious convictions which 
then expanded to statements linking the wider Muslim community to the threat.  Robert 
Erlich, described the attackers as being fuelled by ‘religious extremism, cultural bias, or 
political philosophy’, strongly implicating racial and religious minorities within America 
as being potential terrorist suspects.
198
  This theme also helps to show how differences 
between outsiders and the rest of the community were emphasised, as compared to an 
exaggerated internal conformity of the majority population.
199
  For example, 
congressional comments stressed the need to ensure that terrorists were given ‘no place to 
hide, no place to train and organize, no place to keep their assets’ and ‘no safe harbour’.200  
President Bush also made statements distancing the attackers from mainstream Muslims 
groups and ideology.
201
  However, such statements positioned the terrorist threat as 
arising from within America, but from amongst Americans who existed outside the 
dominant social groupings.
202
   
 
The connection between minority communities and the threat from terrorism was further 
entrenched by actions of politicians, such as in returning donations received following 
9/11 to Muslim and Arabic donors. For example Hilary Clinton returned $50,000 to 
Muslim organisations and the, then New York Mayor, Rudy Giuliani, returned money 
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donated for the victims of 9/11 by a Saudi Prince.
203
  Further, despite Bush stating that the 
attackers were part of a ‘fringe movements that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam’, 
in the same public announcement he repeatedly made the connection between the 
mainstream religion and the terrorists’ ‘radical beliefs’. 204  In addition, Attorney General 
John Ashcroft’s calls for Americans not to engage in hate attacks against Americans of 
Arabic, Middle Eastern and Muslim descent were coupled with the request that 
Americans be alert to the activities of ‘suspicious individuals’. 205   This connection 
perpetuated the idea that ‘suspicious individuals’ were likely to belong to a visible, 
minority community, a sentiment more explicitly expressed by his statement that terrorists 
overstaying their visas will be arrested – presuming that terrorists would be non-
Americans.    
 
Within Congress itself, debates made use of various religious and race-based 
stereotypes,
206
 while remaining impervious to the involvement in terrorism of individuals 
not fitting these stereotypical images.  For example the terrorist threat was described 
without reference to incidents unrelated to Islam, such as the Oklahoma bombing in 
America in 1995, perpetrated by Timothy McVeigh.
207
 The limited utility of such 
stereotypical descriptions of potential terrorists is further demonstrated by the actions of 
terrorists who do not fit the racial or ethnic profile being perpetuated, such as John Walker 
Lindh,
 208
 Richard Reid
209
 and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.
210
  In the US legislative 
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 Reid attempted to detonate explosives hidden in his shoes on 22 December 2001 on a flight from Paris to 
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debate a single reference is made to the 9/11 attackers being no more ‘typical of their 
religion than Timothy McVeigh is typical of Christianity’.211  However, aside from this 
remark the terrorist threat was exclusively described as arising from racial minority 
adherents to Islam, leading to an inaccurately narrow portrayal of the source of the 
terrorist threat.
212
   By selectively concentrating on particular events as being wholly 
representative of this new manifestation of highly threatening terrorism its religious, and 
also racial, nature were emphasised, whilst the terrorists themselves were reduced to 
racially identifiable, religious fanatics.
213
    
 
4.4  Conclusion  
 
In the shadow of the threat from terrorism the subsystem behaviour of US and UK 
legislatures repeated recognised deficiencies of systems behaviour in their response to 
national security law-making needs.  The environmental irritant of public opinion and 
political considerations were particularly able to shape the subsystems’ programme of 
operation, which in turn appeared to justify the level of the public fear and nature of the 
statutory powers. Environmental irritants arising from the national security threat face 
unbalanced each legislature’s prioritisation of the habitualised principles of majoritarian 
responsiveness and minority protection, which legitimise the law-making supremacy of 
Parliament and Congress.
214
  Portrayal of a wholly unprecedented threat meant that 
effective debate was dominated by calls for cross-party consensus, which failed to 
effectively give voice to minority interests.   
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In the US, although debate and legislative scrutiny persisted, law-making behaviour was 
controlled by the demands of the executive, which imposed its own legislative priorities 
on the law.  The evidence of this is borne out by the failure to incorporate significant 
safeguards against misuse of the powers into the statutory powers and the rejection of the 
draft proposals arising from the committee-based scrutiny, in preference for its own 
unilaterally determined bill.
215
  In the UK, in the aftermath of 9/11, any consideration of 
minority protection was seen as an almost unspeakable concession to terrorists.
216
  
Somewhat counter-intuitively, therefore, the US sub-system’s operation was more able to 
uphold normal autopoietic behaviour than the UK, against the politically-driven 
environmental irritants it faced.  Adherence to positive patterns of subsystem behaviour 
was, however, weakened by the ability of the US executive to circumvent ordinary 
legislative process by passing over the House and Senate negotiated bills in favour of its 
own draft statute.
217
 
 
Racially loaded imagery also demonstrated the subsystem’s own understanding of the 
threat, which was then reflected in its subsystem communications.
218
  This imagery 
fashioned a homogenous and separate suspect community identifiable by its racial, ethnic 
and religious origins, thus making minority and Muslim communities appear to be the 
common-sense focus for terror-related policing.  The link between particular racial and 
religious minority groups and the terrorist threat was given the appearance of rationality 
through legislative language, imagery and specific legislative provisions such as the 
definition of terrorism.   Such subsystem behaviour resulted in the enactment of broad and 
highly discretionary law enforcement power, which contained the potential for racially 
disproportionate use.
219
  Mere recognition of the need to uphold ordinary law-making 
standards even in the face of an acute national security threat was thus insufficient to 
achieve this effect.
220
   However, in the US the cause of this departure appears to owe 
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more to the atypical progress of the bill through Congress, and the successive 
interventions of the Bush Administration in imposing its own draft legislation on the 
process,
221
 than to Congressional failure to consider the importance of balancing 
individual rights with national security.   
 
In the UK, despite both a clear description of the problems arising out of the 1974 Act and 
the principles by which Parliament would be able to avoid these procedural and 
substantive mistakes, the law-making process giving rise to the Terrorism Act repeated 
many of the failings attributed to past legislators.
222
  Therefore, while past experiences 
caused Congress and Parliament to hesitate before instituting the statutory powers 
proposed, each ultimately bowed to mounting public and Executive pressure for a quick 
and decisive subsystem response to the terrorist threat.
223
   What this suggests is that 
while the programme of operation of both the US and UK law-making subsystems is 
understood as being based in considerations of majority responsiveness, curbed by 
minority protection, this is not actually how the subsystems behave, particularly when 
faced with certain environmental irritants, such as threats to national security.  In such 
circumstances, as seen in relation to the Terrorism Act and the Patriot Act, effective 
minority protection does not form a meaningful part of subsystem behaviour.  Instead, 
minority protection is described as the responsibility of some other subsystem or 
subsystems.  However, law-making subsystem expectations regarding the responsibility 
of the policing subsystem derive from its own system-specific understanding of the 
policing subsystem’s role.  This does not match the police’s own interpretation of tits role 
and its subsystem operations consequently do not meet the expectations of he law-making 
subsystem.  Chapters five and six will now show how this barrier between the 
understanding of the two subsystems further contributed to the realisation of the racial 
effect of the stop, search and surveillance powers. 
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Chapter Five: The Policing Standards for Sub-system Behaviour: Normative versus 
Empirical 
 
Fig five: policing subsystem – use of powers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once enacted, interpretation and implementation of the statutory stop, search and 
surveillance powers was effectively passed to the US and UK policing subsystems, in 
order that they could apply the provisions to concrete situations.
1
    In the US use of the 
ss.214-215 powers was strongly linked to the exceptional circumstances in which they 
were enacted.  For the law-making subsystem the ‘state of exception’ resulting from the 
9/11 attacks justified, even demanded enacting suspicion-less powers and the ‘new’ 
criminal process of which they were a part.
2
  By contrast, the permanent enactment of the 
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UK powers, in advance of 9/11, permitted a degree of normalisation of the suspicion-less 
powers within the broader spectrum of police stop and search.
3
   One consequence of this 
‘normalisation’ was that the powers were already available for the police to use when the 
9/11 attacks were carried out.  Despite the different contexts in which the s.44 and ss.214-
215 powers were enacted, following 9/11 the police in both the US and UK had at their 
disposal powers which lacked the normal operational restrictions arising from the 
requirement of reasonable suspicion.  In both countries the police were also confronted 
with strong exhortations to protect national security amid the unparalleled threat faced. 
 
Chapters five and six will question whether the police’s understanding of law-making 
expectations for how it would exercise the discretion within the statutory powers played a 
role in giving rise to the racial effect and, if so, in what ways.
4
     Indeed, US and UK law-
making subsystems have sought to dismiss any failings on their own part as contributing 
to the disproportionate targeting of the powers on particular racial minorities and instead 
linked this effect to police use of the powers.
5
  These arguments support claims that 
counter-terrorism statutory provisions have only an ancillary role in directing and shaping 
police operations in tackling terrorism.
6
  Whilst the legislature’s protestations have been 
criticised,
7
 instead of absolving either the law-making or the policing subsystems, 
chapters five and six of this thesis analyse the communicative barriers between the two 
subsystems, and suggest that these barriers meant that neither subsystem truly understood 
the operational programme of the other so that the expectations each held for the 
behaviour of the other were not in-line with the other’s expectations of those expectations.  
One area of such a mismatch was in relation to minority protection, and in particular the 
minority-protecting role that each subsystem expected the other subsystem to perform. 
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In order to identify and analyse the inter-subsystem communicative barriers between the 
law-making and policing subsystems, this chapter firstly sets out the programme of 
system-specific operations by which policing subsystems in the US and UK seek to 
reconcile and fulfil various externally held expectations that the police operate in an 
effective, efficient and fair manner.  By acting pursuant to their interpretation of these 
expectations to law enforcement subsystems retain their operational legitimacy, in society 
at large.  This chapter then suggests that the damaging effect to the legitimacy and utility 
of police activities experienced when these standards are not maintained was fully 
appreciated within each country’s law enforcement subsystem, prior to the enactment of 
the suspicion-less stop, search and surveillance powers on which this thesis focuses.  
Finally this chapter will produce evidence to suggest that despite the existence of 
established system behaviours, and subsystem awareness of the implications of not 
adhering to these, the police subsystems in both the US and UK deviated from these in 
applying the suspicion-less counter-terrorism stop, search and surveillance powers on the 
basis of broadly drafted, race-based profiles.  
 
Before analysing policing operations in the US and UK it is necessary to note that there 
are significant differences in the nature of each country’s law enforcement organisations.8  
In the US, the ‘police’ is comprised of a variety of federal, state and local forces with 
different, but overlapping, geographical remits, varying law enforcement powers and 
distinct organisational structures.
9
   UK policing is organised into regional police 
authorities, operating in accordance with centrally devised standards, but without a single 
overarching nationwide police force.
10
  To facilitate this comparison this chapter focuses 
on specific parts of each country’s law enforcement organisation which have comparable 
elements in both countries.  The US analysis focuses on the role of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (‘FBI’), as it is this organisation which, through its operational field offices, 
is responsible for law enforcement at a federal level and has the primary policing mandate 
to tackle terrorism.
11
   There are 56 FBI field offices located in major metropolitan areas 
across the US, which are responsible for all FBI operations within a defined geographical 
area.  Each office is headed by a special agent in charge or an assistant director and has 
                                               
8 Although for their early commonalities see L.A. Steverson, Policing in America (ABC-CLIO, 2008) 4-10. 
9 See J.S. Dempsey and L.S. Forst, An Introduction to Policing (5th ed., Delmare, 2010) 42-108. 
10 See L. Jason-Lloyd, The Legal Framework of Police Powers (Frank Cass & Co., 1997) 1. 
11 Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. 0.85(1).  See also A.G. Theoharis, ‘FBI Oversight and Liaison Relationships’ in A.G. 
Theoharis (ed.), FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide (The Oryx Press, 1999) 159-67. 
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control over a number of resident agencies, of which there are around 400 across the 
country and are located in smaller cities and towns.
12
  FBI operations are undertaken on 
the basis of Attorney General Guidelines and are subject to congressional and executive 
oversight.
13
  In the UK, local police authorities operate on the basis of UK-wide powers, 
loosely built upon the ancient premise of keeping the king’s peace.14  There are 43 police 
authorities of varying size within England and Wales, and eight in Scotland, each headed 
by a chief constable.
15
  Under the chief constable’s authority there is a strong UK policing 
convention of constabulary independence, intended to enable the police to act 
autonomously from political control and base their decisions on their law enforcement 
expertise.   
 
A further important point to note, in relation to the analysis of the UK police is that the 
counter-terrorism powers were used far more heavily by some police authorities than 
others, due to the relative importance of national security concerns and the different 
operational priorities of local forces.
16
 In particular, the s.44 powers were predominantly 
deployed by police officers, at street-level, within the Metropolitan Police Service (‘MPS’) 
and the British Transport Police (‘BTP’).17  These two forces focus on urban areas of high 
population density and which include high levels of sites, which are recognised as 
potential terrorist targets.
18
  It is, therefore, the operational behaviour of these two forces, 
as analysed through police authority guidelines and similar publications, which represents 
the major focus of the UK policing subsystem analysis.  Geographical differences in US 
police use of the powers are less clear than in the UK because the FBI, despite being 
broken down into regional field officers, operates under nationwide umbrella 
organisations and because there is less statistical data to reveal the patterns of use of the 
powers.  Despite the structural differences in US and UK policing subsystems, the 
                                               
12 See http://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field, accessed 06.06.2011.   
13 www.fbi.gov/about-us/faqs, accessed 02.09.2011.   
14 A. Brown, Police Governance in England and Wales (Cavendish Publishing, 1998) 3-4. 
15 See http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/CrimeJusticeAndTheLaw/Thejudicialsystem/DG_4003281, accessed 
06.06.2011. 
16 In his annual review Lord Carlile attributed this uneven use to an inconsistency in approach to using the 
powers among chief officers, see Carlile, Report on the Operation in 2007 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of 
Part I of the Terrorism Act 2006 (June 2008), para 32 and Carlile, Report on the Operation in 2009 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part I of the Terrorism Act 2006 (June 2010), para 52. 
17 In fact the MPA and BTP consistently accounted for over 90 per cent of the use of s.44.  See Lord Carlile, 
Report on the Operation in 2009 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 (July 
2010), annex E, table 2.2. 
18 J. Coaffee, Terrorism, Risk and the City: The Making of a Contemporary Urban Landscape (Ashgate, 
2003). 
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barriers to inter-subsystem understanding, which contributed to the racial effect of the 
policing powers, were experienced in both US and UK police subsystems.  One reason 
which may explain this it that, despite the organisational differences between the US and 
UK policing subsystems, there are some comparable subsystem priorities which marked 
both country’s policing subsystem programme of operation, as are considered in the next 
section. 
 
5.1 Standard Policing Subsystem Programme 
 
In the US and UK the functional aims through which the police seek to fulfil the 
expectations for their behaviour held by other subsystems, focus on enforcing and 
upholding criminal law.
19
  Each policing subsystem, therefore, shapes its operational and 
law enforcement programme in accordance with its interpretation of the requirements for 
crime prevention, detection and reduction.
20
  The effect of these operational priorities is 
that police behaviour is largely results-driven.
21
  Pursuant to the achievement of the 
desired ‘results’ stops, searches and surveillance are frequently deployed investigative 
techniques, predominantly used to secure indictments, arrests and ultimately 
convictions.
22
   In utilising these powers the police respond to legislative powers by 
drafting and implementing operational guidelines.  Like the statutory powers, these 
guidelines are designed to balance majority concerns of law enforcement with avoiding 
unreasonable and disproportionate police incursions into individual liberties.
23
  In 
particular, such subsystem norms seek to address the ‘perennial problems’ of 
discrimination and disparity in the police treatment of different groups.
24
  In this way the 
police’s identification with the rule of law provides a means of reconciling their 
                                               
19  Memorandum for the Heads of Department Components, ‘The Attorney General’s Guidelines for 
Domestic FBI Operations’ Press Release (29 September 2008) 2, 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines-memo.pdf, 07.06.2011. 
20 L. Lustgarten, ‘The Future of Stop and Search’ (2002) CLR 603. 
21 See ACPO, APA and Home Office, Equality, Diversity and Human Rights Strategy for the Police Service, 
which described the police as having ‘developed a strong culture of focusing on results’ 5. 
22 J.T. Nason, ‘Conducting Surveillance Operations. How to Get the Most out of them’ (May 2004) 73(5) 
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 1 and USDOJ, Report to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the US: The FBI’s Counterterrorism Program Since September 11 2001 (14 April 2004) 67.; G.P. Alpert, D. 
Flynn and A. Piquero, ‘Effective Community Policing Performance Measures’ (2001) 3(2) Justice Research 
and Policy 79. 
23 See, e.g., Spano v New York which held that ‘the police must obey the law while enforcing the law, that in 
the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be 
criminals as from the actual criminals themselves, Spano v New York 79 S. Ct. at 1206 (1959). 
24
 R. Reiner, The Politics of the Police (OUP, 2010) 25. 
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fundamentally authoritarian character with the expectations of democratic society.
25
  To 
help to maintain this balance evidential standards govern police implementation of their 
statutory powers.
26
   In relation to stop, search and surveillance the key requirements are 
the need for reasonable suspicion in the UK, and either reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause in the US.  The nature of these evidential pre-requisites, and the way that the police 
have interpreted and shaped their own subsystem behaviour around them, is considered 
further in the following paragraphs. 
 
5.1.1 UK: Stop and Search based on Reasonable Suspicion 
 
The power of the police to stop and search individuals is a common and long-established 
form of street-level policing in the UK, albeit that it remains highly contentious.
27
  The 
first such powers were implemented through the Metropolitan Police Act 1839 which 
gave police officers in London the power to stop and search people if they ‘reasonably 
suspected’ them of carrying anything ‘stolen or unlawfully obtained’.28  The criterion for 
conducting these searches was an officer’s subjective suspicion, a controversial and 
unpopular standard, which led to the provisions being pejoratively referred to as the ‘sus’ 
laws.
 29
   The first standard stop and search power in England and Wales was introduced 
by s.1 of PACE, and under which the determinant for carrying out a stop and search has 
developed into the requirement for reasonable suspicion.
30
  Use of a stop and search 
power, where there is reasonable suspicion of criminal behaviour or intent, is intended to 
allay or confirm the officer’s suspicions that he will find stolen or prohibited articles on 
the individual stopped,
31
 without the need for the police officer to exercise a power of 
arrest.
32
   
                                               
25 D.A. Sklansky, ‘Police and Democracy’ (2004-05) 103 Mich L. Rev 1699 as earlier recognised in J.H. 
Skolnick, Justice without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society (1966). 
26 D. Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (2nd ed., OUP, 2002) 330. 
27 B. Bowling and C. Philips, ‘Disproportionate and Discriminatory: Reviewing the Evidence on Police 
Stop and Search’ (2007) 70(6) MLR 936-61.   
28 Metropolitan Police Act of 1839 (2&3 Vict. c.47), s.66. 
29 C. Demuth, ‘Sus’: A Report on the Vagrancy Act 1824 (Runnymede Trust, 1978). 
30 PACE, s.1.  See also Council of Europe, European Code of Police Ethics, adopted 19 September 2001 
pursuant to Recommendation Rec (2001) 10 (March 2002) para 47 and European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance, General Policy Recommendation number 11 on Combating Racism and Racial 
Discrimination, in Policing (adopted 29 June 2007) sec I, para 3 which advocate maintenance of a 
reasonable suspicion standard in police investigations. 
31 PACE, s.1(3). 
32 Home Office, PACE Code A, para 1.4.  The Home Office definition of a stop is: ‘when an officer requests 
a person in a public place to account for themselves, ie. Their actions, behaviour, presence in an area or 
possession of anything’, ibid, para 4.12. 
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Reasonable suspicion shapes police conduct of stops and searches on two levels.  Firstly, 
it imposes a requirement for objective intelligence and secondly, it expressly demands 
that this intelligence must not rely on group-based generalisations which could lead to 
discriminatory connections between, for example, race and criminal behaviour.  These 
conditions shape the policing subsystem’s programme of operation by which it pursues its 
operational aim of crime reduction, whilst also responding to wider legislative and 
societal expectations relating to efficient and fair police behaviour.  Reasonable suspicion, 
therefore, serves as a safeguard to protect individuals from arbitrary or prejudicially-
motivated police action,
33
 and is a key communicative redundancy by which the police 
respond to the irritants arising from popular opinion, which expect the police to fulfil their 
mandate to control crime, while balancing this with individual rights.   
 
The parameters of the reasonable suspicion requirement within police stop and search are 
further delineated by the explicit exclusion of certain grounds for using the powers.  
These grounds emphasise the importance of objectively assessed suspicion and the strong 
nexus between particularised intelligence and use of the power.  Code A guidance,
34
 
issued by the Secretary of State in conjunction with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984, for example, explicitly states that a police officer’s reasonable suspicion can never 
be based on personal factors alone, without some supporting intelligence or specific 
behaviour by the individual concerned.
35
  In particular race, age, appearance or the fact 
that the person is known to have a previous criminal conviction cannot be used, either 
separately or cumulatively, as the basis for a reasonable suspicion stop and search.
36
  
Reasonable suspicion, therefore, must not be based on generalisations or stereotypical 
images of certain groups of people as more likely to be involved in criminal activity than 
others.
37
 Policing subsystem operations maintain the reasonable suspicion requirement, 
irrespective of views of the reality of ‘on street’ criminal behaviour, in order that it may 
                                               
33 As first expressed in Dumbell v Roberts [1944] All ER 326 at 329: ‘The British principle of personal 
freedom, that every man should be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty, applies also to the function 
of arrest – in a modified degree, it is true, but at least to the extent of requiring them to be observant, 
receptive and open-minded and to notice any relevant circumstances which point either way, either to 
innocence or guilt’.  See also G. Smith, ‘Reasonable Suspicion: time for a re-evaluation?’ (2002) 30 
International Journal of the Sociology of the Law 1. 
34 Issued in accordance with Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.66. 
35 PACE Code A, para 2.2. 
36 ibid. 
37
 ibid. 
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legitimately fulfil its law enforcement mandate.
38
   
 
The ‘reasonableness’ of the police officer’s suspicion is assessed on an objective 
standard,
39
 and is coupled with the requirement that stop and search must be used ‘fairly, 
responsibly, with respect for people being searched and without unlawful 
discrimination’.40  These operational benchmarks illustrate the importance of reasonable 
suspicion as a mechanism by which a police officer’s decision-making is regulated and 
individual discretion is limited to a closely defined ‘sphere of autonomy’.41   In particular, 
the objective nature of reasonable suspicion requires that it is grounded in fact, 
information and/or intelligence.
42
   The intelligence must ‘meet the needs of frontline 
officers’, which includes the expectation that the information should be temporally 
relevant and geographically specific.
43
   Police discretion to exercise their powers, 
therefore, requires the existence of reasonable suspicion.  Discretion in the absence of 
reasonable suspicion can lead to a risk that the police lapse into actions based on 
stereotypes.
44
 
 
5.1.2 US: Surveillance and Search based on Probable Cause or Reasonable Suspicion 
 
Surveillance and search powers are an important means of enabling the police to 
investigate individuals suspected of engaging in criminal behaviour.  Such investigative 
operations are primarily governed by the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution 
which safeguards individual liberties against unreasonable searches and seizures.
45
  The 
Constitutional protections, therefore, do not prohibit all governmental and police searches, 
only those which are unreasonable.
46
  The Fourth Amendment also does not apply to 
wiretaps,
47
 or pen registers,
48
 but does apply to other forms of electronic surveillance.
49
  
                                               
38 A. Saunders and R. Young, Criminal Justice (Butterworths, 2000) 87. 
39 PACE Code A, para 2.2. 
40 ibid, para 1.1.  See also Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 which makes it unlawful for police 
officers to discriminate on the grounds of race, colour, ethnic origin, nationalist or national origin when 
using their powers. 
41 D.J. Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion (2nd ed, Clarendon Press, 1990) 
8.  
42 PACE Code A, para 2.2. 
43 Home Office, Stop and Search Action Team.  Interim Guidance (Home Office, 2005) para 3.6. 
44 See section 5.2 of this thesis. 
45 US Constitution, Fourth Amendment. 
46 Elkins v United States 364 US 206 (1960) at 222.   
47 Olmstead v United States, 277 US 438 (1928); and United States v Miller, 425 US 435, 442-43 (1976). 
48
 Smith v Maryland, 442 US 735 (1979). 
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Nevertheless, even where the constitutional protections do not directly apply, the 
legitimacy of police operations is based on adherence to the same substantive measures 
regarding what constitutes lawful police behaviour.  The starting position for establishing 
that a search or surveillance operation is reasonable is the warrant preference rule, which 
holds that police operations are presumptively unreasonable if they are not undertaken 
pursuant to a warrant.
50
 All warrant applications require that the applying officer outlines 
the exact scope and specific circumstances that justify the request for use of the relevant 
powers.
51
  The requirement for a warrant it is designed to ensure that police behaviour is 
constitutional, on the basis of the reasonableness of the proposed operations.
52
  This 
reasonableness is assessed by the court, as opposed to individual police officers.
53
  There 
are, however, recognised exceptions to the rule, including for operations conducted in 
relation to national security threats.
54
   Instead of requiring a warrant, such searches and 
surveillance must fulfil one of two legal standards to constitute lawful operational 
behaviour: probable cause; or reasonable suspicion. 
 
The primary standard for police individualised suspicion is ‘probable cause’.55  Probable 
cause requires that the circumstances and facts known to the officer are sufficient to 
suggest to a person of reasonable prudence, ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, that evidence of 
criminal behaviour will be found.
56
   Evidentially, probable cause is ‘more than bare 
suspicion’ and ‘less than evidence which would justify … conviction’.57  Probable cause 
has a number of components, which determine whether the standard has been reached.  
These comprise of a quantitative component, relating to how certain the police are; a 
qualitative element, determined by how strong the supporting data sources are; a temporal 
component, regarding when the courts and police must make their judgement; and a 
moral dimension of whether the police officer has individualised suspicion.
58
  The 
                                                                                                                                            
49 Berger v New York, 288 US 41 (1967); and Katz v New York, 389 US 347 (1967) at 354-56. 
50 See T.K. Clancy, ‘The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness’ (2004) Utah Law Review 977, 
993. 
51 Johnson v United States 333 US 10, 13-14 (1948). 
52 United States v Katz, 389 US 347, 360 (1967) at 20. 
53 D.A. Sklansky, ‘Police and Democracy’ (2004-05) 103 Mich L. Rev 1699, 1738. 
54
 United States v Katz 389 US 347, 360 (1967), per Justice White.  See also New Jersey v TLO, 469 US 325, 
340-41 (1985). 
55 Beck v Ohio 379 US 89, 91 (1964).  See also Almeida-Sanchez v United States, 413 US 266, 269-73 
(1978). 
56 US v Ornelas 116 S. Ct 1657 (1996).  See also U.S. v Covarrubias 65 F.3d 1362 (7th Cir. 1995). 
57 Brinegar v US 338 US 160 (1949). 
58 A.E. Taslitz, ‘What is Probable Cause, and Why Should We Care?: The Costs, Benefits and Meaning of 
Individualized Suspicion’ [2010] 73 Law and Contemporary Problems 145. 
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Supreme Court has prioritised the existence of individualised suspicion as the most 
important amongst the different considerations.
59
  Like the warrant preference rule, 
however, there are also exceptions to the requirement for probable cause where the lower, 
‘reasonable suspicion’, standard applies.60   
 
Despite the difficulty the courts have found in precisely defining the reasonable suspicion 
standard
61
 it requires a particularised and objective suspicion that the target of the power 
is, or has been, involved in a criminal activity.
62
  This standard necessitates more than 
‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or [a] ‘hunch’’ and must be based on ‘specific 
and articulable facts’.63 The necessary facts can, however, be little more than suspicious 
behaviour in an area known for criminality.
64
  The difference in the intelligence 
requirements in the two standards was considered in United States v Perrin, in which the 
court held that reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard and can be established 
with quantitatively less information and information that is qualitatively less reliable than 
that required to establish probable cause.
65
  Crucially, however, for both operational 
standards the information must constitute objective intelligence regarding suspected 
criminal activity, which is reasonably linked to the individual subject to the search or 
surveillance.
66
  This connection must not be derived from discriminatory considerations 
such as, relating to the individual’s religious or political views. 67   The operational 
importance of the reasonable suspicion and probable cause requirements, as safeguards 
against the unbalancing of the crime prevention and civil liberties considerations, is 
heightened by the fact that if the requisite legal standard for the stop or surveillance is 
present the officer’s personal motive for his actions is irrelevant.68   Consequently any 
reduction in the stringency of the legal tests, or their application, could accommodate 
                                               
59 Maryland v Pringle, 540 US 366, 372-73 (2003), quoting McCarthy v De Armit, 99 P. 63, 69 (1881); and 
citing Ybarra v Illinois, 445 US 85 (1979). 
60 Terry v Ohio 392 US 1 (1968) 4. 
61 W.R. LaFavre, Search and Seizure, vol 1 (4th ed. 2004). 
62 See Carroll v United States 267 US 132, 153-54 (1925); and Camara v Municipal Court 387 US 523, 
538-39.   
63
 Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968) 21.  See also Ferguson v City of Charleston 532 US 67, 86 (2001); City of 
Indianapolis v Edmond 531 US 32, 37 (2000). 
64  See Illinois v Wadlow where the court upheld the reasonableness of the suspicion aroused by an 
individual’s flight from the police, in an area known for drugs trafficking, 528 US 119 (2000). 
65 U.S. v Perrin 45 F.3d 869 (4th Cir 1995). 
66 Ornelas v United States 517 US 690, 696 and Carrol v US 267 US 132, 162, 288. 
67 United States v US District Court 407 US 287 (1972). 
68
 Whren v U.S. 166 S.Ct 1769 (1996). 
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police action consciously or unconsciously motivated by racial animus.
69
   
 
In both the US and UK the key communicative redundancy designed to sustain the 
subsystem’s balance between crime reduction and individual civil liberties, is based on 
the pre-requisite for objectively reasonable suspicion.  These standards not only help to 
ensure that limited police resources are effectively deployed and enforce the presumption 
of innocence, but also that police action is not based on race-related generalisations about 
criminality or, indeed, officer prejudice.  Both the US and UK police subsystems 
understood the negative impact on its subsystem operations of deviating from these 
normal modes of operation, as is shown in the next section. 
 
5.2 Recognised Risk of Departing from Standard Operational Behaviours  
 
In both the US and UK, policing subsystems have recognised their susceptibility to 
racially uneven policing when there is a specific, acute environmental irritant such as with 
‘epidemics’ of drugs-related crime or threats to national security. 70  Police behaviour in 
such circumstances is strongly affected by political interests which, in turn, are heavily 
influenced by public sentiment.
71
  Such publicly endorsed and high profile policing 
objectives have been linked to the reduction or removal of statutory safeguards as well as 
the uneven and aggressive use of police powers.
72
   Such behaviours are most readily 
accommodated where the police are afforded extremely broad, discretionary powers, with 
minimal statutory safeguards to maintain standards of due process.
73
  Such powers can 
undermine human rights whilst also having a counterproductive impact on crime 
detection and prevention.
74
  In this way, policing failure to adhere to normal operational 
and evidential standards has contributed to stop, search and surveillance practices being a 
                                               
69 J.H Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard University Press, 1980) 96-97. 
70 For past examples of this see D. Walsh, ‘The Impact of Anti-subversive Laws on Police Powers and 
Practice in Ireland: The Silent Erosion of Individual Freedom’ (1989) 62(4) Temple Law Review 1099. 
71 See, e.g., Chandler v Miller 520 US 305 (1997); and Ferguson v City of Charleston 121 S. Ct. 1281 
(2001). 
72
 See, e.g., D. Cole, No Equal Justice (1999); M. Mauer, Race to Incarcerate (1999); S.L. Johnson, ‘The 
Self-Fulfilling Nature of Police Profiles’, in M.W. Markowitz and D.D. Jones-Brown (eds.), The System in 
Black and White (2000). 
73 See, e.g., T. Maclin, ‘Race and the 4th Amendment’ (1998) 51 Vand. L. Rev. 333, 344-54; and A.C. 
Thompson, ‘Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the 4th Amendment’ (1999) 74 NYU L Rev. 956, 983-91. 
74  H. Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (4th ed. Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 1329; and B. 
Ackerman, Before the Next Attack.  Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism (Yale University Press, 
2006) 109. 
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source of conflict between minority individuals and the police’.75  Indeed, a continuing 
race-based division in attitudes towards the police has been borne out by several surveys 
in which white respondents consistently exhibit a more favourable attitude towards the 
police than minority individuals.
76
  The discriminatory nature of institutional racism and 
racial profiling, together with their lack of utility in effectively tackling crime, have 
resulted in the widespread recognition and condemnation of such behaviours within the 
US and UK policing and law-making subsystems, as is shown in the following paragraphs.  
 
5.2.1 Deleterious Impact of Institutional Racism 
 
The concept of ‘institutional racism’77 developed in the US out of the radical political 
struggle and Black Power movement of the 1960s,
78
 and the expansion of understandings 
of the causes of racial inequality from their focus on individual prejudice.
79
  The concept 
was later applied to UK policing in the report arising from the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, 
which referred to institutional racism as a ‘corrosive disease’ and concluded that it was 
present within police forces nationwide.
80
   These reports contributed to a change in the 
official recognition and condemnation of institutional racism, and prompted the 
enactment of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 which brought the police within 
the scope of UK anti-discrimination legislation.
81
  The evolution in official views of 
institutional racism in the UK, from denial to acceptance and then criticism has been 
experienced in an even more high profile way in the US, especially following the 
investigation and report regarding the police beating of Rodney King, by the Los Angeles 
Police Department, in 1991.
82
    Whilst institutional racism can include overt and 
                                               
75 L. Lustgarten, ‘The Future of Stop and Search’ (2002) CLR 603.  See also J. Bennett, Police and Racism: 
What has been Achieved 10 Years after the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report (ECHR, 2009); European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Third Report on the United Kingdom (15 June 2005) para 83. 
J. Foster, T. Newburn and A. Souhami, Assessing the Impact of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (Home Office, 
2005) 30; and ‘Where has all the Racism Gone/ Views of Racism within Constabularies after Macpherson’ 
(2007) 30(3) Ethnic and Racial Studies 397. 
76 R. Weitzer and S.A. Tuck, Race and Policing in America: Conflict and Reform (CUP, 2006) 106, 70-73, 
and 119-23. 
77 Scott and Marshall, Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (OUP, 2005) 211-12. 
78 See S. Carmichael and C. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation (Vintage, 1967) and K. 
Murji, ‘Sociological Engagements: Institutional Racism and Beyond’ (2007) 41(5) Sociology 843. 
79 See, e.g., G. Myrdal (auth) and A.M. Rose (ed.), The Negro in America (Harper and Row, 1964) and R.E. 
Park, Race and Culture (Simon & Schuster, 1964). 
80 Sir William of Cluny, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report of an Inquiry by Sir William of Cluny 
(HMSO, 1999). See M. Rowe (ed.), Policing beyond MacPherson – Issues in Policing, Race and Society 
(Willan Publishing, 2007). 
81 See Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 (c. 34). 
82
 Report of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department (1991), also informally 
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conscious discriminatory attitudes, more invidious forms exist in the unquestioned, 
unconsciously discriminatory bureaucratic procedures, which become entrenched within 
the subsystem operations through its self-referential behaviour. Although the requirements 
for probable cause and reasonable suspicion are not a panacea for curing all uneven and 
race-based policing, and are frequently absent even where they are officially required,
83
 
departing from these standards make the policing subsystem particularly susceptible to 
institutionally racist operations.
84
    
 
Official recognition of the presence of institutional racism within the police has led to 
efforts in both countries to regulate the subsystem’s choice from amongst its repertoire of 
possible behaviours to exclude those which lead to discriminatory practices.
85
  The most 
overtly discriminatory subsystem behaviour, identified by Scarman, Macpherson, the 
Christopher Commission, and in other studies,
86
 have been at least partly remedied 
through institutional reform.
87
  However, the communicative redundancies behind this 
systemic racism have by no means been wholly excised from subsystem programmes.
88
  
Instead, the practices that gave rise to it may have simply become more subtle and 
                                                                                                                                            
referred to as ‘the Christopher Commission’, due to it being headed by then-attorney Warren Christopher. 
83 See, D. Brown, PACE Ten Years On: A Review of the Research, Home Office Research Study 155 (Home 
Office Research and Statistics Directorate, 1997); D. Dixon, Law in Policing: Legal Regulation and Police 
Practice (OUP, 1997); P. Quinton, N. Bland and J. Miller, Police Stops, Decision-making, and Practice, 
Police Research Series (Home Office, Policing and Reducing Crime Unit, 2000). 
84  Report of an Inquiry by Sir William MacPherson of Cluny Presented to Parliament by the Home 
Secretary (February 1999) and Report of the Independent Commission of the Los Angeles Police 
Department, The Rodney King Beating (1991).  See also J. Hall, ‘Police and Law in a Democratic Society’ 
(1953) 28 Und. L.J. 133, 153, 156, 171 – an early article which warden that the wide scope of police 
discretion opened the door to discrimination against minorities and that it violated the rule of law. 
85 See C. Ogletree, M. Prosser, A. Smith and W. Talley, Beyond the Rodney King Story.  An Investigation of 
Police Conduct in Minority Communities (Northeastern University Press, 1995) and B.K. Landsberg, 
Enforcing Civil Rights.  Race Discrimination and the DOJ (University of Kansas, 1997). 
86 See S. Holdaway, Recruiting a Multi-Racial Police Force (HMSO, 1991); S. Holdaway and A.M. Barron, 
Resigners?  The Experience of Black and Asian Police Officers (Macmillan, 1997); E. Cashmore, ‘The 
Experiences of Ethnic Minority Police Officers in Britain: Under Recruitment and Racial Profiling in a 
Performance Culture’ (2001) 24(4) Ethnic and Racial Studies 642; and E. Cashmore, ‘Behind the Window 
Dressing: Ethnic Minority Police Perspective on Cultural Diversity’ (2002) 28(2) Journal of Ethnic 
Migration Studies 327. 
87 See Home Office, From the Neighbourhood to the National Policing our Communities Together (July 
2008) which states that there have been ‘substantial and positive changes’ in policing since the Macpherson 
report, at para 4.18.  See also ACLU claims that ‘[a]lthough fewer de jure forms of discrimination remain in 
existence, de facto racial disparities continue to plague the United States and curtail the enjoyment of 
fundamental human rights’, ‘The Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States.  A Follow-
Up Report to the UN Committee of the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’ (June 2009). 
88 See J. Bennett, Police and Racism: What has been achieved 10 Years after the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry 
Report (ECHR, 2009); European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Third Report on the United 
Kingdom, (15 June 2005), para 83; and R.BR. Banks and R. Thompson-Ford, ‘(How) Does Unconscious 
Bias Matter?: Law, Politics and Racial Inequality’ (2008-09) 58 Emory L.J. 1053, 1089-90. 
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covert:
89
 less visible but hardly less ‘polluting’ to police operations. 90   This would 
certainly correspond with CRT arguments of racism as part of the normal state of 
institutional operation.  In particular, behaviour that has an unconsciously discriminatory 
effect, rather than a discriminatory intent, continues to be a recognised feature of routine 
policing.
91
   The engrained nature of institutional racism in the UK was suggested by the 
Parekh report which concluded that even the notions of Britishness and Englishness have 
racial connotations so that there remains an unstated assumption ‘that Britishness and 
whiteness go together, like roast beef and Yorkshire pudding’ and that these ideas are 
spread throughout society, and perpetuated in popular culture and consciousness.
92
 
 
The types of unconsciously discriminatory operations which fuel institutional racism arise 
from a particular mode of understanding human behaviour which perceive certain 
criminal activities as more associated with some racial minority groups than others.  
Consequently, in order to pursue the policing aim of reducing crime it appears to be 
appropriate, even necessary, to shape the subsystem programme so that police resources 
are concentrated on particular societal groups.
93
  The mechanisms though which racial 
profiling threatens to maintain racial hierarchies are mutually reinforcing, so that, for 
example, law enforcement tactics which result in heavily disproportionate rates of arrest, 
conviction and incarceration of members of racial minorities may reinforce stereotypes of 
minorities as linked to criminality.
94
   
 
A further manifestation of institutional racism is where the police give higher priority to 
the offences that are dominant amongst minority communities.
95
  This form of behaviour 
has been linked to the disparate treatment of crack and powder cocaine possession in the 
                                               
89 J. Foster, T. Newburn and A. Souhami, Assessing the Impact of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (Home 
Office, 2005) 30 and ‘Where has all the Racism Gone/ Views of Racism within Constabularies after 
Macpherson’ (2007) 30(3) Ethnic and Racial Studies 397.    
90 D.T. Goldberg, ‘Racial Europeanization’ (2006) 29(3) Ethnic and Racial Studies 331, 339. 
91 Metropolitan Police Authority, Report of the MPA Scrutiny on MPS Stop and Search Practice paras 87-
88 
92
 The Runnymede Trust, The Future of Multi-ethnic Britain, The Parekh Report (Profile Books, 2000) 24-
25. 
93 A.H. Garrison, ‘Disproportionate Minority Arrests: A Note on What had been Said and How it Fits 
Together’ (1997) 23 New England J. on Criminal and Civil Confinement 29, 53-54; and S.L. Johnson, ‘Race 
and the Decision to Detain a Suspect’ (1983) 93 Yale L.J. 214, 236-39. 
94 D.A. Sklansky, ‘Police and Democracy’ (2004-05) 103 Mich L. Rev 1699, 1817. 
95 ACLU, How the USA PATRIOT Act Enables Law Enforcement to Use Intelligence Authorisations to 
Circumvent the Privacy Provisions Afforded in Criminal Cases (23 October 2001). 
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US,
96
 and police concentration on crimes associated with minority groups, as a means of 
meeting law enforcement targets,
97
 rather than the much more economically costly white-
collar crime associated with white individuals.
98
  Such behaviour joins two ‘outsider’ 
concepts – race and crime – in an effort to enhance operational legitimacy and efficiency, 
and accords with expectations of other subsystems that these modes of police operation 
will reduce crime.
99
   This prioritisation need not be attributed to a conscious desire to 
target minority offenders but is demonstrative of how the policing subsystem shapes its 
programme in response to external irritants which designate these forms of offending as 
being a particularly acute social problem, and so as warranting greater attention from the 
police.
100
   
 
Whilst institutional racism exists at a structural level it can manifest itself in the 
behaviour of individual officers, especially where officers’ use of their powers is not 
subject to the normative safeguards.    One operational manifestation of structural, 
institutional racism is the use of racial profiling, as is considered in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
5.2.2 Rejection of Racial Profiling 
 
Unlawful racial profiling consists of any ‘action that relies on race, ethnicity, or national 
origin rather than the behaviour of an individual or information that leads the police to a 
particular individual who has been identified as being, or having been, engaged in 
criminal activity’.101  Such profiles are based on generalisations about the predicted future 
                                               
96 See K.B. Nunn, ‘Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the “War on Drugs” was a 
“War on Blacks” (2002) 6 Journal of Gender, Race and Justice 381, 415-16; R.R. Banks and R. Thompson-
Ford, ‘(How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?  Law, Politics and Racial Inequality’ (2008-09) 58 Emory L.J. 
1953, 1095-96; and D.A. Sklansky, ‘Cocaine, Race and Equal Protection’ (1995) 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1283. 
97 See comments of Professor R. Morgan, former Chair of the Youth Justice Board, describing how police 
practices of ‘picking low hanging fruit’ to meet law enforcement targets had a disproportionate impact on 
minority youth’, see The Guardian (19 February 2007). 
98 R. Delgado, ‘Rodrigo’s Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White Fears – On the Social Construction of 
Threat’ (1994) 80 Virginia Law Review 503. 
99 K. Crenshaw, ‘Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Anti-Discrimination 
Law’ (1988) 101 Harvard Law Rev 1331, 1357. 
100 The relationship between the police and minority communities was explored in the 1960s by the Kerner 
Commission, see The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (February 1968).  See also 
Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices, Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The 
Evidence (The National Academic Press, 2004). 
101 D. Ramirex, J. McDevitt, A. Farrel, A Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection Systems.  
Promising Practices and Lessons Learned (November 2000) 3.  The USDOJ uses a similar definition of 
profiling as ‘the erroneous assumption that any particular individual of one race or ethnicity is more likely 
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behaviour of specific groups and individuals within those groups.  Consequently, profile-
based policing has the tendency to result in wide net-casting for information and potential 
assailants,
102
 and can result in the police focusing on individuals whose apparent racial or 
ethnic background fulfils a stereotypical image of a criminal suspect.
103
   The 
discriminatory nature of policing based on unlawful race-based profiles has been 
recognised in both the UK
104
 and the US.
105
   Accordingly, the routine use of such profiles 
violates the legal principle that only in exceptional circumstances may the race, ethnicity, 
religion or national origin of a person influence any decisions about their treatment.
106
   
 
Race-based profiles should be distinguished from criminal and suspect profiles which are 
based on detailed information or suspect descriptions, specifically relating to a crime or 
series of crimes.
107
  Such profiles can be legitimate policing tools, and are widely 
accepted as useful in law enforcement terms by judges and scholars.
108
  The degradation 
of profiling from being based on specific information to becoming stereotype-led, is 
                                                                                                                                            
to engage in misconduct than any particular individual of any other race or ethnicity’, Guidance Regarding 
the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies (June 2003).  See also D.Al. Ramirez, J. Hoopes, 
T.L. Quinlan, ‘Defining Racial Profiling in a Post September 11 World’ (2003) 40 American Criminal Law 
Review 1195, 1206.  A similar definition is used in Amnesty International, Threat and Humiliation.  Racial 
Profiling, Domestic Security and Human Rights in the United States (Amnesty International, 2004). 
102 See C. Walker, ‘Intelligence and Anti-terrorism Legislation in the United Kingdom’ (2006) 44 Crime, 
Law and Social Change 387 and Open Society Justice Initiative, Ethnic Profiling in Europe: Counter-
terrorism Activities and the Creation of Suspect Communities (June 2007) 6. 
103 P. Siggins, ‘Racial Profiling in an Age of Terrorism’ (2003) 5 J. L and Soc. Challenges 59; and R. Singer, 
‘Race Ipsa? Racial Profiling, Terrorism and the Future’ (2007-8) 1 DePaul Journal of Social Justice 293. 
 See also N. Lund, ‘The Conservative Case against Racial Profiling in the War on Terrorism’ (2002-3) 66 
Alb L. Rev 329. 
104 See Open Society Justice Initiative reports: Ethnic Profiling by Police in Europe (Open Society Institute, 
2005); Ethnic Profiling in the Moscow Metro (Open Society Institute, 2006); and I Can Stop and Search 
Whoever I Want.  Police Stops of Ethnic Minorities in Bulgaria, Hungary and Spain (Open Society Institute, 
2007). 
105 See, e.g., A.W. Aschuler, ‘Racial Profiling and the Constitution’ (2002) Uni. Chi. Legal F. 163, 186-69; R. 
Brest, ‘The Supreme Court, 1975: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle’ (1976) 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 
9-10. See D.A. Harris, ‘Symposium Article: When Success Breeds Attack: The Coming Backlash against 
Racial Profiling Studies’ (2001) 6 Michigan Journal of Race and Law 237 and S.J. Ellman, ‘Racial 
Profiling and Terrorism’ (2003) 22 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 
305. 
106 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Opinion No. 4, Ethnic Profiling (December 
2006) at 10; and US Constitution, 14th Amendment.  
107
 See European Network against Racism and Open Society Justice Initiative, Ethnic Profiling (October 
2009) 2; O. De Shutter and J. Ringelheim, ‘Ethnic Profiling: A Rising Challenge for European Human 
Rights Law’ (2008) 71(3) MLR 358; and D.H. Harris, Profiles in Injustice – Why Racial Profiling Cannot 
Work (The New Press, 2002) 16-18. 
108 See, e.g., J. Jackson, P. van den Eshof, and E. De Kleuver, ‘A Research Approach to Offender Profiling’ 
in J. Jackson and D. Bekerian (eds.), Offender Profiling: Theory, Research and Practice (Wiley, 1997) 107-
32; United States v Waldron, 206 F.3d 597, 604 (6th Cir. 2000); D. Cole, No Equal Justice (1999) 540; and R. 
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synonymous with profiles of drug couriers
109
 used by the Drug Enforcement Agency 
during the mid-1980s as part of ‘Operation Pipeline’.110  Political pressure to reduce drug-
related crime was a powerful environmental irritant encouraging police officers to target 
people of colour, who were represented as being predominantly responsible for drug use 
and trafficking, thus making an individual’s ethnic or racial background an apparently 
justifiable reason for them being targeted.
111
  This police focus has been connected to the 
overrepresentation of blacks throughout the criminal justice system, which perpetuated 
the apparent legitimacy of police use of race as a proxy for criminality.
112
    
 
In the US the controversy surrounding racial profiling developed during the 1990s 
alongside growing evidence of the targeting of people of colour for police attention.
113
  
Such operational priorities led to the development of phrases such as ‘driving while 
black’, ‘flying while Arab’ and ‘flying while black/brown’ - variants on the criminal act of 
‘driving while intoxicated'114 - which entered popular discourse.115  Racial profiling of 
airline passengers was a particular source of concern, with the US Customs Service facing 
                                               
109 The ‘drug courier’ profile was created by President Nixon’s Drug Enforcement Agency, established in 
1973 to tackle the politically-fuelled popular concern regarding illegal drug use that had been growing since 
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relation to youth offending in the UK, see T. May, T. Gyateng and M. Hough, Differential Treatment in the 
Youth Justice System, Report 50 (ECHR, 2010). 
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(1996) Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 145, 163-87; C.M. Glantz, ‘Note “Could” This be the End of Fourth Amendment 
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Black Men: Contrasting Presumptions of Innocence and Guilt’ (1994) 23 Cap. U.L. Rev 151; A.J. Davis, 
‘Race, Cops and Traffic Stops’ (1997) 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 425, 425; D.A. Harris, ‘Factors for Reasonable 
Suspicion: When black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked’ (1994) 69 Ind. L.J. 659, 677-88; D.A. Harris, 
‘Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry’ (1994) 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev 1, 43-45. 
114
 D.A. Harris, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling on Our Nation’s Highways.  An American Civil 
Liberties Union Special Report (June 1999), http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/driving-while-black-racial-
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multiple allegations of discrimination from black travellers.
116
  Profiles also featured in 
covert policing methods and were again subject to criticism for their discriminatory 
nature.  For example, FBI efforts to uncover potential Communist sympathisers involved 
the surveillance of library records based on profiles which targeted patrons with ‘Eastern 
European or Russian-sounding names’, from at least the early 1960s until the late 
1980s.
117
   In the UK Lord Scarman criticised the police’s use of stop and search against anyone who 
‘looked suspicious’ or ‘did not belong’ in an area.
 118
   This mode of police operation was linked to the fact 
that over half of the 943 individuals stopped and 118 arrested during the three days of the Brixton Riots 
were black.
119
  Scarman noted the tendency of some police officers to ‘lapse into an 
unthinking assumption that all young black people are criminals’, particularly in the 
absence of clearly and enforced safeguards against such modes of behaviour.
120
   The 
Scarman report suggests the extent to which race-based policing was entrenched as a 
permissible form of law enforcement behaviour, and came to the fore, in response to 
particular environmental irritants relating to crime control and public order priorities.
121
  
Such claims prompted studies dismissing arguments claiming that profiling was an 
operationally effective police tool.
122
  However, police stops, searches and surveillance 
based on racial profiling, have proved to be so endemic that even after their official 
rejection minority individuals have continued to be disproportionately targeted by the 
police.
123
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117
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1991). 
118 The Scarman Report, The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981 (1982). See also D. Ramirez, J. McDevitt, 
A. Farell, A Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection Systems.  Promising Practice and Lessons 
Learned (November 2000) 
119 See B. Bowling and C. Phillips, Racism, Crime and Justice (Pearson Education Limited, 2002) 139-40. 
120 Scarman, The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981 (1982) para 4.63.  See also J. Bourne, ‘The Life and 
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Cautioning and Practice in England and Wales’ (1990) 29(3) The Howard Journal 155; R. Evans and R. 
Ellis, Police Cautioning in the 1990s, Home Office Research Study No. 52 (HMSO, London, 1997). 
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Personal Searches Could Produce Better Results (2000) 12-13. 
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US opinion polls, prior to 9/11, demonstrate a near consensus in opposition to police use 
of race-based profiling,
124
 with the majority of Americans considering it to be an 
illegitimate and ineffective method of policing.
125
   This rejection was judicially 
supported, such as in a number of cases linked to Nixon’s Operation Bolder, which 
singled out Arabs for FBI investigations, interrogations and wiretapping; and cases 
challenging the use of biased and hearsay evidence to secure the removal of Arabs 
through the immigration framework.
126
  Similarly, in United States v Avery, the Court held 
that if law enforcement ‘adopts a policy, employs a practice or in a given situation takes 
steps to initiative an investigation of a citizen based on that citizen’s race without more, 
then a violation of the Equal Protection Clause has occurred’.127  The Court concluded 
that selective law enforcement, based on race, was forbidden.
128
   
 
Through the 1990s, political opinion also turned against profiling, which was labelled a 
‘morally indefensible, deeply corrosive practice’, by then President Bill Clinton.129  In the 
months before the 9/11 attacks, George Bush pledged to end racial profiling on the basis 
that it was both wrong and ineffective,
130
 and Attorney General John Ashcroft stated that 
‘racial profiling is not doing the job well because … [i]t injures the trust that communities 
                                               
124 See, e.g., US General Accounting Office, US Customs Service: Better Targeting of Airline Passengers 
for Personal Searches could produce better Results (March 2000) GAO/GGD-00-38, 5-6; 10-15 \which 
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128 ibid, at 354. 
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Rights Division, Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies (June 2003). 
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need to have in order to participate in law enforcement’. 131   In accordance with its 
widespread criticism in 2000 the US Customs Service ended its use of race and gender-
based profiles to decide who to stop and search for drugs,
132
 and by 2001 more than 20 
US states had enacted legislation prohibiting racial profiling.
133
   In the US, therefore, 
there was a widespread appreciation, both inside and outside the policing subsystem, that 
powers based on racial profiling were ill-suited to effective law enforcement, because of 
their weakness as predictors of future criminal behaviour.
134
   In the UK there was a 
similarly negative attitude to race-based profiling prior to the enactment of the Terrorism 
Act 2000.
135
  Indeed, the UK was more alert to the problem of such profiling than many 
European countries,
136
 and had enacted statutory provisions intended to prohibit the 
practice.
137
  
 
The extent of the rejection of racial profiling in both the US and UK meant that even 
profiles which did not exclusively operate on a racial basis, but included it as one of a 
number of policing considerations, were criticised as unreliable ‘given the outsized 
prominence of physical appearance in human perception’. 138   Accordingly, any 
operational decision incorporating race or ethnicity was recognised as creating a risk that 
this factor would be given a greater prominence than other factors.
139
  Consequently, 
police use of profiles was endorsed only where they were based on ‘concrete, trustworthy 
                                               
131 See Attorney General’s News Conference on Racial Profiling, International Information Programs (2 
March 2001). 
132
 US General Accounting Office, US Customs Service: Better Targeting of Airline Passengers for Personal 
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2003); Okla. Stat. title 22 ss34.3 (2001); R.I. Gen. Laws ss 31-21.1-2 (2001). 
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and timely intelligence that is time – and/or place – specific’.140  Growing recognition of 
the discriminatory nature of race-based profiles was coupled with an understanding that 
such subsystem behaviour was also ineffective in achieving law enforcement aims.
141
  In 
particular, the over-inclusive nature of profiles was recognised as a significant limitation 
to their operational utility.
142
  Such profiling was also acknowledged as being under-
inclusive because not all criminals, and therefore not all criminal suspects, adhere to 
stereotypes.
143
  Before 9/11 a further negative effect of profiling that had been identified 
was the disengagement of targeted minorities with law enforcement.
144
  US Attorney 
General John Ashcroft, for example, recognised the policing problems arising from 
minority distrust, both in terms of its efficacy,
145
 and legitimacy.
146
    
 
Such wide-ranging condemnation of race-based profiling demonstrates how, at least at a 
strategic level, this form of police behaviour evolved from being an accepted 
communicative redundancy within the policing subsystems to being rejected as a deviant 
activity, in light of the police’s response to changing environmental irritants from society, 
the government and the legislature.  On the basis of these irritants the programme of 
operation for both the US and UK policing subsystems was built around the aim of 
controlling and reducing crime; but subject at all times to officers acting in a non-
discriminatory manner in achieving this aim.  This representation of the subsystem 
programme was borne out in its criticism of previous police behaviour, which was 
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 See J.I. Winn, ‘Time for Clarity in Federal Guidance: Suspect Profiling as Legitimate Counter-terrorism 
Policy’ (2005-07) 1 Homeland Security Review 53 which distinguishes between the long-criticised 
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Why Racial Profiling Cannot Work (The New Press, 2002) 1112 and D.A. Harris, ‘The Stories, the Statistics 
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labelled as racist and unacceptable.  Even within pre-9/11 condemnation and prohibition 
of racial profiling as a mode of subsystem behaviour, however, there remained a degree of 
disjunct between the express subsystem programme and actual practice.
147
   Consequently, 
irrespective of opposition to profiling the behaviour was stubbornly resistant to 
elimination, such that race-crits have argued that it widely persists in policing.
148
  
Statutory safeguards, effective review and independent oversight of police behaviour 
were, therefore, advocated to minimise the risk of the police succumbing to the ‘complex 
and multifaceted problem’ of unlawful racial profiling.149  However, in relation to the 
ss.214-15 and s.44 powers the recognised need for safeguards failed to prevent profiles 
based on race and religion from affecting how the powers were used, as is shown in the 
next section. 
 
5.3 The Role of Race-based Profiles in Deployment of the Powers 
  
In relation to the suspicion-less counter-terror stop, search and surveillance powers the 
US and UK policing subsystems departed from normal subsystem behaviours in a manner 
which resulted in the powers having a racial effect.   This occurred through the apparent 
legitimation of use of the powers based on broadly-drafted, race-based profiles.
150
 
 
In the UK, judicial and other criticisms of such use of the s.44 powers are given 
additional credence by policing guidance apparently advocating the implementation of 
s.44 on the basis of broadly-drafted, race-dependent profiles.
151
  Acceptance of the role of 
such profiles is suggested by the PACE Code A guidelines, from 1999 and 2003, which 
state that it may be relevant to take into account an individual’s ethnic background in 
deciding who to stop and search, where a specific terrorist threat is ‘associated with 
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particular ethnic groups, such as Muslims’. 152  Further, National Police Improvement 
Agency (‘NPIA’) guidance from 2004 stated that although ethnic, religious or personal 
criteria could not be the sole consideration in using s.44, they will sometimes be 
relevant.
153
  The guidance potentially placed all Muslims, and those perceived as being 
Muslim, under heightened scrutiny.
154
   Code A also failed to specify what factors beyond 
ethnic origin might be relevant to such targeted behaviour, what weight could legitimately 
be given to ethnic origin, and when and whether specific intelligence was required for 
ethnicity to be a legitimate factor.
 155
  Such omissions from the law enforcement guidance 
helped to accommodate the use of race-dominated profiles in stop and search programmes.   
 
The police’s approach to using the powers in a racially uneven way was further indicated 
by Ian Johnson’s now infamous comment, that the police ‘should not waste time 
searching old white ladies’.156   Similarly, Hazel Blears, the then Minister responsible for 
counter-terrorism policing, expressly justified the use of racial and religious profiling 
when she told a Home Affairs Select Committee that ‘the fact that at the moment the 
threat is most likely to come from those people associated with an extreme form of Islam, 
or falsely hiding behind Islam…inevitably means that some of our counter-terrorist 
powers will be disproportionately experienced by people in the Muslim community. That 
is the reality of the situation’.157  Blears’ comments, in 2005, give a clear and unashamed 
indication of the type of irritants in response to which the police were shaping their use of 
the powers.  Race-based counter-terror policing has also been linked to the shooting dead 
of ‘Asian-looking’ Jean Charles de Menezes in 2005. 158   Even former Chief 
Superintendent Ali Dizaei, of the National Black Police Association, supported s.44’s use 
on the basis of racial profiling, provided that the searches were carried out politely and 
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with respect.
159
  These communications suggest that the law-making subsystem’s 
intention that s.44 would not be discriminatory was not upheld in the policing 
subsystem’s own communications.  Consequently, each subsystem was saying one thing 
and doing another.  Race-based profiles were, therefore, understood by at least some 
elements within the policing subsystem as an appropriate basis for deployment of the 
suspicion-less stop and search powers,
160
 despite this constituting misuse of the powers in 
terms of normal subsystem operational standards.   
 
Whilst the ss.214-15 powers are covertly deployed evidence of the role of racial profiling 
in driving use of the powers is suggested, by analogy, from how the FBI has used overt 
counter-terrorism powers.  The way in which the profiling has been used is, for example, 
suggested by airport screening through which individuals with Asian and Arabic-sounding 
names have been pre-selected for additional scrutiny.
161
  In 2006 the Council on 
American-Islamic Relations received 80 complaints of racial discrimination having taken 
place in US airports.
162
  Patterns of security staff behaviour demonstrate that individuals 
who appear to be Muslim, Sikh, Arab and Asian have been subjected to different and 
discriminatory treatment, irrespective of whether their behaviour warrants any special 
attention.
163
  This has included targeting individuals that are American-born, but with 
minority ethnic origins.
164
  The legal powers, which have accommodated this profiling, 
take the same form as ss.214-15, in that they are not premised on individualised suspicion.  
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Therefore the racial effect evident in the operation of these powers – with the use of race 
as a proxy for increased risk of terrorist activity
165
 – strongly suggests that the police will 
have used race-based profiles in the operation of the powers of covert surveillance and 
records searches.
166
 
 
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that police powers have been used to specifically target 
individuals on the basis of their actual or perceived racial or religious origin.  In particular, 
the direction of surveillance at mosques,
167
 and by planning the surveillance needs of an 
area based on the number of mosques, suggests the existence of policing based on broad-
brush racial and religious profiling.
168
  The perception of government profiling is also 
fostered by periodic warnings ‘to be on the lookout for suspicious activity’, without any 
suggestion of what this means, other than heightening suspicion surrounding people who 
fulfil the broad stereotype of terrorist suspects.
169
  This pattern of use of the powers is also 
suggested by Department of Justice policing guidance which advised that federal law 
enforcement officers may consider race or ethnicity only ‘to the extent permitted by the 
constitution and law of the United States’, pursuant to which it carved out a broad 
exception for national security policing.
170
  The exception was confirmed by the fact-
sheet published alongside the guidance which stated that ‘race and ethnicity may be used 
in terrorist identification’.171  Despite independent reiteration of the onerous constitutional 
restrictions that any such use would have to adhere to,
172
  the fact-sheet also noted that 
national security policing could automatically fulfil the exceptional circumstances in 
which profiling may be used because of the ‘incalculably high stakes involved in such 
investigations’.173   Police guidelines, therefore, accommodated use of racial and religious 
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profiling and, through a process which has been labelled ‘practical orientalism’,174 reified 
the stereotypical representations of ethnic and racial group as terrorist suspects.
175
    
 
Anchoring the terrorist threat within minority communities meant that the threat was 
identifiable and, therefore, perceived as being controllable.
176
  Such police behaviour 
corresponded with support among the general population for police use of profiling, after 
9/11.
177
  A further indication of the popular elision between minority groups and the threat 
from terrorism is suggested by the sharp rise in hate crimes in the period following 
9/11.
178
  Whilst its effectiveness in actually increasing security and countering terrorism 
are questionable,
179
 by focusing stops, searches and surveillance on individuals that the 
public suspected of being connected to the terrorist threat, and in-line with irritants 
linking the threat and minority groups, such practices developed into a socially shared 
notion of the ‘reality’, and appeared to be an objective and common-sense approach to 
counter-terror policing.
180
  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has identified the system-specific standards designed to uphold the even-
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handed and fair exercise of law enforcement powers positioned by the policing subsystem 
as making up the operationally closed mode of behaviour of the subsystem in both the US 
and UK.  This chapter has also shown that the policing subsystems in both countries have 
also had direct experience of discriminatory policing, arising out of a particular 
organisational mind-set and patterns of behaviour, which do not adhere to contemporary 
delineations of subsystem-generated behaviours.  As well as recognising the types of 
systemic behaviour which led to these forms of subsystem operation the subsystem also 
linked them to particular characteristics of their statutory powers, such as the absence of 
externally imposed safeguards against a deleterious interpretation of inter- and intra-
subsystem communications.  Despite examples of subsystem awareness of these problems, 
this chapter has also shown that the manner in which the US and UK police forces 
implemented the stop, search and surveillance powers and efforts to respond to the 
communications detected from the operational environment of each, functionally 
contributed to their racial effect.   
 
The most direct operational cause of this racial effect was the use of profiling, by which 
race and ethnic origin became a proxy for Muslim, which in turn was employed as a 
proxy for terrorist suspect.
181
  The evidence suggests that the police reduced suspect-
status to biographical risk profiles.
182
  In line with these profiles the police 
disproportionately targeted their powers at individuals fulfilling a broad, race-based 
stereotype of a terrorist suspect.
183
  Such use of proxies, and the resultant profiling, 
emerged as an apparently acceptable, or even necessary, police strategy post-9/11 in both 
the US and UK.
184
   This contradiction, between the subsystem programme of operation 
focusing on protecting minority interests and it lapsing into readily condemned race-based 
suspect profiles, suggests that the policing subsystem’s programme of operation is not 
what it initially seems to be.  In addition, it is not what the law-making subsystem expects 
it to be.  Indeed, this contradiction mirrors that demonstrated in chapters three and four in 
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relation to the law-making subsystem and this dichotomy between the statutory 
characteristics the subsystem described itself as prioritising and the reality of those which 
came to the fore when the legislators were faced with the need to respond to the threat 
from international terrorism.  In order to identify what the policing subsystem programme 
of operation actually is, chapter six looks more closely at the subsystem-specific 
operations which shaped police interpretation of the statutory powers and environmental 
irritants which the police detected, and which led to such racially uneven behaviour.   
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Chapter Six: Role of the Policing Subsystem in Establishing the Racial Effect of 
Counter-terrorism Stop, Search and Surveillance. 
 
Fig. six: Policing subsystem response to 9/11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The system-specific operations and modes of understanding of the policing subsystem are 
important to in understanding police practice and the disjuncture between laws enacted by 
the legislature and the powers as deployed by the police.  The analysis within this chapter 
takes a specifically systems-based approach to what has been analysed elsewhere as 
‘police occupational cultures’.1  The analysis within this chapter focuses on three areas of 
inter-subsystem communications.
2
  The first communications relate to the nature of the 
stop, search and surveillance powers.  Here, it is advanced that a communicative barrier 
                                               
1 See, e.g., M. Young, An inside job: Policing and police culture in Britain (Oxford University Press, 1991); 
and J. Skolnick , Justice without Trial.  Law enforcement in a democratic society (Macmillan, 1966). 
2
 See fig. six. 
Police interpretation of the nature of 
their powers: Instead of increasing 
internal controls to compensate for 
loss of external controls these were 
reduced because the policing sub-
system understood the external 
changes as meaning that this was 
the expected response from the 
Government and law-making 
subsystems (6.1.1./ 6.1.2). 
Law-making sub-system imagery 
concerning origins of the threat 
(4.3). 
Manner in which organisational 
behaviour changed, in response to its 
expectations of the expectations held 
by other subsystems: 
- High levels of pre-emptive use 
meaning that the powers were not 
based on the detailed information on 
which the law-making sub-system 
expected (6.2). 
- Understand intelligence in more 
general terms than the law-making 
subsystem expected (6.3). 
Use of powers independent of 
particularised evidence regarding terrorist 
behaviour accommodated the use of 
profiling as a basis for deployment of the 
powers.  Racially uneven use was 
legitimised and made seem a common 
sense operational decision for the police 
(6.3/5.3/2.2). 
Law making sub-systems 
communications invoke 
popular hyperbole and sense 
of emergency in policing 
operations (4.1). 
Police receive powers with normal 
safeguards and controls removed (no 
reasonable suspicion requirement). 
Knock on impact on organisational 
behaviour because the police normal 
operations are subject to externally 
imposed safeguards against misuse 
(2.1/3.3). 
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existed between subsystem specific interpretations of what were intended by the law-
making subsystem to be flexible powers and the policing subsystem’s interpretation of 
these as highly discretionary.  These mismatched interpretations helped to minimise the 
protective value of the statutory safeguards, expected by the law-making subsystem, to 
prevent misuse of the powers.  The second set of communications relates to expectations 
for levels of use of the powers, and suggests that a mismatch existed between the police’s 
understanding of law-making subsystem as expecting high levels of use and the law-
making subsystem’s own expectation of circumspect deployment.  The final area of 
communications focuses on the different subsystem understandings of the requirement for 
intelligence, through which law-making expectations of police use based on particularised 
intelligence were understood by the police as including their basis on race-based profiles, 
broadly reflective of the national threat assessment.  Double contingencies, arising from 
obstacles to inter-subsystem understanding can, therefore, be seen to exist behind the use 
of the powers based on racial profiles and, therefore, at the heart of the racial effect of the 
stop, search and surveillance powers.  These communicative barriers indicate how 
‘everyday policing will tend to conspire to handle things differently’ from the way 
envisaged by the law-making subsystem.
3
   The operations of the policing subsystem are 
used to support the race-crit argument that the greater the level of discretion is afforded to 
the executive and related parts of the legal system, such as the police, the more likely that 
they exercise that discretion in a way which targets minority groups.
4
 
 
6.1 Nature of the Powers 
 
Different subsystem understandings of the nature of the stop, search and surveillance 
powers contributed to their racial effect and arose from the barriers to subsystem 
interpretations of the communications of other subsystems and environmental irritants.  
Consequently, law-making subsystem expectations for how the police would understand 
the powers, and upon which the law-making subsystem premised the statutory drafting, 
failed to take account of the inability of the law-making subsystem to simply ‘reach out’ 
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1522; and C. Walker, ‘Discerning Friend from Foe under Anti-terrorism Laws’ (2008) 32(1) Melbourne 
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of its own subsystem through legislative powers, because of its own autopoietic nature.
5
  
Instead, the law-making subsystems understanding of the statutory provisions were not 
matched by the police’s own understanding of the powers, based on its expectation of the 
law-making subsystems’ expectations for necessary police powers.6  This meant that the 
police attributed a wholly distinct significance to the absence of normal statutory 
safeguards against misuse, namely reasonable suspicion and probable cause, than that 
intended by the legislature, such that the police responded to the lack of safeguards in a 
way which accommodated the highly discretionary use of the powers.
7
  This section 
examines these obstacles to understanding and double contingencies, which arose 
between the law-making and policing subsystems in relation to the stop, search and 
surveillance powers.  
 
6.1.1 UK Policing Subsystem Interpretation of the Nature of the Powers 
 
In the case of Gillan, the ECtHR expressly criticised the high levels of subjective officer 
discretion in contributing to police misuse of the powers.
8
  In enacting the powers, 
however, the law-making subsystem did not purport to afford the police unchecked 
discretion.
9
  Instead, whilst departing from the standard test of reasonable suspicion, s.44, 
and its predecessor stop and search powers were made subject to a mandatory, statutorily 
proscribed procedure prior to being used.
10
  This process was described by the 
Government as providing operational flexibility, coupled with ‘clear safeguards’ against 
misuse.
11
  However, the police’s interpretation of this procedure, facilitated the use of the 
powers without the level of oversight by which the legislature justified their broad and 
highly discretionary drafting.
12
   This mismatch, between intention and effect, points to 
the existence of a communicative barrier between the legislature and the police, arising 
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from different subsystem expectations regarding the nature of the powers,
13
 which in turn 
diminished the effectiveness of the statutory safeguards against their misuse. 
 
The law-making subsystem was keen to ensure that the police were ‘not needlessly 
deterred from acting to combat terrorism’ through restrictive statutory drafting or onerous 
legislative pre-conditions for use of the powers.
14
  Instead, the law-making subsystem 
spoke of the need in counterterrorism policing to ‘let the proper agencies off the leash… 
Policemen and the military, who are invariably used to working with one hand tied behind 
their back, if not two, must be let loose’.15  By virtue of these safeguards the Government 
maintained that the powers would be flexible, but with significant safeguards to prevent 
their discretionary use.
16
    The statutory safeguards against the wholly discretionary use 
of s.44 were designed to operate at a number of different levels.  A key safeguard 
promoted by the law-making subsystem was the requirement that use of the powers be 
authorised by a police officer of at least the rank of Assistant Chief Constable.
17
  In 
granting this authorisation the officer was required to confirm that use of the powers was 
expedient for the purposes of protecting against terrorist attack.
18
    The authorisation 
itself was then subject to review by the Secretary of State, upon which it could be 
confirmed, cancelled or varied.
19
   Home Office guidance designed to provide clarity on 
the proper execution of the authorisation procedure indicated that ‘in view of their 
importance, authorisations are subject to considerable scrutiny before being confirmed by 
the Secretary of State’.20   Each authorisation expired after a maximum of 28-days, upon 
which a new authorisation was required for any subsequent use of the powers.
21
    
 
In contrast to the law-making subsystem’s insistence that it was providing flexible powers 
coupled with strong safeguards, however, the policing subsystem treated the departure 
from the reasonable suspicion standard as an instruction to use the powers on the basis of 
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unfettered officer discretion.
22
   One example of the modes of law-making subsystem 
behaviour which the police understood as indicating that the s.44 powers were highly 
discretionary was demonstrated in the response to Simon Hughes’ suggestion that instead 
of s.44 authorisations being premised on its expediency in countering-terrorism, it should 
be based on a test of strict necessity.
23
  Hughes was concerned that whilst the word 
‘expedient’ need not be pejorative, it was highly subjective and, provided an ‘officer gave 
any reason at all, he or she would be permitted to use the subsystem power’.24  Hughes’ 
comment was, however, rejected and, instead of fears that the powers would be overused, 
a greater fear of the law-making subsystem regarding police use of the powers was that 
they would be under-deployed.
25
 A further indication of the highly discretionary use of 
the stop and search power is suggested by reports that officers using s.44 often appeared 
unclear how, why and when it was appropriate to deploy the powers.
26
  Research by 
Helen Fenwick and Tufyal Choudhury cites a police source stating that use of stop and 
search involved ‘looking for a needle in a haystack when there wasn’t any evidence that a 
needle existed’. 27   Removal of the external safeguards against the subjective, 
discretionary use of stop and search, therefore, seems to have been understood by the 
police as demonstrating the law-making subsystem’s expectation that use of the powers 
should not be controlled or curtailed by any objectively determined standards.  The 
suspicion-less nature of the powers was thus seen by the police as representing ‘a 
significant change in the relationship between the public and the police’, 28   and as 
enabling the largely discretionary use of the powers, which rendered some groups more 
suspect than others.
29
 
 
                                               
22 C. Pantazis and S. Pemberton, ‘From the ‘Old’ to the ‘New’ Suspect Communities’ (2009) 49(5) British 
Journal of Criminology 646, 653. 
23  Simon Hughes, Standing Committee, 1 February 2000.  The change was rejected by the Standing 
Committee on the basis of a vote in which Simon Hughes voted for the change, whilst the other 12 Standing 
Committee members voted against it. 
24 Simon Hughes described the stop and search powers as ‘entirely subjective and open to any justification 
that a police officer gives it….It appears to give carte blanche to the police officer… [and] seems a 
dangerous, broad and unqualified powers that has no justification from other history’, Standing Committee 
(1 February 2000).  See also O. Gross ‘Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be 
Constitutional?’ (2002-3) 112 Yale Law Journal 1011. 
25 David Lidington, Standing Committee (1 February 2000). 
26 Home Affairs Committee, Terrorism and Community Relations, vol II, para 142, ev. 67. 
27 See, e.g., H. Fenwick and T. Choudhury, The Impact of Counter Terrorism Measures (2011) 33. 
28 NPIA, Practice Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to Terrorism (2008) para 2.3.1. 
29  See J.B.L. Chan, Changing Police Culture: Policing in a Multicultural Society (1997); M. Rowe, 
‘Rendering Visible the Invisible: Police Discretion, Professionalism and Decision-Making’ (2007) 17 Policy 
and Society 279; R. Reiner, The Politics of the Police (3rd ed., 2000). 
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The distinction between flexibility and discretion meant that in applying the powers on 
the basis of officer discretion the policing subsystem did not treat the powers as though 
they contained any statutorily imposed restrictions on use.
30
  The 28-day authorisation 
period, for example, was rendered effectively meaningless by successive renewals, 
without any apparent intervention from the Secretary of State.
31
  Further, the effect of the 
requirement that the powers be limited to a specific geographical area was minimised by 
authorisations routinely being obtained across entire police authorities,
32
 enabling the 
blanket use of powers.
33
  The result was that for some police forces s.44 became a 
permanent feature of their law enforcement capabilities.
34
  An example of such use was 
the continued authorisation of s.44 across the entire Metropolitan Police area, from 
February 2001 until May 2009.
35
   The police also interpreted the ability for officers to 
use the powers ‘whether or not the constable ha[d] grounds for suspecting the presence of 
articles of that kind [relating to terrorist activities]’,36  as allowing an officer to stop and 
search anyone, provided there was a valid authorisation in place.  This model of use was 
endorsed by a 2005 MPA report, scrutinising stop and search practice, which stated that 
‘the law has defined when a police officer may act, but … [i]n practice the police can stop 
and search almost anyone in almost any circumstances’. 37   The policing subsystem, 
therefore, appears to have treated the very low level of the safeguards imposed by the 
law-making subsystem as expecting their discretionary use, while the executive defended 
such use on the basis of the police’s ‘detailed knowledge of the circumstances of the area 
[which] are readily to hand’.38    
 
Flexibility was, therefore, understood by the police as shorthand for them not needing to 
justify their use of the powers.
39
  Consequently, the notion of there being any effective 
                                               
30  Such executive behaviour demonstrates the continuation of a pre-existing trend towards heightened 
executive power, C. Greenhouse, ‘Nationalizing the Local: Comparative Notes on the Recent Restructuring 
of Political Space’ in R.A. Wilson (ed), Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ (CUP, 2005) 195. 
31 Gillan,, para 80.  Between February 2001 and February 2005 944 stop and search authorisations were 
confirmed by the Secretary of State, as compared to 18 instances in which they were not confirmed, see 
Home Affairs Committee, Terrorism and Community Relations para 48. 
32 Human Rights Watch, Without Suspicion. Stop and Search under the Terrorism Act 2000 (2010) 2 
33 See comments of Paul Stephenson, describing the use of s.44, in ibid 58. 
34
 Gillan, para 81. 
35 Home Affairs Committee, Terrorism and Community Relations, para 44; and A. Cavell, ‘Capital Sees 
Rise in terror Stops’ BBC News (6 May 2009). 
36 Terrorism Act 2000, s.45(1)(b). 
37 MPA Report of the MPA Scrutiny on MPS Stop and Search Practice, para 237. 
38 Charles Clarke, House of Commons Defense Select Committee, ‘The Threat from Terrorism’, HC348 
(Session 2001-2002). 
39
 M-F. Cuellar, ‘Choosing Anti-Terror Targets by National Origin and Race’ (2003) 6 Harvard Latino Law 
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political check upon police use of the powers was largely illusory.
40
   This pattern of law 
enforcement behaviour was recognised by Lord Carlile who saw the high usage of s.44 as 
an indication of its largely discretionary deployment, and as demonstrating the lack of 
police understanding of the range of stop and search powers available in counter-terror 
policing or their intended use.
41
  The statutory safeguards designed to regulate use of the 
stop and search powers, therefore, had a very different effect in practice than they were 
described as having by the law-making subsystem.
42
  This mismatch appears to be linked 
to a gap between each subsystem’s understandings of the nature of the powers and the 
role of police subjective discretion in deploying them, arising from each subsystem 
deriving its own understanding from its system-specific programme of operation and its 
expectations as to how the other subsystem would expect it to operate.   
 
6.1.2  US Policing Subsystem Interpretation of the Nature of the Powers 
 
FBI communications described the law-making subsystem’s intention behind the counter-
terrorism powers as being to ‘strengthen the capabilities of federal law enforcement in the 
fight against terrorism while simultaneously protecting civil liberties’.43  The FBI also 
understood the passage of the suspicion-less surveillance powers as demonstrating the 
expectation of the law-making subsystem that the broadly-drafted powers should be 
widely used, because Congress considered this necessary, on the basis of the exceptional 
nature of the threat.
44
  By contrast, Congressional support for the powers was premised on 
the desire that they should be available, if and when the FBI deemed their use appropriate, 
but that their use would be based on a specific operational need undertake by the policing 
subsystem.
45
  The statute was simply designed to remove ‘unnecessary bureaucratic 
hurdles’ to law enforcement operational flexibility and freedom.46    
                                                                                                                                            
Review 9, 33. 
40 G. Phillipson, ‘Deference, Discretion, and Democracy in the Human Rights Act Era’ (2007) Current 
Legal Problems 40, 45. 
41 Carlile, Report on the Operation in 2005 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (May 2006), para 26. 
42 N. Luhmann, ‘Generalized Media and the Problem of Contingency’, in J. J. Loubser, R.C. Baum, A. 
Effrat and V.M. Lidz (eds) Explorations in General Theory in Social Science: Essays in Honor of Talcott 
Parsons. (Free Press, 1976) 507-32. 
43  USDOJ, FBI, Terrorism 2000/01 (Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, National 
Security Division, 2001) 31-32. 
44 USDOJ, FBI Terrorism, 2000/01 (2001) 31-32. 
45 See, e.g., Senator Enzi who states that ‘[e]veryone in America understands the need for enforcement, 
immigration and the intelligence community to have the tools necessary to find terrorists, cut off their 
financial support and bring them to justice’, SCR (11 October 2001) S10594.  See also, Senator Hatch, ibid, 
S10586 and Rep. Thompson, Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001. Hearing before the 
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Patriot Act surveillance powers were described in Attorney General Guidelines as 
affording law enforcement organisations ‘the necessary flexibility to act well in advance 
of the commission of planned terrorist acts or other federal crimes’.47  In pursuing these 
aims the executive was confident that the surveillance provisions contained sufficient 
safeguards to prevent misuse of the powers, and ensure that they adhered to 
Constitutional requirements. The law-making subsystem, however, displayed a far more 
mixed approach to the purported safeguards against misuse of the powers.   Endorsing the 
‘many safeguards built in to prevent its [s.215] misuse’, Senator Orin Hatch specifically 
noted the safeguarding value of: the requirement that an officer of at least the level of an 
Assistant Special Agent in Charge had to authorise use of the power; the requirement that 
the records sought are necessary to protect against international terrorist or clandestine 
intelligence activities; and the need for the investigation to be conducted in line with 
Attorney General guidelines.
48
 Similarly, James Sensenbrenner considered the 
surveillance provisions to be a successful means by which ‘to address many of the 
shortcomings of current law, and to improve our law enforcement ability to eradicate 
terrorism from our borders while preserving the civil liberties of our citizens’.49    
 
By contrast, raising his concern as to the likely effectiveness of the safeguards relating to 
the use of pen registers and trap and trace, Senator Patrick Leahy noted that the provisions 
allowed for the unprecedented, widespread disclosure of this tightly sensitive information 
without any notification to or review by the court that authorizes and supervises the 
wiretap’.50  Another critic of the proposed statutory powers and the related safeguards, 
Barney Frank, concluded that ‘the bill before us today preserve the follies of the powers, 
but substantially weakens the safeguards against the misuse of the powers’.51  Frank also 
                                                                                                                                            
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (107th Congress, 1st Session, 24 September 2001) 53 
46  US House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, News Advisory, ‘President Bush signs 
PATRIOT Anti-terrorism Bill into Law.  Sensenbrenner Heralds New Era in Fight against Terrorism’ (26 
October 2001), www.judiciary.house.gov/legacy/news_102601.htm, accessed 30.05.2011. 
47  The Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism 
Enterprise Investigations (May 2002) 2. 
48 Orin Hatch, SCR (11 October 2001) S10586. 
49 F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Committee on the Judiciary, Business Meeting (3 October 2001) 99. 
50 Patrick Leahy, SCR (11 October 2001) SS10555-56. 
51
 HRCR (12 October 2001) H6761. 
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specifically pointed to the role of the executive in diminishing the safeguards proposed by 
the law-making subsystem.
52
     
 
A key feature of the ss.214 and 215 powers that the executive cited as safeguarding 
against their misuse was the restriction of the use of the powers to ‘non-content’ 
information relating to the communications.  The protective value of this restriction was 
limited by different subsystem understandings of the distinction between contents and 
non-contents of communications.  Executive derived policing guidance confirmed that 
‘pen registers and trap and trace devices may obtain any non-content information’.53  
However, in distinguishing between what constitutes content and what is non-content 
successive FBI guidelines were evasive, merely referring any enquiries concerning this to 
the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property section of the Department of Justice, as 
opposed to setting out any definition or interpretive guidance.
54
  Consequently, the 
‘contents of “contents” seems to have been a matter of mystery’.55  Law enforcement 
interpretation of the breadth of ‘content’ necessarily had significant implications for the 
potential use of the powers, and there is evidence that while the law-making subsystem 
expected the police to adopt a very restrictive understanding of contents, a broader 
approach was taken by the FBI, encouraged by their operation along the lines of executive 
guidelines.   
 
Appeasing the concerns of both subsystems that they fulfil their operational and 
constitutional mandate the Attorney General offered frequent assurance that despite the 
‘fundamentally different approach to law enforcement’ required to counter terrorism, the 
police were ‘think[ing] outside the box – but never outside the Constitution’.56  Faced 
with a range of irritants pertaining to the nature of the powers the FBI’s understanding of 
the powers, and the safeguards against their misuse, is most closely aligned with that 
expressed by the Attorney General. Police use of the surveillance powers was in fact 
                                               
52 For example, Frank refers to the proposed role of Assistant Inspector General, intended to monitor the use 
of the powers, and states that executive interference with the draft legislation had resulted in this being 
downgraded, HRCR (12 October 2001) H6761. 
53 USDOJ, Field Guidance, at 1234. 
54 See ibid and USDOJ, Search Manual, at 112. 
55 S. Freiwald, ‘Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act’ (2004-05) 56 Ala. L. 
Rev. 9, 69. 
56 US AG John Ashcroft, Remarks at the Eight Circuit Judges Conference (7 August 2002).  See also S.F. 
Keimer, ‘Watching the Watchers: Surveillance, Transparency and Political Freedom in the War on Terror’ 
(2004-05) 7 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 133, 162. 
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strongly influenced by executive communications, in particular, because the police were 
interpreting the powers through Attorney General guidelines.
57
  Therefore, instead of 
responding to law-making subsystem communications either directly or through its 
interpretation of legislation the police responded to these irritants through its operation in 
accordance with the guidelines.    
 
FBI interpretation of the surveillance powers were shaped by statutory and constitutional 
provisions, as well as the FBI Domestic Operations Guide, published in December 2008 
and based on the Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations, published 
in September of the same year.  The 2008 Domestic Operations Guide stresses the 
importance of oversight and the FBI’s own self-regulation, as a means of ensuring that 
‘all investigative and intelligence collection activities are conducted within Constitutional 
and statutory parameters’.58  It further states that ‘the FBI’s comprehensive infrastructure 
of legal limitations, oversight and self-regulation effectively ensures that this commitment 
[to constitutional rights] is honored’.59  The FBI Guide maintained that an important 
safeguard against police misuse of the power existed in the threshold requirement that 
investigative activities must be conducted for an ‘authorized purpose’.60 The Guide noted 
that ‘simply stating such a purpose is not sufficient … It is critical that the authorized 
purpose not be, or appear to be, arbitrary or contrived; that it is well-founded and well-
documented; and that the information sought and the investigative method used to obtain 
it be focused in scope, time and manner to achieve the underling purpose’.61  The extent 
to which this limitation truly restricted FBI operations, however, is questionable when it 
is considered alongside other policing guidance, which described the national security 
threat as not being reducible to any specific time or place, so that the general national 
threat could seemingly always constitute an authorised purpose. 
 
The Executive maintained that the statutory powers had sufficient safeguards in them to 
enable the police to use the powers freely – whereas, on enacting the powers, the law-
making subsystem justified the removal and reduction of safeguards on the basis that the 
police would deploy the powers in a circumspect manner, driven by their own 
                                               
57 D.J. Solve, ‘Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law’ (2003-04) 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev 1264, 1296. 
58 FBI, Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (16 December 2008) 1. 
59 ibid, 21, para 4.1A and 22. 
60 This must be an authorised national security, crime or foreign intelligence purpose, ibid 21. 
61
 ibid 21, para 4.1B. 
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professional assessment of the threat.  Police interpretation of the nature of the powers 
was also subject to misinformation about their nature.  Claims have been made against the 
Justice Department that it had relied upon ‘spreading falsehoods and half-truths about the 
powers’.62  Inaccurate statements made about the Act included that it did not apply to 
American citizens and that the basis of the use of its surveillance powers was probable 
cause.
63
  In addition, whilst the Executive was insistent that it had to ‘convince a judge’ to 
allow it to use powers, including s.215, the substance of the judicial scrutiny of the 
powers and, therefore, its oversight was minimal.
64
  James Dempsey has commented, that 
‘that Government can get one of those [surveillance] orders just upon the certification of a 
prosecutor that it is relevant to an ongoing investigation.  No factual enquiry at all by the 
judge.  The judge really just becomes a rubber stamp’.65  Dempsey further argues that 
subsystem checks and balances, necessary to guard against police misunderstanding and 
misuse of their powers, ‘weak in some key respects before 9/11, were seriously eroded by 
the Patriot Act and Executive Branch actions’.66 
 
6.2 How the Powers Were Used 
 
Obstructions to inter-subsystem communications between the law-making and the 
policing subsystems are also revealed in the differing expectations regarding the extent to 
which the s.44 and ss.214-215 powers were intended to become part of daily police 
operations, as opposed to remaining exceptional powers to be used only against the most 
acute national security threat.  Whilst the law-making subsystems in both the US and UK 
described the powers being confined to exceptional circumstances, communications 
regarding the nature of the threat and the operational role of police in  countering 
terrorism helped to normalise their use as part of everyday policing.
67
    A systems-based 
approach to this mismatch, between actual and expected levels of use of the powers, 
suggests two possible explanations: one relating to operational constraints within the 
statutory powers; and the other relating to the impact of law-making subsystem 
                                               
62 ACLU, Seeking truth from Justice, vol. 1, PATRIOT Propaganda: The Justice Department’s Campaign to 
Mislead the Public about the USA PATRIOT Act (July 2003) 1. 
63 ibid, 2-4. 
64 ibid, 4-5. 
65 Anti-terrorism Investigations and the Fourth Amendment after September 11, 2001 – hearing before the 
Subcommittee on the Judiciary, House of Representative, 108th Congress, First Session (20 May 
2003)(Serial No.35) 15. 
66 ibid. 
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communications in shaping operationally closed police behaviour, as the following 
sections consider in relation to the US and secondly in relation to the US. 
 
6.2.1 UK Policing Use of the Powers 
 
In extending the police powers of suspicion-less stop and search in 1996, from applying 
to vehicle-related searches to also including pedestrian-related powers, the law-making 
subsystem emphasised the ‘circumspection and sensitivity’ with which the police would 
deploy the powers.
68
  Setting out the government’s plans Michael Howard expressed 
‘praise and credit’ for the limited and strategic use the police had made of the pre-existing 
powers and emphasised his certainty ‘that they will exercise the additional powers, if they 
are granted by Parliament, in the same way’.69  The Government also cited the low levels 
of prior use as a means of justifying its expectation of the infrequent police use of the 
powers going forward.
70
   The highly restrained manner in which the police would deploy 
the powers was also stated as being a key reason behind the Opposition’s support of the 
statutory provisions, despite the accelerated enactment process adopted.
71
   In addition, 
the police’s selectivity in using the powers was explicitly cited as the basis for Lord 
Lloyd’s recommendation, in 1996, that the suspicion-less stop and search powers be 
retained amongst the permanent counter-terrorism powers.
72
  The powers were, therefore, 
enacted as ‘exceptional powers…that are needed [only] exceptionally’.73   Police use of 
the powers following 9/11, however, suggests that law-making subsystem expectations of 
police self-restraint, and the circumspect deployment of the powers, were misplaced.
 74
    
 
Whilst the increased use of the s.44 powers must, of course, be evaluated in light of the 
impact of 9/11 on policing priorities, law-making subsystem communications continued 
to reflect the executive’s expectation that the powers would be used with circumspection, 
                                               
68 Michael Howard, HC Deb (1995-96) 275, ccs.36, 215, 253, 269; and Jack Straw, ibid, c.221. 
69 ibid, c.253. 
70 Michael Howard stated that in the five metropolitan boroughs in which the powers had been used there 
has been 1,746 vehicle stopped, 1,695 searched and 2,373 occupants searched and in the Heathrow 
perimeter there had been 8,142 vehicles stopped, 6,854 searched and 40 occupants searched, ibid, col.210. 
71See, e.g., ibid Jack Straw, cc.37-38, 184; and Ann Taylor, c.161. 
72 Lord Lloyd, Review of Counter-terrorism Powers, para 10.24. 
73 Michael Howard HC Deb (1995-96) 275, c.251. 
74 See Home Office Statistical Bulletin, Statistics on Terrorism Arrests and Outcomes Great Britain, 11 
September 2001 to 31 March 2008 (13 May 2009) and Home Office Statistical Bulletin, Operation of 
Police Powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes and stops and 
searches, Great Britain 2008/09 (26 November 2009).   
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caution and proportionality.
75
  With s.44, as with the previously existing powers, 
therefore, there remained a strong consensus within the law-making subsystem that use of 
the powers ‘must never become the normal run of things’. 76   In contrast to such 
expectations, however, there is evidence that use of the powers in line with purely 
numerical targets was an explicit part of police counter-terrorism strategy in some police 
authorities.
77
  For example, the City of London Police recognised that they had used s.44 
‘extensively; as part of on-going counter-terrorism initiatives, in order to reassure the 
public of their safety.
78
  Evidence collected by Tufyal Choudhury and Helen Fenwick also 
indicates that in determining how the powers were used there was a subsystem tendency 
towards ‘going for big numbers’. 79   In line with such aims some police authorities 
reported their high levels of use of the powers with apparent pride, treating it as indicative 
of their operational success.
80
      
 
Looking firstly at the statutory provisions there are several features of s.44 which can be 
distinguished from the powers it replaced.  One such change was the extension of 
suspicion-less stop and search from being applicable only within Northern Ireland to 
applying throughout the United Kingdom,
81
 and from initially only relating to vehicle 
stops,
82
 to subsequently also applying to pedestrians.
83
  In addition, the pedestrian-
focused powers were initially only intended for use to find articles used in terrorism – as 
opposed to being concerned with the individual themselves.
84
 Despite this, the law-
making subsystem treated the extensions and re-enactment of the powers simply as ‘clear 
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 David Blunkett, HC Debs (2000-01) 375 cc.21 and 23.  See also HC Debs (2005-06) 438 Elfyn Llwyd, 
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combined’ at 9. 
81 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Measures) Act 1989, s.21.  See also HC Debs (1993/94) 235 Michael 
Howard, c.30. 
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practical proposals’, necessary to fill ‘a lacuna in the existing powers’,85 but as having no 
substantive impact on the nature of the powers.  This suggests that Parliament’s 
expectation of their circumspect deployment failed to account for the external constraints 
on the basis of which the police had previously been acting which were removed or 
weakened in successive re-enactments of the powers.  Alongside the growing range of 
contexts within which the suspicion-less powers could be used the link between such use 
and specific terrorist actions was weakened.  When the suspicion-less stop and search 
powers were introduced and extended they were used in response to a commissioned 
attack.
86
   Subsequently the pre-emptive use of the powers was increasingly advocated 
within the law-making subsystem.  This pre-emptive use was firstly intended to be at a 
very late stage, such that the terrorists may ‘be intercepted on their way to their target’.87  
However, use of the powers was advocated increasingly far in advance of specific 
terrorist actions.
88
  The link between the use of the powers and a terrorist attack, or 
planned attack, was further weakened under the Terrorism Act 2000 because of its 
expanded definition of terrorism, so as to include individuals ‘concerned in’ terrorism – a 
wider construction than solely meaning individuals actively involved in, or attempting to 
commit, acts of terrorism.
89
  This expanded definition meant that the stop and search 
powers were operating at a higher level of abstraction than pre-existing powers,
90
 
facilitating increased levels of use, whilst the law-making subsystem did not consider this 
potential implication of the changes in the nature of the powers. 
 
A further change in the external constraints affecting police use of the powers, which may 
have contributed to the misplaced nature of the law-making subsystem expectations of 
circumspect deployment, was the need for the earlier powers to be annually renewed by 
                                               
85 Michael Howard, HC Deb (1995-96) 275, c.35.  The persistence of this view if the new legislation is 
demonstrated by its description in 2010 as merely ‘a consolidating provision, drawing together previous 
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88 See, e.g., Richard Shepherd, HC Debs (1999-00) 346, c.343. 
89 Terrorism Act 2000, s.1. 
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Parliament.
91
  Under s.44, the powers were permanently enacted so that, although subject 
to the oversight of the government reviewer,
92
 they could not be amended or cancelled 
without specific action by the law-making system.  There was not the same level of active 
legislature reassessment of the use, utility and effect of s.44 as had previously been 
routine.  The largely unacknowledged effect of the changes to the legislative provisions, 
in increasing the range of circumstances in which the power could be deployed, meant 
that the law-making subsystem was endorsing the police’s ability to constrain and 
regulate itself on the basis of its behaviour in circumstances in which there were in fact 
external factors shaping the subsystem’s programme.93  These developments correspond 
with a more recent, general trend by which Parliament and the executive has extended 
police powers, without specific safeguards.
94
  The increased use of the powers once these 
external constraints were removed suggests that complete reliance on police self-
regulation overlooked the police’s own expectation of external constraints and its 
interpretation of the removal of constraints as an instruction from the law-making 
subsystem that it should make far greater use of the powers. 
 
Compounding the impact of the removal of the statutory constraints on police action were 
parliamentary discourses and other communications regarding the nature of the threat 
from terrorism and the role of the police in safeguarding against this.
95
  These were 
detected by the policing subsystem and its understanding of them informed police use of 
the powers, to such an extent that the police themselves acknowledged that s.44 should 
have been used in a way that attracted societal approval, ‘rather than using it because 
Parliament said we could’.96   Whilst insisting that the powers should remain confined to 
exceptional circumstances the law-making subsystem described the level of the national 
security threat as making the context exceptional.
97
  The law-making subsystem also 
described the threat as permanent, recognising that it was a ‘sad but inescapable fact that 
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terrorism is here to stay for the foreseeable future’.98  Descriptions of the exceptional 
nature of the circumstances became even more acute after 9/11, which was described as 
prompting a call to ‘rethink dramatically the scale and nature of the action that the world 
takes to combat terrorism’. 99   Once the exceptional threat became the new state of 
normality in law-making subsystem communications this was interpreted within the 
policing subsystem’s framework of understanding as justifying, even necessitating,100 that 
the exceptional counter-terrorism powers were ‘routinely used’ in everyday policing.101  
The police echoed law-making communications which described the risk of terrorist 
attack as being a ‘daily threat’102 and as representing the ‘new normality in policing’.103    
Responding to what it interpreted as the nature of the law-making subsystem assessment 
of the terrorist threat a number of police authorities described themselves as being left 
with effectively no option but to make use of counter-terrorism powers a central part of 
everyday police activities.
104
  Daily use of the powers also helped to fulfil the police’s 
‘need to be seen to be doing something to reassure the public, with little regard for the 
long-term consequences of what they do’.105   Consequently, in the parts of the policing 
subsystem which were most closely associated with countering terrorism the police 
interpreted expectations that they respond to the constant threat of attack, as requiring that 
the powers were an important feature within day-to-day policing.
106
   
 
Despite growing evidence of the highly discretionary use of s.44 and the blanket approach 
to its deployment, law-making subsystem confidence in the efficacy of police use of s.44 
was sustained by its expectation that police operations were based upon detailed and 
expertly evaluated intelligence.
107
    Such expectations, however, overlooked the fact that 
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the powers were often used by ordinary police officers, as opposed to specialist counter-
terrorism operatives.
108
  Further, these officers were typically amongst the most junior 
ranks within the force,
109
 and not given any adequate training or briefings on how to use 
the powers.
110
  Despite this police expertise was cited to justify the continuation of the 
undemanding ‘expediency’ standard for using the powers, because ‘[t]he police are well 
used to – and highly expert at – deciding, almost daily what level of action should be 
taken in response to all sorts of circumstances; they take such decisions all the time’.111   
By endorsing the adequacy of the provisions the law-making subsystem downplayed the 
complexity of the threat and the role of the statutory powers in countering it, deferring on 
all questions of expertise and professionalism to the police.
112
   
 
Indeed, the professional judgement of the police and their experience in dealing with 
security matters were cited as justifying the law-making subsystem’s refusal to scrutinise 
police use of the powers, despite criticism of this use.
113
  Even in the face of empirical 
evidence revealing the disproportionate and operationally ineffective deployment of s.44 
against racial minorities, Parliament, therefore, sustained its ‘universal praise’114 of the 
police in protecting the country against further terrorist attacks.
115
  This relationship is at 
odds with the earlier-stated law-making subsystem expectation that the police would have 
to justify their decisions to use the powers.   Parliamentary deference to policing 
subsystem decisions is further suggested by Tony Blair’s pledge to work ‘in close 
consultation with the police and the agencies to see whether there are additional powers 
that they might need to prevent further attacks’.116   As well as describing the threat posed 
by international terrorism as one of uncaveated exceptionalism, so as to justify the 
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passage of the heightened discretionary counter-terrorism powers, the UK government, 
therefore, also praised the operational expertise and independence of the police.
117
  The 
government described the police as able to offer complete protection against the menace 
of terrorism, as well as reassuring a worried public of their safety.
118
 
 
Expectations of police professionalism and ability for self-regulation are exemplified by 
the review of Lord Carlile of the operation of the powers, which initially concluded that 
‘their use works well and is used to protect the public interest, institutions and in the 
cause of public safety’. 119  Despite concluding that the stop and search powers, and the 
Act overall, were ‘working well’,120 however, by the time of Lord Carlile’s second review 
he reported some ‘difficult problems’ arising from the use of the stop and search 
powers.
121
  Thereafter, year-on-year the criticism Lord Carlile voiced in relation to s.44 
increased.  In his report concerning 2004 Lord Carlile stated that his views on the powers 
had ‘developed’ and that ‘their use gave some rise for anxiety’.122   By 2007 Carlile had 
‘no doubt that its use could be halved from present levels without risk to national security 
or to the public’.123 The reports, however, continued to conclude that the powers were 
‘necessary and proportional to the continuing and serious risk of terrorism’.124 
 
Parliament sanctified the ‘courage and commitment’ of law enforcement services and 
used this to justify affording them a high level of discretion in utilising the s.44 powers.
125
  
Police expertise was used to justify the incorporation of the undemanding ‘expediency’ 
standard as the basis for using the powers,
126
 because ‘[t]he police are well used to – and 
highly expert at – deciding, almost daily what level of action should be taken in response 
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to all sorts of circumstances; they take such decisions all the time’.127 The legislature’s 
deference was bolstered by individual MPs praising police professionalism and levels of 
expertise, both before and after 9/11.
128
  MP Oliver Letwin, for example, stated that the 
‘Home Secretary believes that he needs powers now to protect us against an appalling 
attack on our fellow citizens.  I am unwilling on behalf of my party to put my country at 
the risk of the Home Secretary being proved right’.129  Such pronouncements continued 
throughout the period immediately post-9/11 with the MPA describing counter-terrorism 
stops and searches in 2008 as ‘vital tools in the fight against crime and terrorism’130 and 
the NPIA referring to it as an ‘essential tool for the Police Service in reducing terrorist 
crime’.131  However, these claims do not appear to have been founded in operational 
utility, relating to the prevention of terrorist attacks.  Both Parliament and the Police, 
therefore, understood the other as expecting it to use the powers in particular way, which 
failed to match the others expectation of this, a pattern repeated in the US, as the next 
section shows. 
 
6.2.2 US Policing Use of the Powers 
 
One indication that the FBI was affording a broader interpretation of possible use of the 
surveillance powers, than was expected by the law-making subsystem, is indicated by the 
sheer volume of covert surveillance undertaken following 9/11.  The volume of secret 
wiretaps undertaken grew so significantly after 9/11 that the Justice Department, at times, 
fell behind in processing applications despite the allocation of additional resources.
132
  
However, views as to the practical impact of the Patriot Act on the ability of the FBI to 
conduct surveillance and the safeguards protecting against its misuse vary from those who 
have claimed that in passing the Patriot Act Congress and the President substantially 
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altered the government’s ability to carry out electronic surveillance;133 to those who have 
argued that the legislation made little change to the powers, in practice.
134
  One way in 
which the congressional debate marginalised calls for any additional legislative 
safeguards on the powers was through descriptions of the powers as achieving little more 
than ‘making the statutes technology neutral’.135  The provisions were described as simply 
enabling law enforcement to keep up with modern technology’136  and being ‘primarily 
directed at allowing law enforcement agents to work smarter and more effectively’.137  
For the law-making subsystem, therefore, the powers did not require additional 
safeguards because they did not pose any additional risk to individual rights or risk of 
misuse than the previous powers.  These claims minimised descriptions of the impact of 
the new surveillance powers on the existing legal framework.
138
   
 
Despite such claims the powers can be seen as constituting a more substantive revision of 
the nation’s surveillance laws,139 while simultaneously helping to reduce the perceived 
need for checks and balances in overseeing use of these powers.
140
  The Government had 
clear political incentives to minimise the perception of the statutory changes because this 
meant that the compatibility of the statute with constitutional considerations was an 
unnecessary area of congressional debate.
141
    Descriptions of the powers as representing 
only a minimal change from those previously existing were primarily offered by the 
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executive, and in particular the Attorney General.
142
   Ashcroft insisted that without such 
developments ‘we are vulnerable and this, our vulnerability, is elevated as long as we 
don’t have the tools we need to have’.143 Alongside the need for the powers, Ashcroft 
described them as having little effect apart from enabling law enforcement powers to 
develop as technology advances.
144
   The limited extent to which the law-making 
subsystem to incorporated legislative safeguards into the draft bills can, therefore, be 
linked to the strength of the nexus between executive communications and to the law-
making subsystem programme of operation.  The legislature’s desire to shape its own 
behaviour in response to these communications is reflective of the steady accumulation of 
powers in the executive branch, which was occurring even before 9/11, and its impact on 
the law-making process.
145
  Congress enacted potentially rights-infringing legislation 
whilst being certain it was avoiding a repeat of previous legislative failings.
146
  
 
Despite such claims a number of differences can be identified between the Patriot Act 
surveillance provisions and those that had previously existing and those relating to 
criminal investigations.  In relation to criminal investigations, for example, federal agents 
must meet the requirements to title III,
147
 which necessitate that a judge finds that there is 
probable cause to believe that ‘an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to 
commit’ an enumerated predicate offence and that ‘particular communications concerning 
such offence will be obtained through … interception’. 148  Consequently, the judicial 
inquiry focuses on the conduct of the target of the surveillance and whether the 
surveillance will uncover evidence of crime.  By contrast, under the counter-terrorism 
powers a law enforcement agent must establish probable cause that the target of the 
surveillance is a ‘foreign power’ or the ‘agent of a foreign power’. 149   There is no 
requirement for the probable cause to be linked to belief that the surveillance will uncover 
evidence of crime and so does not correspond with the traditional criminal standard.
150
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Substantive differences between the Patriot Act provisions and previous legal position 
also arose from the dependence of Internet and other electronic communications on 
intermediary parties.  Information held by third parties is excluded from constitutional 
rules concerning the expectation of privacy.
151
  This opened up a vast array of 
communications to government surveillance.
152
 Whilst these factors were not a change 
arising from the Patriot Act powers themselves they were ignored in executive comments 
that there was no change in the effect of the powers from when they were originally 
handed down. The Patriot Act also enacted a change in the centrality of the investigative 
purpose of the FISA surveillance from that of the ‘primary purpose’ to ‘a significant 
purpose’, 153  so that the link between countering terrorism and the law enforcement 
behaviour was weakened.  That this change was not part of  Congress’ intention behind 
the powers was suggested by the claims of two senators involved in the enactment of the 
powers – Patrick Leahy and Diane Feinstein – that their comments on this matter had 
been misconstrued by the Department of Justice.
 154
  Despite being an apparent 
misinterpretation the requirement of ‘significant purpose’, it was treated by the FBI as 
eliminating the ‘wall’ between criminal and foreign intelligence investigations. 155  By 
contrast Leahy and Feinstein protested that this had never been the intention of the law-
making subsystem.
156
   Each subsystem’s programme of operations, therefore, was 
affected by the communications arising from the other, without accounting for the fact 
that those communications had been shaped through a process by which the emitting and 
receiving subsystem interpreted the communications arising from the other through its 
own subsystem communicative redundancies.    
 
As well as cutting the FBI loose from the criminal standard, neither the statutory powers, 
nor executive guidelines, gave any indication as to how the police should prioritise its 
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efforts.
157
  The extensive deployment of the counter-terrorism surveillance powers in the 
US was, for example, encouraged by descriptions of the severity of the terrorist threat, in 
terms of its nature and scale.  Members of the Executive warned that Islamic 
radicalization exists nationwide, across the United States.
158
  The threat was portrayed as 
being all pervasive, and accordingly linked to the use of exceptional powers on a frequent 
basis.
159
  The effect of these communications was that use of the ‘emergency’ police 
powers became an emerging normality.
160
  This sentiment was entrenched within the post-
9/11 policing context by President Bush placing the country on a ‘war-footing’.161  This 
helped to blur the lines between external security and foreign intelligence with internal 
security and domestic law enforcement.
162
 
 
The FBI’s operational programme was also affected by expectations that culpability for 
any future attack would reside with the policing subsystem.
163
  The executive criticised 
the ‘limited FBI aggressiveness’ and their uneven response to terrorism, with only some 
FBI field offices devoting significant resources to Islamic extremists, whilst others 
remained ‘clueless’ with regard to counter-terrorism. 164   Policing guidance also 
emphasised the Executive’s expectation that ‘federal law enforcement personnel must use 
every legitimate tool to prevent future attacks, protect our Nation’s border, and deter those 
who would cause devastating harm to our Nation and its people’.165 In response to these 
communicative irritants the FBI launched ‘unprecedented collection activities’ enabled by 
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the use of counter-terror surveillance.
166
  This sentiment was further fuelled by executive 
communications, such as briefings from the Government Counter-terrorism Organizations, 
which were highly critical of the failure amongst the FBI, and other security organisations, 
during the 1990s, to take the growing threat from international terrorism more 
seriously.
167
  In turn, the law-making subsystem interpreted these activities as an 
endorsement of their own descriptions of the severity of the threat and further encouraged 
the police to be afforded operational freedom to use the powers widely and at their own 
discretion.
168
   
 
The Attorney General’s Guidelines state the purpose of the surveillance and search 
powers as being to ‘enable the FBI to perform its duties with effectiveness, certainty and 
confidence’ and to ‘provide the American people with a firm assurance that the FBI is 
acting properly under the law’.169  In line with its enabling tone the guide states that the 
‘FBI shall not hesitate to use any lawful method … even if intrusive, where the degree of 
intrusiveness is warranted in light of the seriousness of a criminal or national security 
threat or the strength of the information indicating its existence, or in light of the 
importance of foreign intelligence sought to be United States interests.  This point is to be 
particularly observed in investigations relating to terrorism’.170  The Guidelines also note 
that ‘in the exercise of its protective functions, the FBI is not constrained to wait until 
information is received indicating that a particular event, activity, or facility has drawn 
the attention of those who would threaten the national security.  Rather, the FBI must take 
the initiative to secure and protect activities and entities whose character may make them 
attractive targets for terrorism or espionage’. 171   On top of its descriptions of the 
significant threat of terrorist attack, therefore, the independence of FBI operations were 
supported by successive Congressional declarations of the importance of FBI expertise 
and professional knowledge in countering terrorism.
172
  Law enforcement officers were 
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described as ‘pillars of our community’173 and as deserving ‘[o]ur nation’s admiration and 
respect’,174  as well as ‘hard-working public servants who perform a dangerous job with 
dedication, fairness and honor’.175   
 
Such deference to police actions disregarded the normal congressional oversight function 
against the abuse of police powers.
176
  Against the relevant background communications, 
regarding the threat faced and the role of the police in protecting against this, the US 
policing subsystem promoted the powers as a necessary response to their ‘[i]ncreased 
awareness of the need for compiling essential information on those who threaten the 
safety of all Americans’.177   The reality of the police’s particular expertise, and its role in 
constraining police action is, however, further brought into question by research such as 
that undertaken by Richard Ericson and Aaron Doyle which studied risk modelling in the 
insurance industry.
178
  Ericson and Doyle found that despite the heavy reliance on the 
‘expertise’ of former counter-terrorism officers, these individuals, by their own 
admission, saw the process ‘as little more than converting guesses into threats’. 179   
Consequently, the police’s commitment to deploy the powers on the basis of their 
‘professional judgment’ 180  did not necessarily invoke the narrow and discerning 
deployment of the powers.  Consequently, the FBI was operating in ways that over-
extended its institutional competencies, while the law-making subsystem was advocating 
a deferential approach to its activities on the basis of its high levels of professional and 
expert knowledge.
181
    
 
This section has shown that the policing subsystem’s use of their suspicion-less stop, 
search and surveillance powers was based on its system-specific interpretation of the law-
making subsystem and government expectations regarding their use.  However, in 
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interpreting law-making subsystem communications through system-specific 
communicative redundancies the law-making subsystem’s objective of providing the 
police with flexible powers, but containing significant safeguards against misuse, was 
understood by the police as affording them entirely discretionary powers.  In addition, the 
police interpreted law-making subsystem expectations for the frequency with which the 
powers would be used differently from the law-making subsystem intentions for its 
interpretation.  Consequently, while the policing subsystem deployed the discretionary 
powers in accordance with the daily, but exceptional threat described by the executive and 
adopted by the law-making subsystem, the law-making subsystem premised the statutory 
powers on the expectation that their use would be based on a professional assessment of 
the terrorist threat that was temporally and geographically specific.  The mismatch 
regarding the circumstances in which the powers were used also led to a further disjunct 
in understanding regarding the grounds on which this use was based. In particular, further 
inter-subsystem communicative barrier appear to have given rise to different system-
specific understandings of what precisely an expertise-led approach to the police 
entailed,
182
 so that its role in safeguarding against misuse of the powers was 
diminished.
183
  Specifically, the role of intelligence in using the stop, search and 
surveillance powers was interpreted differently by each subsystem, so that the powers 
were implemented on the basis of general, as opposed to particularised, intelligence 
regarding the terrorist threat, as is shown in the next section. 
 
6.3 Role Afforded to Intelligence  
 
Despite recognition from within the policing subsystems that to defeat terrorists ‘we must 
be intelligence-driven’,184 in practice a mismatch between the requirement for intelligence 
as expected by the law-making subsystem, and the understanding of this requirement by 
the policing subsystem emerged on the basis of the communications arising from each 
subsystem.
185
   This section shows how this different interpretation, coupled with 
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expectations of the police that they should make frequent use of the powers, and a context 
in which law-making subsystem communications echoed popular and media connections 
between terrorists and racial minorities,
186
 encouraged the police to deploy the powers 
based on broad-brush, race-based profiled of terrorist suspects.
187
 
 
6.3.1 UK Policing Interpretation of the Intelligence Requirement 
 
In the UK, the law-making subsystem’s expectation that s.44 would be based on 
intelligence reflects the normal operational prioritisation of ‘intelligence-led policing 
[which] underpins all aspects of policing’.188  Indeed, the policing subsystem expressly 
advocated an intelligence-led approach to s.44.
189
 When the powers were initially debated 
this was an implicit requirement because of their largely responsive nature.
190
   Further, in 
1996, David Trimble suggested that the powers should only be used ‘when there is 
intelligence that such an outrage [a terrorist attack] may be committed in a particular 
area’.191  Trimble’s expectations were shared by other MPs, including Jack Straw.192   
Following 9/11 the intelligence-based use of the powers continued to be described as vital 
in ensuring that the powers were effectively used.  David Blunkett, for example, stated 
that ‘[o]btaining good intelligence and being able to target potential terrorists is 
essential’,193 and after 7/7 Charles Clarke reaffirmed that ‘intelligence is our key weapon’ 
in fighting terrorism.
194
   
 
Communications from within the policing subsystem also expressly advocated the 
intelligence-led implementation of s.44,
195
 so as to avoid their ‘arbitrary’196 use.  However, 
the role of intelligence as interpreted by the police subsystem was very different from the 
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role the law-making subsystem assumed it would have.  For example, police practice 
advice recognised that stops and searches could only be carried out if supported by 
evaluated intelligence,
197
 whilst simultaneously advising officers to look at the 
demographic make-up of the area in which the searches are based, and in so-doing to be 
mindful of ethnicity and religion as a factor in the conduct of a stop and search.
198
  In 
addition, although policing guidance cautioned against conducting ‘arbitrary’ stops and 
searches it linked intelligence to demographic factors, before suggesting that use of these 
factors could ensure that the police avoided any arbitrary and unlawful stops.
199
  Despite 
the range of views expressed in subsystem communications, therefore, the law-making 
subsystem consistently linked intelligence with evidence of suspected terrorist activity, 
while the policing subsystem treated the intelligence requirement as being linked to 
factors such as the demographic make-up of an area.
200
     
 
The heightened calls for the police to pre-emptively act against terrorist after 9/11,
201
 
encouraged a purportedly ‘intelligence-led’, but one that was based on wide net-
casting.
202
  Consequently, despite the consistent invocation of the importance of 
intelligence in using the powers, the role that it was afforded, as interpreted by the police 
subsystem, was very different from the role the law-making subsystem assumed it would 
have.
203
  The effect of these different interpretations was that while the law-making 
subsystem consistently linked intelligence with specific evidence of terrorist activity, the 
policing subsystem treated intelligence as potentially existing irrespective of such 
evidence thus affording the intelligence-based police powers a far wider potential 
applicability than that expected by the law-making subsystem.
204
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Police interpretation of the legislature’s communications as not necessitating the 
existence of particularised intelligence is suggested by NPIA guidance, which stated that 
‘[i]f police are in possession of specific intelligence about possible terrorists then searches 
under section 43 may be more appropriate than under s.44’.205  This advice does not 
simply indicate that the policing subsystem understood particularised intelligence to be 
unnecessary for use of s.44 but that if any such information was present s.44 should not in 
fact be used.   Police use of s.44, despite the absence of particularised intelligence, is also 
indicated by oral evidence given to the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, by 
Assistant Chief Constable Rob Beckley.
206
   Beckley stated that s.44 could be based on 
either ‘broad or specific intelligence in an area’, demonstrating that the particularised 
nature of the intelligence was not exclusively maintained through the use of the 
powers.
207
  Beckley also confirmed that police used the powers ‘in a pretty random 
way’, 208  further suggesting the absence of a link between their use and specific 
intelligence.
209
   In line with subsystem understandings that no particularised intelligence 
concerning terrorist activities was necessary prior to use of s.44, British Transport Police 
guidance described the primary basis for deployment of the s.44 powers as being the 
existence of the authorisation.
210
  Most explicitly of all there is some evidence that the 
police consciously eschewed the intelligence basis for the powers, instead maintaining 
that the stops and searches ‘should not be based on intelligence’, but rather on their ability 
to be a ‘disruptive element against terrorist cells’.211  Instead of a shared approach to the 
application of intelligence requirements between the law-making and policing subsystem 
guidance,
212
 was interpreted in accordance with each subsystem’s own understandings of 
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the type of intelligence expected by the other.
213
   The law-making subsystem’s 
expectations for temporally and geographically specific intelligence, prior to police use of 
s.44, were not reflected police approaches to the requirement.     
 
One example of the different interpretations of the role of intelligence in deploying the 
s.44 powers relates to the authorisation process relating to the powers. The law-making 
subsystem described the requirement for Secretary of State authorisation,
214
 as an 
important safeguard against the misuse of the power,
215
 particularly in light of the highly 
flexible nature of the powers.
216
  Home Office guidance, described the authorisation 
process as requiring ‘a detailed account of the justification for authorising the powers, and 
information of their prospective use’.217  The guidance also noted that ‘[a]lthough a high 
state of alert may seem enough in itself to justify authorisation of powers, it is important 
to set out in detail the relation between the threat assessment and the decision to 
authorise’.218  The detailed intelligence expected by the law-making subsystem was not, 
however, reflected in the actual police applications for authorisations, which responded to 
contradictory advice emanating from the Home Office.  In particular, despite confirming 
law-making subsystem expectations that the authorisation would be based on detailed 
intelligence Home Office notes for completion of the application warned that because the 
s.44 application is a publically disclosable document ‘care must be taken not to include 
direct reference to the matter that could compromise the broader counter-terrorist 
activities’. 219   Consequently, the notes concluded that ‘it is sufficient to refer to the 
existing national threat level at the time of the application without the need to elaborate 
on the basis upon which it was reached’. 220   This advice directly contradicts the 
expectation of a detailed justification, based on particularised intelligence.  Instead it ties 
the existence of intelligence to the national threat level, whilst elsewhere this was 
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described as an inappropriate ground for the authorisation of use of s.44.
221
  Instead the 
national threat level was intended principally to provide a general public reflection of the 
national security situation, as indicated by the rudimentary five-point scale upon which 
the threat level was based.
222
  The non-expert nature of the national threat assessment is 
further suggested by the fact that between June 2006, following the discovery of two 
potentially viable car bombs in London and the terrorist incident at Glasgow Airport, and 
2008 the national threat level remained at either ‘severe’ or ‘critical’.223  By basing the 
authorisation and renewal requirements on a non-professional appraisal of the security 
threat, while the law-making subsystem treated this as a detailed and expert assessment, 
the authorisation process became little more than a ‘rubber stamp exercise’, as opposed to 
a means of testing the operational need for s.44.
224
  Therefore, instead of mediating 
between the two subsystems and attempting to cultivate a shared approach the police 
guidance perpetuated subsystem-specific understandings of the requirement for 
intelligence, and one that meant authorisation of the powers was linked to a broad 
understanding of the existence and nature of the terrorist threat, as opposed to the 
professional, circumspect evaluation expected by the law-making subsystem.
225
  A 
comparable mismatch can be observed in relation to the US powers, as is considered in 
the next section. 
 
6.3.2 US Policing Interpretation of Intelligence 
 
Congressional and police briefings following 9/11 readily acknowledged ‘that the most 
effective way to fight [international] terrorist is to gather as much intelligence as 
possible’.226  Intelligence was recognised as law enforcement’s ‘information advantage’ 
over terrorists,
227
 and its collection and analysis was ‘a priority of the highest measure’.228  
The statutory powers to use pen registers and trap and trace mechanisms required 
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governmental certification that the information likely to be obtained was foreign 
intelligence information, not concerning a US person, or was relevant to on-going 
investigations to protect against terrorism or clandestine intelligence activity.
229
  Prior to 
the passage of the Patriot Act authorisation for use of the pre-existing policing powers 
was contingent on the existence of a relevant investigation, together with reason to 
believe that the individual using the tapped line was an agent of a foreign power, or 
someone in communication with such an agent under certain circumstances.
230
  Police 
intelligence, therefore, was at the heart of the law-making subsystem’s drafting of ss.214-
15 powers.  While the law-making subsystem promoted the certification processes as 
safeguarding mechanisms against police misuse of the powers, the FBI’s use of the 
powers demonstrated the policing subsystem’s inclination instead to operate on the basis 
of highly generalised intelligence of the terrorist threat faced.   
 
Police justification for use of the powers without detailed intelligence was that ‘[t]he 
absence of evidence is not the absence of a threat’,231 despite law-making subsystem 
communications specifically criticising the breadth of the discretionary powers and the 
risks of misuse associated with their application without particularised intelligence.
232
  A 
key illustration of the way in which executive guidelines which pre-dated 9/11 facilitated 
police use of the powers without particularised intelligence is the change between the 
1976 guidelines and the 1983 version, which resulted in the possibility of starting an 
investigation ‘when the facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more 
persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of furthering political or social goals 
wholly or in part through activities that involve force or violence and a violation of the 
criminal laws of the US’.233  This standard explicitly did ‘not require specific facts or 
circumstances indicating a past, current or impending violation’. 234   This threshold 
represented a less particularised standard than the need for ‘specific and articulable facts, 
upon which an investigation could previously be launched.
235
  It was this lower standard, 
                                               
229 Patriot Act, s.214. 
230 FISA 1978. 
231
 Maureen Baginski, FBI Executive Assistant Director, Police Executive Research Forum Conference on 
Intelligence, Washington DC, (16 December 2005). 
232  See, e.g., Bob Conyers, Committee on the Judiciary, Business Meeting (3 October 2001) 99; 
Congressional Record, Russ Feingold, S10585; Barney Frank (12 October 2001), H6761. 
233  The AG’s Guidelines on General Racketeering, Enterprise and Domestic Security/ Terrorism 
Investigations (1989), ss.III.B.1.a. 
234 ibid, ss.II.c.1. 
235
 The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Reporting on Civil Disorders and demonstrations involving a 
  
189 
as renewed through the 1989 guidelines, which regulated FBI surveillance immediately 
following 9/11.
236
   
 
The broad and non-particularised nature of the intelligence-basis upon which law 
enforcement could undertake surveillance and records searches was further entrenched by 
the 2003 guidelines, in accordance with which the FBI could gather information without 
any requirement that it relate to suspected criminal activity.
237
  Along the same lines the 
2008 guidelines stated that authorisation for use of the powers only required that they 
were needed ‘for an authorized purpose … [which] must be an authorized national 
security, criminal or foreign intelligence collection purpose’.238  The guidelines also did 
not limit use of the powers to ‘investigations in a narrow sense’, for example in relation to 
a particular investigation, but sanctioned them for ‘broader analytic and intelligence 
purposes’.239    The requirements for intelligence set out in the executive guidelines were 
justified on the basis that normal ‘[l]aw enforcement standards of evidence are high: [and] 
making a case that meets these standards often requires unattainable intelligence and 
compromises sensitive sources or methods’.240   However, the guidelines were enacted 
‘through executive fiat, rather than through legislative discussion or debate, 241  and 
departed from the forms of intelligence which the law-making subsystem has described as 
essential to avoid misuse of the powers, during their enactment.
242
   
 
A further way in which the FBI departed from the intelligence requirements expected by 
the law-making subsystem was by avoiding the authorisation procedure entirely, by 
undertaking ‘assessments’, as opposed to commencing an investigation. 243    FBI 
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guidelines sanctioned the separation of the ss.214 and 215 powers from direct 
investigative activities by enabling the FBI to undertake assessments without any factual 
or suspicion-based premise.
244
  There was, therefore, no required connection between 
intelligence concerning the individual’s behaviour and the policing operation.  In addition, 
unlike investigative uses of the powers, FBI agents were also entitled to commence an 
assessment without any need for specific authorisation and without reporting the fact to 
FBI headquarters or the Department of Justice.
245
   Consequently, whilst the law-making 
subsystem continued to endorse the requirement for detailed intelligence of a threat 
before the FBI was authorised to use their powers the practical restriction that this placed 
on police conduct was limited by the modes of operation the police used. 
 
Aside from conducting assessments the lack of an intelligence-based connection between 
the use of the suspicion-less surveillance powers and the individual targeted is further 
suggested by guidance for the FBI stating that the powers are ‘concerned with the 
investigation of entire enterprises, rather than just individual participants and specific 
criminal acts’.246  This broad conception of the threat separated use of the powers from 
the existence of detailed intelligence about specific terrorist operations.  This 
development was recognised by the policing subsystem itself which noted, in 2005, that 
‘[l]aw enforcement intelligence has changed dramatically since the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001’. 247    The tie between intelligence, the start of an investigative 
activity and evidence of a crime was thus weakened significantly.
248
  Executive guidance 
also confirmed that surveillance could be used to establish the scope of any suspected 
terrorist enterprise, and to collect information about the finances of the enterprise, its 
geographical parameters, and its past and future activities.
249
  In accordance with such 
descriptions of executive expectations for police use of the surveillance powers the 
guidance stressed that instead of the surveillance powers being used on the basis of 
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detailed intelligence, they were a means of obtaining such intelligence.
250
  These 
communications demonstrate that the prior to the police commencing surveillance failed 
to take into account the inherent limitations of these subsystems to adhere to these 
standards, as a result of its interpretation of the operational expectations placed on the 
police by the Executive and the law-making subsystem.
251
    
 
The organisational shift marked by these new priorities,
252
 meant that the FBI’s policing 
aims focused on the high levels of use of the powers, as opposed to the link between the 
surveillance and searches conducted and positive law enforcement outcomes.  The pursuit 
of these objectives is indicated by FBI guidance which notes that the information-seeking 
function of the surveillance powers is ‘perhaps more important’ than the other FBI 
functions of analysing, and even of responding to, information.
253
  Indeed, the small 
likelihood of the powers actually contributing to arrests and convictions is suggested by 
the description of the suspicion-less powers as only likely to discover terrorists through 
‘serendipitous interception’.254  FBI publications also note that in relation to national 
security policing while the ‘investigation clearly constitutes part of the information 
collection process, the intelligence function often is more exploratory and broadly 
focused than a criminal investigation per se’. 255   The same FBI guidance urges law 
enforcement departments to ‘focus on what they do not know’,256 and in so-doing appears 
to advocate the use of surveillance techniques without any link to suspected terrorist 
activity or received intelligence, despite this directly contradicting the intelligence-base 
on which the law-making subsystem expected the FBI to use the powers.   
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6.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that police interpretation of operational flexibility as subjective 
discretion rendered the already limited statutory safeguards against misuse of the powers 
further reduced, whilst both the law-making and police subsystems maintained that the 
statutory safeguards represented strong protectors against any misuse, especially when 
coupled with expertise and professional decision-making skills of the policing subsystem.  
However. the policing subsystem interpreted the law-making subsystem’s removal of the 
suspicion requirements as indicating its expectation that the powers would be deployed at 
the entire discretion of the policing subsystem.
257
  Further communicative barriers 
between the law-making and policing subsystems arose from the fact that the law-making 
subsystems’ expectations for circumspect deployment of the powers based on 
particularised intelligence regarding the terrorist threat were interpreted by the police as 
an expectation for high levels of pre-emptive use of the powers, which were, therefore, by 
necessity based on generalised intelligence relating to the national security threat.   Each 
of these understandings aligned with popular and media demands for a ‘community 
policing’ response, whereby police behaviour is shaped by popular concerns.258    Despite 
awareness inside and outside the policing subsystems of the risks arising from police 
popular responsiveness,
259
 this chapter has shown that a number of communicative 
barriers arose between the police and the legislatures concerning how the powers should 
be deployed.   These, alongside the lack of safeguards against misuse within the powers 
themselves, facilitated a racially uneven pattern of use of the powers.   
 
Despite the communicative barriers between the law-making and policing subsystems 
both subsystems expected that any misuse of the powers would be subject to judicial 
challenge and overturning.
260
  Consequently, just as the law-making subsystem relied 
upon the operational expertise of the police in determining how and when the suspicion-
less powers should be used both the law-making subsystem and the policing subsystem 
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cited the role of the judiciary as able to ensure the legality, legitimacy and fairness of the 
powers.  As will be shown in chapters seven and eight, however, expectations that the 
judicial subsystem perform this role are not borne out either by past experience, nor were 
they fulfilled in relation to the s.44 and ss.214-215 powers.  Again, a social systems-based 
explanation is offered for this mismatch between expectations of the role of the courts and 
the reality experienced. 
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Chapter Seven: The Judicial Sub-system Standards for Sub-system Behaviour: 
Normative versus Empirical 
 
Fig. seven: Judicial subsystem – adjudication of rights-based claims 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is a tenet of social systems theory that subsystems exist in largely horizontal 
relationships with one another.  In contrast, traditional conceptions of the relationship 
between the judicial subsystem and the other parts of the legal system consider them to 
exist in a more pyramidal relationship, with the judiciary as an ‘overseer’, regulating the 
mechanisms of government, including safeguarding against misuse of statutory powers.
1
  
For the purposes of this thesis, one relevance of this description, is that while the law-
making and policing subsystems contributed to the causes of the racial effect of the stop, 
search and surveillance powers, the role of the judicial subsystem is more accurately 
                                               
1 M. Foucault, ‘Governmentality’ in M. Foucault (auth), J.D. Faubion (ed.), R. Horley et al (trans), Power: 
the Essential Works of Foucault (The New Press, 2000) 201-02. 
Statutory power review: 
- Judiciary is expected to ensure 
that statutory powers are not 
drafted in a way which mean 
that they infringe minority 
interests; and  
- Reviews the law-making sub-
system. 
Use of power review: 
- Judiciary expected to 
ensure that statutory powers 
are not interpreted in a way, 
which infringes minority 
interest 
- Reviews law enforcement 
sub-systems. 
Framework for Judicial Scrutiny (7.1) 
 
HRA/Article 14 (7.1.1) 
- Legislative review 
- Applied review 
- Proportionality test 
Constitutional/14th Amendment 
(7.1.2) 
- Standards of scrutiny 
- Strict scrutiny 
External irritants pertaining to 
institutional 
competency/constitutional 
legitimacy (8.3). 
Post 9/11 counter-terror related case 
law demonstrates judicial attempts to 
reconcile oversight role with notions 
of its competency and legitimate scope 
of operation: 
- Fact-finding deference (8.2). 
- Deference regarding 
executive decision making. 
(7.3) 
Protection of minority rights from 
unlawful incursion, as a result of 
majoritarian priorities (7.1). 
Oversight function of the judiciary Expectations of the role of the judicial subsystem (7.2) 
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characterised as failing to prevent this effect.  Supporting this distinction Gavin Phillipson 
has suggested that ‘the primary mover against civil liberties was Parliament or the 
Executive.  All that happened was that the judges failed in a number of cases effectively 
to challenge them’.2   Despite Phillipson’s assertion that failing to stop this effect was all 
that the judiciary did, chapters seven and eight of this thesis demonstrate that the 
expectations of the law-making and policing subsystems that the courts would perform 
this rights-protecting function and the impact that this had on police and legislative 
behaviour meant that the judicial subsystem played an instrumental role in the racial 
effect of the stop, search and surveillance powers. 
 
This chapter outlines the normal, constitutionally ordained role of the judiciary in both the 
US and UK, and argues that this centres on enforcing legislatively protected rights, 
including equal treatment.
3
  The analysis of judicial subsystem behaviour in safeguarding 
against the racial effect of the counter-terrorism powers in chapter eight is undertaken 
against this framework.  Before looking at how the judiciary did behave, this chapter 
considers the rights-safeguarding role that the law-making and policing subsystems in 
each country expected the judiciary to perform in reviewing police use of the counter-
terrorism stop, search and surveillance powers. Finally, this chapter explores the 
proclivity of both the US and UK judicial subsystems to depart from their safeguarding 
functions, particularly based on notions of its institutional competency and constitutional 
legitimacy.  This section draws on some of the themes previously explored in this thesis 
which equate legitimate behaviour with behaviour that corresponds with popular 
expectations, but also explores the arguments specific to judicial legitimacy, surrounding 
expectations of judicial deference/ activism in relation to law-making decisions.  These 
competencies arise both from the judiciary itself and also from external irritants observed 
and interpreted by the judiciary.    
 
7.1  The Constitutional and Rights-Protecting Role of the Courts 
 
In the US and UK the role of the judiciary involves bridging the gap between law and 
                                               
2 G. Phillipson, ‘Deference, Discretion and Democracy in the Human Rights Act Era’ (2007) Current Legal 
Problems 40, 60. 
3
 See fig. seven. 
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society, and in so doing upholding the rule of law and the legitimacy of democracy itself.
4
  
In order that the judicial subsystem can perform this function social and political 
questions are translated into legal ones, which are resolved in accordance with distinct 
constitutional and legal frameworks in the US and UK.  Within each country’s legal 
system judges are relied upon to demonstrate ‘practical wisdom’: balancing legal 
expertise with understanding of context and compassion with detachment, in order to 
evaluate different arguments on the basis of impersonal reasons and values.
5
    Within the 
UK’s constitutional model of parliamentary supremacy three characteristics are 
commonly attributed to the judiciary.  These are: firstly that, in line with the principle of 
the separation of powers and classical constitutional theory, the courts are limited to the 
settlement of specific disputes by applying positive law;
6
 secondly, that the judiciary 
functions as an important actor in a continuous multi-participant process or network of 
decision-making; and thirdly, that the courts play a central role in protecting and 
promoting core societal values.
7
    
 
In the US, federal courts are vested under the Constitution with the authority of the 
supreme determinant of the law, which includes the interpretation of statutes and common 
law.
8
  The court’s supremacy in legal interpretation is only rebutted where a particular 
constitutional provision entrusts Congress or the President exclusive and conclusive 
power to interpret and enforce it.
9
  Crucially, the US judiciary has a whole different power 
from that of the UK courts, in that it can strike down legislation.  The UK courts, by 
contrast, only have interpretive and declaratory powers.  The UK doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy affords Parliament the ultimate law-making authority, and a 
statute found to be inconsistent with Convention rights remains valid and of full effect.  
                                               
4 A. Barak, ‘Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democracy’ (2002) 116 
Harv. L. Rev 16, 25-26. 
5 A.T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer (Harvard University Press, 1995) 66-74, 117-18. See also O. Fiss, ‘The 
Supreme Court 1978 Term: The Forms of Justice’ (1979) 93(1) Harvard L. Rev. 13-14. 
6  R. Warner, ‘Adjudication and Legal Reasoning’ in M.P. Golding and W.A. Edmondson (eds.), The 
Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Blackwell Publishing Online, 2004). 
7 M. Cohn and M. Kremnitzer, ‘Judicial Activism: A Multidimensional Model’ (2005) 18 Canadian Journal 
of Law and Jurisprudence 333. 
8
 US Constitution, art.III, s.1: ‘The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court 
and in such inferior Court as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish’.   See also Worcester 
v Georgia, 31 US 515 (1932) which President Jackson claimed did not bind his actions and Abraham 
Lincoln’s denouncement of the court’s ruling in Dred Scott v Sanford, 60 US 393 (1857); and  D.M. 
O’Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics, vol. 1: Struggle for Power and Government Accountability 
(Norton and Co., 2005). 
9  The Federalist No. 78 (Madison) 524-25.  See also R.J. Pushaw, ‘Judicial Review and the Political 
Question Doctrine: Reviving the Federalist “Rebuttable Presumption”’ (2002) 80 NCL Rev 1165. 
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By contrast, within the US ‘it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is’ and a statute found by the Courts to be inconsistent 
with the Constitution can be rendered null and void.
10
   
 
In both the US and UK as well as the judicial function being affected by the relative 
hierarchy of the different branches of government it is also shaped by their degree of 
separation.
11
 The rationale behind the separation between the branches is the need to 
maintain a system of checks and balances to prevent any single government branch from 
being able to wield unchecked power over the others.
12
  Within this constitutional model 
the existence of an independent judiciary is seen as a necessary pre-requisite for 
upholding the rule of law.   Despite constitutional and structural differences in each 
country, therefore, the judiciary is expected to operate as a neutral, adjudicating forum, 
safeguarding against the effects of any decision-making in the law-making subsystem, 
which departs from the normal range of considerations, as well as any unintended 
outcomes arising from the implementation of legislative provisions.
13
  The judiciary is 
deemed to be a more competent forum for resolving such matters than either the 
subsystem out of which the legal measure originated, or through which it was 
implemented, because it has an ability to engage in an impartial contemplation of the 
arguments before it. The other systems may be unable to do because of contextual 
influences on them.  This function is particularly important in reviewing the behaviour of 
the law enforcement subsystem, which should be undertaken ‘by a neutral and detached 
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime’.14    Through the separation of powers, therefore, there is 
a distinction between matters which ought to rightly be within the jurisdictions of the 
                                               
10Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137 (1803) per John Marshall J. An even stronger articulation of the strength of 
the courts to strike down offending legislation was expressed by John Marshall in Marbury which 
maintained that under the doctrine of ‘Constitution Supremacy’ any such conflicts should result in the court 
applying the Constitution and thereby striking down the law.  This argument has, however, been labelled as 
fallacious by Alexander Bickel, see A.M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (2nd ed Yale University Press, 
1986) 8-10. 
11 For judicial definitions of this doctrine see ex p. Fire Brigades, per Lord Mustill, para 567; and  
12 C.R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Harvard University Press, 1993) 7-13.  The doctrine of the 
separation of powers was originated by Aristotle before gaining widespread constitutional influence through 
the writings of Montesquieu and John Locke. See C. de Montesquieu (C.W. Carrithers (ed.)), The Spirit of 
Laws, A Compendium of the First English Edition (University of California Press, 1977); and J. Locke, 
Second Treatise of Civil Government, ss.143, 144, 150 and 159, http://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtreat.htm, 
accessed 30.07.2011. 
13 Alexis de Tocqueville has noted that ‘scarcely a political question arises in the United States that is not 
resolved sooner or later into a judicial question’, A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1984) 280. 
14
 Johnson v United States 33 US 10 (1948) at 13-14. 
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courts and those which are matters for political determination.
15
    
 
In undertaking their adjudicatory function, US and UK courts have a central role in 
upholding individual rights and liberties, and in so-doing are charged with interpreting the 
boundaries of legal protection for individual rights against government actions.
16
   This 
judicial function is part of the ‘judicialisation of rights’.17 In the UK the key individual 
rights instruments informing judicial decision-making are the Human Rights Act 1998 
(‘HRA’) and the ECHR, and in the US it is the Bill of Rights.  These regimes form the 
legal basis for the operational expectations held by the law-making and policing 
subsystems, pertaining to the judiciary’s role in protecting individuals against 
infringement of their rights.  In particular, both HRA and Bill of Rights include equal 
treatment and protection requirements, which the courts are charged with applying. 
System expectations regarding the nature of these provisions and judicial implementation 
of them, are considered in the following sections. 
 
7.1.1 The UK Human Rights Act and Article 14 ECHR 
 
The legal framework for rights protection under the HRA mirrors the ECHR’s distinction 
between absolute,
18
 narrowly qualified
19
 and generally qualified rights.
20
  In claims 
alleging the infringement of an absolute right judicial consideration is focused on whether 
court accepts that the State conduct in question engages the rights as there are no 
exceptions to these.   Narrowly qualified rights require the court to determine both 
whether the State conduct engages the rights, but then to consider whether any of the 
specific exceptions to the right apply.  In determining whether one of the generally 
qualified rights has been unlawfully infringed the court also considers whether the 
infringement is proportional.  The court, then, is then charged with determining whether 
this infringement is justified on the basis of its ‘proportionality’.21  Prior to the enactment 
                                               
15 See, e.g., D.R. Williams, ‘After the Gold Rush – Part II: Hamdi, the Jury Trial and Our Degraded Public 
Sphere’ (2008-09) 113 Penn St. L. Rev 55, 109. 
16
 J. Jowell, ‘Judicial Deference: Servility, civility or institutional capacity?’ [2003] Public Law 597. 
17 I. Cram, ‘Judging Rights in the United Kingdom: the Human Rights Act and the New Relationship 
between Parliament and the Courts’ (2006-07) 12 Rev. Constitutional Studies 53, 62. 
18 E.g., ECHR, art. 3. 
19 E.g. ECHR, arts. 2 and 5. 
20 E.g. ECHR arts. 8 to 11 (inclusive). 
21 Belgian Linguistics (No.2) held that’ the principle of equality of treatment is violated it the distinction has 
no objective and reasonable justification’ (1968) 1 EHRR 252 at para 34.  Applied in Petrovich v Austria 
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of the HRA the court’s review of public authority and governmental decisions undertaken 
in accordance with the Wednesbury doctrine of reasonableness.
22
  The Wednesbury 
standard restricted judicial intervention to clearly unreasonable administrative action and 
in so-doing maintained a high level of separation between judicial, legislative and 
executive branches of government.
23
   By contrast, the HRA proportionality assessment 
evaluates whether the measure pursues a legitimate aim;
24
 and whether it is a 
proportionate means of achieving that aim.  The justification inquiry read into article 14 
by the European Court in Belgian Linguistics (No.2) requires the State to demonstrate that 
the relevant measures do not produce discriminatory effects that are disproportionate to 
the advancement of government interests which prompted the measures.
25
  In order that a 
measure can be defended against a finding of discrimination, therefore, the societal or 
governmental benefit must be proportionate to its negative individual or group impact.
26
  
Judicial understanding and application of proportionality is, therefore, central to the 
parameters of the protection afforded by constitutionally protected rights, such as the right 
to equal enjoyment of protected rights under article 14.
27
   
 
Domestic incorporation of the protections within the ECHR through the HRA has 
required the UK courts to establish its own test of proportionality.
28
  The European test of 
proportionality was interpreted by the UK courts through the pre-HRA case of de 
Freitas.
29
 The de Freitas judgment articulated the determinants of proportionality as being 
whether: the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a 
fundamental right; the measures designed to meet the legislative objectives are rationally 
                                                                                                                                            
(1998) 33 EHRR 207; Gaygusuz v Austria (1997) 23 EHRR 364; See also J. Beatson and P. Duffy, Human 
Rights: The 1998 Act and the European Convention (Sweet and Maxwell, 2000) C14-20-C14-23. 
22 Associated Provincial Picture House v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223. 
23 ibid. 
24 The ECtHR has only very rarely failed to fine a legitimate aim, including within: Darby v Sweden, 
application No. 11581/85 (23 October 1990) para 33; and Thlimmenos v Greece (2001) EHRR 411 para 47. 
Counter-Terrorism measures are unlikely not to meet this standard because of the important objective of 
safeguarding national security, see Klass v Germany (1978) 2 EHRR 214, para 46. 
25 Belgian Linguistics (No.2) (1968) 1 EHRR 252 at para 10.  See also Ghaidan at para 133. 
26 A. McColgan, ‘Discrimination Law and the Human Rights Act’ in T. Campbell, K.D. Ewing and A. 
Tomkins (eds.), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (OUP, 2001) 232. 
27 D. Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (OUP, 2002) 144; S. Livingstone, 
‘Article 14 and the Prevention of Discrimination in the European Convention on Human Rights’ (1997) 1 
EHRLR 25, 32-33. 
28 D. Keene, ‘Principles of Deference under the Human Rights Act’ in H. Fenwick, G. Phillipson and R. 
Masterman, Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 206-
12. 
29 De Freitas v Secretary of Agriculture [1999] 1 AC 69. See also Lord Hoffmann, ‘The Influence of the 
European Principle of Proportionality upon UK Law’ in E. Ellis (ed.), The Principle of Proportionality in 
the Laws of Europe (1999) 107. 
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connected to it; and the means used to impair the right to give freedom are no more than 
is necessary to accomplish the objective.
30
  Despite subsequent application of the de 
Freitas test
31
 it has been criticised as not constituting a comprehensive test of 
proportionality.
32
  This perceived failing was addressed in the case of Huang,
 
in which the 
court held that assessing proportionality required a fourth question on top of the three 
established limbs, which considered the balance struck between different interests.
33
  The 
Court in Huang, however, failed to indicate how this ‘balance’ should be arrived at, 
including determining which values are relevant and the weight that should be attributed 
to competing factors.  As such, Huang acts more as a restatement of the balance intrinsic 
in any assessment of proportionality, as opposed to a refinement or clarification of the 
substance of the test itself.  This failing has led to on-going uncertainty as to the role and 
meaning of ‘balance’ in an objective judicial assessment of proportionality.34   
 
As well as some general uncertainty about the substance of judicial review regarding the 
HRA, and protection of individual rights, judicial enforcement of rights to equal treatment 
by racial minorities have presented some particular challenges.
35
  These are exacerbated 
in cases also invoking issues relating to national security.  Firstly, whilst domestic 
legislation prohibiting racial discrimination
 
does extend to public authorities including the 
police,
36
 it contains a blanket exemption for justified acts done for the purpose of 
safeguarding national security.
37
  This standard, coupled with the judicial proclivity 
towards deferring to the executive’s assessment of justifiable action, for protecting 
national security, effectively removes domestic race relations legislation as a potential 
basis for challenging the racial effect of counter-terrorism measures.  The result is that 
any claims of this nature are largely confined to the framework of article 14 ECHR.  
Despite the importance of this avenue of protection, however, the UK courts have been 
                                               
30 De Freitas, at 80.  For an evaluation of the relationship between the de Freitas and Wednesbury tests see 
M. Elliott, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Standard of Substantive Review’ (2001) 60 CLJ 301. 
31 See, e.g., R (on the application of Daly) v Secretary of State for Home Department at 27, per Lord Steyn.    
32 R. Clayton and H. Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights (OUP, 2000) 278. 
33 Huang v Home Secretary [2007] UKHL 11 at 19.  See also R (Samaroo) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, [2001] EWCA Civ 1139 at 67, per Dyson LJ; and Poplar Housing, at 69, per Lord Woolf. 
34
 See, e.g., the leading judgment in R (SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKLHL 15 at 30-
34 (per Lord Bingham) which noted the necessity to balance and judge proportionality objectively, but then 
rejected the appeal, relying solely on the strength of the justification for the challenged measures, without 
balancing these against the impact on the claimant.  
35  As anticipated before the enactment of HRA see, e.g., M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Effects of Rights on 
Political Culture’ in P. Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights (1999) ch.2. 
36 RRA, s.19B. 
37
 TA, s.42. 
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criticised for their limited engagement with Convention issues, and showing a particular 
‘structural passivity’ to rights protection, where they fear being seen as acting outside a 
traditional judicial role.
38
  The ECHR/HRA protections, themselves also have 
characteristics which limit their potential utility to a litigant.  Firstly, the nature of the 
proportionality test focuses judicial decision-making on governmental justifications for 
measures.  However, because the court has no means of qualitatively assessing national 
security claims, they are liable to be treated as an all or nothing justification.  
Consequently, because the court cannot evaluative the claim of the evidence upon which 
the claim is based, it perceives itself as having to either reject it, or wholly defer to the 
government.  Any balance between rights and security is, therefore, invariably going to 
weigh heavily in favour of national security concerns.  These factors contribute to the 
arguably low human rights hurdle created by the HRA and imposed on courts, with large 
numbers of caveats and exemptions, especially in relation to national security.
39
   
 
A further limitation to the protective value of article 14 is that it is only activated once 
another protected right has been invoked, albeit that it does not require that the other right 
has been unlawfully infringed.
 40
  In other words, article 14 is ‘parasitic’ on one or more 
free-standing rights.
41
   The effect of this is that article 14 has been described as a ‘second 
class’ status,42 despite there being nothing within the Convention rights that indicates a 
hierarchy to their protection.
43
  Protocol 12 to the ECHR does provide a free-standing 
equality guarantee within European Law thus strengthening the equality duty, but the UK 
is not currently a signatory to it.
 44
  The comparator requirement within article 14 has also 
been linked to the weakness of the provisions in protecting individuals against unequal 
treatment, because of the judicial tendency to confuse the comparator with the 
                                               
38 C. Gearty, ‘Are Judges Now Out of their Depth?’ JUSTICE Tom Sargant Memorial Annual Lecture 
(October 2007) 4. 
39 H. Fenwick, ‘The ATCSA: A Proportionate Response’ (2002) 65(5) MLR 724. 
40 See Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30 at 10-11. 
41 See, e.g., Whaley v Lord Advocate 2004 SLT 425, para 95.  See also Chassagnou v France (1999) has ‘no 
independent existence’, para 18; and Clarke v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and the 
Regions [2001] EWHC Admin 800, at para 5. 
42 L. Wildhaber, ‘Protection against Discrimination under the European Convention on Human Rights: A 
Second Class Guarantee?’ (2002) 2 Baltic Yearbook of International Law 71. 
43 H. Fenwick, ‘Clashing Rights, the Welfare of the Child and the Human Rights Act’ (2004) 67 MLR 889, 
906. 
44 See 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=177&CM=8&DF=7/6/2009&CL=ENG, 
accessed 27.07.2011.   
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justification test in determining the proportionality of a measure.
45
  The amalgamation of 
these distinct limbs risks the court assessing whether the government justification for 
using the proxy matches its actual use, as opposed to evaluating whether the proxy itself 
was justified.
46
  This mode of adjudication, therefore, fails to uncover the effects of 
decision-making processes based on discriminatory and unjustifiable presumptions about 
people.
47
   
 
By giving the courts the duty to interpret away human rights incursions not necessarily 
implied by statutory provisions,
48
 Parliament effectively charged the judiciary with 
assessing the prima facie case of infringement without reference to governmental policy 
objectives.
49
  Instead, the court’s focus in the first instance was expected to be on the 
effect of the legislative provision, as opposed to the provision itself or its motivating 
force.
50
  Only an analysis of circumstances other than government aims, however, will 
reveal the full extent of any discriminatory effects of a measure, including those that are 
unanticipated or arise from unquestioned social behaviours.
51
  Despite this, the UK courts 
have shown some hesitancy in adopting this new focus and have also failed to revise the 
range of evidential sources through which they assess the alleged infringement.
52
  The 
HRA provides the statutory framework through which the courts oversee the operation of 
the legislative, the police, and protect individual rights from unlawful incursion.  9/11 
provided an unexpectedly early test of the framework, and the court’s application of it.53   
 
 
 
                                               
45  A. Baker, ‘Article 14 ECHR: a protector, not a prosecutor’ in H. Fenwick, G. Phillipson and R. 
Masterman, Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (CUP, 2007) 348, 363. 
46 See, e.g., judicial reasoning in R(Carson) Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 3 All ER 984, paras 
61-67; [2003] EWCA Civ 797, para 61-63 in which, instead of evaluating justification of the measure Lord 
Justice Laws merged the comparator and justification considerations and based the court’s judgment of the 
state’s rational for the decision, as opposed to the appropriateness of the proxy deployed.  See also Pearce v 
Mayfield Secondary School Governing Body and Attorney General for Scotland v MacDonald [2003] 
UKHL 34 [2003] IRLR 512. 
47 A. McColgan, ‘Discrimination Law and the Human Rights Act’ in T. Campbell, K.D. Ewing and A. 
Tomkins (eds.), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (OUP, 2001) 232. 
48 HRA, s.3(1). 
49  A. Baker, ‘Comparison tainted by justification: against a “compendious question” in Article 14 
discrimination’ [2006] Public Law 476, 487. 
50 S. Fredman, ‘Equality: A New Generation?’ (2001) 3(2) Industrial Law Journal 145. 
51 A. Baker, ‘Comparison tainted by justification’ 497. 
52 A. Baker, ‘A Protector not a Prosecutor’ 349. 
53
 Justice, The Future of the Rule of Law (October 2007) 19. 
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7.1.2 The US Constitution and the 14
th
 Amendment 
 
The ability of the US judiciary to determine the meaning and scope of statutory 
provisions is premised upon its application of the conditional and unconditional rights 
protections, set down in the US Constitution.  The positive protection of individual rights 
within the country’s core legal document has been described as withdrawing such issues 
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, and placing them beyond the reach of 
majorities.
54
  In adjudicating alleged infringements of conditionally protected rights the 
courts must strike a balance between governmental and individual interests.  This judicial 
balancing of individual rights and governmental aims is an inherent part of judicial 
interpretation of the equal protection guarantee, contained within the Equal Protection 
Clause (‘EPC’) of the 14th Constitutional Amendment.55    
 
The Equal Protection Clause provides that ‘no state shall … deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws’.56  The Clause originally afforded equality of 
treatment under the law to all US citizens, building on the narrow interpretation of the 
articulation of equality within the Declaration of Independence.
57
  The protection was 
later afforded irrespective of citizenship, thus applying the Equal Protection Clause ‘to all 
persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without any regard to any differences of race, 
color, or of nationality’, 58 and ‘whatever his status under immigration law’.59  Whilst 
equality is at the heart of US constitutional law it has also proved to be an elusive concept 
for the courts to identify.
60
  Judicial interpretation of the EPC has, therefore, been 
important in realising the protective value of the 14
th
 Amendment.  This was seminally 
demonstrated by Justice Stone’s famous footnote in United States v Carolene Products Co. 
decrying prejudices against discrete and insular minorities that curtail the operation of 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.
61
  The Carolene 
judgment has been described as having laid the seed for modern court analysis and 
                                               
54 West Virginia State Board v Barnette, 319 US 625 (1942) at 638 (per Justice Jackson).  See also J. Rawls, 
A Theory of Justice (Clarendon Press, 1972). 
55 14th Amendment US Constitution (1886). 
56
 ibid, sec.1. 
57 The Declaration of Independence states that: ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident: That all men are 
created equal.  That they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights’(1776). 
58 Yick Ho v Hopkins, 118 US 356, 369 (1886). 
59 Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202, 210 (1982).  See also Zadvydas v Davis, 533 US 678, 693 (2001); Kwong Hai 
Chew v Colding, 344 US 590, 596-97, n. 5 (1953); and Shaughnessy v Mezei, 345 US 206, 212 (1953). 
60 N. Devins and D.M. Douglas, Redefining Equality (OUP, 1998). 
61
 United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152-53 (1938) ft nt 4. 
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application of the EPC.
62
    
 
Infringement of the 14
th
 Amendment requires a finding of intentionally discriminatory 
behaviour,
63
 or an adverse effect coupled with discriminatory intent.
64
  The importance of 
intent means that statistical evidence of disparate impact is rarely held to be sufficient to 
show that ‘the decision makers in the case acted with discriminatory purpose’.65  Further, 
where race is one of a number of factors behind the unequal treatment even if it is the 
dominant factor prompting or determining the unequal treatment, it remains compliant 
with the constitutional protection, providing that some of those criteria are legitimate and 
non-discriminatory.
66
  Even where the US courts have not adhered to the intent 
requirement in EPC-based cases the Supreme Court has developed a high threshold 
standard for establishing the existence of discrimination.
 67
  In United States v Armstrong, 
for example, the Court held that to establish that capital punishment was racially 
discriminatory the claimants’ would have to ‘produce some evidence that similarly 
situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted and were not’ to support 
their claim that they had been singled out for prosecution on the basis of their race’.68  
The judicial subsystem itself has recognised that this is a high standard for any litigant to 
fulfil.
69
 
 
In the event that the requisite intent or disparate impact is found the court must then 
determine whether the infringement is justified.  The courts apply one of three levels of 
judicial scrutiny in order to assess justifications for infringing the EPC, namely: rational 
                                               
62 D.M. O’Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics, vol. II: Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (W.W. Norton, 
2005) 1326-27. 
63 See, e.g., Brown v Oneonta, 221 F. 3d 329, 337 (2nd Cir 1999) citing Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 356, 
373-74 (1886), in which the police stopped and searched every black student on a college campus, and 
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relationship scrutiny; intermediate scrutiny; and strict scrutiny.
70
  Rational relationship 
scrutiny requires that the measure under consideration is rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental interest,
71
 which may be either real or hypothetical.
72
  This form of review 
is predominantly used in assessing government economic policies and entails a strong 
presumption of the constitutionality of the provision.
73
  Intermediate scrutiny requires the 
court to consider whether the law or policy being challenged furthers an important 
government interest in a way that is fairly and substantially related to the achievement of 
that interest.
74
   This form of scrutiny is used in claims such as those based upon gender 
inequality.
75
    The final level of review, strict scrutiny, is applied to differential treatment 
on the grounds of ‘suspect categories’, such as race-based distinctions.76   The strict 
scrutiny test requires the court to consider whether the measure constitutes a justifiable 
response to a ‘compelling state interest’.77   The strict scrutiny test is usually interpreted 
as meaning that the provision must be ‘narrowly tailored’ and finite in duration so the 
impact on minority individuals is no more than is necessary to pursue the governmental 
interest.
78
  This level of scrutiny is intended to create a strong presumption against the 
permissibility of unequal treatment based on so-called ‘suspect categories’ in virtually 
every aspect of US law.
79
  The high hurdle for validity represented by strict scrutiny has 
even resulted in declaring racial classifications intended to benefit underrepresented 
minority groups, such as those used in affirmative action programmes, as unlawful.
80
  The 
strict scrutiny standard of review necessitates that the court’s focus is on the governmental 
motivation behind the policy, to determine whether it is unlawful or not, as opposed to its 
effect.
81
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Claims of discriminatory policing under the EPC have been particularly difficult to 
pursue through the courts.
82
  One reason for this is that whilst express racial 
classifications are rare, without one, it is necessary for a claimant to prove ‘discriminatory 
purpose’.83   This pre-condition effectively prevents constitutional challenges to racial 
disparities where invidious bias is difficult to establish,
84
 and without comprehensive data 
indicating the impact on minority communities.
85
  Even where such data are available and 
accessible, two significant hurdles in themselves,
86
 the intent standard has been 
interpreted as necessitating a state of mind which is approaching malice and judicial 
determination that the potentially discriminatory measure should have been adopted 
‘because of’ and not merely ‘in spite of’ the unlawful outcome.87   A central challenge to 
showing this is the need to present adequate proof, as the police are unlikely to openly 
identify their actions as racially motivated, or make publicly available internal documents 
that would show discriminatory intent.
88
  Litigants can attempt to demonstrate intent 
through statistical evidence of disparate impact, but courts have been reluctant to accept 
this form of proof in the context of policing claims.
89
  These reasons have contributed to 
the lack of development of equal protection in this area.
90
  Some of the difficulties faced 
by litigants when asserting a claim of discrimination under EPC are demonstrated by the 
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Second Circuit Court’s opinion in Brown v Oneonta.91  The Court ultimately declined to 
apply the EPC to the police conduct after finding that the plaintiffs had not identified a 
law or policy containing an express racial classification.
92
 Indeed, the Court asserted that 
police activity based on race might be more effective when undertaken in relation to 
racial groups that comprise a minority in a community, because there would be fewer 
individuals fitting the description and, therefore, fewer potential suspects to eliminate.   
 
The Court distinguished Brown from the decision in United States v Avery, which had 
applied equal protection guarantees to claims of race-based police actions,
93
 because 
although both scenarios were based on a suspect description in Brown the officers were 
given, and therefore had no control over, the nature of the ‘tip’ they were provided with.94  
In declining to find breach of the EPC the Court stated that the role of the judiciary in 
such matters ‘is not to evaluate whether the police action in question was the appropriate 
response under the circumstances, but to determine whether what was done violated the 
EPC’.95  The endorsement of the use of race by the police in Brown has been described as 
showing that ‘the centrality of race in suspect descriptions represents a form of racial 
discrimination so ingrained ... as to be immune to legal remediation and beyond moral 
recognition … signal[ing] the bluntness not only of our doctrinal tools, but of our moral 
assessments as well’.96 
 
Judicial reluctance to move away from considering motive as opposed to effect and utility 
of police powers further heightens the barriers to establishing breach of the 14
th
 
amendment in the context of counter-terrorism law enforcement.
97
  In particular, in cases 
involving race-based profiling the primary statutory provision enabling victims of alleged 
discrimination to file criminal charges requires that the law enforcement officer 
specifically intended to violate the individual’s constitutional rights, as opposed to merely 
intending to commit the acts which resulted in the violation.
98
  The intent requirement has 
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been described as meaning that the Supreme Court can ‘in every practical sense … [turn] 
a blind eye to the use of race as a central factor in focusing police suspicion and 
activity’.99  Allegations of discrimination, which result from informal ethnic profiling are, 
therefore, very difficult to prove in a judicial setting.  Further, even if a claimant manages 
to establish the requisite intent, an officer’s reasonable belief that his conduct is 
reasonable under the circumstances constitutes a defence to any charge pertaining to his 
rights-infringing conduct.
100
  The intent requirement behind the 14
th
 amendment also fails 
to recognise and protect against the more subtle forms of discrimination that can lead to 
unequal treatment and results, such as the unquestioned adherence to formally race-
neutral practices, which nevertheless have a racially-uneven effect.
101
  The effect of intent 
in discouraging plaintiffs to bring article 14 claims is likely exacerbated because breaches 
of other constitutional protections are determined without recourse to individual 
motivations, including the 4
th
 amendment protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.
102
  There are, therefore, strong incentives for plaintiffs to avoid claiming on 14
th
 
amendment grounds, in favour of restricting their claims to breach of other protected 
rights.    
 
The causes of inaccessibility within the judicial process are particularly acute at the 
intersection of racial equality and national security, as a result of the sensitive nature of 
both subjects.  Rights groups, which are largely responsible for bringing such claims have 
reported a number of difficulties litigating issues in which race-based issues intersect with 
other rights, such as privacy.  This has encouraged these groups to focus on challenging 
the powers on the basis of more broadly applicable rights, such as the right to privacy.  
Further, in undertaking such litigation interest groups frequently start by having to 
counter cases that do not fit clearly in with their own arguments.
103
  Group led claims can 
also face potential difficulties as a result of any negative judicial finding in terms of the 
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prospects of later litigation.  Such groups can, therefore, be put on the defensive even 
before they seek to challenge their direct opponent and may be forced to disassociate 
themselves with legal arguments of purported allies.
104
  All of these factors mean that 
cases are only undertaken on the most clear-cut grounds, which can mean excluding more 
controversial lines of argument, including those citing race as an additional ground of 
claim. 
 
Both the US and UK have rights regimes which afford the judiciary a key role in 
upholding individual rights, including the right to equality and equal treatment.  In 
determining whether a particular protection has been infringed both countries’ courts 
assess whether the measure, and its impact, are justified, albeit that the precise form of the 
protection and evaluation differ.  Based on their own interpretations of these frameworks 
the law-making and policing subsystems in both the US and UK expressed their own 
expectations for the protective function of the courts, including in relation to s.44 and 
ss.214 and 215, as will now be shown. 
 
7.2  Expectations of the Judiciary’s Rights Safeguarding Role  
 
The importance placed by other subsystems on the judiciary’s power to protect against 
any unjustified infringement of individual rights is demonstrated by direct references by 
both the US and UK law-making and policing subsystems to this judicial role.  Such 
statements indicate the external expectations projected onto the judicial subsystem in 
respect of the subsystem’s behaviour after 9/11.  In the UK the law-making subsystem’s 
expectations regarding the role of the courts took two distinct forms, one arising from the 
enactment debate surrounding the Terrorism Act 2000; and the other from the subsystem 
discourse in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, as the statutory powers were brought into 
use. 
 
In the pre-9/11 period the law-making subsystem was unified in its positive endorsement 
of the judiciary as a strong overseeing power in respect of parliamentary behaviour, 
through the application of the HRA protections in their decision-making.
105
  Jack Straw, 
for example, explicitly referred to the ‘profound safeguard against the disproportionate 
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use of the powers … [represented by] the Human Rights Act 1998’.106  Straw exhorted 
other MPs to ‘have some confidence’ in the courts and said that, in light of their 
protective role, there should be no hesitation in enacting statutory powers which ‘go 
beyond the normal criminal law’.107  Straw cited judicial oversight as constituting an 
important part of the checks and balances that the counter-terrorism powers would be 
subject to following their enactment.
108
   
 
Even the mere expectation of judicial review of the powers was described as being a 
means of ensuring that the pressures from the Executive did not prevent the law-making 
subsystem from adhering to a balanced and appropriate programme of law-making.  Tom 
King, for example, suggested that the ‘integrity of Ministers is often bolstered by the 
knowledge of the existence of judicial review’, 109  and Charles Clarke described the 
judicial model of legislative oversight for the new powers as a ‘positive and progressive 
change’.110  Therefore, although arguably the rights-protecting standard set by the ECHR 
in the field of anti-terrorism law was a relatively low one,
111
 it was held up by the 
Government as providing a ‘powerful control over police use of the powers set out in the 
Bill’. 112    Amongst opponents of the counter-terrorism statutory powers the review 
function of the judiciary was described as an important means of protecting against any 
infringement of rights occasioned by legislative action.  For example, in questioning the 
Home Secretary’s declaration of compatibility relating to the Terrorism Bill, Kevin 
McNamara stated that ultimately this question would be decided in the courts.
113
   
Similarly, John Taylor, noted that ‘[i]f there were any question that the police officer had 
acted improperly, it would be for the court to interpret’.114  Both governmental and non-
governmental components of the law-making subsystem, therefore, premised the verity of 
the subsystems’ actions on the expectation that the judicial subsystem would remedy any 
rights-infringing effects arising either from the law-making function of parliament, or the 
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law-enforcement behaviour of the police. 
 
Against the generally positive endorsement of the safeguarding potential of the courts 
some concerns were expressed regarding the protective strength of judicial oversight.  
The ability for the courts to offer the promised protection was, for example, described as 
‘not deliverable’ by Alan Simpson.115  Aside from pockets of scepticism, however, the 
main consensus in the debate concerning the Terrorism Bill, reflected by the large margin 
by which the Bill was passed,
116
 was that the adjudicating function of the courts would be 
able to prevent any rights-infringing effect arising from use of the powers Parliament was 
enacting.  Concern as to whether the courts would be able to fulfil this role was dismissed 
as a fringe and unhelpful sentiment. 
 
In the aftermath of 9/11 the law-making subsystem’s expectations for the role of judicial 
review sharply diverged from its previous position.
117
  Departing from prior expressions 
of the importance of its protectionist role a number of MPs were concerned that neither 
the Courts nor the HRA should be allowed to inhibit counter-terror policing.
118
  As 
already explored in this thesis,
119
 support was also voiced for the need for the Home 
Secretary to be able to act ‘without the threat of his decisions being overturned as a result 
of the HRA’.120  Alongside these demands the constitutional legitimacy of the judiciary in 
scrutinising primary legislation was questioned, with the Government, accountable 
through Parliament and on the basis of popular opinion, being described as having the 
sole authority to balance rights and security.
121
  On the basis of its popular mandate 
Gerald Howarth asserted that ‘the time has come when judges must no longer be allowed 
to determine policy.  Parliament must determine policy’. 122   Both the constitutional 
competency of the role of the judiciary and its institutional capability were questioned 
within the law-making subsystem, although such views have been criticised as 
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misconceiving the effect of the HRA.
123
  Charles Clarke, for example, suggested that 
government ministers, as opposed to the courts, were more adept at evaluating the facts in 
national security cases.
124
  Consequently, whilst in advance of 9/11 the protective role of 
the courts was advocated as a safeguard against rights infringements arising from the 
legislative powers, in the febrile atmosphere after the attacks the legitimacy of this 
judicial role was rejected in favour of heightened government and police authority. 
 
In the US, Congress sought to justify the passage of counter-terrorism powers, despite 
them lacking the normal safeguards to protect against misuse of statutory powers, on the 
grounds of externally imposed rights protections which would be administered by the 
judiciary.  During the debates Congress was divided in its belief that either the 
constitutional rights protections were in no way endangered by the legislative 
provisions,
125
 or that the draft provisions infringed the constitutional guarantees.
126
  One 
such comment was made by Edward Bryant who noted that ‘[t]he provisions of this 
Patriot Act will undoubtedly be tested and must withstand challenge in a court of law’.127   
Bryant’s reassurance was given in confident support that the powers adhered to 
constitutional standards.  A further mention of judicial review immediately preceded the 
Senate’s passage of the draft legislation, when Senator Patrick Leahy noted that the 
legislation would ‘face difficult tests in the courts’ and that in the event that ‘the courts 
find an infirmity’ in the provisions it may be necessary for Congress to revisit the issues 
in the future.
128
  This comment was designed to appease remaining critics of the Bill by 
reassuring them that it would be made to adhere to constitutional standards.    Whichever 
opinion was being promoted, therefore, members of Congress were overwhelmingly 
confident in the ability of the courts to safeguard rights against any possible incursion by 
police behaviour. 
 
In contrast to the congressional confidence in the review function of the courts, some 
concerns were expressed within the Committee on the Judiciary about the judiciary’s 
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ability to provide a substantial oversight function.  For example, Robert Scott warned that 
in the context of a national security threat ‘robust judicial review of legislative powers 
was not a reliable safeguard, and so rigorous judicial scrutiny should not be presumed in 
the drafting of the powers’.129  Similarly, reflecting on the relationship between the law-
making and judicial subsystems, William Delahunt concluded that the ‘bill fails 
constitutional muster’ and that the tendency towards deference of the judiciary in times of 
national emergency excluded the courts from offering the sought after safeguard against 
executive misuse of the powers.
130
  To minimise its concerns regarding the weakness of 
the judicial oversight function the Committee recommended the creation of a new office 
within the Department of Justice to oversee the maintenance of civil liberties amidst 
deployment of the powers.
131
  However, this recommendation was lost from the enacted 
legislation by the rejection of the Committee’s version of the draft legislation, in favour of 
the executive’s proposals.132 
 
Internal communications also seem to indicate that the US policing subsystem premised 
its operational decisions on an expectation that the judiciary would protect individual 
rights from any resulting infringement.  FBI operational publications, for example, cited 
the courts as an important safeguard against its own misuse of statutory powers, including 
in the context of national security policing.
133
  Similarly, subsystem communications 
confirmed an expectation that ‘[w]hile the USA Patriot Act removed many of the 
obstacles that hindered terrorist and intelligence investigations in the past, it did not give 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies a free hand.  The actions of the government 
still are conducted under the watchful eye of the courts’.134   The Department of Justice’s 
2003 guidance concerning the use of race by federal law enforcement agencies included a 
section delineating the constitutional prohibition of selective law enforcement based on 
considerations such as race, and concluded that such operational behaviour would face 
strict judicial scrutiny by the courts and be invalidated in the event of the use of 
impermissible racial classifications.
135
  Only in guidelines issued more than seven years 
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after 9/11 did the police subsystem acknowledge that the judicial safeguarding function 
may be in any way limited.
136
  During the most operationally critical years, in terms of 
both national security and potential rights infringements following 9/11, therefore, the 
police cited the judiciary as a means of defending itself against criticism of its rights-
infringing behaviour.  The expectations of the external safeguard, therefore, did not match 
its actual protective value. 
 
In both the US and UK the judicial subsystem was championed, directly and indirectly, as 
an important and powerful protector of individual rights.  Invocation of the protective 
value of judicial review arose from both supporters and critics of the statutory provisions, 
and maintained that the law-making and policing subsystems would be held to account for 
their legislative actions.  However, in expecting the courts to perform this function the 
subsystems failed to effectively take into account the fact that when faced with national 
security threats the judiciary may falter,
137
 or indeed may be by-passed completely.
138
  
Indeed, this restricted judicial role was explicitly demanded by the UK law-making 
subsystem after the 9/11 attacks: the same subsystem that had promoted the courts as a 
safeguard when enacting broad and unrestrained police powers.  In the US, on-going 
concerns about the strength of the courts’ protective power were silenced by the 
executive’s rejection of committee proposals, designed to reinforce judicial oversight.  
The contents of cases concerning the stop, search and surveillance powers, as well as 
analogous counter-terrorist powers, therefore did not demonstrate the rights protecting 
role the judicial was described as expected to fulfil, as will now be shown.
139
   
 
7.3   Judicial Approaches to Counter-terrorism Cases 
 
Having set out the rights frameworks through which the judicial subsystems are expected 
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to perform their safeguarding function, as well as the express use of those expected 
behaviour to justify the actions of the law-making and policing subsystems, this section 
undertakes a brief review of some case law concerning the s.44 stop and search powers 
and the ss.214 and 215 surveillance and records search powers, as a means of uncovering 
the extent to which the judicial subsystem, was able to fulfil this role.   
 
The role of the courts in protecting individual rights is of particular importance in the face 
of threats to national security.  Such contexts, however, also create additional pressures on 
the subsystems’ ability to perform its normal adjudicatory function.  In times of war, for 
example, the courts have frequently been described as a non-political safeguard against 
executive excesses.
140
  Conversely, cases invoking national security have also given rise 
to particularly high levels of judicial deference.
141
  High levels of deference in such 
circumstances have been endorsed by the judiciary itself on the basis that ‘no government 
interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation’.142  Lord Diplock, speaking 
from within the UK judicial subsystem, even described issues surrounding national 
security as ‘par excellence a non-justiciable question’.143  Judicial approaches to national 
security issues incorporates a variety of forms of deference, ranging from the application 
of proportionality and scrutiny tests; to fact deference concerning the existence of the 
emergency conditions, and regarding the utility of the measures enacted and their non-
rights-infringing nature. Cases invoking issues concerning war, emergency and national 
security, therefore, inhabit a highpoint in the tension between the rights-protecting role of 
the courts and its desire not to usurp the will of the legislature or executive.
144
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7.3.1 UK Case Law   
 
The key illustration of the adjudicatory approach of the UK courts to the suspicion-less 
stop and search powers within s.44 is the case of Gillan.
145
  The two claimants in Gillan 
were subject to s.44 stops and searches while on their way to the Docklands Arms Fair: 
one, Kevin Gillan, who was a student, to join a peaceful demonstration against the fair; 
and the other, Pennie Quinton, who was a film-journalist, to record the protesters.
146
  
There were no grounds for suspecting either claimant of any offence, but they were both 
stopped and searched, despite Quinton showing her press card.   The case progressed 
through the UK courts before being finally being brought before the ECtHR.  Despite 
relating to a single claim each of the judgments is useful in revealing particular facets of 
the approach of the UK courts to reconciling national security needs with the protection 
of individual rights. 
 
In the Divisional Court the claimants challenged the lawfulness of the police use of s.44 
on three grounds.  Firstly, the claimants claimed that the authorisation for use of the 
power was unlawful and ultra vires.
147
  Secondly, the claimants argued that s.44 was only 
intended to be used in response to an imminent terrorist threat to a specific location in 
respect of which normal police powers of stop and search were inadequate.  Accordingly, 
it was claimed that the powers were never intended to be used arbitrarily against those 
engaged in peaceful protest.
148
  In the alternative, the claimants argued that the Police 
Commissioner had failed in his duty to give appropriate instructions to officers under his 
command in relation to their exercise of the powers, which had the potential to cause 
unjustified and disproportionate interference to individual human rights.
149
  Thirdly, the 
claimants claimed that the police were using s.44 as part of day-to-day policing, which 
constituted a disproportionate interference with their rights under articles 5, 8, 9, 10 and 
11 of the ECHR.
150
  The Court found against the claimants in relation to each of the three 
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arguments.  The Court rejected the claimants’ first argument on the grounds that, although 
its scrutiny in this area was ‘necessarily a limited one’, the claimants’ interpretation of 
parliamentary intention regarding use of the power was overly narrow.
151
  Further, while 
the Court expressed its concern regarding the lack of evidence of police guidance 
controlling use of s.44,
152
  it held that there was ‘just enough’ to reject the second head of 
claim.
153
  In particular, the Court determined that the deputy police commissioner had 
‘clearly understood the purpose of the s.44 powers and the need to ensure that they were 
not misused’.154  Finally, responding to the third claim, the Court found that there was no 
evidence that the powers had become part of day-to-day policing, so that their use 
infringed ECHR protections.
155
 The Court remarked that if there had been any such 
evidence this claim would have had ‘considerable force’,156 but concluded that instead of 
use of s.44 infringing the Claimants’ rights the ‘annoyance’ experienced by the Claimants 
was primarily due to the ‘slow bureaucratic process’ and the delay occasioned by the stop 
and search.
157
  Despite rejecting the claim the Court granted the claimants the right to 
appeal against the decision, due to the importance of the issues raised.
158
 
 
The Court of Appeal’s judgment divided the grounds of appeal into five areas of 
adjudication.  These were that: (i) the s.44 power, as an incursion into liberties, should be 
construed restrictively (the ‘interpretation question’); (ii) the exercise of discretion to 
issue the authorisation on behalf of the Commissioner of the Police was unlawful (‘the 
authorisation question’); (iii) the Secretary of State had exceeded his powers in 
confirming the authorisation (the ‘confirmation question’); (iv) the officer in charge of the 
police operation wrongly invoked the powers in that place and time (the ‘command 
question’); and (v) there was excessive action by the operational officers who had stopped 
and searched the appellants (the ‘operational question’).159 In relation to each of the areas 
of argument the Court also considered the claim that s.44 breached individual rights 
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within the common law and articles 5, 8, 10 and 11 ECHR.
160
  Looking firstly at the 
interpretation question, the Court held that the wording of the statute was clear, but that 
even if it was unclear an expansive interpretation was obviously intended by Parliament 
as evidenced by the use of the word ‘expedient’ in determining when the power could be 
used.
161
  Dealing with the authorisation and confirmation questions together the Court 
held that evidence of global and national terrorist incidents justified the rolling 
authorisation of the power, and did not consider that such use of s.44 meant that it had 
become part of day-to-day policing.
162
  The Court also rejected the command question 
claim on the basis that, provided the Police Commander could imagine possible reasons 
for terrorists targeting the arms fair, the authorisation was justified.
163
  Echoing the 
concerns of the Divisional Court, the Court of Appeal observed that the evidence 
produced to demonstrate the rationale behind the invocation of the powers was 
‘lamentable’. 164   Nevertheless, it rejected this claim.  Further, in addressing the 
operational question, although the Court stated that it had received ‘no satisfactory 
explanation’ for the inadequacies of the evidence,165 it rejected the claim following its 
evaluation of the ‘limited evidence available’.166  The Court, therefore, rejected the appeal, 
whilst maintaining that this did not mean that it had, or would in future, adopt a 
deferential approach to executive decisions relating to national security.
167
   
 
The Claimants launched a further appeal to the House of Lords.  The Lords divided its 
judgment into four heads of claim, largely mirroring those articulated by the Court of 
Appeal, namely: (i) construction; (ii) authorisation and confirmation; (iii) breach of 
ECHR articles 5, 8, 10 and 11; and (iv) lawfulness.  The Court’s judgment affirmed the 
findings of the lower courts and rejected all of the claimants’ arguments. 168   Their 
Lordships held that construction of the legislative power indicated the law-making 
subsystem’s grant of a broad and discretionary power, but that significant safeguards 
against misuse of the power had been incorporated into the legislation to protect against 
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the misuse of the power.
169
   The Court further ruled that whilst Parliament had perhaps 
not envisaged a rolling authorisation it had clearly intended that the s.44 power should be 
available whenever a terrorist threat was apprehended
170
 and, therefore, rejected the 
authorisation and confirmation claims.
171
  As regards the ECHR claims their Lordships 
concluded that the stops and searches had breached neither article 5
172
 nor article 8 
ECHR.
173
  Further, even if there had been a prima facie breach of either Convention right, 
the Court considered that this would have been justified on the basis of the proportionality 
of the police action, in light of the threat posed by terrorism.
174
  The Court held that the 
powers, if misused, could conceivably infringe articles 10 and 11, but provided they were 
used ‘subject to compliance with the ‘prescribed by law’ condition’ such use would be 
likely to fall within the article 10(2) and 11(2) justifications.
175
   Although the Claimants’ 
in Gillan did not argue that the powers had a discriminatory impact this possibility was 
nevertheless considered and rejected by several judges in the House of Lords.  Lord 
Brown, for example, concluded that ethnic origin ‘can and properly should be take  into 
account in deciding whether and whom to stop and search, provided always that the 
power is used selectively and the selection is made for reasons connected with the 
perceived terrorist threat’.176 
 
Having exhausted all domestic avenues for challenging the use of the powers the 
Claimants’ applied to the ECtHR.177  The application was based on the alleged breach of 
articles 8, 5, 10 and 11, although only the article 8 claim was examined by the Court.
178
  
The ECtHR’s judgment diverged from that of the House of Lords, holding that the use of 
s.44 constituted a prima facie breach of article 8 and was a clear and unequivocal 
interference with the right to respect for private life.
179
  The Court held that s.44 granted 
such broad discretion to police officers that it amounted to an arbitrary power.  Thus the 
requirement  within article 8(2) ECHR that infringements of article 8(1) be ‘in accordance 
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with law’ was not met.180  The ECtHR considered that ‘[t]here are simply no effective 
safeguards against such abuse’.181  The European Court’s decision on this matter arose 
not solely from its reading of the statutory provisions, as was the case with the UK courts, 
but from its examination of the provisions as implemented.
182
  In particular, the ECtHR 
noted that while the Secretary of State was given a statutory power to decline or amend 
applications for authorisation to use s.44 in practice this was never used.
183
  To the 
European Court, therefore, it did not constitute a meaningful limitation to the 
discretionary nature of the powers or, therefore, a safeguard against their misuse.  By 
contrast, for the UK courts the statutory provision was presumptively treated as indicating 
the reality of the oversight provided for.  Further, the ECtHR described the role of the 
Independent Reviewer of counter-terrorism legislation as limited and weak, because it 
lacked the power to cancel or alter the authorisations.
184
   By contrast, the UK courts were 
satisfied that the mere existence of such a review function necessarily gave rise to an 
adequate level of statutory oversight.  Of even greater concern to the ECtHR was the level 
of discretion afforded to individual police officers, which it described as giving rise to a 
‘clear risk of arbitrariness’.185  The ECtHR was also adamant that the possibility for the 
discriminatory use of the powers was an unquestionable risk arising from their 
deployment.
186
    
 
The distinct approaches of the UK courts and the ECtHR not only meant that two 
different outcomes were reached but also indicates the ability of the European Court to 
detect infringements of individual rights in situations in which the UK courts fail to see 
any such wrongdoing. Demonstrative of the greater awareness of the ECtHR of the 
potential difficulty of protecting individual rights through the judicial subsystem was the 
fact that the ECtHR even explicitly rejected the utility of judicial review as a safeguard 
against misuse of the powers, because of the lack of requirement for reasonable suspicion 
in use of s.44.
187
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Further case law demonstrating the approach of the UK courts to expectations of their 
rights protecting role is explored in chapter eight.  However, what Gillan demonstrates is 
that the reality of judicial oversight of the police and statutory provisions was not 
comparable to that described by the policing and law-making subsystems themselves. 
 
7.3.2 US Case law 
 
Unlike Gillan in the UK, in the US there is not a single case squarely concerning the 
ss.214 and 215 powers which was argued at all stages of the country’s court system.  
Nevertheless, the US’ judicial approach to counter-terrorism police powers is indicated by 
several judgments regarding police counter-terrorism powers.  One of the key cases 
regarding counter-terrorism surveillance is American Civil Liberties Union v National 
Security Agency, in which the ACLU challenged the use of suspicion-less wiretaps by the 
law enforcement subsystem on the basis that it was unconstitutional and infringed federal 
law.
188
  In an opinion written by Judge Taylor, the District Court found that the 
surveillance programme violated federal law in the FISA, as well as the constitutional 
provisions of the first and fourth amendments and the doctrine of separation of powers.
189
  
On appeal, however, the District Court decision was overturned.
190
  The Appeal Court’s 
decision was driven by its acceptance of the government’s invocation of the state secrets 
doctrine.
 191
  The Appeal Court recognised that ‘even to the extent that additional 
evidence may exist, which might establish standing for one or more of the plaintiffs on 
one or more of their claims, discovery of such evidence would, under the circumstances 
of this case, be prevented by the State Secrets Doctrine’.192   Acceptance of the state 
secrets doctrine deprived the plaintiffs of the standing necessary to successfully make out 
their claim because they were unable to show ‘concrete’ and ‘actual’ harm.193  The Court 
also refused to acknowledge that the presence of illegal wiretaps had a qualitatively 
different impact on those subject to the surveillance than in relation to legal wiretaps.
194
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Invocation of the state secrets doctrine thus meant that because the surveillance could be 
undertaken lawfully, it was held to have been lawful.   
 
A further illustration of the approach of the US court to the FBI’s use of covert, 
suspicion-less counter-terrorism surveillance is the case of Al-Haramain Islamic 
Foundation v Bush.
195
  In Al-Haramain the state secrets hurdle appeared to have been 
cleared as a result of the inadvertent disclosure of a ‘top secret’ document.  This 
document alerted the Foundation to the fact that it was the subject of covert surveillance, 
and on the basis of which it launched a claim alleging that the surveillance constituted an 
infringement of its eighth amendment right to privacy.  In its judgment the Court 
confirmed that ‘simply saying “military secret”, “national security” or “terrorist threat” or 
invoking an ethereal fear that disclosure will threaten our nation’ was insufficient to 
automatically support a claim of privilege.
196
  Despite this statement, however, the Court 
proceeded to show a high level of deference to the executive’s determination that the 
national security threat was sufficient to invoke the state secrets doctrine.  Ultimately, 
therefore, although the disclosed document was essential to verifying the allegations, its 
admission as evidence was precluded and the claim was frustrated, as a result of the 
Claimant’s lack of standing.197   
 
The case of El-Masri v United States concerned the threshold dismissal, on state secrets 
grounds, of a tort suit alleging that US government officials conspired to violate the 
Petitioner’s rights under the Constitution and international law to be protected from 
abduction, arbitrary detention and inhumane treatment.  Without permitting any discovery, 
or considering any non-privileged evidence, and based solely on two government 
affidavits and speculation about what evidence might be needed to sustain the claims or to 
make possible defences, the District Court dismissed the case at the pleading stage, based 
on state secrets privilege.  This decision was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit.  El-Masri 
provides a clear demonstration of the Court’s approach to the government’s use of state 
secrets privilege and how the exercise of privilege relates to judicial review of executive 
action.  The decisions also considered broader issues surrounding the issue of the 
separation of powers.  Rejecting the plaintiff’s claims that ‘[w]hen the Executive 
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unilaterally asserts a need for secrecy in a manner that disables judicial power and 
threatens individual liberties, courts have a special duty to probe deeply before acceding 
to judicial demands’,198 the Court held that El-Masri incorrectly ‘envisions a judicial that 
processes a roving writ to ferret out and strike down executive excess’.199  Instead, the 
Court described the risk of it being ‘guilty of excess in our own right if we were to 
disregard settled legal principles in order to reach the merits of an executive action that 
would not otherwise be before us – especially when the challenged action pertains to 
military or foreign policy’.200  In reaching its decision the Court reflected the law as set 
down in cases such as Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v Sawyer.
201
  However, the 
Court’s response to El-Masri’s arguments presupposed that its decision on the 
applicability of the claims of privilege adhered to the principles set out in United States v 
Reynolds.
202
  Reynolds explicitly recognised that it was pre-eminently the decision of the 
judiciary whether an executive assertion of the judiciary is valid.
203
  The Court in El-
Masri noted that the Reynolds Court also cautioned against the possibility that the state 
secrets doctrine could be used to allow the Court to ‘avoid the constitutional conflict that 
might have arisen had the judiciary required that the executive disclose highly sensitive 
military secrets’.204  However, while the El-Masri decision may appear to constitute an 
evaluation of powers it raises a question regarding the degree to which the judiciary was 
in fact exercising control over the state privileges doctrine, as under Reynolds it is bound 
to do. 
 
Concerns relating to governmental secrecy were also a motivating factor behind the claim 
in Re Sealed Case.
205
  In this case the ACLU sought the unsealing of orders issued by the 
Courts and related legal briefs submitted by the Government relating to this programme.  
The Court recognised that without the disclosure of the sealed materials ‘it will be 
impossible for the public to assess whether any gap [in the executive’s authority to 
conduct necessary surveillance] is a significant problem’.206  Demonstrating an assurance 
in its own constitutional legitimacy the Court held itself out as having ‘the authority and, 
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indeed, the obligation to independently review whether information in the sealed 
materials is properly classified’.207  On this basis the Court stated that ‘information should 
remain classified only if the executive can demonstrate, with specificity, that its release 
would harm national security’.208  However, while the US courts consistently held that the 
state secrecy doctrine could not be unquestioningly invoked it nevertheless readily 
accepted governmental claims of its need. 
 
The Court’s decision in the case of Former Attorney General Ashcroft v Iqbal provides a 
final example of the nature of its adjudicatory approach to counter-terrorism measures.
209
  
Iqbal was arrested by federal officials and detained under restrictive conditions.  Iqbal 
filed a Bivens action alleging that his designation as a person ‘of high interest’ was on 
account of his ‘race, religion or national origin’, in contravention of the first and fifth 
amendments.   Iqbal further alleged that the FBI had arrested and detained thousands of 
Arab Muslim men as part of its 9/11 investigation and as part of this had willingly and 
maliciously subjected Iqbal to harsh conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, 
solely on account of prohibited factors and for no legitimate penological reasons.
210
  The 
Supreme Court held that Iqbal’s complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim 
for purposeful and unlawful discrimination.
211
 The Court held that to make out his claim 
Iqbal needed to have presented sufficient factual matter to show that the FBI had adopted 
and implemented the detention policies not for neutral investigative reasons but for the 
purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion or national origin.  The Court, 
therefore, adhered to the intent requirement in its approach to the claims on the first and 
fifth amendments.
212
 
 
The Court in Iqbal further held that the pleadings did not comply with Rule 8(a)(2) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which requires that a complaint must contain a ‘short 
and plain statement of claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’.213  Applying 
the interpretation of Rule 8 delineated in the case of Twombly,
214
 the Court in Iqbal 
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concluded that the complaint had not ‘nudged claims’ of invidious discrimination ‘across 
the line from conceivable to plausible’.215  The Court, instead, held that several of Iqbal’s 
allegations, including his subjection to harsh conditions on a discriminatory basis, were 
conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true, without independent evidence.  Further, 
the Court held that the factual allegations that the FBI arrested and detained thousands of 
Arab Muslim men, and that Mueller and Ashcroft had approved the detention policy, did 
not plausibly suggest that there had been purposeful discrimination.  Indeed, given that 
the 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by Arab Muslims, the Court noted that it was wholly 
unsurprising that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain 
individuals because of their suspected links to the attacks would produce a disparate, 
incidental impact on Arab Muslims.  The Court concluded that Iqbal’s claim rested solely 
on the petitioners’ ostensible policy of holding detainees categorised as ‘of high interest’ 
but that his complaint did not contain facts plausibly showing that the policy was based 
on discriminatory motives.
216
 Even the dissenting opinion, written by Justice Souter, and 
joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsberg and Breyer, did not explicitly disagree with the 
majority’s opinion that targeting Muslim and Arab individuals was an entirely common-
sense approach to protecting against terrorist attacks.  In addition, whilst dissenting with 
the majority opinion Justice Breyer wrote separately to agree with the other Justices 
regarding the importance of preventing such ‘unwarranted litigation from interfering with 
the proper executive of the work of the Government’.217 
 
This section has outlined some of the key cases that the US and UK judiciaries have heard 
against the background of the national security threat in the aftermath of 9/11.   What 
these cases suggest, both in their reasoning and outcomes, is that the factors affecting the 
subsystem’s adjudicatory role are not uniformly those professed within the subsystem, or 
those expected by agents and subsystems outside the judiciary.  The courts have declined 
to challenge decisions of other subsystems, such as the existence of an emergency or the 
need for a statutory power, in circumstances where the subsystem under scrutiny expected 
a possible challenge.  Similarly, the court’s application of rights protections, at times, was 
relegated behind other priorities as a result of the mode in which it was applied.    At 
times, within such modes of judicial behaviour the particular interests and vulnerabilities 
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of racial minorities were effectively lost within the range of judicial decision-making, or 
passed over with only a minor reference. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
Despite the known judicial proclivity to defer to executive, legislative and police 
decisions in times of national security crisis and the difficulties experienced within the 
judicial subsystem regarding its application of statutory and constitutional rights 
protection, the law-making and policing subsystems in the US and UK portrayed the 
courts as able to provide a strong and testing oversight of the use and effect of the law 
enforcement powers in relation to the terrorist threat.  This mismatch demonstrates the 
lacuna between the ideal of judicial review at its most searching and the tendency towards 
deference, which is exacerbated in periods of national emergency.   This gap is largely 
unobserved by the law-making and policing subsystems and reflects the failure of 
different subsystems to understand the behavioural patterns of other subsystems, whilst 
continuing to premise their own behaviours on erroneously held expectations regarding 
other subsystem programmes.  
 
As well as the characteristics of the judicial decision-making that related to the counter-
terror powers suggesting that the gap between the expected and actual rights-protecting 
role of the judiciary the number of cases is also suggestive of this situation.  The limited 
number of cases specifically concerning the racial impact of the stop, search and 
surveillance powers could be interpreted as showing that the powers lacked any 
significant race-based effect.  The expectations of the law-making and policing 
subsystems regarding the safeguarding role of the courts certainly imply that any 
infringement of individual rights arising from the scope or use of the statutory powers 
they would have been subject to judicial scrutiny.
218
  However, the limitations on the 
ability of the judicial subsystem to protect individual rights, including the right to equal 
treatment, do not solely arise out of its adjudication of such issues but also from the 
occasions in which rights-infringing behaviour is not litigated.  Indeed, the cases that 
reach the courts are only the ‘tip of the iceberg’.219  Consequently, instead of the lack of 
                                               
218 As shown in section 7.2 of this thesis. 
219 J. Jowell, Politics and the Law.  Constitutional balance or Institutional Confusion? (JUSTICE, Tom 
Sargant Memorial Annual Lecture, 2006) 4. 
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case law indicating either that the powers had no rights-infringing effect of that the 
judicial subsystem did not play any role in the racial effect of the powers it actually 
demonstrates one way in which it contributed to this outcome.
220
  Thus the appearance of 
judicial oversight did not fully match the reality of their protective ability.
221
   
 
In light of the gap between the appearance of judicial oversight and rights-protecting 
power as compared to the reality of it as borne out in post-9/11 counter-terrorism case law, 
chapter eight considers which particular self-creating, but cognitively open, subsystem 
behaviour which contributed to the limitations to the ability of the judicial subsystem to 
perform the safeguarding function delineated by the constitutional framework and 
expected by the other subsystems.   
                                               
220 S.N. Herman, ‘The USA Patriot Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth Amendment’ (2006) Harvard CR-
CL L. Rev 67 (2006) at 71. 
221 G. Phillipson and H. Fenwick, ‘Covert derogations and judicial deference: redefining liberty and due 
process rights in counterterrorism law and beyond’ (2011) McGill Law Journal 56(4) 863.  
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Chapter Eight: The Role of Judicial Subsystem in Failing to Protect Against the 
Racial Effect of Counter-terror Stop, Search and Surveillance Powers 
 
Fig. eight: Judicial subsystem behaviour regarding s44 and ss214-5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter seven demonstrated that in its adjudicatory role the judicial subsystem provided 
limited protection to the interests of minority individuals from discriminatory treatment 
arising from police use of the s.44 and ss.214-215 counter-terrorism powers.  Such modes 
of operation meant that the courts departed from their ideally portrayed role of rights-
protection and overseer of legislators and police behaviour – despite these two 
subsystems expressly endorsing this function of the courts as a safeguard against the 
effects of their own departure from normal patterns of behaviour.  Adopting the same 
approach as was taken in relation to the law-making and policing subsystems this chapter 
analyses the judicial subsystem behaviour which gave rise to the gap between the ideal 
and actual patterns of subsystem operation.
1
  These behaviours and communications are 
                                               
1
 See fig. eight. 
While not demonstrating a 
wholly deferential approach 
case law relating to terrorism 
post 9/11 contains many 
hallmarks of the judicial 
tendency towards legislative 
and executive deference in 
national security-related 
issues (7.3). 
Expectations of the protective powers 
of the judiciary in safeguarding 
minority interests was not matched by 
actual judicial behaviour, unable to 
observe racial effect of the powers 
(1.2). 
External factors limiting the 
protective ability of the judiciary, 
including: 
- Structure of rights-protecting 
legislation (8.1/ 7.1). 
- Government criticism of activist 
judgments (8.3.2). 
 
 
Judicial decision-making and, 
therefore, the protective value 
of the judicial subsystem in 
safeguarding minority rights 
affected by: 
- Political considerations 
(8.3.1). 
- Judicial adoption of 
governmental exceptionalism 
regarding the threat (8.3.1). 
- Judicial interpretation of its 
own role (8.2). 
Judicial oversight in the context of 
the national security threat. 
Communications arising from both 
the law-making and policing 
subsystems indicate the expectation 
of these sub-systems indicating the 
oversight and minority-protecting 
function of the judiciary (7.2).   
-  
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used to suggest why, instead of fulfilling this rights-protecting function the judiciary was 
expected to provide, it has been described as acting ‘almost as though they were in the 
centre of a repressive maelstrom, but unable to do anything about it’.2   Such judicial 
behaviour corresponds with the race-crit claim that the impact of external factors and 
notions of judicial legitimacy in its decision-making constitute a key factor in the racial 
bias of the law.
3
  These limitations are analysed firstly by focusing on the external 
irritants affecting the US and UK judicial subsystems; and secondly on the internal 
programme of operation of the two countries’ judiciaries.     
 
8.1 Structural Obstacles to the Rights-Protecting Role of the Judicial Subsystem  
 
This section offers examples of structural obstacles to the enforcement of rights through 
the judicial process has meant that the ‘lure of litigation, while powerful, is by no means 
irresistible’ both generally, and more particularly, challenging counter-terrorism powers.4   
This section considers what these obstacles were and how they affected judicial 
subsystem behaviour and consequently, its fulfilment of the rights-protecting mandate 
attributed to it by the law-making and policing subsystems.  One key obstacle to the 
judiciary’s oversight function is its tendency towards deferential approach in particular 
contexts and in response to certain sources of opinion. 
 
Whilst US and UK frameworks for equal treatment mandate an intensive standard of 
review by the courts for race-based treatment, judicial legitimacy in performing this 
oversight is regularly under attack.
5
  Such criticism primarily manifests itself in 
arguments concerning the level of deference that the courts are expected to show to 
legislative and executive decision-making in order that the judiciary furthers, as opposed 
to detracts from, democratic ideals of directly and popularly accountable decision-
making.
6
    
                                               
2 C. Gearty, ‘11 September 2001.  Counter-terrorism and the Human Rights Act’ (2005) 32(1) JLS 18, 30. 
3 T. Ying, ‘”I do not think [implausible] means what you thinks it means: Iqbal v Ashcroft and Judicial 
Vouching for Government Officials’ (2010) 14 Lewis and Clark L. Rev 203; and L. Arbour, ‘In our Name 
and One Our Behalf’ (2006) EHRLR 371. 
4 M. McCann and H. Silverstein, ‘Rethinking Law’s Allurement: A Relational Analysis of Social Movement 
Lawyers in the United States’ in A. Sarat and S. Scheingold (eds.), Cause Lawyering: Political 
Commitments and Professional Responsibilities (OUP, 1999). 
5 Lord Steyn, ‘Deference – A Tangled Story’ para 29.  For a relatively recent survey of literature regarding 
the amount of deference that the judiciary should show to the executive see R.M. Chesney, ‘Disaggregating 
Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive Treaty Interpretation’ (2007) 92 Iowa L. Rev. 
6
 See, e.g., M.A. Graber, ‘The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary’ (1993) 7 
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Deference involves the judge-made principle that the court reviews a particular legal issue 
in a restrained way, giving some weight to the view of the primary decision-maker.  The 
obligation for deference to democratic institutions stems from arguments relating to their 
directly and democratically elected nature.
7
  The rationale for judicial deference towards 
the executive is based on the perceived importance of the separation of powers.
8
  The 
HRA made a clear change to the traditional approach of the judiciary on national security 
cases, which has affected the deference the courts have shown to legislative and executive 
decisions.  In particular, the HRA enables the courts to resolve human rights arguments by 
going beyond its traditional constitutional role of applying the law, and instead expecting 
that the courts assess the merits and reasonableness of particular provisions and practices.  
This has led to the UK courts adopting the principle of proportionality, which it has 
previously rejected.
9
    
 
Irrespective of the enactment of the HRA, some continuing judicial tendency towards 
national security deference remains.
10
  One example of this is the case of Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v Rehman, in which the Court dismissed an appeal by 
Rehman, a Pakistani national, against the refusal to grant him indefinite leave to remain in 
the UK on the basis that he was likely to pose a national security threat.
11
   In its judgment 
the Court demonstrated a high level of fact deference particularly in response to the 
government’s claims regarding the threat posed by Rehman, unquestioningly upholding 
the Home Office’s decision despite its basis on undisclosed information from confidential 
sources.
12
  Underlining the Court’s competency-based rationale for its deference, Lord 
Slynn cited the Government’s ability to gather ‘a wide range of advice from people with 
                                                                                                                                            
Studies in American Political Development 35; J.H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political 
Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court (University of Chicago Press, 
1980) 9-10; L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (The Foundation Press, 1978) 51; M.J. Perry, The 
Constitution, the Courts and Human Rights: An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Constitutional Policymaking 
by the Judiciary (Yale University Press, 1982) 32-60. 
7 See comments in R v Lambert [2002] QB 1112 para 16; Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community 
Association v Donoghue [2002] QB 48, para 69; Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681, 703, 711; and R (Pretty) v 
DPP [2002] 1 AC 800 para 2. 
8 See Chief Constable of North Wales Police v Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155, 1160 per Lord Halsham; and 
generally Lord Irvine 'Judges and Decision-Makers: the Theory and Practice of Wednesbury Review' 
[1996] PL 59. 
9 See R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex. P. Brind [1991] 1 AC 696. 
10 K. Ewing, ‘The Futility of the HRA’ [2004] Public Law 829. 
11 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2001] UKHL 47. 
12
 ibid at para 44. 
  
231 
day to day involvement in security matters’.13  Further, Lord Hoffmann described the 
constitutionally motivated reason behind the Court’s deference, on the basis that the 
question of whether ‘something is in the interests of national security’, is a matter of 
judgement and policy, and therefore within the remit of the Executive as opposed to the 
courts.
14
   In justifying the wide discretion afforded to executive decision-making 
Hoffmann cited governmental expertise and access to information, as well as the fact that 
‘decisions, with such serious potential results for the community, require a legitimacy 
which can be conferred only by entrusting them to persons responsible to the community 
through the democratic process’.15   Hoffmann’s approach in Rehman indicates a judicial 
willingness to adhere to a long-standing, pre-HRA conception of institutional legitimacy 
in which direct democratic accountability outweighs the court’s rights-protecting 
mandate.
16
   
 
In A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the House of Lords held 
that the detention provisions of the ATCSA 2001 were incompatible with article 5 ECHR, 
and were not justified under article 15 ECHR, which allows for derogations to some 
rights in times of war or other emergency threatening the life of the nation.  In making 
their decision the majority of their Lordships
17
 accepted that there was such a threat, 
stressing too that significant weight should be attached to the assessment of the Home 
Secretary and Parliament in this regard.  However, their Lordships also held that the 
measures taken were not proportional and strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation.  Lord Bingham noted that even in situations where national security may be 
threatened, the courts were not precluded from scrutinising the relevant issues and 
deciding on the proportionality and necessity of the measures.  The measures were 
deemed disproportionate because they did not deal with the threat of terrorism other than 
in relation to foreign national and permitted those suspected terrorists to carry on their 
activities elsewhere provided there was a safe country for them to go to.  Further, the HL 
held that if the threat posed by UK national terrorist suspect could be addressed without 
                                               
13
 ibid at para 52, per Lord Slynn. 
14 ibid at para 50 per Lord Hoffmann. 
15 ibid at para 62, per Lord Hoffmann. 
16 See D. Feldman, ‘Human Rights, Terrorism and Risk: the Rules of Politicians and Judges’ (2006) Public 
Law 364, 374-82. 
17 Lord Hoffmann dissenting on the basis that there was merely a threat of serious physical damage and loss 
of life.  Hoffmann concluded that the real threat of the life of the nation came from provisions such as those 
within the ATCSA that were the subject of the case. 
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infringing individual liberty it had to be shown why this was not the same for foreign 
national suspects. 
 
A has been described as the epitome of judicial activism in UK jurisprudence since 9/11: 
‘the first significant blow in the battle against the UK government to protect the human 
rights of suspected terrorists’,18 and an ‘extraordinary[ily] rights-enforcing judgment’.19  
Commenting on the impact of the HRA on judicial review in A Lord Bingham noted that 
the statute affords ‘the courts a very specific, wholly democratic mandate’.20  In A the 
House of Lords held that the statutory power at the centre of the case, which permitted the 
indefinite detention of non-British terrorist suspects,
21
 constituted an unlawful breach of 
article 14 ECHR.
22
   
 
However, despite the ruling that the detention had breached articles 5 and 14 ECHR by 
the time the case reached the ECtHR the law-making subsystem had developed an 
alternative method of dealing with suspected terrorists, through control orders, meaning 
that the practical impact of the judgment was minimised.
23
 The need to exhaust all 
domestic remedies before recourse to Strasbourg also helps to choke off, or at least delay 
actions, reducing their utility as a means of safeguarding individual rights.
24
  In response 
to the decision in A, which condemned the executive detention power as discriminatory, 
the Government announced that it would consider its options, while the detainees 
remained in detention.  It was only when the powers began to lapse under the statutory 
                                               
18 S. Shah, ‘The UK’s anti-terror legislation and the House of Lords: the Battle Continues’ [2006] Human 
Rights Law Review 416, 416.  See also S. Shah, ‘The UK’s anti-terror legislation and the House of Lords: 
the First Skirmish’ [2005] EHRLR 403; and N. Hayes, ‘Liberty v Security – Anti-Terrorism Legislation, the 
ECHR and the House of Lords’ (2005) 8 Trinity C. L. Rev 106. 
19 A. Tomkins, ‘Readings of A v Secretary of State for the Home Department’ [2005] Public Law 259.  See 
also A. Tomkins, ‘The Rule of Law in Blair’s Britain’ (2008) University of Queensland Law Journal 1, 28, 
30, 33; C. Gearty, ‘11 September 2001’ (2005) 32 JLS 18, 28; C. Gearty, ‘Human Rights in an Age of 
Counter-terrorism: Injurious, Irrelevant or Indispensable?’ (2005) 58 CLP 25, 37; K. Ewing, ‘The Futility of 
the Human Rights Act – A Long Footnote’ (2005) 37 Bracton Law Journal 41, 42; and Lord Lester, ‘The 
Utility of the Human Rights Act: A Reply to Keith Ewing’ [2005] Public Law 249, 253. 
20 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] AC 68, para 42. 
21 Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, s.23. 
22  See Lady Arden, ‘Human Rights in the Age of Terrorism’ (2006) 121 LQR 604; and D. Bonner, 
‘Checking the Executive?  Detention without Trial, Control Orders, Due Process and Human Rights’ (2006) 
12 EPL 45. 
23  Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, ss.1-9. Under a control order, which were subject to judicial 
supervision, individual terrorist suspects whether British or non-British national s could be subject to 
restrictive curfews and residency conditions, as also their assets frozen pursuant to UN Security Council 
Resolutions.   
24 L. Lustgarten and I. Leigh, ‘Making Rights Real: the Courts, Remedies and the Human Rights Act’ (1999) 
Cambridge Law Journal 509, 542. 
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sunset clause, and the court had begun releasing the detainees itself, that the executive 
detention powers were replaced with the control order regime.
25
  In terms of its rights-
upholding effect, therefore, the decision in A had a limited direct impact.
26
  This 
conclusion is made even clearer when A is viewed in conjunction with subsequent court 
decisions, in particular, those concerning the control order regime that replaced executive 
detention.
 27
   
 
Another case indicating the nature of the judiciary’s approach to balancing the 
safeguarding of individual rights with the needs of counter-terror policing is that of 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ and Others.
 28
  JJ brought together a 
number of claims concerning the use of control orders against terrorist suspects, on the 
grounds that they constituted an unlawful deprivation of liberty of the controlees subject 
to the orders.
29
  The Court held that while an 18-hour daily curfew constituted a 
deprivation of liberty shorter periods did not.
30
  The Court’s approach was highly 
accommodating of the government’s use of control orders holding them out to be 
permissible, despite being ‘not very far short of house arrest’.31   Following JJ, the Court 
upheld both a 14-hour curfew
32
 and a 12-hour curfew,
 33
 apparently using the 18-hour 
limit stated in JJ as the sole determinant of whether or not the orders infringed individual 
rights. The government’s interpretation of the control order judgments further limited 
their rights-protecting effect, because the Home Secretary used the opinion to support 
curfews of 16 hours, despite the tentative nature of Lord Brown’s acceptance that curfews 
of this length may be permissible, with him suggesting that determination of this 
ultimately resided with Strasbourg.
34
  The interpretation of Lord Brown’s explicitly 
uncertain opinion as an uncaveated endorsement of 16-hour curfews led to the 
                                               
25 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, ss.1-9. 
26  See D. Moeckli, ‘The Selective ‘War on Terror’: Executive Detention of Foreign National and the 
Principle of Non-Discrimination’ (2006) 31 Brook J. of Int. Law 495. 
27 See Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ and others [2007] UKHL 45. 
28 Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ and others [2007] UKHL 45. 
29 ibid. 
30
 ibid, paras 24 (Lord Bingham), 63 (Baroness Hale) and 105 (Lord Brown). Lord Hoffmann and Lord 
Carswell dissenting. 
31 JJ, para 3.  See also House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights in their 
Twelfth Report of Session 2005-2006 (HL Paper 122, HC 915), para 38. 
32 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF and another [2009] UKHL 28. 
33 Secretary of State for the Home Department v E and another [2007] EWCA Civ 459. 
34  JJ, Lord Brown: ‘It may be, indeed, that 16 hours is too long.  I would, however, leave it to the 
Strasbourg Court to decide upon that’, para 106. 
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government increasing the curfews in question, which had been reduced ahead of the 
Court’s decision. 35    
 
Deference is also an established characteristic of some aspects of US judicial decision-
making, particularly in its acceptance of police claims as to the necessity and efficacy of 
targeting particular individuals with police powers.  In the case of Ornleas v United 
States,
36
 for example, the police justified searching behind a loose panel in the suspect’s 
car, based on the fact that the panel was loose and contained a rusty screw.  The officer 
said that these factors suggested that it have been removed and drugs placed behind it.  
The Court accepted the officer’s assertion, that loose panels often hide drugs and, on that 
basis, deemed the search to have been reasonable.  This line of reasoning is indicative of a 
more widespread tendency of the US judiciary, to unquestioningly accept police officer 
testimony in cases considering police deployment of their powers and cases claiming 
discrimination as a result of their use.
37
   
 
The US judiciary has explicitly recognised that the existence of war or other exigent 
circumstances do not in themselves abrogate the court’s role in assuring constitutional 
guarantees.
38
  Indeed, the judiciary’s own statement of its function has maintained that it 
‘is the historic role of the judiciary to see that in periods of crisis, when the challenge to 
constitutional freedoms is the greatest, the Constitution of the US remains the supreme 
law of our land’.39  Despite such a description of its operational function the US judiciary 
has shown a strong trend of wartime deference,
40
 through which real or imagined threats 
to public welfare have been used as an excuse for compromising individual rights.
41
   The 
political nature of the making, execution and evaluation of foreign and national security 
policies has been used as the justification for confining such matters to the jurisdiction of 
                                               
35 JCHR, Court Policy and Human Rights, para 41. 
36 Ornelas v United States 517 US 690 (1996). 
37 D. Sklansky, ‘Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists and the Future of the 4th Amendment’ (1997) Sup. Ct. Rev. 
271, 300-01. 
38 Youngstown at 649-50, per Jackson J (concurring); Milligan, 71 US at 8.  See also W.J. Brennan, ‘The 
Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Times of Crisis (1988) 18 Isr. Y.B. Human Rights 11. 
39 United States v United States District Court, 441 F.2d 651, 664 (6th Cir, 1971). 
40
 See Korematsu 323 US at 224-25; Rosker v Goldberg, 453 US 57, 64-65 (1981); Green v Spock, 249 US 
47 (1976); Haig v Agee, 453 US 280 (1981); United States v Robel, 389 US 258 (1967); and New York 
Times v United States, 403 US 713 (1971).  For academic comment relating to this trend see, e.g., S.R. 
McAllister, V. Dinh, E. Chemerinsky, C. Stone and J. Rosen, ‘Life after 9/11: Issues affecting the Courts 
and the Nation’ (2002-03) 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 219, 225-231; A. Gruber, ‘Raising the Red Flag: The 
Continuing Relevance of the Japanese Internment in the Post-Hamdi World’ (2006) 54 U. Kan L. Rev 307, 
310; and S. Sherry, ‘Judges of Character’ (2003) 38 Wake Forest L. Rev793, 808. 
41
 Duncan v Kahanamoku, 327 US 304 (1946), per Justice Murphy. 
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Congress and the President, by virtue of their democratic authority and institutional 
competence.
42
  Such ‘special needs’ deference represents an enduring tradition through 
which the courts have recurrently yielded to the executive’s expectation that the judiciary 
should legitimise its actions and engage in a minimal standard of judicial review,
43
 when 
considering matters related to national security.
44
   
 
An infamous example of wartime judicial deference and one central to CRT claims of 
constructed minority status,
45
 are the Japanese-American cases during the Second World 
War,
46
 in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of Executive Orders subjecting 
Japanese Americans to curfews
47
 and internment.
48
  In the case of Korematsu v United 
States, despite the Court noting the need to subject the Executive Order to a strict standard 
of review, it nevertheless acquiesced to the executive’s conclusions regarding the efficacy 
and necessity of the race-based measures, due to the risk of espionage and sabotage by 
Japanese Americans, and upheld the Order.
49
   In reaching its decision the Court relied on 
the earlier judgment in Hirabayashi v United States which upheld the constitutionality of 
curfews for Japanese-Americans,
50
 despite the Court in that case having expressly stated 
that its decision should be interpreted and applied narrowly.
51
  The level of judicial 
subservience to the Executive’s arguments in the Japanese American cases was quickly 
and repeatedly criticised.
52
  These criticisms ultimately resulted in the Korematsu and 
                                               
42  See Prize Cases 67 US (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862) in which the Court deferred to the President’s 
determination that the Confederate State’s cessation had marked the outbreak of the Civil War.  This 
tendency was also recognised in: The Federalist, No. 23.  (Alexander Hamilton) at 147 and The Federalist, 
No. 41 (James Madison) at 270. 
43 See e.g., Lidster, 540 US at 427 citing Brown v Texas, 443 US 47, 51, 99 S. Ct 2637, 61, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 
(1979).  See also C.N. May, In the Name of War.  Judicial Review and the War Powers Since 1918 (Harvard 
University Press, 1989); and T. Cruz, ‘Judicial Scrutiny of National Security: Executive Restrictions of 
Civil Liberties when ‘Fears and Prejudices are Aroused’’ (2003-04) 2 Seattle Journal of Social Justice 129. 
44 Although the courts have been reluctant to extend the special needs exception to additional forms of 
criminal investigation such as drugs searches (City of Indianapolis v Edmond); and drug abuse testing of 
pregnant women (Fergusson).  
45 See section 2.1.2 of this thesis. 
46 See E. Rostow, ‘The Japanese American Cases – A Disaster’ (1954) 54 Yale Law Journal 489. 
47 See Hirabayashi v United States, 320 US 81 (1943) in which the court upheld the conviction of Japanese 
America, Gordon Hirabayashi, for refusing to obey a racial curfew order. 
48 See Korematsu v United States, 323 US 214 (1944), in which the Supreme Court deferred to military 
claims of necessity as justification for Japanese internment. 
49
 See US Commission on the Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Personal Justice Denied, 
GPO (1982).  See also K.D. Ringle, ‘Report on Japanese Question’ (26 January 1942) section I(h), stating 
that: ‘the “Japanese Problem” has been magnified out of its true proportion … [and] should be handled on 
the basis of the individual regardless of citizenship and not on a racial basis’, 
http://home.comcast.net/~eo9066/1942/42-01/Ringle.html, accessed 28.07.2011. 
50 Korematsu v United States, 323 US 214 (1944) at 218. 
51 Hirabayashi v United States, 320 US 81 (1943). 
52
 See, e.g., R.N. Dembitz, ‘Racial Discrimination and Military Judgement: The Supreme Court’s 
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Hirabayashi judgments being overturned.
53
  The Japanese-American cases provide an 
example of how, through the level of its scrutiny; acceptance of executive ‘facts’; and 
shaping its judgments in accordance with political aims, the judicial subsystem has 
restricted its own rights-protecting capabilities, especially in the context of national 
security threats or in adjudicating claims brought against the police. Where national 
security considerations represent an immediate concern, therefore, courts, through judicial 
deference, have made clear efforts to accommodate the government’s compelling interest 
in safeguarding the populace and country from attack.
54
  Consequently, mere invocation 
of the word ‘war’ has, in effect, been able to strip individuals of the right to full due 
process, and judicial protection of individual rights, and increased the political incentive 
to characterise its activities as conducted pursuant to a ‘war’.55    
 
The approaches of the US and UK judiciaries to national security deference eschew 
recognition of the different, but complementary sources of operational legitimacy of the 
judicial and law-making subsystems.
56
  Judicial legitimacy derives from a range of 
sources, including the requirements that: the court justifies its decisions publicly, by 
means of rational arguments; judicial decisions must been formulated with reference to 
objective, publicly accessible standards and supported by legal authority derived from a 
source other than the opinion of a single judge; and the independence of the judiciary 
from the political branch of government guarantees an unbiased and objective assessment 
of the case before it.
57
  None of these constitutes direct democratic accountability, but 
                                                                                                                                            
Korematsu and Endo Decisions’ (1945) 45 Colum. L. Rev. 175; M. Weglyn, Years of Infamy: The Untold 
Story of American’s Concentration Camps (1976); E. Y. Yamamoto, ‘Korematsu Revisited – Correcting the 
Injustice of Extraordinary  Government Excesses and Lax Judicial Review: Time for a Better 
Accommodation of National Security Concerns and Civil Liberties’ (1986) 26 Santa Clara L. Rev 1; and E. 
K.. Yamamoto et al, Race Rights and Reparations – Law and the Japanese American Internment (2001). 
53 The overturning of the decision was based on a determination that the War and Justice Department had 
altered, suppressed and destroyed key evidence that demonstrated the absence of military necessity for mass 
racial internment and curfews.  See Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. (1983) at 1417 and Hirabayashi v United 
States, 828 F.2d 591, 604-08 (9th Cir., 1987).  See generally P. Irons, Justice at War (OUP, 1983). 
54 J.C. Yoo, ‘Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism’ (2003) 72 George Washington Law Review 427. 
55  D.M. Filler, ‘Values we Can Afford – Protecting Constitutional Rights in an Age of Terrorism: A 
Response to Crona and Richardson’ (1998) 21 Oklahoma City University Law Rev. 409, 420.  Compare 
with Crona and Richardson who argue that in relation to terrorism the US could not afford to use civilian 
courts and that the war-footing of this threat was appropriate and justified, S.J. Crona and N.A. Richardson, 
‘Justice for War Criminals of Invisible Armies: A New Legal Approach to Terrorism’ (1996) 21 Oklahoma 
City University L. Rev 349. 
56 A. Barak, ‘The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy and the Fight against Terrorism’ (2003-04) 58 U. 
Miami L. Rev. 125, 127.  Making this point more generally see K. Roach, ‘The Role and Capacities of 
Courts and Legislatures in Reviewing Canada’s Anti-terrorism Law’ (2008) 24 Windsor Rev. Legal and 
Social Issues 5, 55. 
57
 See, e.g, R. Masterman, The Separation of Powers in the Contemporary Constitution.  Judicial 
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each nevertheless contributed to the court’s institutional legitimacy.58  Both US and UK 
judiciaries have demonstrated the tension between the judiciary’s reluctance to overstep 
what it perceives as the boundaries of its institutional and constitutional authority and its 
obligation to act as both a guarantor of individual rights and a check on the political 
branches.
59
  In the absence of external scrutiny from the courts there is no incentive for 
popularly elected decision-makers to justify their decisions openly, so the courts have a 
specific role in eliciting an explanation from the legislature as to the rationale behind their 
decisions.
60
   Such deference has contributed to a situation by which the permissibility of 
profiling in police deployment of their powers has been shaped less by how the judicial 
subsystem oversees police exercise of its discretion, and more by how the policing 
subsystems allocated that discretion themselves.
61
 
 
As well as subsystem approaches to deference affecting its safeguarding role for 
individual rights, the protective capabilities of the courts were also influenced by the 
manner in which the government pursued counter-terrorism cases.  For example, the 
government used delays within the court system to achieve its aims, whilst avoiding the 
judicial making its final judgment on a matter.
62
  Delays were achieved by government 
consolidation of cases,
63
 and the pursuit of all possible routes of appeal, to enable the 
continuation of the condemned practice while a new approach is devised, before 
abandoning the appeal prior to their final determination.
64
  This approach had the effect of 
avoiding an adverse ruling, while allowing the government to claim that by the time the 
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matter came to trial, any unconstitutional effect of the powers had been remedied through 
the replacement of the original measures.
65
    
 
In the US, one example of the way in which structural features of the judicial subsystem 
can limit the impact of rights-protecting judgments is illustrated by the ability of the 
Supreme Court has refused to hear appeals from lower courts.
66
  Since 9/11 the Supreme 
Court has refused to hear a number of appeals relating to the balance between national 
security and civil liberties interests,
67
 on occasion not even offering any reasons behind 
this decision.
68
  In terms of its impact on the protective role of the courts, it does not 
matter that this discretion is not solely limited to national security or rights-related cases, 
or that there may be any number of legitimate reasons for the Supreme Court’s refusal to 
hear the cases.  Instead, it is the fact that this refusal, on whatever grounds, restricts the 
ability of the judicial to have the rights-protecting function it is described as having by 
other subsystems and that despite the existence and potential effect of this power being 
known about this was not reflected in stated expectations regarding the strength of the 
judiciary’s power to protect individuals from suffering from racial discrimination or the 
introduction of other safeguarding measures to prevent misuse of the statutory powers.
69
   
 
The overall picture of the post 9/11 national security-related case law also demonstrates 
that while there are a number of cases in which district courts have ruled in favour of civil 
liberties these have regularly been overturned on appeal.
70
  One such example is Center 
for National Security Studies v United States Department of Justice,
71
 in which a coalition 
of public interest groups sought the release of information concerning individuals 
detained in relation to counter-terrorism investigations.
72
   The District Court ruled in 
favour of the disclosure, largely on the basis of the Freedom of Information Act, holding 
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that ‘the public interest in learning the identities of those arrested and detained is essential 
to verifying whether the government is operating within the bounds of the law’. 73  
However, the Court of Appeal reversed this in a 2-1 decision, citing the need for 
deference to the executive’s judgement as to the needs of national security.74   By contrast, 
there are almost no rulings in which district court decisions in favour of the government 
have been later reversed.
75
    
 
A similar pattern, by which district court activism has been overturned on appeal, is 
evident in the case of North Jersey Media Group Inc. v Ashcroft in which the appeal court 
reversed the lower court’s decisions and supported the Attorney General’s blanket closure 
of immigration hearings to the media and public, in order to maintain public confidence in 
the government’s actions.76   Finally, in the case of In re: All Matters Submitted to the 
FISC the FISC unanimously rejected new executive-proposed guidelines allowing federal 
prosecutors to consult law enforcement agents conducting foreign intelligence 
surveillance and the permanent use of special Foreign Intelligence Surveillance wiretaps 
for investigating ordinary crimes.
77
  The Court held that the proposals breached the 4
th
 
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, and in so-doing ended 
an unbroken series of around 14,000 approvals of government applications.  However, the 
Department of Justice appealed this decision which was then overturned.
78
 
 
Within the US extrajudicial settlements have also limited the role of the judicial 
subsystem in national security.
79
  In the case of Hamdi v Rumsfeld, for example, before 
the appeal granted by the Supreme Court was heard the Bush administration reached a 
deal with Hamdi by which he would be released from detention in return for him 
renouncing his citizenship and promising never to return to the US or take up arms 
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against it.
80
   A further way in which judicial oversight of the surveillance has been 
limited is through the court’s application of the ‘third party rule’, under which no 
reasonable expectation of privacy attaches to documents held by third parties.  This rule 
has become increasingly problematic as a result of electronic communications and 
transactions – which pass through or are received by third party service providers.  The 
Court has even suggested that the absence of reasonable expectation of privacy in sent 
and received emails extends to the contents of the emails,
81
 as well as information 
regarding the sender and recipients of the email and volume of data transmitted.
82
 
 
In both the US and UK, therefore, the judicial subsystem faced a range of obstacles in 
terms of fulfilling the extent of its rights-protecting role.  These arose from notions of 
deference as well as the mechanics of the court system in each country.  The specific 
obstacles differed between the US and UK, but each shared the characteristic that it 
restricted the judicial in safeguarding individual rights infringement.  Similar restrictions 
also arose from the judicial interpretation of its own role in each country, as the next 
section shows.  
 
8.2 Judicial Interpretation of its Adjudicatory Role 
 
As well as obstacles to the judicial protection of individual rights arising from the 
structure of the subsystem and its interaction with the government, limitations to the 
courts protective ability also relates to the judiciary’s own interpretation of its role in 
adjudicating counter-terrorism case law and its application of statutory human rights 
protections. 
 
The appellants did not expressly raise the potential for the racially uneven use of the stop 
and search powers amongst their claims.  Despite this a number of the UK and European 
judges found this issue worthy of comment.
83
  The approach of the UK courts to human 
rights provisions illustrates a restriction within the courts rights-protecting role, which is 
at odds with the level of judicial oversight described by the policing and law-making 
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subsystems.   
 
In the House of Lords, Lords Hope, Scott and Brown addressed the question of whether 
deployment of the s.44 powers on the basis of ethnic profiling was compatible with the 
prohibitions on discrimination on grounds such as race, colour, religion, national origin or 
other status within domestic law,
84
 or in the enjoyment of rights within the ECHR.
85
  
Their Lordships found police use of s.44 to be justified on several grounds.    
 
Lord Scott accepted that deployment of the s.44 powers ‘might require some degree of 
stereotyping in the selection of the persons to be stopped and searched and arguably, 
therefore, some degree of discrimination’. 86   Pursuant to the provisions of the Race 
Relations Act any such discrimination Lord Scott concluded that this discrimination was 
nor unlawful provided that it was ‘done for the purpose of safeguarding national security 
if the doing of the act was justified by that purpose’.87  In considering the purpose of the 
statutory power Lord Scott’s reasoning appears to overlook the fact that s.44 was intended 
for the purpose of combating terrorism and that it was by no means automatically true that 
this would pursued by targeting a particular racial group, nor that so doing was inevitably 
necessary for the purpose of safeguarding national security.
88
    
 
Lord Scott also failed to consider article 14 ECHR.  By contrast, Lords Bingham and 
Brown acknowledged that stops and searches may engage a person’s article 8 right to 
respect for private and family life
89
 and, therefore, analysed the stop and search powers in 
light of the Article 14 prohibition.  Lord Brown commented that ‘[i]t is one thing to 
accept that a person’s ethnic origin is part (and sometimes a highly material part) of his 
profile; quite another (and plainly unacceptable) to profile someone solely by reference to 
his ethnicity’.90  In applying the article 14 protection, however, Lord Brown prioritised 
the Government’s rationale for the potentially infringing treatment, as opposed to 
evaluating the particular use and impact of the provision.  By contrast the ECtHR found 
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no difficulty in concluding that ‘the risk of the discriminatory use of the powers was a 
‘very real consideration’.91  The ECtHR based its assessment on the fact that the statutory 
powers were ‘neither sufficiently circumscribed nor subject to adequate legal safeguards 
against abuse’.92  The ECtHR, therefore, instinctively recognised that the lack of effective 
safeguards had an impact on equal protection considerations, and used statistical evidence 
to support its view.  The UK court’s interpretation of the statutory framework for 
protecting individual rights, reached the contrary conclusion, without considering any 
specific evidence of discriminatory impact. 
 
In Gillan, therefore, the UK courts failed to challenge or explore the policing link 
between race and the suspect-terrorist profile.  This perceived link, through which race 
acted as a proxy for religion, and in turn for terrorist suspect, meant that it was deemed to 
be automatically justifiable that individuals could be stopped and searched on the basis of 
their actual or perceived racial origins.
93
  For the UK judicial subsystem this perception 
was more influential than any calls to evaluate the justifiability of the proxy employed.  
Lord Hope’s consideration of the possibility that the powers could infringe article 14 
provides a good example of the, at best, limited consideration within the UK’s judicial 
subsystem to the statutory protection.  In justifying his conclusion regarding the 
hypothetical impact of the power on racial equality Lord Hope applied the test set out in 
the Roma Rights Centre case, which condemned the de-individualised treatment of Roma 
passengers on the basis of their ethnic origins.
94
  Interpreting this judgment strictly Lord 
Hope distinguished it from Gillan because the decision to stop and search the claimants in 
Gillan had been on ‘other, further, good reasons … even if, in the end it is based more on 
a hunch than on something that case be precisely articulated or identified’.95   Lord Hope 
did not, however, explore the necessary qualities of the supplementary considerations or 
the weight that should be attached to them.  In addition, Lord Hope’s reliance upon the 
role of the ‘further factors’ does not seem to have been based on any concrete statute or 
judicial precedent.
96
  Lord Hope also offered no basis for his conclusion that these 
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additional factors would meaningfully narrow the class of suspects beyond simply 
considering racial and ethnic origins.   Lord Hope’s opinion does indicate some awareness 
of the judiciary’s role to oversee executive behaviour in that he noted that a national 
security-related purpose is not sufficient to render discriminatory use of the power lawful; 
and that an individual’s racial origin is insufficient to justify deployment of s.44. 97  
Despite these strong statements, however, Lord Hope held that, on the balance of 
probabilities, it was not inevitable that stopping persons who are of Asian origin would be 
found to be discriminatory and, therefore, concluded that the power was lawful.
98
   
 
A similar judicial hesitancy in challenging legislative choices is demonstrated in A, in 
which the Court stated that those ‘conducting the business of democratic government 
have to make legislative choices which … are very much a matter for them, particularly 
when (as is often the case) the interests of one individual or group have to be balanced 
against those of another individual or group or the interests of the community as a 
whole’.99  In his dissenting opinion, Lord Hoffmann rejected governmental claims of 
public emergency, maintaining that the ‘real threat to the life of the nation … comes not 
from terrorist but from laws such as these’. 100  The majority, however, afforded the 
government a broad and relatively unchallenged area of deference regarding whether 
there was a relevant national security need for the measures, despite the government’s 
concession that there was no evidence of a specific threat to national security.
101
  Whilst 
such an approach does not entirely exclude judicial oversight it limits its protective 
potential, by rendering a wider range of operations a proportionate incursion into rights 
protections, in response to contextual pressures against which it was nevertheless still 
intended to provide adjudicatory oversight.   
 
A further example of the difference between the EU and UK judiciaries approach to 
individual rights protections in the context of counter-terror legislation, is the case of 
Liberty v United Kingdom,
102
 which was referred to in Gillan.
103
  In Liberty the ECtHR 
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held that the legislation, which permitted the secret monitoring of communications,
104
 
‘strikes at the freedom of communication’.105 Consequently, the ECtHR found that the 
powers interfered with the applicants’ rights under article 8 ECHR, irrespective of any 
measures actually taken against them, because the legislative provisions themselves 
constituted a breach.
106
  This case demonstrates the expansive European Court approach 
to rights infringements, which is unswayed by considerations of institutional or 
constitutional competency, or even the need for standing on the part of the claimants.  By 
contrast, the UK courts appear to have based their adjudication on the presumptive 
validity of the domestic legislation, readily accepting the government’s rationale behind 
its implementation and use.   
 
As in the UK, in the US the judiciary’s rights-protecting function is also affected by its 
understanding of its adjudicatory role in overseeing national security powers, which has 
meant that the Supreme Court ‘as a matter of policy, does not enforce the rule of law with 
respect to large sections of people’.107  This effect has arisen both from judicial action and 
inaction; in particular, because the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue 
of whether racial profiling by law enforcement necessarily invokes equal protection 
analysis.
108
  One of the reasons cited for the judicial subsystem’s failure to make an 
expressed declaration on the permissibility of profiling is the lack of congressional 
guidance regarding this mode of police behaviour,
109
 which has meant that the courts have 
persisted in applying the intent requirement to determine whether the police have engaged 
in discriminatory differential treatment.
110
  This approach has exacerbated the 
disconnection between civil liberties enshrined in the constitution and applied by the 
courts and post-9/11 law enforcement operations, as demonstrated by cases such as 
Hamdi v Rumsfeld, in which the Executive claimed that the separation of powers doctrine 
should preclude the courts from interfering in the detention and trying of enemy 
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combatants.
111
   
 
One area of case law which indicates the nature of the US judiciary’s understanding of its 
adjudicatory function relating to police powers is its approach to governmental claims of 
secrecy surrounding the use of counter-terrorism powers. In MacWade, the majority 
opinion stated that while ‘[c]ounter-terrorism experts and politically accountable officials 
have undertaken the delicate and esoteric task … [w]e will not – and may not – second 
guess’ them.112  In its decision, therefore the Court was quick, almost eager, to accept that 
no empirical proof of the effectiveness of the powers in protecting national security was 
necessary to evaluate the balance struck between individual rights and countering 
terrorism.
113
  As well as relying upon a somewhat tendentious distinction between fact 
and law,
114
 however, the existence of such a recognised area into which the court will not 
enquire enabled the executive to present what were really moral or legal conclusions as 
factual findings.
115
   Such judicial reasoning ignores the propensity, which is particularly 
acute in relation to national security measures, for the law-making and law enforcement 
subsystems to take action to create a sense of security, as opposed to the reality of 
security.
116
  In failing to evaluate claims relating to the utility of the powers, therefore, the 
Court helped to facilitate the demonstrative and symbolic use of the counter-terrorism 
powers.
117
   The judicial subsystem’s tendency to acquiesce to governmental claims of 
security need, irrespective of the lack of a factual basis for this assessment was also 
demonstrated in the case of Detroit Free Press v Ashcroft.
118
  In Detroit Free Press the 
Court upheld the Government’s claim of necessity on the basis of a conclusory affidavit 
from a single law enforcement officer and unsupported assertions in the oral arguments 
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heard.  In his dissenting opinion Justice Tatel criticised the ‘government’s vague [and] 
poorly explained allegations’ and accused the majority judgment of ‘filling in the gaps in 
the government’s case with its own assumptions about the facts absent from the records’.  
Tatel further considered the Court to have ‘converted deference into acquiescence’.119    
 
In a further case, that of El-Masri, although the Court stated that it was ‘the court, and not 
the Executive, that determines whether the state secrets privilege has been properly 
invoked’120 it nevertheless accorded the ‘utmost deference to the responsibilities of the 
executive branch’ on the grounds that the executive was in a better position than the 
courts to evaluate the negative effect of releasing the information against which privilege 
was claimed.
121
  The Court concluded that ‘virtually any response to El-Masri’s 
allegations would disclose privileged information’, so no response was made. 122  The 
Court’s refusal to challenge executive assessment of the impact of releasing information 
effectively eliminated any meaningful evaluation of whether the doctrine was properly 
invoked confirming the decision to invoke the doctrine, and evaluation of the justification 
behind it, to a single governmental branch.
123
   Whilst it is not claimed that the Executive 
invoked the State Secrets Doctrine specifically to avoid judicial scrutiny, in doing so it 
would have known that the courts have traditionally shown it a high level of deference to 
this doctrine.
124
  However, the court’s previous approach had primarily resulted in the 
exclusion of particular pieces of evidence and issues,
125
 and had still enabled it to 
adjudicate in relation to warrantless surveillance in national security cases.
126
  Under this 
previous approach the court only struck out entire cases where the very subject matter of 
the case was itself a state secret, which only applied to circumstances in which the 
plaintiff could not present the prima-facie case, or the government raise a valid defence, 
without recourse to privileged evidence,
127
 and there was no alternative way of enabling 
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the case to progress.
128
  The El-Masri judgment, by contrast, suggests an increased 
deferential turn in the court’s approach to the state secrets doctrine and effectively 
confirmed that the Government’s action, in the present case and in any future judicial 
challenge, was insulated from judicial review.
129
    
 
As well as deference regarding the level of the emergency faced the US and UK courts 
have also adopted executive irritants pertaining to the efficacy of challenged police 
powers in countering the terrorist threat, citing the latter’s greater expertise in determining 
such questions.
130
   Long-standing arguments supporting fact-finding deference have cited 
both constitutional and institutional rationales for this mode of judicial behaviour.
131
   
These include the claim that matters of fact are essentially political questions, whereas the 
jurisdiction of the courts exists solely in resolving legal questions, and that the judiciary is 
structurally and institutionally less adept at discovering and analysing complex facts than 
Congress.
132
  The role of law-making subsystem fact-finding in informing judicial 
decisions was expressly acknowledged by the US courts in the case of Metro 
Broadcasting, where the Supreme Court held that courts ‘must pay close attention to the 
fact-finding of Congress… [and] give great weight to decisions of Congress’. 133  
Adhering to this approach in post-9/11 adjudication, judicial fact-finding deference is 
apparent in the case of MacWade v Kelly, in which the Court upheld a programme of 
container searches in the New York subway, on the basis of the special needs doctrine.
134
  
In MacWade v Kelly the Court opined that the search programme ‘address[ed] the broad 
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range of concerns related to terrorist activity’ and ‘created an environment in NYC that 
has made it more difficult for terrorist to operate’,135 despite the Court not having been 
shown, nor sought, any specific evidence as to this effect of the New York Transport 
Authority.   Invocation of the doctrine meant that the presumption that a stop and search 
in the absence of the normal warrant and probable cause requirements was unreasonable 
did not apply, and the programme was upheld.
136
 
 
This section has provided examples of how the US and UK judicial subsystems have 
interpreted and applied the legislative frameworks through which human rights 
obligations of the political subsystem are protected, in a way which has contributed to the 
inherent limitations of these provisions.  Consequently, whilst the rights regimes represent 
a self-imposed restriction on legislative freedom the effect of the restriction is limited.  A 
key reason for this was that because the legislative frameworks originated from the 
legislatures, but are interpreted by the judicial subsystem in its rights-related judgments
137
.  
Through this process the legal frameworks had a different effect to that claimed by the 
originating subsystem.  The absence of a straightforward constitutionally-focused solution 
to the limitations of the 14
th
 Amendment EPC and Article 14 in protecting rights hints at 
the complexity of the problems faced by the judicial subsystem in safeguarding individual 
rights against infringement as a result of national security concerns.   As well as the role 
of judicial interpretation of constitutional rights protections, in curtailing their protective 
value, judicial subsystem programmes of operation were also affected by the manner in 
which each judiciary responded to political irritants, relating to the national security threat, 
arising from terrorism, as the next section shows. 
 
8.3 The Influence of Political Irritants on the Judicial Subsystem   
 
The rights-safeguarding function of the judiciary is strongly tied to its institutional 
independence.
138
  While the relatively insulated nature of the judicial subsystem and the 
doctrine of precedent are designed to promote judicial independence and neutrality they 
do not hermetically seal off the judicial subsystem from environmental irritants.  
                                               
135 MacWade v Kelly, para 267. 
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Consequently, court judgments at all levels are informed by a range of sources from the 
general public, interest groups and the federal government.
139
  This has led to suggestions 
that we can rely on judges no more than on legislators to exercise the dispassionate 
application of reason.  Consequently, normal subsystem operations are responsive to 
political irritants, which play a role in standard subsystem communicative redundancies, 
such as the doctrine of deference.  This section shows that in the context of the threat 
from international terrorism the judicial subsystem interpreted changes in the nature of 
these irritants as necessitating a change in its own operational responses to them.
140
   Such 
changes suggest a judicial willingness, if not to be ‘stampeded by the Executive’, then at 
least to reflect political communications in its own programme of operations relating to 
national security threats.
141
  This nexus affected the judicial subsystems’ protection of 
individual rights against their infringement by the police.    
 
8.3.1 Political Irritants and Judicial Decision-Making 
 
The impact of political irritants on judicial decision-making is suggested by several 
features of counter-terrorism jurisprudence.  A number of judgments, for example, show 
evidence of the judiciary adopting governmental exceptionalism regarding the nature of 
the security threat faced, against which judicial condemnation of executive measures 
would represent an unacceptable concession to the terrorists.    
 
In the UK, the Gillan judgments suggest a number of ways in which politically-motivated 
communications were incorporated into the judicial subsystem’s programme of operation 
and affected its decision-making.   One such influence is evident in the judiciary’s 
adoption of the exceptionalism of the terrorist threat, upon which the law-making 
subsystem premised the enactment and deployment of the stop and search powers.
142
  In 
the Court of Appeal judgment, for example, the court’s role in applying the HRA was 
described as being to ‘place in the scales the authorities’ evaluation of the action needed 
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to avoid the terrorist incident as against the courts’ assessment of the effect on the 
member of public’. 143    This approach to the HRA’s proportionality test enabled 
governmental claims of the nature of the threat faced to dominate the court’s adjudication 
without any scrutiny of their basis.  The judgment of the Court of Appeal also 
demonstrates a strong link between the mode of judicial reasoning and the politically 
inspired communications arising from the law-making subsystem with the Court 
describing the scale of the terrorist threat being ‘so well-known [that] it hardly requires 
evidence’. 144   Thus the exceptionalism pervading the parliamentary debate was an 
important factor in shaping judicial decision-making.   
 
A further example of the openness of the judiciary to political communications exists 
specifically in relation to the deployment of stop and search in a racially targeted manner.  
Judicial comments labelled the race-based deployment of s.44 as ‘common sense’ and 
‘inevitable’, because terrorists ‘are likely to be linked to sectors of the community that, 
because of their racial, ethnic or geographical origins are readily identifiable’. 145   In 
rejecting the possibility that the powers had been used in a racially discriminatory manner 
the Court distinguished Gillan from the decision in the Roma Rights Case, because of the 
existence, in Gillan, of ‘other, further, good reasons’ for using the power, beyond race.146  
These factors meant that race-based stops and searches were not inevitably discriminatory 
and, indeed, performed an important function in reassuring the public that they were 
effectively protected against terrorist attack.
147
  The lack of evidence of, or comment 
regarding, the necessary quality of these other reasons, however, casts doubt as to their 
ability to effectively target the powers, beyond their arbitrary deployment against 
individuals satisfying a particular race-based suspect profile.  The judiciary’s acceptance 
of both the exceptionalism of the terrorist threat and the utility of a race-based terrorist 
profile automatically meant that, from the perspective of the Court, the level and nature of 
use of the powers was sufficiently selective as to be neither arbitrary nor 
discriminatory.
148
  Indeed, Lord Brown concluded that the racially targeted use of the 
powers was the only means of avoiding their arbitrary deployment, and was therefore an 
                                               
143 Gillan (CA), para 35. 
144 Gillan (CA), para 50. 
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essential means of avoiding the abuse of the power.
149
 
 
A final feature of the Gillan judgment which suggests the interconnection between the 
politically-driven law-making subsystem communications and the substance of judicial 
decision-making is the Court’s adoption of the legislature’s expectations of police 
professionalism and discretion in deploying the powers.   To the extent that the Court 
accepted that the powers may have been deployed on a racial basis, therefore, this was 
attributed to the police exercising their professional judgement, even where the power 
was used against a person who ‘conforms to some extent in the mind of the police officer 
to a stereotype of a person’ who may be involved in terrorism.150  This confidence was 
reflected in the fact that whilst the powers themselves were wide-ranging this was 
described as merely enabling the powers to be used sparingly but flexibly, as 
operationally required.
151
  Thus, despite having acknowledged that the evidence 
surrounding the operational guidance upon which the police based their deployment of 
the power was ‘lamentable’ the court nevertheless adhered to the same levels of 
confidence as expressed within Parliament, that use of the power was appropriate and 
proportionate given the scale of the threat faced.
152
  Such judicial expectations of 
professional judgement are also suggested by the wholesale rejection of the claim that 
s.44 had become part of day-to-day police operations.
153
  The centrality of the police’s 
own ability to protect against misuse of the power within the judicial decision-making is 
further suggested by Lord Hope’s comment that the best means of preventing any misuse 
of the powers ‘is likely to be found in the training, supervision and discipline of the 
constables who are to be entrusted with its exercise’.154 
 
In the US several of the enemy combatant cases provide a good insight into the way in 
which judicial considerations were affected by political irritants and expectations 
regarding the role of the courts in reviewing counter-terrorism powers.  One such decision 
was the judgment in Hamdi, which actually received a positive reception, in terms of its 
rights-affirming nature, when it was initially handed down.
155
  In rejecting the President’s 
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argument that courts may not inquire into the factual basis for the detention of a US 
citizen as an enemy combatant,
156
 the Court was described as having found ‘ways to 
honour the Constitution without compromising vital national security interests’. 157 
However, the impact of the case on counter-terrorism policy and practice did not 
correspond with its apparent promise.
158
   A number of characteristics of the judgment 
indicate a judicial adoption of executive-originating political value judgements and 
assumptions,
159
 so that the policing measures were rationalised on the basis of military 
necessity and their objective nature.
160
  The Court, for example, quickly accepted the 
utility and necessity of the detention, describing it as a ‘fundamental and accepted 
incident to war’,161 and as constituting ‘necessary and appropriate force’.162   
 
In adopting this approach the Court failed to evaluate the measures in accordance with 
prescribed levels of judicial scrutiny.  Further, while the Court recognised that detention 
was only permissible for the duration of the relevant conflict it did not distinguish the 
context it was assessing, with its potentially on-going and unending nature, from that of 
conventional military engagement.
163
  This practical, but not judicially recognised 
difference negated the protective value of the temporal limitations to the detention 
provisions.   The Court also wholly deferred to the Executive’s designation of the 
individuals as ‘enemy combatants’.164  More generally the Court failed to resolve broader 
questions concerning the role of the judiciary in the separation of powers and the nature 
of due process available to citizen-detainees.
165
  Claims regarding the impact of political 
irritants on the Hamdi judgment also came from within the judiciary itself.  In a 
dissenting opinion, for example, Justice Motz criticised the majority for simply rubber-
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stamping the Executive’s practically unsupported designation of Hamdi. 166   Further 
limitations of the Hamdi judgment were expressed in the dissenting opinions of Scalia 
and Stevens who considered the majority to have effectively provided the government 
with a process by which to render illegal detention legal.
167
   
 
Even where the court did take a more executive-challenging approach to the enemy 
combatant cases, such as in Boumediene v Bush, again there are indications that the 
judiciary was acting in accordance with the expectations of the wider political context, as 
opposed to demonstrating any independent activism.
168
  The Boumediene judgment was 
published less than six months before the US would elect a new President, and in a 
context in which the candidates from both political parties had pledged to review the 
Bush administration’s treatment of detainees, including the possibility of closing 
Guantanamo Bay.  As well as being near the end of the presidential tenure Bush and 
Congress were faced with very low approval ratings.
169
  Realising that the court was 
unlikely to face political backlash it is hard to see the judgment as one of determined 
activism.
170
   As such, the behaviour of the US court in the Boumediene judgment in a 
sense supports Gerald Rosenberg’s thesis of the fallacy of the ‘dynamic court’, by which 
external considerations are frequently able to explain judicial protection of minority 
interests.
171
   
 
As well as the effect of political irritants in shaping judicial decision-making the impact 
                                               
166 Hamdi, para 373 per Justice Motz (dissenting). 
167 ibid, para 24 per Scalia and Stevens (dissenting).  For a similarly critical view of the majority onion see 
E. Halsam, ‘Human Rights and Hegemony in the Way against Terror’ in P. Eden and T. O’Donnell, 
September 11, 2001.  A Turning Point in International and Domestic Law? (Transnational Publishers Inc., 
2005) 363, 374. 
168 A. Shinar, ‘Constitutions in Crisis: A Comparative Approach to Judicial Reasoning and Separation of 
Powers’ [2008] 20 Florida Journal of Int. Law 115, 145. 
169 In the second half of 2008 both the President and Congress received record low approval ratings of 25% 
and 14% respectively.  See Gallup Polls, ‘Bush Approval Rating at 25%, His Lowest Yet’ (6 October 2008) 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/110980/Bush-Job-Approval-25-Lowest-Yet.aspx, accessed 28.07.2011; and 
‘Congressional Approval Hits Record-Low 14%’ (16 July 2008), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/108856/Congressional-Approval-Hits-RecordLow-14.aspx, accessed 
28.07.2011. 
170
 See N. Devins, ‘Congress, the Supreme Court and Enemy Combatants: How Lawmakers Buoyed 
Judicial Support by Placing Limits on Federal Court Jurisdiction’ (2007) 91 Minn. L. Rev 1562. 
171  G. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope. Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (2nd ed., University of 
Chicago Press, 2008) 2-3.  See also G. Rosenberg, ‘The Irrelevant Court: The Supreme Court’s Inability to 
Influence Popular Beliefs about Equality (or Anything Else)’ in N. Devins and D.M. Douglas, Redefining 
Equality (OUP, 1998) 172; M.J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights.  The Supreme Court and the 
Struggle for Racial Equality (OUP, 2004) 449, 468; and E.N. Gates (ed.), The Judicial Isolation of the 
“Racially” Oppressed (Garland Publishing Inc., 1997). 
  
254 
of such factors on the judicial subsystem is also apparent in the aftermath of judicial 
decisions where courts did not support executive behaviour and legislative provisions, as 
the next section considers.   
 
8.3.2  Political Irritants Following Judgments 
 
Executive and legislative criticism of judicial decision-making have been described as 
bordering on the irrational, ‘since the judges have merely applied orthodox doctrine that 
the Government was well aware of before introducing counter-terrorism measures’.172  In 
such circumstances, in both the US and UK courts have been subject to some express 
criticism from the political subsystem, as this section shows.   
 
In the UK Tony Blair described the decision of Justice Sullivan in the case of R(S) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department
173
 as ‘an abuse of common sense’.174  Further, 
David Blunkett suggested that ‘[i]f public policy can always be overridden by individual 
challenge through the courts then democracy itself is under threat’.175  In making his 
comment Blunkett elided the ability to challenge public policy with the court’s scrutiny of 
the justification of the rights incursion.  The comments, therefore, failed to recognise that 
the legitimate and legislatively prescribed role that the court is afforded in balancing 
rights and security is regulated through the test of proportionality.  Consequently, it is 
always possible for the courts to scrutinise public policy, by applying an established test 
of justification which specifically envisages that some individual rights may be sacrificed 
for more broadly applicable aims.   Parliamentary debate has also been a forum for 
negative comments regarding the role of the courts in enforcing necessary legal measures 
to counter terrorism.  Following the judgment in Chahal, for example, the then Home 
Secretary John Reid, criticised the Court for frustrating the Government’s wish to deport 
foreign terrorist suspects through its interpretation of Article 3 ECHR, and described the 
decision as an ‘outrageously disproportionate judgment’.176   
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In the US, the potentially detrimental influence of external politics on the judicial 
subsystem was recognised before 9/11.
177
  Following 9/11 political criticism of judicial 
decision-making is evident, for example, in comments regarding the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Boumediene v Bush, which was described by Senator John McCain as being 
‘one of the worst decisions in the history of the country’.178   Similarly, in relation to 
United States v Moussaoui
179
 the Government was reported as having suggested that it 
could, and would, resort to exigent procedures if the court dismissed the case, including 
using a military tribunal to hear the case.
180
  Such public castigation from members of the 
executive and the law-making subsystems increased the pressure on the courts to avoid 
reaching any decisions which challenged the government’s approach. 181    These 
influences on judicial behaviour, arising both from politics and popular opinion, have 
been seen as particularly concerning because of their potential to discourage the courts 
from protecting individual rights in the face of over-zealous, but possibly ineffective 
government efforts to protect national security.
182
  The courts, therefore, are unlikely to 
act against majority opinion.
183
  Where such rights protect minority group interests they 
are even less likely, by definition, to attract popular support.
184
  Commentators such as 
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Mark Tushnet have claimed that in such situations minority interests are only likely to 
come to the fore where it is in the direct interests of the majority group, such as where it 
needs to form political coalitions.
185
   
 
The interaction between judicial decisions and political irritants may further be used to 
explain the factors encouraging a number of the US and UK’s more activist decisions – 
because they have predominantly been reached in circumstances where they did not 
significantly challenge the government’s position.  In making its judgment in the case of 
A, for example, the court would have known in practical terms that it was not significantly 
challenging government policy suggesting that the apparent activism within the decision 
may be connected to the effect of wider contextual considerations, as opposed to a 
judicial determination to uphold individual rights.
186
  Claims of the limited judicial 
activism of A are bolstered by the wider context of the judgment which shows that by the 
time the appeal reached the House of Lords there had been extensive criticism of the 
detention power, including from parliamentary committees,
187
 the independent reviewer 
of counter-terrorism legislation,
188
 from both the European Union and the United 
Nations,
189
 and in terms of general public opinion.
190
   The notion that A marked a radical 
change in the court’s approach to national security cases is not, therefore, as persuasive as 
it initially appears to be.
191
  Indeed, it may stand more as a testament to the rights-
protecting power of public and political opinion than that of the courts.   A further 
example of delay leading to the practical irrelevance of the judgment, in terms of it 
challenging governmental priorities, is Gillan in which, by the time it had been finally 
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determined by the Strasbourg court, s.44 had been widely condemned and the government 
showed little reluctance to suspend the power, especially following the election of a new 
government, four months after the judgment.
192
   Seen in this light, the decisions in A and 
Gillan, are not only wholly in accordance with popular opinions, but also reflective of the 
Government’s own changing programme for counter-terrorism law enforcement.   
 
In considering the way that the judicial subsystems have been influenced by political 
irritants it is not claimed that the limited judicial protection of minority interests is a 
conscious decision on the part of either country’s law-making subsystem.  Instead, it 
simply reflects the limited ability of the judiciary to articulate the minority viewpoint 
within existing institutional structures,
193
 and the effect of popular opinion on judicial 
operations.
194
  An important factor suggested as contributing to this has been the dual role 
of the media in reporting on, and cultivating, popular sentiment and expectations 
surrounding the response to threats to national security.
195
  The courts cannot stand above 
and wholly separate from their environment, but instead are likely to identify with 
governmental interests in such circumstances.
196
  Therefore, despite the idealised 
operational standards in accordance with which US and UK are expected to reach their 
decisions these are far from being a panacea for rights-infringing legislative powers or 
law enforcement behaviour.   In Gillan, for example, both the Divisional Court and the 
Court of Appeal held that the level of discretion implicit in s.44 limited judicial scrutiny 
because such decisions were the constitutional responsibility of the policing subsystem.
197
 
The Court of Appeal held that it only needed to be conceivable that an arms fair could be 
a potential terrorist target for such discretion to have been appropriately exercised.
198
  As 
Clive Walker has noted, however, given the UK’s exposure to IRA attacks since 1918 and 
the size of the country’s arms industry this standard permitted the powers to be 
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effortlessly invoked.
199
  This meant that the police did not need any specific reason to stop 
and search a person – a decision that could not be effectively challenged through any 
legal procedure because of the suspicion-less nature of the power.
200
    In its determination 
of facts regarding use of s.44 both the divisional and appeal courts in Gillan deferred to 
the testimony of the police, without seeking or analysing other contemporary evidence 
relating to these assertions.
201
  The judgments, therefore, demonstrated a judicial 
perception that the court lacked institutional and constitutional legitimacy ensuring that it 
deferred to police descriptions justifying their operational behaviour. 
 
When Gillan reached the House of Lords, instead of evaluating the proportionality of the 
powers the Court accepted the national security threat as fully justifying the statutory 
powers and the use made of them.   As well as limited judicial scrutiny of the evidence 
and arguments regarding utility of the powers the UK courts also failed to inhabit the 
victim-focused approach envisaged by the HRA or ECHR, under which judicial 
evaluation of alleged rights infringements would have been focused on the basis of the 
impact on the claimant(s).
202
  Under both ECHR and the HRA the reason behind the 
rights infringement is irrelevant to making the prima facie case of discrimination,
203
 with 
the expected judicial focus being instead wholly on the detrimental impact caused by the 
measure under consideration.
204
  However, the Lords maintained the pre-HRA 
adjudicatory focus on the governmental justification for enacting and using the powers, 
which the Court accepted as fact irrespective of the weakness of the evidence presented 
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on this.  The UK courts in Gillan were unwilling to scrutinise the content of the statutory 
provisions, which meant that they were fundamentally unable to assess the rights-
infringing nature of the scope and use of the powers.
205
   In his consideration of racial 
discrimination, for example, Lord Scott suggested that whilst use of the power might 
require a degree of stereotyping in the selection of individuals to be stopped and searched, 
any such treatment was validated by the statutory authority of the Terrorism Act.
206
   
 
In reaching this conclusion, Lord Scott refused to question the lawfulness of the 
legislation itself or its use, despite the fact that while race-based profiling targets a 
particular racial group the legislation was intended to target terrorists necessitating a link 
between the racial group and effective counter-terror policing.  Instead, Lord Scott 
endorsed the use of s.44 because the Act was for the purpose of safeguarding national 
security,
207
 without considering whether the power had any utility in achieving that 
objective, or whether any such link made the power a proportionate means of balancing 
the aim and outcome. The failure to enquire as to the utility of the powers by the UK 
justices indicates how the opinions were premised on the value of ethnic appearance in 
identifying terrorist suspects.
208
  Explicit confirmation of this link was provided by Lord 
Hope who stated that terrorists are ‘likely to be linked to sectors or the community that, 
because of the racial, ethnic or geographical origins are readily identifiable’.209  Further, 
Lord Brown concluded that it was ‘inevitable’ that in the context of the current terrorist 
threat a disproportionate number of individuals stopped and searched would be of Asian 
appearance.
210
  The link between race and suspicion was, therefore, presented as being 
one of ‘common sense’.211  By contrast, the ECtHR rejected any such nexus.  Instead, it 
analysed the empirical evidence of the racial effect of the powers and their lack of utility 
in safeguarding against terrorist attacks.
212
  For the ECtHR there was no question that the 
suspicion-less nature of the powers led to the risk that they could have a racially uneven 
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impact.  Following on from this, the European Court rejected the claims as to the utility of 
the powers in safeguarding national security.  There was no doubt expressed in the court’s 
reasoning that policing predominantly based on an individual’s racial background was 
discriminatory.  In so doing the court rejected the claimed legitimacy of such race-based 
policing.   In consistently yielding to the government claims of state secrets doctrine and 
in employing a functionalist approach to standing, and other process-based considerations, 
the courts have taken a generally deferential approach to counter-terror related 
adjudication.
213
   
 
The US judiciary has also been particularly susceptible to responding to political irritants, 
regarding the national security threat and intent on avoiding political censure arising from 
its making governmentally unpopular decisions.  Judges, like the rest of the population, 
the legislature and the government are socialised by the dominant culture and are thus 
liable to having ‘internalized the basic values and assumptions of that culture, including 
the benefits and predispositions that can cause the majority to discount minority 
interests’.214   Such attitudes and personal judicial philosophies are, therefore, likely to 
play an important part in shaping the subsystem’s programme of operation.215  Individual 
judicial attitudes can, therefore, include negative notions about minority groups, such as 
are evident in the observation of Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1990 that non-Americans are 
not part of ‘we the people’ because ‘they are not part of our national community’ and have 
not ‘otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of 
that community’.216  Like other subsystems, therefore, while the judiciary constitutes a 
social system, it is also a body of individuals whose personal beliefs and adjudicatory 
approaches affect the manner in which the subsystem adheres to its system-specific 
operational rules.
217
  Commentators, such as Mark Tushnet, have described one effect of 
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this as being that judges are likely to succumb to the security hysteria of the day.
 218 
 
Therefore, any constitutional review, to which the courts subject the government’s 
wartime policies, risks being motivated by public misperceptions of risk and 
vulnerability.
219
  These views are highly susceptible to ‘risk amplification’ through the 
reporting of the media.
220
  Against such sentiments, and policing designed to appease 
popular fears, the courts are ‘the crucial forum in which this galloping exceptionalism, 
fear-mongering and rights-trammelling should encounter forensic challenges’.221 Despite 
this aspiration, judicial review has frequently amounted to a mere rubber-stamping of 
those policies, creating bad precedent, if not encouragement, for future exercises of such 
executive power.
222
 
 
Judicial discretion and behaviour are also affected by the norms and expectations of legal 
culture.
223
  Consequently, judicial unwillingness to support socially protective claims has 
long been apparent in its adjudications, which have included infamous judgments holding: 
that at common law trade unions could be liable in damages for trade disruptions arising 
from strike action;
224
 that paying women the same wages as men breached local authority 
fiduciary duty to spend money wisely;
225
 that discounted fares for the elderly were not in 
accordance with normal business principles;
226
 or finding against the argument that caring 
for the sick is a ‘function of a public nature’.227  The US courts have a similar category of 
judicial decisions ruling against efforts to promote social equality, with decisions ruling 
against affirmative action efforts to decrease racial inequality;
228
 election financing;
229
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and gun control providing good examples.
230
  Consequently, expectations of judicial 
intervention to protect the interests of minority groups overlook the extent to which law 
remains a powerful expression of ruling interests: a ‘microcosm and model for the nation 
as a whole’.231  That these inclinations are likely to be in line with government priorities 
is increased further as a result of the appointments process for some US justices, which 
has been described as itself a political process.
232
  In particular federal courts of appeal 
judges and members of the Supreme Court are selected by the government.
233
  Such 
appointments are, therefore, likely to be from amongst judges whose political sympathies 
are known to lie with the current administration.
234
  The process, by which the subsystem 
is renewed, therefore, fuels the potential for its politicization,
235
 as well as that the 
judiciary is tantamount to an extension of the executive branch, bending with whatever 
political view is ascendant.
 236
 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
 
The judiciary’s role in scrutinising post-9/11 counter-terrorism powers cannot be simply 
described as adhering to either one of the two polar opposites of the debate surrounding 
judicial deference, in either the US or UK.  Instead, it demonstrates a variable ability to 
perform the rights-protecting role expected of it by the law-making and policing 
subsystems.    However, the level of judicial activism should not be overstated as, upon 
analysis, such judicial behaviour can often either be attributed to particular contextual 
circumstances; or failed to have any significant or lasting impact on governmental policy.  
Consequently, whilst the role of the judicial subsystem is not wholly given to a monolithic 
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characterisation it has broadly repeated the previously established pattern by which in 
times of war and threats to national security the courts subscribe to a relatively deferential 
role in overseeing the law-making and law enforcement subsystems.  In post-9/11 
counter-terrorism jurisprudence these limitations combined with the inherent weaknesses 
within the statutory protection of equality, meant that the unflinching rights safeguarding 
role that is the idealised purview of the judicial subsystem was not matched by the reality 
of its protective power.
237
  Such idealised expectations of the role of the courts may 
‘forget their history and ignore their constraints’ whilst they also ‘cloud[ing] our vision 
with a naïve and romantic belief in the triumph of rights over politics’.238  This failure of 
the law-making and policing subsystems to shape their own programmes of operation in 
response to the reality of how the judiciary has tended to respond to cases invoking 
national security and minority rights issues turns self-generating modes of judicial 
subsystem behaviour into a means of perpetuating racially uneven and discriminatory 
legal provisions – as opposed to a means of criticising them and their prejudicial nature. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations for Reform 
Fig. nine: Racial effect of suspicion-less counter-terrorism stop, search and surveillance powers 
 Law-making 
Subsystem (ch.s 3 & 4) 
Normal  behaviour 
(ch.3): 
- Subsystem balances 
majoritarian 
responsiveness with 
minority protection. 
- Debate acts as the 
means by which the 
subsystem maintains its 
operational balance. 
Deleterious Operational Behaviour (ch 
4 and 9.1.1): 
- Exceptionalism as to the scale and 
imminence of likely terrorist attacks. 
- Elimination of debate either by 
demanding unanimity or by executive 
fiat in insisting its statutory proposals 
are enacted. 
- Racially loaded imagery regarding the 
origins and nature of terrorist threat. 
 
Enactment of powers 
departing from suspicion-
based operation and subject to 
minimal safeguards and 
oversight (3.3). 
Policing Subsystem 
(chs. 5&6) 
Normal behaviour 
(ch.5): 
- Recognition of the risk 
of institutional racism, 
but condemnation of 
subsystem lapsing into 
this mode of operation. 
- Institutional racism 
providing the contest for 
police lapsing into 
unthinking modes of 
behaviour, which give 
rise to unlawful and 
discriminatory profiling. 
 
 Deleterious Operational Behaviour 
(ch. 6 and 9.1.2): 
- Interpreted provision of flexible 
statutory powers as affording 
unfettered police discretion in their 
deployment. 
- Law-making exceptionalism 
regarding the threat understood as 
requiring equivalently high level of 
use. 
- Intelligence, upon which use of the 
powers was based, attributed law-
making subsystem claims of the 
threat, as opposed to expect police 
assessment law-making subsystem 
expected. 
Deployment of powers relying on 
broadly-drafted, predictive race-based 
profiles of suspected terrorists (5.3). 
Judicial Subsystem (chs. 
7&8) 
Normal Operational 
Behaviour (ch.7): 
- Judiciary as overseeing 
and safeguarding power 
against unlawful statutory 
powers or their effect. 
- Protection of minority 
interests through the 
application of article 14 
ECHR or 14th amendment 
EPC. 
Counter-terror Operational 
Behaviour (ch. 8 and 9.1.3): 
- Case laws demonstrated a 
tendency towards judicial 
deference regarding the need for, 
and utility of, the powers. 
- Structural obstacles to rights-
protecting arising from legal 
framework of the protections. 
- Judicial subsystem affected by 
political irritants before and after 
adjudication. 
 
Cases relating to racially 
uneven deployment of 
powers are discouraged 
from being launched and 
existing case law repeated 
judicial tendency towards 
deference in national 
security matters (7.3). 
Recommendations for reform 
(9.2.1): 
- Committee-based statutory 
scrutiny requiring mandatory 
evaluation of the impact of draft 
legislation on minority interests. 
- Prevention of executive/ 
presidentially introduced draft 
legislation circumventing the 
dialogic nature of the law-making 
subsystem. 
- Mainstreaming of human rights 
considerations within statutory 
debate. 
Recommendations for reform 
(9.2.3): 
- Judiciary as the overseeing 
subsystem in a regulatory body 
comprising of agents from the 
law-making and policing 
subsystem. 
- Quasi-judicial process for 
dealing with individual 
complaints of discriminatory 
powers which help to reveal 
patterns of potentially 
discriminatory behaviour without 
relying on individual court actions 
or police complaints processes. 
Recommendations for reform 
(9.2.2): 
- Role of independent reviewers 
of counter-terrorism legislation.  
Need to be insulated from the 
policing subsystem but also able 
to challenge the subsystem 
without deferring to its perceived 
operational expertise. 
- Independent reviewer or review 
body as the mediating mechanism 
by which the expectations of the 
law-making subsystem for use of 
the powers are translated to be 
better understood by policing 
subsystem. 
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9.1 Conclusions
1
 
 
This thesis has proposed a critical systems explanation for the racial effect of the US and 
UK counter-terrorism stop, search and surveillance provisions.  This explanation has 
identified how each subsystem departed from its normal modes of operationally closed 
behaviour in response to external irritants arising from the terrorist threat.  In addition, the 
case studies of s.44 and ss.214-215, have highlighted some of the communicative barriers 
between the law-making, policing and judicial subsystems resulting from each 
subsystem’s interpretation of externally arising communications through its own specific 
frame of understanding.  This autopoietic behaviour meant that despite having identified 
difficulties in previous efforts at inter-subsystem communications, these obstacles 
remained.  Consequently, the operations of each subsystem were misunderstood by other 
subsystems resulting in differences between the intended effect and actual effect of the 
statutory powers.  The key ways in which the subsystems departed from their normal 
modes of behaviour and the barriers to understanding that arose within and between each 
of the three subsystems, together with their contribution to the racial effect of the powers, 
are summarised in the following paragraphs. 
 
9.1.1 Law-making Subsystem 
 
The analysis provided in chapters three and four demonstrated that in both the US and UK 
the law-making subsystems were cognisant of the risk of departing from normal 
operational behaviours in general, as well as the particular subsystem susceptibility to 
doing-so in times of acute threat to national security.  Communications arising from the 
law-making subsystems in both countries showed an awareness that in such 
circumstances environmental irritants, in particular arising from popular opinion and the 
media, are liable to affect the legislature’s approach to balancing majoritarian 
considerations with minority protection.   In both the US and the UK the subsystems 
recognised that their directly accountable nature encouraged a tendency towards over-
reacting to national security pressures, and as seeing its law-making function as being 
best fulfilled by drafting heightened statutory powers, affording the police extensive 
operational discretion and independence.  In the UK previous examples of such behaviour 
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relating to Irish terrorism were used by MPs to demonstrate how counter-terrorism 
powers were rushed through Parliament without consideration of their utility or impact.  
In the US members of Congress criticised their predecessors for enacting police powers 
which infringed constitutionally protected rights, without contributing to law enforcement 
effectiveness.  The law-making subsystems in both countries combined their critique of 
previous subsystem behaviour with an avowed intention to avoid any similar occurrences 
in their then present actions. 
 
Despite the expressed desire to maintain normal subsystem operations, in the aftermath of 
9/11 several trends in law-making subsystem behaviour helped to accommodate its 
tendency to enact and support ill-considered legislation in response to popular irritants 
pertaining to the threat faced.  Firstly, both the US and UK law-making subsystems 
demonstrated their openness to environmental irritants arising from popular and media 
representations of the threat faced through their use of exceptionalism in the law-making 
debates.  Indeed, to characterise the legislative process as consisting of debates is itself 
something of a misnomer, because the law-making subsystems’ behaviour in both 
countries eliminated, or at least severely curtailed, partisan debate regarding the draft 
powers. The lack of debate meant that executive proposals as to the scope of the 
provisions were largely ascendant in the enacted legislation.  To the extent that the US 
law-making subsystem was better able to retain a degree of partisan debate concerning the 
draft statutory provisions, any beneficial impact of the revisions and compromise secured 
were largely eliminated through the Executive by-passing normal law-making process to 
introduce its own draft Bill.  A final way in which the law-making subsystems’ tendency 
to shape its behaviour in accordance with popular expectations was apparent was in its 
use of imagery relating to the racial minority character of the terrorist threat.  This 
imagery not only linked the threat with a single, visibly identifiable minority group; but 
also appeared to accept that this link placed all individuals within this group as legitimate 
and justifiable targets for heightened suspicion and police attention. 
 
The response of the US and UK law-making subsystems to the perceived need for 
additional counter-terrorism police powers was the enactment of suspicion-less powers 
which incorporated minimal requirements in terms of external oversight and safeguards 
against misuse.  To the extent that there were safeguards incorporated into the powers 
these failed to live up to the subsystem’s expectations regarding their protective effect, 
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because of the law-making subsystem’s misplaced expectations regarding the manner in 
which the policing subsystem would deploy the powers as part of their counter-terrorism 
police operations. 
 
9.1.2 Policing Subsystem 
 
Chapters five and six showed that police use of the suspicion-less counter-terrorism stop, 
search and surveillance powers turned the potential that they be used in a highly 
discretionary and uneven manner into a reality.  The particular way in which this 
discretion was borne out was in the deployment of the powers in a racially uneven way, so 
that they were disproportionately targeted at Muslims, or individuals perceived as being 
Muslims, belonging to Asian or Arabic ethnic minorities.  The operational behaviour, 
which gave rise to this targeting, was the use of the powers based on broadly-drafted, 
predictive profiles as to who should be targeted with the policing power.  In both the US 
and UK the policing subsystems have long been aware of the threat to their operational 
legitimacy in engaging in racially uneven law enforcement, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, as well as the institutional tendency to do so.  Despite long-standing 
condemnation of race-based profiling, both on the basis of its lack of operational utility 
and its discriminatory nature, such profiles became an apparently legitimate and common-
sense mode of operations in relation to the counter-terrorism stop, search and surveillance 
powers.  The use of race-based profiles was readily accommodated within the counter-
terrorism statutory provisions because of their departure from normative policing 
standards based on reasonable suspicion and lacked rigorous safeguards against misuse or 
any stringent review of use of the powers.   
 
In identifying why racially uneven policing was once again elevated to a legitimate mode 
of subsystem behaviour, the analysis within chapter six demonstrated the existence of 
several communicative barriers between the law-making and policing subsystems, in 
relation to the intended nature and use of the suspicion-less stop, search and surveillance 
powers.  These barriers help to account for the gap between the normal modes of policing 
and the subsystems’ reversion to operating in accordance with discredited subsystem 
priorities.  Firstly, while the law-making subsystems justified the suspicion-less nature of 
the powers on the grounds that the police needed to be free to deploy the powers in 
accordance with expertly assessed operational needs the police interpreted this change in 
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accordance with its own subsystem-specific understanding of the law-making subsystems’ 
behaviour.  This interpretation did not match the law-making subsystems’ own legislative 
intentions for how the police would use the powers. Instead of interpreting the law-
making subsystems intention to enact statutory powers that were flexible but still subject 
to significant operational limitations, therefore, the police interpreted the suspicion-less 
nature of the powers as demonstrating the law-making subsystem’s expectation of their 
groundless deployment.   A second communicative barrier between the law-making and 
policing subsystems was apparent in relation to how the law-making subsystem expected 
the police to use the powers.  The law-making subsystems expressly justified the 
enactment of broad and discretionary powers on the basis of the police’s circumspect 
deployment of them – so that they would only be used when the expert determination of 
the police deemed them to be necessary.  However, the police interpreted the nature of the 
powers, coupled with the law-making subsystems communications relating to the 
exceptional nature and scale of the threat of terrorist attack, as indicating an expectation 
on the part of the law-making subsystems that the powers would be widely and frequently 
deployed.    
 
A final communicative barrier between the law-making and policing subsystems 
considered in chapter six related to the different subsystem understandings of the role and 
meaning of intelligence.   Intelligence regarding the threat from terrorism was at the 
foundation of the law-making subsystem’s expectations for how the police would use the 
stop, search and surveillance powers.  The expectations of the law-making subsystem 
regarding police exercise of discretion in determining when to use the powers and the 
frequency with which they would be deployed was premised on the assumption that 
deployment of the powers would be grounded in particularised intelligence concerning 
terrorist activity.  However, the law-making subsystems in both the US and UK 
emphasised the importance of acting far in advance of any possible attack and were also 
emphatic in their own descriptions of the extreme level of threat faced.  However, the pre-
emptive use of the powers advocated by the law-making subsystems meant that the type 
of particularised intelligence upon which the law-making subsystem premised the drafting 
of the powers was not available.  Therefore, the policing subsystem used the law-making 
subsystems’ assessment of the threat of attack the operational justification for the 
deployment of the powers.  The generalised nature of this intelligence added to the 
apparent legitimacy of race-based profiles to determine how the powers were targeted. 
  
269 
9.1.3 Judicial Subsystem 
 
Despite the self-recognised fallibility of the law-making and policing subsystems in 
acting in the shadow of threats to national security these subsystem, in both the US and 
the UK, cited the judicial subsystem as able to identify and protect against any 
infringement of individual rights.  However, as chapters seven and eight showed 
confidence in the rights-protecting function of the courts was not matched by reality.  
Instead, both through its actions and inactions, the judicial subsystems in the US and UK 
enabled the racially uneven use of the stop, search and surveillance powers to persist as 
an apparently legitimate and lawful exercise of the statutory powers.  The analysis within 
chapter eight showed that the constitutional rights-protecting role of the courts was 
relegated behind the judicial tendency towards judicial deference, a tendency that it 
recognised as being particularly pronounced in cases arising out of national security-
related contexts.  The judiciary’s interpretation of its adjudicatory role in evaluating 
national security-related police behaviour and statutory provisions, therefore, diverged 
from the role that the law-making and policing subsystems expected it to play. 
 
On top of judicial subsystem understandings of the parameters of its constitutional 
legitimacy and institutional competence in adjudicating cases where national security and 
individual rights intersected, chapter eight also showed that the rights-protecting role of 
the courts was affected by structural obstacles arising from the nature of the statutory 
protections against which the police behaviour was assessed.  The conditional nature of 
the equal protection guarantees of the 14
th
 Amendment of the US Constitution and Article 
14 of the ECHR provided one such obstacle but others existed, such as the fact that claims 
citing breach of article 14 must be brought alongside a claim of the infringement of 
another protected right.  As well as demonstrating a greater degree of institutional 
subservience to the expertise of the law-making and policing subsystems than that 
expected by those subsystems, the rights-protecting function of the courts was also 
limited by its susceptibility to acting in accordance with political irritants.  These irritants 
encouraged the modes of exceptionalism espoused popularly, for example, in the media, 
coupled with judicial desire to avoid governmental censure by reaching politically 
unpopular decisions, to play a role in shaping judicial behaviour.  Through both its action 
and inaction, therefore, the judiciary’s deferential programme of operation subjected 
police use of the counter-terrorism powers to minimal judicial oversight or scrutiny, 
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despite the police and the law-making subsystem expressing the contrary expectation. 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that behind the racial effect of the counter-terrorism stop, 
search and surveillance powers were communicative barriers between the law-making, 
policing and judicial subsystems.  These communicative barriers can be linked to the 
enactment of the statutory provisions which departed from normal suspicion-based 
requirements for use and which, in the febrile atmosphere following 9/11, were deployed 
by the police based on high levels of unchecked discretion.  Faced with such use the 
oversight function of the judicial subsystem, upon which the law-making and policing 
subsystems relied to ensure that their own operations were lawful and appropriate, was 
largely illusory. 
 
9.2 Recommendations for Reform 
 
To a large extent the recommendations for reform flow naturally from the findings of the 
analysis of the three subsystems.  The behaviour of the law-making, policing and judicial 
subsystems in relation to the enactment, use and review of the counter-terrorism stop, 
search and surveillance powers highlight a number of potential ways in which the racially 
uneven effect of the powers could have been avoided.  Particular subsystem tendencies 
which were recognised as liable to give rise to negative modes of operation are evident in 
communications within each of the three subsystems, in responding to the national 
security threat.   These observations and the suggestions for how the subsystems could 
have behaved to avoid the negative effects of the stop and search powers are, however, of 
limited value in trying to ensure that such behaviours are not repeated in future primarily 
because even where they were recognised the subsystems failed to avoid similar modes of 
operation in this instance.  A more forward-looking approach to the difficulties observed 
in inter-subsystem communications is, therefore, the more potentially fruitful option, 
albeit that it lies in the inherently more difficult task of identifying mechanisms which 
may help to stop these tendencies from manifesting themselves in subsystem behaviour in 
future.  
 
9.2.1 Law-making Subsystem 
 
The analysis of the law-making subsystem within this thesis suggests that greater 
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parliamentary and congressional self-awareness regarding the subsystem’s tendency to 
respond to media and popular perceptions of crises may help to limit the extent to which 
these factors are allowed to drive law-making operations.  However, the communications 
arising from the law-making subsystems prior to the enactment of the statutory powers 
demonstrate that each was aware of its behavioural tendency to respond to popular 
irritants, but nevertheless remained powerless, or unwilling, to avoid its recurrence.  
Another potentially useful subsystem reform, therefore, is that it should be more explicit 
in stating its expectations for how statutory powers should be used, including those 
deployed by the police.  If Parliament and Congress were more explicit in communicating 
its expectations for the grounds upon which statutory powers would be deployed this may 
help those subsystem responsible for implementing the powers, including the police, to 
enact them in accordance with the reality of parliamentary and congressional expectations, 
as opposed to its own erroneous expectations of those expectations.   
 
The inherent difficulty in making suggestions for reform which rely upon subsystem’s 
overcoming their own deleterious patterns of self-determined behaviour suggests that any 
recommendation for additional oversight of the subsystem as a means of guarding against 
its repetition of previously criticised but seemingly unavoidable patterns of behaviour 
must come from outside the subsystem.  This suggests that an overseeing body focused on 
the law-making subsystem, could help to prevent some of the negative subsystem patterns 
of behaviour.  However, because subsystems only understand externally originating 
communications in terms of their own internally derived patterns of operational behaviour, 
in order that the communications of the overseeing, external source are understood as 
expected by the law-making subsystem it is necessary that the overseer must be part of 
the law-making subsystem.  Any successful safeguarding mechanism therefore seems to 
require the apparently impossible characteristics that it is both inside the law-making 
subsystem whilst at the same time sitting outside it.  This apparent paradox may not, 
however, be as irresolvable as it may initially seem to be.  What the analysis of the 
behaviour of the law-making subsystems in both the US and UK demonstrate is that the 
role of legislative committees can provide a forum within which statutory provisions and 
their potential impact are debated and analysed without the highly politicized and emotive 
discourse of the public legislative chambers.    
 
The US law-making subsystem provides a particularly clear demonstration that the 
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committee-system operated both as part of the law-making subsystem as well as being a 
check on its proposals.   Where the safeguarding role of judicial committees floundered in 
the enactment of the Patriot Act was the executive’s ability to reject the committee’s 
output and introduce its own Bill, which was then passed without being subjected to 
congressional scrutiny.  A US-specific reform, therefore, could be that if the Executive 
rejects the draft provisions that have passed both congressional and committee scrutiny 
the executive provisions still have to go back through the normal statutory process.  This 
may help to dissuade the Executive from any attempts to by-pass the normal law-making 
process in this way, whilst still maintaining the President’s power to decide whether a law 
is enacted or not and to propose draft powers.  In the UK, the committee process is 
already increasingly becoming an integral part of the law-making process, and the 
enactment of the s.44 powers illustrates the importance of this forum to ensure that draft 
statutory powers are considered more widely than parliamentary debate sometimes allows, 
particularly with reference to any potential impact on individual rights.    
 
9.2.2 Policing Subsystem 
 
Operational freedom is important for the police to be able to implement abstract statutory 
powers to the real life challenges of preventing and detecting crime.  This need is 
heightened when the crimes in question are a matter of particular public concern, such as 
terrorism.  However, in order that policing subsystems are able to interpret and implement 
statutory powers in the way in which they were intended by the law-making subsystem 
there needs to be some means of translating these communications into a vernacular 
which the policing subsystem can understand in terms of its own programme of 
operations.  A potential consequence of the absence of a mediating mechanism, as has 
been demonstrated in relation to the suspicion-less stop, search and surveillance powers, 
is that the policing subsystems understand statutory powers lacking safeguards against 
misuse, combined with highly charged political rhetoric about the need for wide spread 
use of the powers as a green light for their blanket deployment.  By contrast what the law-
making subsystem intended was for the police to be afforded the operational flexibility to 
determine the most appropriate model of circumspect and intelligence-led use of the 
powers.   
 
One avenue by which legislative communications may be more effectively incorporated 
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into policing programmes of operation could be through the development of the role of 
the independent reviewer of counter-terrorism legislation, which was undertaken by Lord 
Carlile in the UK during the time frame with which this thesis has been concerned.  In the 
US a comparable review function was performed by the Inspector General of the 
Department of Justice.
2
   As a safeguarding mechanism against the consequences of the 
police failing to understand parliamentary expectations for their use of the stop and search 
powers the UK’s independent review and the US inspector general have been relatively 
unsuccessful.  Instead of casting light and condemnation on the misuse of the powers their 
reviews repeated many of the misplaced expectations of police operational restraint 
maintained within the law-making subsystem.   It was not until there was widespread 
public and political condemnation of the police’s use of the powers that the reports of 
Lord Carlile and the US Inspector General shared this sentiment,
3
  and even then both 
Carlile and the US Inspector General lacked the power to compel a governmental review 
of s.44.    
 
Given that Carlile and the US Inspector General were lone individuals who failed to 
withstand the irritants of the contexts within which they were operation it is possible that 
their review function may have been able to act as a more effective mediating mechanism 
if it was the responsibility of a number of individuals, representing both the law-making 
and policing subsystem, as opposed to a single person.  Of course, this review body 
would face similar communicative obstructions as between the law-making and policing 
subsystems as a whole but having multiple individuals from each would enable them to 
acquire a greater understanding, through training and experience, of the way in which the 
other subsystem operates and its expectations for the other’s operational priorities.   
 
Aside from these recommendations, the analysis within this thesis hints at the inherent 
difficulty of making any such proposals, because of the likely subsystem reactions to, and 
possible misunderstanding of, them.  In the UK the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy 
poses a further difficulty in making recommendation because it is not possible to make 
recommendations to the law-makings subsystems along lines that would require them to 
                                               
2  Under the statutory authority within USA Patriot Act 2001, s.1001 the Inspector General of the 
Department of Justice was required to produce a biannual report to the Committees on the Judiciary of the 
House of Representative and the Senate. 
3 Lord Carlile of Berriew, Report on the Operation in 2009 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (2010), para 268; 
Inspector General of the Department of Justice, USA Patriot Act: Sunset Provisions (April 2005) 37 and 41. 
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purport to bind their future behaviour so as to avoid deleterious departures from normal 
subsystem programmes of operation.  In relation to the policing subsystem, a key 
conclusion arising from the analysis of this subsystems operations was that the police are 
systemically incapable of interpreting and responding to communications instructing them 
how to behave in the way that the instructing subsystem expects them to.   Any 
recommendations for reform of the policing subsystems, therefore, would be likely to 
suffer the same fate as other communications, preventing the proposed reforms from 
avoiding the problematic behaviour at which they were targeted.  Given the difficulties 
with proposing any concrete recommendations for reform in relation to either the law-
making or policing subsystems, a perhaps greater focus for reform must be on the 
judiciary.   
 
9.2.3 Judicial Subsystem 
 
Reliance on reform of the judicial subsystem as the key for trying to avoid the types of 
subsystem behaviour analysed in this thesis in future is a somewhat paradoxical 
conclusion in light of the fact that out of the three subsystems analysed herein the 
judiciary was the one that was the least actively involved in creating or realising the 
potential racial effect within the powers.  In contrast to the law-making and policing 
subsystems it was primarily the judiciaries’ inaction, together with its actual and 
perceived inability to act, which marked its contribution to the racially uneven impact of 
the stops, searches and surveillance.  Nevertheless, the judicial subsystem is perhaps the 
best placed to bridge the gaps in communications between the other subsystems, because 
of the interpretive nature of its adjudicatory function.  The role of the judiciary means that 
if it was able to encompass a greater understanding of how other subsystems work this 
would help to ensure that its decisions were based on a more genuine evaluation of the 
context and facts before it.  For example, in scrutinising parliamentary and congressional 
legislative intent the judicial subsystem is well-placed to respond to the fact that when the 
law-making subsystem says one thing it frequently means a different thing altogether.  
Similarly, judicial understanding of how the policing subsystem behaves when it is 
granted unfettered discretion by the law-making subsystem will enable the courts to see 
through general claims of police expertise and professionalism and evaluate the police’s 
behaviour in each particular circumstance. 
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The judicial subsystem could also perform a role in the mediating mechanisms mentioned 
previously, in relation to the policing and law-making subsystems.  The proposed review 
body could operate under the direction of a member of the judiciary, in an effort to 
facilitate the process of achieving a cross-subsystem understanding.  The body could 
evaluate the type of concerns regarding the powers that might otherwise be directed 
towards the police complaints authority.  As such the review body could offer a forum for 
an abstract analysis of the powers; an evaluation of empirical data regarding their overall 
use; or for hearing formal challenges concerning specific instances of their use.  The 
outcome of this quasi-judicial process would not have the standing of a court judgment – 
but would send a clear message to the government that if the need for a review of the 
powers was not given serious consideration a legal challenge through the courts would be 
a serious risk.  This sort of forum may offer a context in which the judicial subsystem 
could perform a rights safeguarding role exactly as intended – but without the difficulties 
which arise from perceptions of its institutional competency and constitutional legitimacy 
as well as the procedural rigidity of the criminal justice system. 
 
In terms of hearing cases of individual complaint concerning the nature and/ or use of 
statutory powers one reform which could assist the oversight function of the courts would 
be the acceptance of evidence from a broader range of sources than is currently the case, 
particularly in UK courts.  In the US judicial subsystem, in contrast to the position in the 
UK, the courts take a more engaged approach to the use of social science arguments or 
empirical background data when evaluating whether a particular legal provision has a 
discriminatory impact on minorities.  Each case is still dependent upon the specific facts 
before the court but less-particularised evidence can be used to place those facts within 
their wider context and can help to reveal patterns in behaviour are not so identifiable in 
cases concerning a particular instance of use of police powers.  By contrast, the UK courts 
are less willing to look outside the specific facts in front of them, such that the may lose 
the opportunity to explore other issues.  Such judicial behaviour is indicated by the 
widespread reluctance of the Court to fully explore the contentious matter of the racially 
uneven use of s.44 in Gillan, because the two claimants in the case were white.   Whilst it 
may seem obvious, even appropriate, that the Court did not engage in a wholly unrelated 
line of judicial enquiry the racially uneven use of suspicion-less stop and search is closely 
linked to it being an ineffective and inappropriate counter-terrorism police tool.    Further, 
it is only through a broader approach to its evaluation that the courts can hope to uncover 
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racial discrimination that is neither conscious nor wholly unconscious, but an 
unquestioned part of the way in which the policing subsystem operates.  In contrast to the 
UK courts the ECtHR felt no difficulty in exploring the issue of the racially uneven use of 
the stop and search power. 
 
9.3 Avenues for Future Research 
 
While the specific claims made in this thesis are focused on the racial effect of counter-
terrorism police stop, search and surveillance powers these statutory provisions have been 
used to provide a case study through which to apply the social systems claims which 
provide the analytical framework for this thesis.  Despite the narrow focus of this thesis, 
therefore, the interaction between subsystem operation and unexpected and negative 
effects of legal provisions identified herein may be analysed across a range of legal 
contexts, and offers potential avenues for future research.  
 
 Equality on grounds other than race such as, for example, gender-based equality offers 
one such opportunity for additional research.  In particular, an analysis of the enactment, 
use and review of affirmative action and positive action provisions in both the US and UK 
may provide a means of understanding why, despite a degree of apparent political will in 
both countries to address inequality between men and women, it continues to be an 
elusive goal, with legal measures seeking to mandate this effect often being accused of 
worsening, as opposed to improving, the situation, and departing from 'the norm of a 
career open to talents’.4   The application of a social systems framework to affirmative 
action would be particularly in accordance with the claims of critical theorists who 
consider merit to be socially constructed by the dominant group and used to maintain its 
social hegemony.
5
  Social systems offers a means of explaining how subsystem 
constructions and expectations surrounding merit contribute to the rejection and limited 
success of positive action efforts.     Other areas of the legal protection of individual rights, 
and the inherent need to balance this with wider societal interests, could also offer 
potentially fruitful avenues for future research.   Indeed, conceivably any situation in 
which statutory provisions give rise to a different impact in their enactment and use than 
was anticipated by the law-making subsystem offers the opportunity to use a systems-
                                               
4 A. Koppelman, Anti-discrimination Law and Social Equality (Yale University Press, 1996) 35. 
5
 R. Delgado, Critical Race Theory (New York University Press, 2000) 105-07.   
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based analysis to reveal the communicative barriers giving rise to this effect.   
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